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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the extent to which formal logic can be applied to the 
topic of conflict analysis and conflict resolution. It is motivated by the idea that conflicts 
can be understood as inconsistent sets of goals, beliefs, norms, emotions, or the like. To 
achieve this aim, two formal frameworks are presented. Conflict Modelling Logic (CML) 
is a logical system, based on branching-time temporal logic, which can be used to 
describe and interpret conflicts. Conflict Resolution Logic (CRL) is a set of five 
algorithms, inspired by the AGM model of belief revision, which can be used to generate 
possible solutions to conflicts. Furthermore, two numerical measures for the ‘potential 
conflict power’ of propositional formulae and the ‘degree of inconsisteny’ of sets of 
propositional formulae are introduced. The two measures allow one to assess the role of 
particular elements within a conflict and the depth of a conflict. The formal framework is 
illustrated with the example conflict of the Second Congo War.
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Introduction 
“A conflict exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually 
inconsistent. […] A conflict is resolved when some mutually compatible set of actions is 
worked out.” 1 
As the above definition by political scientist Michael Nicholson shows, conflicts can be 
understood as inconsistent sets of goals, values, or the like. Conflict resolution, then, is 
the process of eliminating the inconsistencies of these sets. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the extent to which formal logic can be applied to the 
topic of conflict modelling and conflict resolution. It is based on the assumption that a 
logical representation of conflicts helps to identify and, finally, eliminate the 
inconsistencies that constitute them. To achieve this aim, we present two formal, logic- 
based frameworks: Conflict Modelling Logic (CML), a logical system which can be used 
to model conflicts, and Conflict Resolution Logic (CRL), a set of five algorithms which 
can be used to generate possible solutions to conflicts. 
1 (Nicholson 1992, p. 11)
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CML consists of a syntax, a semantics, and an axiomatics. The syntax combines 
operators from various logics, such as classical propositional and first-order logic, 
branching-time temporal logic, and modal logic. It allows one to express the 
propositional attitudes of the parties involved in a conflict, such as their beliefs, goals, 
norms, and emotions, in terms of formulae and to track their temporal development. The 
semantics provides an interpretation for the formulae by specifying their truth conditions 
in a universal conflict model. According to this model, conflicts are specific types of 
social processes passing through a forwards-branching, backwards-linear, tree of conflict 
states. The axiomatics characterises CML in a proof theoretical way and makes it possible 
to define the notions of consistency and inconsistency. The completeness theorem, in 
which we prove that the axiom system adequately characterises the semantics of CML, 
links the proof theoretic notion of consistency with the semantic notion of satisfiability. 
After having introduced the syntax, semantics, and axiomatics of CML, we present a 
general conflict definition based on our formal framework and establish a classification 
scheme which allows one to identify the specific type of a conflict modelled by CML. We 
argue that the property distinguishing conflicts from other social processes is the 
existence of at least one inconsistency between the parties’ propositional attitudes. 
Depending on whether the inconsistency occurs between beliefs, goals, or norms, 
conflicts can be classified as factual disputes, goal conflicts, value conflicts, or 
combinations of these. 
Conflicts described by CML can be entered as an input into the five algorithms of CRL 
which then generate possible solutions. Each solution has the form of a consistent set of 
formulae and expresses a combination of propositional attitudes that are mutually 
compatible. Hence, the solutions generated by the algorithms determine those 
propositional attitudes which need to be changed in order to resolve the conflict. For a
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given input of a set of formulae, each of the algorithms systematically replaces formulae 
in the set until a consistent set is obtained. The process of replacement is guided by the 
principle of replacing formulae with a high degree of potential conflict power by 
formulae with a lower degree of potential conflict power. The ‘potential conflict power’ 
of a formula is a measure of how likely it is to be inconsistent with arbitrary other 
formulae. Each of the five algorithms follows a different principle of conflict resolution 
and, hence, produces a different type of solutions. Thus, we can compute two types of 
minimally invasive solutions, solutions that are compatible with a set of pre-defined legal 
or moral norms, and two types of compromise solutions. 
An outline of the thesis is as follows: In chapter 1, we review current theories of conflict 
with a focus on formal theories, political theories, and psychological theories. In chapter 
2, we introduce the syntax of CML. Chapter 3 deals with the semantics of CML. In 
chapter 4, we present a sound and complete axiomatisation of CML. In chapter 5, we 
introduce a general conflict definition and a classification scheme for conflicts based on 
CML. In chapter 6, we define the potential conflict power of propositional formulae and 
the degree of inconsistency of sets of propositional formulae, two numerical measures 
for assessing propositional formulae and sets of propositional formulae with respect to 
the role they play within a conflict. Chapter 7 and chapter 8 deal with the resolution 
algorithms of CRL. First, we define the five algorithms of CRL and address their 
computability and complexity, and then we evaluate the types of solutions they generate. 
The chapters are augmented by six example sections, in which we illustrate the 
introduced concepts with the example conflict of the Second Congo War, and four 
background sections, in which we provide expositions of theories underlying our own 
model. The background sections address the topics of branching-time temporal logic, 
conflict definitions, belief revision, and dialogue logic.
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CHAPTER 1 
Reflecting on Conflicts 
Theories of Conflict 
1.1  Introduction 
The aim of chapter 1 is to provide an overview of theories of conflict. Theories of 
conflict have been developed in a large number of diverse academic disciplines and 
research traditions including the social sciences, the humanities, the formal sciences, and, 
to a lesser extent, the natural sciences. 2 In our analysis, we focus on formal, 
psychological, and political theories of conflict because these disciplines cover a 
significant amount of theoretical conflict research and provide the most relevant 
contributions to the development of our own logic-based approach. 
As a result of this chapter we will be able to give answers to the following questions. 
· What are the most important formal, psychological, and political theories of 
conflict? 
2 In the natural sciences, conflict theories are focused on evolutionary explanations of aggressive behaviour 
and co-operation/defection.
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· How are conflicts described and defined by mathematicians, psychologists, and 
political scientists, respectively? 
· What are the main factors determining the dynamics of conflicts according to the 
three disciplines? 
An outline of the chapter is as follows: In section 1.2, we review formal theories of 
conflict. In particular, we look at decision theory (1.2.1), game theory (1.2.2), Robert 
Kowalski’s logic-based model of conflict resolution (1.2.3), and Lewis Richardson’s 
equational approach (1.2.4). In section 1.3, we describe psychological theories of conflict. 
First, we concentrate on theories of aggression (1.3.1), and then we look at Muzafer 
Sherif’s realistic conflict theory (1.3.2), and the theory of social dilemmas (1.3.3). In 
section 1.4, we present two political approaches to conflict theory. We start describing 
theories developed in the liberalist/institutionalist tradition (1.4.1), and then we describe 
realist theories of conflict (1.4.2). In section 1.5 we provide general background theories 
about attitudes (1.5.1) and social groups (1.5.2). The concept of attitudes will be used 
later in the thesis to capture various conflict elements, such as beliefs, goals, norms, and 
emotions. Theories about social groups are relevant to our model because conflicts often 
involve agents above the individual level. 
1.2  Formal Theories 
Political scientist James Schellenberg nicely characterises formal theories of conflict as 
follows: 
“A formal theory of conflict […] places primary emphasis on the logical and 
mathematical nature of its generalizations. While ordinary language may be used for part 
of the exposition of these theories, the central ideas are expressed in the language of 
mathematics. In such a framework, social conflict is seen primarily as a manifestation of
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quantitatively expressed relationships; and conflict resolution is seen in terms of 
positions of stability or equilibrium in the dynamics of such relationships.” 3 
Formal conflict theories can be grouped into four categories: decision theory, game 
theory, computational approaches, and equational approaches. We provide general 
descriptions of decision theory and game theory and present example theories for the 
computational approach and the equational approach. 
Many concepts of game theory, such as the notion of utility, have their origin in decision 
theory. As far as conflicts are concerned, decision theory focuses on explaining how 
individual agents involved in a conflict make their decisions. 
Game theory, which constitutes an independent research field in mathematics 4 , can be 
seen as the contribution of mathematicians to the analysis of conflicts. Indeed, it has 
been argued that game theory is a general mathematical theory of conflict. 5 Game theory 
is not only the most predominant formal theory of conflict, but has also influenced 
conflict theories developed in other disciplines, such as political science, psychology, 
biology and, sociology. 
A computational theory of conflict and conflict resolution has been developed by 
Kowalski in his paper A logic-based approach to conflict resolution. We describe his model as an 
example of the computational approach to the theory of conflict. 
Finally, we introduce the pioneering work of Richardson as an example of the equational 
approach. More than the other approaches, his attempt to model various aspects of 
3 (Schellenberg 1996, p. 115) 
4 Game theory is classified under the code 91A as its own mathematical research area in the Mathematics 
Subject Classification of the American Mathematical Society. 
5 Duncon Luce and Howard Raiffa point out that “[i]n some ways the name “game theory” is unfortunate, 
for it suggests that the theory deals with only the socially unimportant conflicts found in parlour games, 
whereas it is far more general than that.” (Luce and Raiffa 1957, p. 2)
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conflicts in terms of differential equations has opened the door for a statistical analysis of 
conflicts because equations express most directly the quantitative relationships between 
the underlying factors of a conflict. 
1.2.1  Decision Theory 
Decision theory provides formal concepts for modelling a rational and intelligent agent’s 
decisions and, therefore, allows one to analyse an agent’s decisions in a conflict situation. 
Decision theory constitutes the conceptual basis for game theory in which two or more 
agents’ decisions, and their mutual interdependencies, are analysed. 
Its aim is to state intuitive requirements for a decision-maker to count as rational and 
intelligent in terms of axioms expressing the properties a rational and intelligent decision- 
maker is expected to have with regard to his preferences. Its central result is the 
expected-utility maximisation theorem. This theorem claims that any agent who complies 
with the axioms, i.e. whose preferences can be considered as rational and intelligent, 
makes his decisions in a way maximising his expected-utility. 
In the context of decision theory, the words “rational” and “intelligent” are used in a 
special sense. “Rational” applies to an agent whose preferences satisfy certain conditions, 
such as transitivity, monotonicity, or continuity. “Intelligent” means that an agent knows 
all the rules and conditions relevant to his decision and their logical consequences. 6 
Decision theory is usually divided into descriptive and prescriptive decision theory. 
Descriptive decision theory aims to model real agents’ decisions and its predictions can 
6 Roger Myersons claims that “[...] if we develop a theory that describes the behaviour of intelligent players 
in some game and we believe that this theory is correct, then we must assume that each player in the game 
will also understand this theory and its applications.” (Myerson 1991, p. 4)
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be tested empirically. Prescriptive decision theory provides a normative standard of 
rationality. However, the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive decision theory 
is vague, and it is an open question whether to interpret results, such as the expected- 
utility maximisation theorem, as an empirical law or rather as a normative condition for 
rationality. 
Decisions can be classified according to the quality of information available to the 
decision-maker. The classification suggested by Luce and Raiffa in their book Games and 
Decisions is widely accepted. According to them, decisions “under certainty” are those in 
which the decision-maker knows, exactly, the outcomes of his actions. In decisions 
“under risk”, the decision-maker knows the outcomes of his actions with a certain 
probability. If the decision-maker’s actions result in certain outcomes, but he has no 
knowledge about the probabilities of these outcomes, the decision is to be made “under 
uncertainty”. Decisions under risk make up the core of decision theory. 7 
As decision theory uses concepts of probability theory, we need to introduce some 
probability theoretical concepts before we can define the basic concepts of decision 
theory. 
Probability theory describes a situation in terms of sample spaces, outcomes, and events. 
Definition 1 (Sample Space, Outcome, Event) 
A sample space is a set X = {x 1 , x 2 , …}. 
8 The elements of X are called outcomes. 
An event S over a sample space X is a subset S Í X. The set of all events over X 
is denoted by Ξ(X) = {S | S Í X} = Ã(X). 
The core concept of probability theory is the concept of probability distributions. 
7 (Luce and Raiffa 1957, p. 13) 
8 In the context of concrete conflicts we are only dealing with finite sample spaces. For a brief overview of 
finite probability theory, see (Mendelson 2004, p. 207ff).
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Definition 2 (Probability Distribution) 
A probability distribution p over a sample space X is a function p: X ® [0, 1] 
from X into the real interval [0, 1] such that å 
ÎX x 
p(x) = 1. The set of all probability 
distributions over X is denoted by Δ(X) = {p Î [0, 1] X | å 
ÎX x 
p(x) = 1}. 
For example, the expression p(x) = 0.7 is to be interpreted as “the outcome x occurs 
with probability 0.7”. 
Probability is usually interpreted as the relative frequency of the occurrence of an 
outcome x. However, in decision theory, probabilities are also interpreted as credence 
functions, i.e. a decision-maker’s subjective assignments of probabilities to outcomes. 
The concept of conditional probability, which is defined for pairs of outcomes and 
events, is crucial to decision theory. 
Definition 3 (Conditional Probability Function) 
A conditional probability function p over a sample space X is a function p: Ξ(X) 
® Δ(X) assigning probabilities to every outcome x Î X and every event S Î 
Ξ(X) such that p(x|S) = 0 if x Ï S and å
ÎS x 
S) | p(x = 1. The conditional probability 
of an event R Î Ξ(X) is defined as p(R|S) = å 
ÎR x 
S) | p(x . 
For example, the expression p(x|S) = 0.7 is to be interpreted as “given that the event S 
has occurred, the outcome x occurs with probability 0.7”. 
Conditional probabilities, as well as probabilities for the union, the intersection, and the 
complement of events, can be determined by the usual equations. 
Theorem 1 (Union, Intersection, Complement, Conditional Probability) 
If X is a sample space and R, S Î Ξ(X) are events, then following equations hold: 
(1) p(R È S) = p(R) + p(S) - p(R Ç S); 
(2) p(R Ç S) = p(R|S) × p(S); 
(3) p(X/R) = p(ØR) = 1 - p(R); 
(4) p(R|S) = p(R Ç S)/p(S).
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Proof 
The proof is standard and can be found in introductions to probability 
theory. 
QED 
To model a situation in terms of decision theory or to solve a decision problem, the 
following five concepts need to be identified. 
Definition 4 (Decision Problem) 
A decision problem is described by the following five elements: 
(1) A set of lotteries L = {f 1 , f 2 , …}; 
(2) A set of states of nature Ω = {t 1 , t 2 , …}; 
(3) A set of prices X = {x 1 , x 2 , …}; 
(4) A conditional probability function p: Ξ(Ω) ® Δ(Ω); 
(5) A utility function u: X ´ Ω ® [0, 1]. 
The set of states of nature Ω = {t 1 , t 2 , …} expresses all external factors relevant to the 
decision problem and grouped into a number of cases t 1 , t 2 , …. For example, when 
deciding whether or not to intervene in a conflict, we can consider the set {t 1 = high 
level of violence, t 2 = low level of violence} containing two states of nature which 
express the possible levels of violence of the parties’ reaction to the intervention. 
Depending on his decision and on the state of nature that becomes true, the decision- 
maker gets a certain price x Î X. The set of prices X = {x 1 , x 2 , …} expresses all possible 
outcomes of the decision. For example, possible outcomes of intervening or not in a 
violent conflict could be the four prices {x 1 = casualties/unsuccessful, x 2 = no 
casualties/unsuccessful, x 3 = casualties/successful, x 4 = no casualties/successful}. Both 
Ω and X must be exclusive and exhaustive descriptions of the situation in question. 
Lotteries express the decision-maker’s alternatives or options. By choosing a lottery f, he 
determines his chances of getting the prices x 1 , x 2 , … for every state t 1 , t 2 , …. Therefore, 
each lottery specifies a probability distribution over the set of prices X for every state t Î 
Ω. A formal definition of lotteries can be given as follows.
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Definition 5 (Lottery) 
A lottery f is a function f: Ω ® Δ(X) from the set of states of nature Ω into the 
set of all probability distributions Δ(X) over the set of prices X. The set L = {f|f 
Î Δ(X) Ω } denotes the set of all lotteries. 
For example, if the decision-maker chooses a lottery f with f(x|t) = 0.7, and t will 
become the true state of nature, he gets price x with probability 0.7. 
A decision-maker can also choose a compound lottery αf i + (1 - α)f j , where f i , f j Î L and 
α Î [0, 1]. In this case, he chooses f i with probability α and f j with probability (1 - α). A 
lottery that gives a decision-maker a certain price x in every state of nature with 
probability 1 is denoted by the expression [x], i.e. [x](x|t) = 1 for all t Î Ω. 9 
Assumptions about which state of nature will become true are expressed by a conditional 
probability function p. Taking into account that the decision-maker may already have 
some knowledge about the world to the extent that he knows that the true state of nature 
is in a certain event S, p depends on the set Ξ(Ω) of events over Ω. In the context of 
decision theory, we can define the conditional probability function p of a decision-maker 
as follows.
Definition 6 (Conditional Probability Function of a Decision-Maker) 
A conditional probability function of a decision-maker is a conditional probability 
function p over the set Ω of states of nature, i.e. p(t|S) = 0 if t Ï S 
and ∑ 
∈ S t 
S) | p(t = 1. 
In the context of decision theory, we interpret an expression of the form p(t|S) = 0.7 as 
“if the decision-maker knows that the true state of nature is in the event S, then he 
believes that t will become the true state of nature with probability 0.7”. 
9 This notation is also used in (Myerson 1991).
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The set of prices X defines the possible outcomes of a decision, but it does not evaluate 
them. In order to model a decision problem, we also need to know how the decision- 
maker values the different outcomes. In our example, the price x 1 = 
casualties/unsuccessful is, for instance, probably judged worse than the price x 4 = 
casualties/successful. Introducing a utility function u is one way of representing the 
values a decision-maker assigns to the possible outcomes of a decision problem. A utility 
function u assigns a number of the real interval [0, 1] to every price x Î X and every state 
of nature t Î Ω and measures the gains from getting a certain price in a particular state of 
nature. 
Definition 7 (Utility Function) 
A utility function u is a function u: X ´ Ω ® [0, 1] from the Cartesian product X 
´ Ω into the real interval [0, 1]. u is called state independent if and only if u(x, t i ) 
= u(x, t j ) for all x Î X and all t i , t j Î Ω. 
The definition shows that one price can be judged differently in two different states of 
nature unless the utility function is state independent. 
Having introduced all the necessary elements of a decision problem, i.e. states of nature, 
prices, lotteries, conditional probability functions, and utility functions, we can now look 
at the concept of expected-utility. Expected-utility is calculated for lotteries. It expresses 
the utility a decision-maker can rationally expect to get if he chooses a certain lottery f. 
Expected-utility depends on the decision-maker’s conditional probability function p, his 
utility function u, and the event S, which he knows contains the true state of nature. 
Definition 8 (Expected-Utility) 
If p is a conditional probability function, u a utility function, f Î L a lottery, and 
S an event, then the expected-utility E p (u(f)|S) of f for a given u, p, and S Î Ξ(Ω) 
is defined as E p (u(f)|S) = å å × × 
Î Î S t X x 
))) t , x ( u t) | (f(x ) S | t ( p ( .
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In the following, we illustrate the basic concepts of decision theory with an example 
modelling the decision of whether to intervene in a violent conflict by means of ground 
forces, ground and air forces, air forces, or a diplomatic mission. 10 
In the example, the set of lotteries is given by L = {f 1 = ground forces, f 2 = ground and 
air forces, f 3 = air forces, f 4 = diplomatic mission}. The set of states of nature is given by 
the set Ω = {t 1 = high level of violence, t 2 = low level of violence}, and reflects the 
possible levels of violence of the parties’ reaction to the intervention. We look at four 
possible outcomes of the intervention and characterise them by the set of prices X = {x 1 
= casualties/unsuccessful, x 2 = no casualties/unsuccessful, x 3 = casualties/successful, x 4 
= no casualties/successful}. By “casualties” we mean casualties of the intervention force 
and by “successful” that the intervention could end the violent conflict. 
The assignment of probability distributions over the set of prices to every lottery and 
every state of nature is guided by the following six considerations. 
(1) The probability of having casualties is zero if we launch a diplomatic mission and 
is highest if we deploy ground forces. 
(2) Success is more likely if we deploy ground forces than if we deploy air forces. 
(3) If we launch a diplomatic mission and the level of violence is high, the chance of 
success is almost zero. 
(4) If we launch a diplomatic mission and the level of violence is low, the chance of 
success is high. 
(5) For all lotteries, the chance of success is higher if the level of violence is low than 
if the level of violence is high. 
10 The example is just hypothetic. Similar examples, modelling strategic decisions in military contexts, can 
be found in (Straffin 1993, p. 27ff; Taylor 1995, p. 166ff; Ordeshook 1986, p. 220ff).
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(6) For all lotteries, the probability of having casualties is higher if the level of 
violence is high than if the level of violence is low. 
A set of lotteries that satisfies all these conditions is shown in the following table. 
t1 = high level of violence t2 = low level of violence 
f1 = ground forces 
f1(x1|t1) = 0.27 
f1(x2|t1) = 0.63 
f1(x3|t1) = 0.03 
f1(x4|t1) = 0.07 
f1(x1|t2) = 0.12 
f1(x2|t2) = 0.48 
f1(x3|t2) = 0.08 
f1(x4|t2) = 0.32 
f2 = ground and air forces 
f2(x1|t1) = 0.3 
f2(x2|t1) = 0.3 
f2(x3|t1) = 0.2 
f2(x4|t1) = 0.2 
f2(x1|t2) = 0.12 
f2(x2|t2) = 0.18 
f2(x3|t2) = 0.18 
f2(x4|t2) = 0.42 
f3 = air forces 
f3(x1|t1) = 0.24 
f3(x2|t1) = 0.06 
f3(x3|t1) = 0.56 
f3(x4|t1) = 0.14 
f3(x1|t2) = 0.1 
f3(x2|t2) = 0.1 
f3(x3|t2) = 0.4 
f3(x4|t2) = 0.4 
f4 = diplomatic mission 
f4(x1|t1) = 0.0 
f4(x2|t1) = 0.0 
f4(x3|t1) = 0.95 
f4(x4|t1) = 0.05 
f4(x1|t2) = 0.0 
f4(x2|t2) = 0.0 
f4(x3|t2) = 0.05 
f4(x4|t2) = 0.95 
Table 1: Lotteries 
Weighing the various outcomes in terms of utility is a difficult task. However, x 1 = 
casualties/unsuccessful is definitely the worst price, and x 4 = no casualties/successful is 
the best price. Therefore, they should get the lowest and highest utility value, 
respectively. The prices x 2 = casualties/successful and x 3 = no casualties/unsuccessful 
are weighed equally here, although one might consider own losses less important if a 
violent conflict can successfully be stopped or vice versa. A state independent utility 
function expressing this evaluation of prices is shown in the following table. 
u(x) 
x1 = casualties/unsuccessful 0.0 
x2 = casualties/successful 0.5 
x3 = no casualties/unsuccessful 0.5 
x4 = no casualties/successful 1.0 
Table 2: Utilities
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Before we can calculate the expected-utilities for our lotteries, we have to guess 
probabilities for the two states of nature t 1 and t 2 . We can do this by using a simple 
probability distribution over {t 1 , t 2 } as there is no event S Ì {t 1 , t 2 } which we know to 
contain the true state of nature, i.e. we assume S = Ω. 
We will calculate expected-utilities for three different probability distributions. The 
probability function p 1 characterises the situation in which the parties’ reacting with a 
high level of violence is considered equally likely to their reacting with a low level, i.e. 
p 1 (t 1 ) = p 1 (t 2 ) = 0.5. According to p 2 , it is certain that the level of violence will be high, 
i.e. p 2 (t 1 ) = 1 and p 2 (t 2 ) = 0, whereas in p 3 the level of violence will certainly be low, i.e. 
p 3 (t 1 ) = 0 and p 3 (t 2 ) = 1. 
p1(t) p2(t) p3(t) 
t1 = high level of violence 0.5 1.0 0.0 
t2 = low level of violence 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Table 3: Probability Distributions 
Expected-utility can now be computed for each of the four lotteries and each probability 
function. 
Ep 
1 
(u(f)|Ω) Ep 
2 
(u(f)|Ω) Ep 
3 
(u(f)|Ω) 
f1 = ground forces 0.5 0.4 0.6 
f2 = ground and air forces 0.55 0.45 0.65 
f3 = air forces 0.55 0.45 0.65 
f4 = diplomatic mission 0.75 0.525 0.975 
Table 4: Expected-Utilities 
The example shows that for the given utility function u and lotteries f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , and f 4 , 
launching a diplomatic mission is the option that maximises expected-utility regardless of 
how probability is distributed over the two states of nature.
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Utility and conditional probability functions provide a means to evaluate lotteries with 
regard to their expected-utility. In the previous example, we can conclude that we should 
choose lottery f 4 first, lotteries f 2 and f 3 second, and lottery f 1 last if we want to maximise 
expected-utility. 
A different way of looking at decision problems is to ask a decision-maker directly about 
his preferences with regard to the available lotteries. In this case, decision theory 
provides criteria that allow one to assess whether or not a decision-maker’s preferences 
can be considered rational. The most straightforward criterion is transitivity: a decision- 
maker fails to be considered rational if he prefers a lottery f 1 over a lottery f 2 , f 2 over a 
lottery f 3 , and f 3 over f 1 . Further criteria are monotonicity, completeness, continuity, and 
independence. Preferences are expressed by means of a binary preference relation ≤ S . 
This relation, which is defined over the set of lotteries L, i.e. ≤ S Í L ´ L, depends also on 
the set Ξ(Ω) of events. An expression f 1 ≤ S f 2 is to be interpreted as “if the decision- 
maker knows that the true state of nature is in S, he prefers lottery f i over lottery f j ”. 
Two relations are derived from the original preference relation. The indifference relation 
~ S is defined by the condition f i ~ S f j iff f i ≤ S f j and f j ≤ S f i . The strict preference relation 
< S is defined by f i < S f j iff f i ≤ S f j and not f i ~ S f j . 
In the following definition we state the axioms for rational decision-makers’ preferences. 
Definition 9 (Axioms for Rational Decision-makers’ Preferences) 
A preference relation ≤ S is a preference relation of a rational decision-maker iff it 
satisfies the following axioms: 
(1) "f i ,f j (f i ≤ S f j Ú f j ≤ S f i ) (Completeness); 
(2) "f i ,f j ,f k (f i ≤ S f j Ù f j ≤ S f k , É f i ≤ S f k ) (Transitivity); 
(3) "f i ,f j "α,β(f i < S f j Ù α < β É αf i + (1 - α)f j ≤ S βf i + (1 - β)f j ) (Monotonicity 
11 ); 
11 The axiom of monotonicity is not an independent axiom as it can be derived from the other axioms. Cf. 
(Myerson 1991, p. 33).
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(4) "f i ,f j ,f k $α(f i ≤ S f j Ù f j ≤ S f k É αf i + (1 - α)f k ~ S f j ) (Continuity); 
(5) "f i ,f j ,f k "α(f i ≤ S f j É αf i + (1 - α)f k ≤ S αf j + (1 - α)f k ) (Independence). 
The preference relation is complete if, for any two lotteries f i and f j , the decision-maker 
either prefers f i over f j or f j over f i . When the decision-maker preferring f i over f j and f j 
over f k implies he prefers f i over f k , the relation is transitive. The preference relation is 
monotone if the decision-maker strictly preferring f i over f j implies he prefers those 
compound lotteries assigning a higher probability of getting f i over those compound 
lotteries assigning a lower probability of getting f i . The preference relation is continuous 
in the sense that if the decision-maker prefers f i over f j and f j over f k , then there is a 
compound lottery of f i and f k such that the decision-maker is indifferent between this 
lottery and f j . It is independent if the decision-maker’s preference of f i over f j implies that 
he prefers every compound lottery involving f i over the corresponding compound lottery 
involving f j . 
The axioms are supposed to provide a formalisation of intuitive principles of rationality. 
Therefore, a decision-maker who violates one of them cannot be considered as rational, 
according to standard decision theory. Although most of them seem intuitively plausible 
at first glance, several authors have questioned their status as axioms of rationality. In 
empirical tests, it can be shown that people’s preferences do not necessarily comply with 
some of the axioms, such as completeness and independence. 12 However, the axioms 
provide a normative framework for rational decision-making. Moreover, they provide a 
procedure for finding appropriate utility functions in a decision-problem. 
12 A famous counterexample to the axiom of independence is the Allais Paradox. See (Allais 1953). For 
further studies exploring the empirical status of the axioms, see (Ross 2006; Hansson 2005, p. 35f).
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The expected-utility maximisation theorem was proven by John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern in their joint book Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour 13 . It links a 
rational and intelligent decision-maker’s preference relation to the concept of utility 
functions as introduced earlier in the section. Indeed, it says that these two concepts are 
equivalent. If a decision-maker has a complete, transitive, continuous, and independent 
preference relation over the set L of all lotteries, then this preference relation provides an 
effective procedure to construct a utility function u and a conditional probability function 
p such that the expected-utility of any lottery f i is higher than the expected-utility of 
lottery f j if and only if the decision-maker prefers lottery f i over f j . 
On the other hand, it can be shown that the ordering over the set L of all lotteries 
induced by the expected-utility function E p (u(f)|S) satisfies the axioms of completeness, 
continuity, monotonicity, transitivity, and independence and is, therefore, equivalent to a 
preference relation ≤ S . 
The theorem is given as follows. 
Theorem 2 (Expected-Utility Maximisation) 
In a decision problem there exists a preference relation ≤ S that satisfies the 
axioms of completeness, monotonicity, continuity, transitivity, and independence 
iff there exists a utility function u and a conditional-probability function p such 
that f i ≤ S f j iff E p (u(f i )|S) ≤ E p (u(f j )|S). 
Proof 
The proof is standard and can be found in introductions to decision- 
theory. 14 Here, we sketch only the basic idea, which consists of the construction 
of a utility function u and a conditional-probability function p on the basis of a 
given preference relation ≤ S . 
First, we have to transfer the preference relation onto the set of prices X 
for every state t Î Ω. This can be done by restricting ≤ S to t, i.e. by looking at the 
preference relation ≤ {t} . The new ordering over the set of prices X allows one to 
13 (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953) 
14 For instance, in (Myerson 1991, p. 14f).
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pick one of the best prices x max and one of the worst prices x min such that for all x 
Î X, we have x min ≤ {t} x ≤ {t} x 
max . 
In a second step, we define two lotteries f max and f min , where f 
max certainly 
results in the best price x max for every state t Î Ω, and f min certainly results in the 
worst price x min for every t Î Ω, i.e. f 
max = [x max ] and f min = [x min ]. For every state t 
Î Ω and every price x Î X, we ask the decision-maker to give a compound 
lottery αf max + (1 - α)f min such that he is indifferent between the lottery [x], which 
gives price x in every state, and the compound lottery given that t is the true state 
of nature. According to the axiom of continuity, such lottery exists. We then take 
α as the utility of price x in state t, i.e. u(x, t) = α. 
By a similar procedure we can construct a conditional-probability 
function p. Finally, u and p can be shown to satisfy the condition f i ≤ S f j if and 
only if E p (u(f i )|S) ≤ E p (u(f j )|S). 
QED 
The theorem implies that if a decision-maker chooses the lottery that is highest with 
regard to his preference relation ≤ S , then he simultaneously chooses the lottery with the 
highest value of expected-utility, i.e. he maximises his expected-utility. 
1.2.2  Game Theory 
In game theory, the participants of a game are called players. They can be characterised 
as social units such as individuals, social groups, social institutions etc. In the context of 
conflicts, typical players are, for instance, states, guerrilla groups, trade unions, firms, 
colleges, or spouses. It is assumed that the number of players is finite and greater or 
equal to 2. The set of all players is abbreviated by N = {1, 2, …, n}. 
In a game, each player chooses a strategy out of a fixed number of available strategies. 
Strategies are possible actions that the players can carry out within a game. If a player 
chooses a strategy, his behaviour in the game is completely determined by this strategy. 
The strategy determines a move for every state of the game. The set of all strategies 
available to a player i is abbreviated by C i = {c i1 , c i2 , …, c ik } with every c ij Î C i 
symbolising one strategy of the player i. Besides choosing a pure strategy, i.e. one single
Theories of Conflict 
37 
element of C i , a player can also choose a randomised strategy, i.e. a combination of 
elements of C i each of which he then plays with a certain probability α. 
If every player i Î N chooses a strategy c ij Î C i , the game can be played leading to an 
outcome in which each player gets a certain price. The subjective value of the price a 
player gets in a certain outcome is measured by an ordinal or cardinal utility function u i . 
Hence, utility functions specify the utility of the price a player gets in a certain outcome 
for every player i Î N and every possible outcome of the game. 
It may be the case that the outcomes of a game depend on some arbitrary factors outside 
the players’ influence. However, from a game theoretic point of view, each player must 
decide how to behave in every possible outcome of the arbitrary factor before the game 
is played. Games without arbitrary factors are called deterministic games. 
Another parameter that is modelled by game theory is information. In each phase of a 
game, the players have information about the game, such as information about the other 
players’ moves, their own moves, and the outcomes of arbitrary factors. This information 
is expressed by information states assigned to the players in each state of the game. If a 
player’s information states are identical in two different states of the game, he is not able 
to decide in which state the game is. Games in which all players always know the current 
state of the game are called games with perfect information. Otherwise, the game is a 
game with imperfect information. 
Most of the literature deals with 2-person games, i.e. games with N = {1, 2}. An 
important subclass of these games is the class of 2-person zero-sum games. In these
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games the sum of the utilities of the two players is zero in any outcome, i.e. the gain of 
the winner equals the loss of the looser. 15 
In its extensive form, a game is displayed as a rooted tree. Rooted trees are a certain type 
of graph, where a graph is a finite set of nodes {x 1 , x 2 , …,x k } together with a set of pairs 
of nodes. In the context of game theory, a pair of nodes <x i , x j > is also called a branch. 
A path is a set {<x 1 , x 2 >, <x 2 , x 3 >, …, <x m-1 , x m >} of pairs of nodes, where all x i 
occurring in the path are distinct nodes and m ≥ 2. A path connects the two nodes x 1 
and x m . A rooted tree can be defined as follows. 
Definition 10 (Rooted Tree) 
A rooted tree is a graph in which any two nodes are connected by exactly one 
path, and one node is designated as the root of the tree. 
The unique path connecting a node x i and the root of the tree is referred to as the path of 
x i . Branches connecting a node x i with other nodes are called alternatives of x i if they are 
not in the path of x i . Nodes without alternatives are called terminal nodes. The following 
figure illustrates the concept of a rooted tree. 
Figure 1: Rooted Tree 
15 2-person games are simple and cover a wide range of applications. Zero-sum games provide a natural 
model for situations in which the competitive aspect is very high. Cf., for instance, (Mendelson 2004, p. 
53ff). 
x1 
x2 
x3 
x1 : root 
: terminal nodes 
: alternatives of x2 
: the path of x3
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A game in extensive form consists of a rooted tree in which all nodes and branches are 
labelled in the following way: each node that is not a terminal node has exactly one player 
label. Player labels are natural numbers {0, 1,…, n} expressing which player controls the 
node. Nodes labelled by 0 are called chance nodes. Each alternative of a chance node is 
labelled by a number of the real interval [0, 1] specifying the probability of the alternative. 
The sum of all probabilities assigned to the alternatives of a chance node equals one, i.e. 
we assign a probability distribution over its alternatives to every chance node. To every 
node that is controlled by a player, a second label is assigned expressing the information 
state of the player. If two nodes have the same information label, the player is not able to 
distinguish between the two states represented by these nodes. Consequently, the set of 
alternatives of two nodes with the same information label must be identical. A move 
label is assigned to each alternative of a node that is controlled by a player. To every 
terminal node, we assign a utility vector (u 1 , u 2 , …, u n ) representing the utility payoffs of 
the players 1, 2, …, n if the game terminates at this node. 
Figure 2 shows a game in extensive form between the two players 1 and 2. 16 The game 
starts with a chance node at which two possible outcomes can occur each with equal 
probability 0.5. Then, player 1 can choose between the two moves r and s. The two 
information states A and B indicate that player 1 knows which of the two outcomes of 
the chance node has occurred at the beginning of the game. If player 1 chooses r, the 
game is over. Player 1 gets the utility payoff 1 or -1, and player 2 gets the payoff -1 or 1, 
depending on the outcome of the chance node. If player 1 chooses the alternative s, then 
player 2 can choose between the two moves u and v, and the game is over. However, 
when choosing between u and v, player 2 does not know which of the two outcomes of 
16 This example shows a game-theoretic model of a simple card game. For an exhaustive description of this 
game, see (Myerson 1991, p. 37ff).
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the chance node has occurred at the beginning of the game as both nodes have the same 
information label C. Utility payoffs for the two players are shown at the terminal nodes, 
respectively. 
Figure 2: Extensive Form 
The extensive form of a game explicitly shows its dynamic and informational structure. 
The players’ strategies are better reflected in the strategic form of a game. However, they 
can also be obtained from the extensive form by specifying a move for each information 
state. For example, a strategy for player 1 in the game of Figure 2 could be to choose r if 
he is in information state A and s if he is in B. 17 
The strategic form of a game specifies a set of players N = {1, 2, …, n} participating in 
the game, a set of strategies C i for each player i Î N, and a set of expected-utility 
functions u i from the Cartesian product 
N jÎ ´
 C j into the set of real numbers for each player 
i Î N. Elements of 
N jÎ ´
 C j are called strategy profiles. They represent the outcomes of the 
game by specifying for each player the strategy that he chooses. If c Î 
N jÎ ´
 C j is a strategy 
profile, then u i (c) expresses the expected-utility payoff of player i if all players choose 
17 A procedure constructing the strategic form of a game in extensive form is described at the end of the 
section. 
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their strategy according to c. Formally, we can define a game in strategic form as 
follows. 18
Definition 11 (Games in Strategic Form) 
A game in strategic form is a structure Γ = (N, (C i ) iÎN , (u i ) iÎN ), where N is a finite 
set of players, (C i ) iÎN is a sequence of sets C i such that every C i is a set of 
strategies of player i, and (u i ) iÎN is a sequence of expected-utility functions u i such 
that every u i is a function from 
N jÎ ´
 C j into ℝ. 
A game in strategic form can be displayed as a matrix. If there are only two players 1 and 
2, the matrix has the simple form shown in the following table. 
2 
c21 c22 … c2m 
c11 u1(c11, c21), u2(c11, c21) u1(c11, c22), u2(c11, c21) … u1(c11, c2m), u2(c11, c2m) 
c12 u1(c12, c21), u2(c12, c21) u1(c12, c22), u2(c12, c22) … u1(c12, c2m), u2(c12, c2m) 
… … … … … 
1 
c1n u1(c1n, c21), u2(c1n, c21) u1(c1n, c22), u2(c1n, c22) … u1(c1n, c2m), u2(c1n, c2m) 
Table 5: 2-Person Game in Strategic Form 
A player can either choose a pure strategy, i.e. an element of C i , or a randomised strategy, 
i.e. a probability distribution over C i . If a player chooses a randomised strategy, he plays 
every pure strategy included in the combination with a certain probability. For instance, 
player 1 in Table 5 could play the randomised strategy 0.5[c 11 ] + 0.3[c 14 ] + 0.2[c 17 ]. The 
set of all randomised strategies of a player i can be identified with the set of probability 
distributions Δ(C i ) over the set C i of strategies of i. The expression σ(c i ) denotes the 
probability of player i playing strategy c i in the randomised strategy σ. For instance, we 
have (0.5[c 11 ] + 0.3[c 14 ] + 0.2[c 17 ])(c 14 ) = 0.3. 
18 A similar notation is used in (Myerson 1991).
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In the strategic form of a game, we have no information about the temporal structure of 
the game, nor do we know the players’ information states during the game. Instead, we 
have information about the various strategies of the players, and we know the players’ 
expected-utilities for every outcome of the game. 
If a game is given in extensive form, we can construct its strategic form Γ as follows: the 
set of players N is identical in both forms. Let H i = {h 1 , h 2 , …, h p } be the set of 
information states of player i in the extensive form, and let M i (h k ) be the set of all 
alternatives of player i if he is in the information state h k . Then, C i , i.e. the set of 
strategies of player i, can be defined as the set 
p k 1 £ £ ´
 M i (h k ). A strategy picks exactly one 
alternative for every information state from the set of available alternatives of that state. 
For example, in the game in extensive form of Figure 2, player 1 has the four strategies 
rr, rs, sr, and ss as we have H 1 = {A, B}, M 1 (A) = {r, s}, and M 1 (B) = {r, s} and, 
therefore, C 1 = 
2 k 1 £ £ ´
 M 1 (h k ) = {r, s}´{r, s} = {rr, rs, sr, ss}. 
The expected-utility u i (c) of player i, if the players choose their strategies according to the 
strategy profile c, is the sum of the utility payoffs of i in those terminal nodes that can 
possibly be reached according to c weighed by the probability of their occurrence. The 
weighing is necessary as the chance nodes in the extensive form have to be taken into 
account. In the game of Figure 2, we have, for instance, u 1 (rs, u) = 0.5 × 1 + 0.5 × (-2) = - 
0.5 and u 2 (rs, u) = 0.5 × (-1) + 0.5 × 2 = 0.5. 
If we transfer a game in extensive form into strategic form, we call the result the normal 
form of the game. The following table shows the normal form of the game in extensive 
form of Figure 2.
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2 
u v 
rr 0.0, 0.0 0.0, 0.0 
rs -0.5, 0.5 1.0, -1.0 
sr 0.5, -0.5 0.0, 0.0 
1 
ss 0.0, 0.0 1.0, -1.0 
Table 6: Normal Form 
If a situation is modelled as a game in extensive form or strategic form, we are interested 
in the question of which strategy each player will choose. An answer to this question can 
be understood either descriptively or prescriptively. In both cases, the answer relies on 
the assumption that every player is rational and intelligent, i.e. his goal is to maximise his 
expected-utility, and he is aware of any consequence of his actions for him and all other 
players. 
A first, simple way to answer this question is the concept of domination. If a strategy of a 
player results in a smaller amount of utility payoff than another strategy, regardless of the 
other players’ behaviour, we say that the first strategy is strongly dominated by the 
second one. A utility maximising player never chooses a dominated strategy as he can 
certainly obtain a higher amount of expected-utility by choosing the dominating strategy. 
Domination holds not only for pure strategies, but also for randomised strategies. In the 
example of Table 6, the randomised strategy 0.5[sr] + 0.5[ss] strongly dominates the pure 
strategy rr. This can be shown by comparing the expected-utility payoffs of the two 
strategies for player 1 for every choice between u and v of player 2. If player 2 chooses u, 
we get the expected-utility payoffs u 1 (0.5[sr] + 0.5[ss], u) = 0.5 × 0.5 + 0.5 × 0 = 0.25 and 
u 1 (rr, u) = 0. If player 2 chooses v, we get u 1 (0.5[sr] + 0.5[ss], v) = 0.5 × 0 + 0.5 × 1 = 0.5 
and u 1 (rr, v) = 0. In both cases, player 1 obtains a higher amount of expected-utility by 
choosing the randomised strategy 0.5[sr] + 0.5[ss].
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In order to define the concept of domination, we have to introduce two further notions. 
A strategy profile c Î 
N jÎ ´
 C j specifies exactly one strategy for each player. If we delete the 
set of strategies C i of player i from 
N jÎ ´
 C j , we obtain the set C -i = 
} i { \ N jÎ ´
 C j expressing all 
strategy profiles that the players other than i can possibly choose. Elements of C -i are 
denoted by c -i . If player i chooses a certain strategy d i , (d i , c -i ) denotes the strategy profile 
in which i chooses strategy d i , and the other players choose their strategies according to 
c -i .
Now we can define the concept of domination as follows. 
Definition 12 (Domination) 
A strategy d i Î 
N jÎ ´
 C j is strongly dominated for player i iff there is a randomised 
strategy σ i Î Δ(C i ) such that for all strategy profiles c -i Î C -i , the following 
condition holds: u i (d i , c -i ) < å 
Î i C e 
i - i i )) c (e, u (e) (σ . 
A strategy d i Î 
N jÎ ´
 C j is weakly dominated for player i iff there is a randomised 
strategy σ i Î Δ(C i ) such that for all strategy profiles c -i Î C -i , the following 
condition holds: u i (d i , c -i ) ≤ å 
Î i C e 
i - i i )) c (e, u (e) (σ . 
As rational and intelligent players never choose strongly dominated strategies, we can 
eliminate them from the strategic form of a game. In the game shown in the following 
table, we can first eliminate strategy c 3 , which is dominated by 0.2[c 1 ] + 0.8[c 2 ], then d 2 
dominates d 1 , and finally, c 1 dominates c 2 . 
2
d1 d2 
c1 1, 0 1, 1 
c2 3, 1 0, 2 
1 
c3 2, 3 0, 0 
Table 7: Domination
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Note that d 2 dominated d 1 only after c 3 was eliminated. As (c 1 , d 2 ) is the only remaining 
strategy profile after iteratively eliminating dominated strategies, we can predict the 
outcome of the game. Of course, this procedure does not apply to all games as there are 
games with no dominated strategies. Furthermore, the iterative elimination of weakly 
dominated strategies can lead to different predictions, depending on the sequence in 
which the elimination was carried out. 
A more general solution concept is that of a Nash equilibrium. 19 A Nash equilibrium is a 
strategy profile with the property that no player can improve his expected-utility by 
switching to another strategy, given that all the other players retain their strategies. For 
the case that the Nash equilibrium consists of pure strategies, we can define it as follows. 
Definition 13 (Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies) 
The pure strategy profile (d 1 , d 2 , …, d n ) is a Nash equilibrium iff for all i Î N and 
for all c i Î C i , the following condition holds: 
u i (d 1 , …, d i-1 , c i , d i+1 , …, d n ) ≤ u i (d 1 , …, d i-1 , d i , d i+1 , …, d n ). 
Nash equilibriums in pure strategies can be found by checking all the outcomes in the 
strategic form of the game. For example, the game in Table 7 has the unique pure Nash 
equilibrium (c 1 , d 2 ). The game in Table 6 has no pure Nash equilibrium. 
If a Nash equilibrium is reached in a game, the players have no incentive to leave it again 
as this would only worsen their utility payoff. Thus, Nash equilibriums represent stable 
outcomes of a game. However, they are not necessarily the best outcomes for all the 
players in the sense of Pareto-optimality. An outcome is Pareto-optimal if there is no 
other outcome in which at least one player could obtain a higher amount of utility, while 
the other players obtain utility payoffs at least as high as in the original outcome. The 
19 John Nash introduced the concept of equilibrium points in his paper Equilibrium points in n-person games. 
See (Nash 1950).
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game in Table 7 has two Pareto-optimal outcomes, i.e. (c 2 , d 1 ) and (c 3 , d 1 ). Note that in 
this game, neither the solution by elimination of dominated strategies nor the Nash 
equilibrium is Pareto-optimal. 
For the case that the Nash equilibrium involves randomised strategies, we have to 
introduce a further notation. If all players choose a randomised strategy, we obtain a 
randomised strategy profile (σ 1 , …, σ n ) with σ i Î Δ(C i ) for all i Î N. Hence, the set of all 
randomised strategy profiles can be defined as the Cartesian product 
N i 
× 
∈ 
Δ(C i ). 
Now we can define a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies as follows. 
Definition 14 (Nash Equilibrium in Randomised Strategies) 
The randomised strategy profile (σ 1 , …, σ n ) is a Nash equilibrium iff for all i Î N 
and all t i Î Δ(C i ), the following condition holds: 
u i (σ 1 , …, σ i-1 , τ i , σ i+1 , …, σ n ) ≤ u i (σ 1 , …, σ i-1 , σ i , σ i+1 , …, σ n ). 
To find Nash equilibriums that involve randomised strategies, we have to simultaneously 
solve a number of linear equations. 20 The equations can be found by making use of the 
idea that if one player chooses a randomised strategy, the probability distribution of this 
strategy must ensure that the expected-utility of the other players’ strategies are identical. 
Otherwise, they were not forced to choose a randomised strategy as they could choose 
the pure strategy resulting in the highest amount of expected-utility. 
We illustrate this idea with the game of Table 6. In this game, player 2 has two strategies 
u and v, and player 1 has four strategies rr, rs, sr, and ss. As rr is strongly dominated by 
the randomised strategy 0.5[sr] + 0.5[ss], and rs is weakly dominated by ss, we have to 
look only at the reduced strategic form of the game shown in the following table. 
20 There are several algorithms computing Nash equilibriums. One of them is the Simplex Method which is 
described, for instance, in (Mendelson 2004, p. 109ff).
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2
u v 
sr 0.5, -0.5 0, 0 1 
ss 0, 0 1, -1 
Table 8: Nash Equilibrium in Randomised Strategies 
Let α and (1 - α) be the probabilities of the randomised equilibrium strategy of player 1 
and β and (1 - β) the probabilities of player 2. If player 1 chooses the pure strategy sr, he 
will receive the expected-utility payoff u 1 (sr, β[u]+(1 - β)[v]) = β × 0.5 + (1 - β) × 0 = 0.5β. 
If he chooses ss, he gets u 1 (ss, β[u]+(1 - β)[v]) = β × 0 + (1 - β) × 1 = 1 - β. Player 2 has to 
choose β in such a way that player 1 is forced to randomise between sr and ss. The only 
way to do this is by making the expected-utility payoffs of player 1 for the two pure 
strategies equal, i.e. u 1 (sr, β[u] + (β - q)[v]) = u 1 (ss, β[u] + (1 - β)[v]). Therefore, our first 
equation is: 
(I) 0.5 × β = 1 - β. 
The same consideration for player 1 leads to the second equation: 
(II) -0.5 × α = 1 - α. 
The only solution to these equations is α = 0.66 and β = 0.66. Hence, the Nash 
equilibrium of the game is the randomised strategy profile (0.66[sr] + 0.33[ss], 0.66[u] + 
0.33[v]). If any player deviates unilaterally from this strategy profile, his utility payoff will 
decrease. 
It can be proven that for any game in strategic form, there exists at least one Nash 
equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium may be a pure strategy profile or a randomised 
strategy profile. However, the Nash equilibrium is not necessarily unique as there are
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games in which more than one Nash equilibrium exist. For example, in the game shown 
in Table 9, there are two pure Nash equilibriums (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ) and one randomised 
Nash equilibrium (0.75[a 1 ] + 0.25[a 2 ], 0.25[b 1 ] + 0.75[b 2 ]). 
2
b1 b2 
a1 3, 1 0, 0 1 
a2 0, 0 1, 3 
Table 9: Nash Equilibrium in Pure and Randomised Strategies 
1.2.3  Robert Kowalski’s Logic­based Approach 
In his 2003 paper A logic-based approach to conflict resolution, the British computer scientist 
Robert Kowalski combines formal logic with decision theory to develop a model of 
conflict resolution. His model is based on a cognitive model which he calls “unified 
logic-based agent model”. It unifies Alan Newell’s idea of production-systems, Paul 
Cohen’s BDI logics, and goal hierarchies, and enables us to represent crucial elements of 
a conflict, such as goals, beliefs, and actions, within a formal system. 
Alternative solutions to a given conflict are generated systematically by means of 
backward and forward reasoning. Then, decision theory helps “to decide between 
different solutions, in the attempt to optimise their expected-utility.” 21 
Kowalski defines a conflict in logical terms as an “inconsistency between different 
goals”. 22 Conflicts can be resolved by finding a way to satisfy all goals or, if this is 
impossible, to satisfy each goal at least to a certain extent. Such a compromise solution 
21 (Kowalski 2003, p. 1) 
22 (Kowalski 2003, p. 1)
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can be found by generalising the goals to higher-level goals which are not inconsistent 
any more, and then satisfying these higher-level goals. 
Kowalski specifies his procedure of conflict resolution by dividing it into five steps. The 
steps proceed from a given set of beliefs and inconsistent goals constituting the conflict. 
First, consistent higher-level goals are identified for every original goal. In the second 
step, consistent ways of satisfying these higher-level goals are identified. In the third step, 
positive and negative consequences of these alternatives are inferred. Step four consists 
of estimating the degrees to which the alternatives satisfy the higher-level goals. In step 
five, a combination of alternatives satisfying the higher-level goals to the greatest extend 
and each individual’s higher level-goals to some minimal extent, is chosen. 
Kowalski uses BDI logic to represent goals and beliefs in terms of declarative 
statements. 23 Declarative statements have well defined meanings and are either true or 
false. Kowalski mentions the following examples of beliefs and actions. 24 
(1) Belief: You defend yourself, if whenever someone attacks you, you attack them 
back; 
(2) Goal: You defend yourself. 
The general pattern of beliefs and goals represented in BDI, has the form β(a, σ) and γ(a, 
σ), respectively. β(a, σ) expresses that the agent a believes σ, whereas γ(a, σ) expresses that 
a desires σ. In both cases σ is a declarative statement. 
Another way of representing goals are production systems. Whereas BDI logic represents 
goals declaratively, production-systems can represent them procedurally. Production 
23 (Kowalski 2003, p. 8) 
24 (Kowalski 2003, p. 9)
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systems consist of a set of condition-action rules and a set of statements called the 
working memory. Each condition-action rule has the form: If condition x, then do 
actions y 1 , …, y n . Kowalski mentions the following example of a condition-action rule: 
25 
If someone attacks you, then attack them back. 
Kowalski intends to unify the declarative and the procedural approach to represent goals. 
Since the hierarchical relations among goals are of interest, Kowalski uses goal 
hierarchies to represent goals. Goal hierarchies can either be illustrated graphically by 
AND-OR trees or linguistically by goal-reduction procedures. 
Goal-reduction procedures are instructions consisting of one statement of a goal and a 
finite set of conditions or sub-goals. Conditions and sub-goals are connected by one of 
the two connectives AND or OR. A set of goal-reduction procedures makes up an 
AND-OR tree that represents a goal hierarchy. 26 Kowalski gives several examples of 
goal-reduction procedures as well as AND-OR trees. Among his examples is the 
following AND-OR tree. 27 
Figure 3: AND-OR Tree 
25 (Kowalski 2003, p. 6) 
26 (Kowalski 2003, p. 12) 
27 (Kowalski 2003, p. 10) 
Improve enjoyment of life 
Provide for old age 
Save money 
Go on strike 
Work less hard 
Improve standard of living 
Earn more money 
Improve productivity 
AND 
OR 
OR
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This AND-OR tree illustrates the hierarchical relations between goals and sub-goals. The 
tree shows, for instance, that the goal of improving your enjoyment of life can be 
achieved by the sub-goal of improving your standard of living which, in turn, can be 
achieved by earning more money. This tree can be expressed by the following four goal- 
reduction procedures. 
(1) To improve enjoyment of life, increase standard of living or work less hard; 
(2) To increase standard of living, increase pay; 
(3) To increase pay, go on strike or increase productivity; 
(4) To provide for old age, increase pay and save money. 28 
Kowalski presents his unified logic-based agent model as a sequence of five steps: (1) 
cycle, (2) observe, (3) think, (4) decide (what actions to perform), and (5) act. In step (2), 
beliefs and goals, represented by goal-reduction procedures and BDI expressions, 
respectively, are read. Step (3) involves both forward reasoning, i.e. deducing goals from 
sub-goals, and backward reasoning, i.e. inducing sub-goals from goals. In step (4), a 
calculation based on decision-theory decides which actions to perform. Finally, the 
chosen actions are carried out (5). 
In our view, Kowalski’s approach, as presented in his paper, does not provide a suitable 
model for conflict resolution. It remains unclear how the different computational tools 
can co-operate with each other and together resolve a specific conflict. Also, the process 
of identifying higher-level goals is not specified, i.e. it is not clear how higher-level goals 
can be found at all. 
28 (Kowalski 2003, p. 12)
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1.2.4  Lewis Richardson’s Equational Model 
Modelling conflicts in terms of mathematical equations is the basic idea of Lewis 
Richardson’s contributions to the theory of conflict. In contrast to the game theoretical 
model, according to which conflicts are finite sets of states, Richardson aims at 
describing conflicts in terms of differential equations. Each equation expresses a 
relationship between certain conflict elements, such as the extent of accumulated 
grievance, the tendency to react strongly or weakly to another party’s threat, or the 
degree of difficulty to produce arms. Once a list of equations is specified, they can be 
used to derive general conclusions about the general dynamics of conflicts or to make 
predictions about the development of specific conflicts. 
Richardson’s research on conflict was mainly developed during World War II. Observing 
how the accumulation of arms and mutually perceived threat had led to large scale war, 
Richardson focused on concepts, such as the level of armament, perceived threat, and 
the extent of accumulated grievance in his conflict analysis. Later, his models turned out 
to be particularly applicable to the Cold War situation and triggered a research tradition 
of scientific conflict analysis including scholars such as Quincy Wright, Kenneth 
Boulding, and Anatol Rapaport. 
Richardson was also the first conflict scholar who collected a large amount of empirical 
data on the topic. His dataset included statistical data on 108 wars in the period between 
1820 and 1949 which he used to test the conclusions made on the basis of his equations 
and to refine his models. His results related to the statistical analysis of conflict were 
published posthumously in the book Statistics of deadly quarrels. 29 His work on arms races is 
29 (Richardson 1960)
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collected in his 1949 book Arms and insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins 
of War. 30 
We illustrate Richardson’s theory with his equational model for arms races. 31 
Richardson’s aim was to provide equations expressing the underlying regularities of an 
arms race, i.e. he tried to model the dynamics of armament and disarmament. To achieve 
this task, he followed a strategy including the following six steps: First, he identified the 
key concepts relevant for describing arms races. Second, he assigned variables and 
constants to the concepts. Third, he formulated equations expressing common sense 
assumptions about the relationships among the variables and constants. Fourth, he 
derived conclusions from the equations. Fifth, he tested the conclusions against statistical 
data on actual arms races. Sixth, he adjusted the equations according to the data. We 
illustrate the first four steps of Richardson’s strategy. 
In step one, Richardson identifies four concepts relevant for modelling arms races: the 
armament level of the states involved in the arms race, the tendency of a state to react 
strongly or weakly to the threat by other states, the tendency to be strongly or weakly 
influenced by the difficulties of producing arms, and the extent of accumulated 
grievances. As a fifth factor, Richardson includes time in his model as he intends to 
model the development of armament levels over time. The model is tailored to two states 
x and y. However, it could easily be extended to further states. 
In step two, he assigns variables and constants to the five concepts. 
(1) t: variable for time; 
30 (Richardson et al. 1960) 
31 The model was fully developed in (Richardson et al. 1960). We use a summary of the model presented in 
(Schellenberg 1996, p. 103ff).
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(2) x/y: variable for the armament level of state x/y; 
(3) a x/y : constant for the tendency of state x/y to react strongly or weakly to the 
threat by state y/x; 
(4) m x/y : constant for the tendency of state x/y to be strongly or weakly influenced 
by the difficulties of producing arms; 
(5) g x/y : constant for the extent of accumulated grievances of state x/y. 
As his model tracks changes of armament levels over time, these two concepts are 
expressed by variables. The factors influencing the two variables, i.e. the other three 
concepts, are assumed to be constant. 
In step three, Richardson makes three assumptions about the relationships between the 
identified concepts. We are not assessing the plausibility of his assumptions here as our 
aim is to illustrate his method rather than to evaluate the content of his assumptions. 
(1) The change of the armament level of a state x is proportional to the threat by 
other states due to their armament level, i.e. the higher the armament level of 
another state, the higher the armament level of state x. This relationship is 
mediated by the tendency of state x to react strongly or weakly to the threat by 
other states. 
(2) The change of the armament level of a state x is proportional to the tendency of 
state x to be strongly or weakly influenced by the difficulties of producing arms, 
i.e. the increase in armament level of a state x is constrained by how easy it is for 
x to produce arms. 
(3) The extent of accumulated grievances of state x positively influences its 
armament level, i.e. the more grievances x has accumulated, the faster it raises its 
armament level.
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Translating the assumptions into equations, Richardson comes up with two differential 
equations, one for each state. The equations have on their left a term expressing the 
change of the armament level over time, and on their right a term combining the three 
factors: tendency to react strongly or weakly to the threat by other states, tendency to be 
strongly or weakly influenced by the difficulties of producing arms, and extent of 
accumulated grievances. The change in armament level is expressed by the first derivative 
of x with respect to time, i.e. dx/dt. The factors on the right are combined by 
summation, where the tendency to be strongly or weakly influenced by the difficulties of 
producing arms is negatively taken into account as it lowers the rate of armament 
according to Richardson’s assumptions. The two constants for the factors: tendency to 
react strongly or weakly to the threat by other states and tendency to be strongly or 
weakly influenced by the difficulties of producing arms are multiplied by the armament 
levels x and y, respectively, as the threat perceived by state x is proportional to the 
armament level of state y and the difficulty of producing arms directly influences the 
armament level. Altogether, Richardson suggests the following two differential equations. 
(I) dx/dt = a x y - m x x + g x ; 
(II) dy/dt = a y x - m y y + g y . 
From these two equations, Richardson deduces several conclusions. He derives the 
conclusions by manipulating the equations and distinguishing various situations 
characterised by specific combinations of the six constants a x , a y , m x , m y , g x and g y . In 
particular, Richardson identifies four prototypical situations characterised by specific 
conditions for the constants. 
(1) If m x + m y > a x + a y , i.e. if the braking factors (m x , m y ) together outweigh the 
combined strength of reactivity (a x , a y ), the states reach a stable equilibrium.
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(2) If m x + m y > a x + a y and g x < 0 and g y < 0, i.e. if the braking factors together 
outweigh the combined strength of reactivity and both states start with an 
accumulation of goodwill (negative g x and g y ), the states move to disarmament. 
(3) If m x + m y < a x + a y and g x > 0 and g y > 0, i.e. if the combined strength of 
reactivity outweighs the braking factors and both states start with an 
accumulation of grievances, the states engage in an arms race leading to war. 
(4) If m x + m y < a x + a y and g x < 0 and g y < 0, i.e. if the combined strength of 
reactivity outweighs the braking factors and both states start with an 
accumulation of goodwill, the situation is indeterminate, i.e. either the states 
engage in an arms race leading to war or move to disarmament. 
The conclusions allow one to make predictions about the outcome of a situation on the 
basis of data about the braking factors, the strength of reactivity, and the extent of 
accumulated grievances of the states involved. 
1.3  Psychological Theories 
Psychological theories of conflict aim at explaining conflicts by looking at characteristics 
of individual people and the interactions between them. 32 First, we look at theories of 
aggression. We introduce three theories of aggression reflecting the nature-nurture 
controversy on the topic. We start with Konrad Lorenz’s ethological two-factor theory of 
aggression, continue with John Dollard’s frustration-aggression hypothesis, and end with 
Albert Bandura’s social learning theory of aggression. 
32 For a monograph on psychological theories of conflict, see (Shalit 1988). A comprehensive anthology on 
the topic is, for instance, (Fuchs and Sommer 2004).
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Second, we discuss Muzafer Sherif’s realistic conflict theory, a psychological theory 
explicitly designed to explain social conflicts. 
Finally, we introduce the theory of social dilemmas. The concept of social dilemmas is 
used to describe paradigmatic conflict situations. We first describe the prisoner’s 
dilemma, the most widely discussed dilemma in conflict studies, and then the dilemma of 
the commons which is often seen as a prototype of resource conflicts. Both dilemmas 
can be understood as specific types of games as defined in game theory. 
1.3.1  Theories of Aggression 
In his book, On Aggression, Konrad Lorenz postulated the existence of a human fighting 
instinct. 33 For Lorenz, aggressive behaviour is natural and inherent to human nature. He 
assumes that a pattern of aggressive behaviour is genetically encoded in most animals, 
including human beings, because such behaviour is evolutionarily advantageous for the 
species. Referring to a large number of observational animal studies, he concludes that 
aggressive behaviour is a survival-enhancing instinct. 
Lorenz’s two-factor theory of aggression does not imply that there is a constant pressure 
to behave aggressively or destructively. Aggressive behaviour only occurs when triggered 
by specific stimuli of the environment called releasers. Thus, the first factor for 
aggressive behaviour is the innate urge to aggress, and the second factor is the 
appropriate stimulation by an environmental releaser. 
According to Lorenz, the innate fighting instinct is not learned ontogenetically, but has 
evolved over the human phylogeny. Aggressive behaviour between members of different 
33 (Lorenz 1971)
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species is an evolutionary advantage as it results in an increased supply of resources for 
the species. 
However, the question arises why members of the same species fight each other. Lorenz 
gives three reasons why intra-specific aggression can also be survival-enhancing to the 
whole species. First, aggressive behaviour results in greater distribution of the population. 
If a member of a population defends its resources against another member, the latter will 
be forced to look for new territory. Second, fights within a population are a means of 
natural selection: if only the strongest members of a population are selected to survive, 
the whole species has an evolutionary advantage. He writes, 
“I return to the theme of the survival value of the rival fight, with the statement that this 
only leads to useful selection where it breeds fighters fitted for combat with extra- 
specific enemies as well as for intra-specific duels.” 34 
Third, intra-specific fights have the consequence that the offspring is defended by the 
most “aggressive family defender”. 35 
When explaining human wars, which are not survival-enhancing, Lorenz identifies two 
dysfunctions of the fighting instinct. Unlike other animals, humans are badly equipped 
with natural weapons, such as sharp teeth, poison etc. To compensate for this 
disadvantage, humans have developed technical weapons aimed at killing others. As a 
consequence, human fights are more lethal than rival fighting of other species. 
Furthermore, technical weapons can be used to kill from a long distance. As there is no 
physical contact between the fighters, they are not able to detect their enemies’ 
appeasement gestures. Indeed, most species have developed patterns of behaviour 
indicating surrender or retreat. If this behaviour is shown during a fight, the winner has 
34 Cf. (Lorenz 1971, p. 40). 
35 (Lorenz 1971)
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no incentive to continue the fight and kill as he has reached his goal. Lorenz argues that, 
as a consequence of distant fighting, humans have lost their appeasement gestures. 
Next, we turn to the frustration-aggression hypothesis, a position which emphasises both 
the biological and social causes of aggressive behaviour. It was formulated by a group of 
scholars around John Dollard at Yale University in the 1930s. 36 In its initial version, the 
hypothesis claimed that 
“the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration 
and, contrariwise, the existence of frustration always leads to some form of 
aggression.” 37 
Frustration is understood as the unexpected failure of reaching a goal that one had 
expected to reach. 
Although there is some empirical support of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, its 
universality was questioned by subsequent scholars. Counterexamples can be found in 
both directions, i.e. frustration does not always result in aggressive behaviour, and 
aggressive behaviour is not only the result of frustration. For instance, Martin Seligman 
showed in a number of studies that frustration can also lead to a feeling of helplessness 
and resignation, instead of aggression. 38 On the other hand, soldiers or policemen often 
behave aggressively in order to obey an order or to prevent other people from aggressive 
behaviour, rather than because of frustration. 
A generalisation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis was proposed by Leonard 
Berkowitz. 39 In his theory of aversively generated aggression, frustration is just one 
example of the more general phenomenon of aversive events. An aversive event is a 
36 (Dollard 1964) 
37 (Dollard 1964, p. 1) 
38 (Seligman 1975) 
39 (Berkowitz 1962)
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situation that is unpleasant and, therefore, avoided. According to Berkowitz, aversive 
events are the only source of aggressive behaviour. However, aggression is only one 
possible reaction to an aversive event. 
According to Berkowitz, aversive events generate negative feelings, certain behavioural 
tendencies, and certain thoughts. These reactions make up three different types of 
responds to aversive events. First, the reactions help to deal with the aversive event 
rationally and calmly. Second, they make a person escape from the situation. Third, they 
make a person behave aggressively. Which of these reaction patterns is predominant is 
determined by genetic influences, the perceived effectiveness of the reaction in the 
particular situation, and the past learning history of the individual involved. 40 
Berkowitz’ theory has been tested in various empirical studies. Most famous are his 
experiments in which he asked subjects to administer punishments to other subjects, 
while holding a hand in a tank of water. When the water was painfully cold, test persons 
gave significantly more punishments than when the water in the tank was warm. 
Another generalisation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is the concept of relative 
deprivation. Particularly, aggressive behaviour on the macro level, such as collective 
violence, can be explained by relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is defined as the 
“[s]ense of having less than that to which one feels entitled” 41 . Berkowitz argues that 
relative deprivation leads to individual frustration which, when amplified by an aversive 
event, leads to aggressive behaviour. 
Finally, we present social learning theory as a theory explaining aggressive behaviour. 
Representing the nurture-end, social learning theory claims that aggressive behaviour is 
40 (Berkowitz 1962) 
41 (Hogg and Vaughan 2002, p. 288)
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learned, i.e. it is not innate to humans but the result of past experiences. This theory, 
which is closely related to the behaviourist school in psychology, provides a general 
explanation of why people acquire, instigate, and maintain certain patterns of aggressive 
behaviour. 
Albert Bandura explains the occurrence of a person’s aggressive behaviour by four 
factors: the person’s past experiences of aggressive behaviour, the success of the person’s 
aggressive behaviour in the past, the perceived likelihood of the aggression being 
rewarded or punished, and a complex of other cognitive, social, and environmental 
factors. 42 
The learning process involves two types of learning: operant conditioning and 
observational learning. In operant conditioning, a person experiences either a positive or 
a negative respond to his behaviour. If the respond is positive, the likelihood that the 
person shows the behaviour again rises. If the respond is negative, it falls. So, if a person 
is rewarded for aggressive behaviour, it will become more likely for the person to behave 
aggressively again. The reward can either be an additional pleasant stimulus (positive 
operant conditioning) or the removal of an unpleasant stimulus (negative operant 
conditioning) Observational learning is the process of imitating observed behaviour. For 
instance, if a child watches somebody else behaving aggressively, it will imitate this 
behaviour and behave aggressively itself. This effect is particularly strong when the child 
observes that the observed person is rewarded for his aggressive behaviour. In a number 
of studies, Bandura found strong empirical support for this effect. In his experiments, 
children observed somebody punching a doll with a hammer. Afterwards they were left 
to play with the doll. Most children showed a significantly higher number of aggressive 
42 (Bandura 1978)
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acts towards the doll than children of a control group who did not observe the violent 
model. 43 
1.3.2  Muzafer Sherif’s Realistic Conflict Theory 
A social psychological theory of conflict has been developed by Muzafer Sherif in the 
1950s and 1960s. 44 Emphasising scarce resources as the main cause of conflict, he called 
his theory realistic conflict theory. His theory is based on a series of experiments known 
as the Robbers Cave Experiment. 45 Before formulating Sherif’s theory, we describe his 
experiments. They are classics in psychological conflict studies and provide the empirical 
basis for his theory. 
Sherif observed the behaviour of 20 boys during a boys scout camp. The camp, which 
was run by experimenters, consisted of four phases. For each of the four phases, Sherif 
changed certain conditions and observed how these changes influenced the quality of the 
boys’ interpersonal and intergroup relations. 
In the first phase, the boys arrived at the camp and experienced ordinary, everyday 
activities. Over time, various friendships formed among the boys. In the second phase, 
the camp was split into two completely isolated groups. Members of the two groups lived 
in different living quarters, and there was no contact between them at any time of the 
day. The result was that formerly established friendships deteriorated, and own group 
norms developed. Some boys expressed a view in which they scaled others with reference 
to their group and considered their own group as superior. In the third phase, the groups 
43 (Bandura et al. 1961) 
44 (Sherif and Sherif 1953) 
45 (Sherif et al. 1961)
Theories of Conflict 
63 
were brought together again, but every contact was organised as an intergroup 
competition, such as a sports contest. In any competition, only one group could win an 
attractive price. This led to fierce competition during, and outside the organised 
competitions. The boys made discriminatory remarks towards members of the other 
group, engaged in various forms of aggressive behaviour, and the general hostility 
between the two groups increased significantly. At the same time, solidarity within the 
two groups increased. In the fourth phase, Sherif exposed the boys to goals which they 
could only achieve through co-operation. One such superordinate goal was, for instance, 
to pull out a bogged down truck bringing a movie. All the boys wanted to watch the 
movie, but the truck could only be pulled by the two groups together. The experimenters 
observed an improvement in the intergroup relations as a result of the co-operation. 
Based on his experiments, Sherif posited a causal relation between individual goals, group 
goals, interpersonal behaviour, and intergroup behaviour. He further classified goals as 
either shared goals, i.e. goals that can only be achieved through co-operation, or exclusive 
goals, i.e. goals that can only be achieved by one individual or group. According to 
realistic conflict theory, shared individual goals lead to interpersonal co-operation, group 
formation and solidarity. Shared group goals lead to intergroup co-operation and 
intergroup harmony. Individual exclusive goals lead to interpersonal competition and 
conflict, reduced solidarity, and group collapse, whereas exclusive group goals lead to 
intergroup competition and conflict. 
Sherif’s theory was confirmed in various studies 46 . However, critics have pointed out that 
goals are not the only variables determining interpersonal and intergroup behaviour. 
46 See, for instance, a study investigating intergroup relations between tribal groups in Africa was carried 
out by Marilynn Brewer and Donald Campbell. See (Brewer and Campbell 1976).
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1.3.3  The Theory of Social Dilemmas 
The theory of social dilemmas aims at transforming abstract models of game theory into 
real world scenarios which can then be tested empirically. If people behave in accordance 
with game theoretic models, so the idea goes, conflict behaviour can be predicted and 
explained by these models. 
The most famous paradigmatic conflict scenario is the prisoner’s dilemma devised by 
Merill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, and so named by Albert Tucker. Since then, it 
has become an influential research paradigm in the social sciences. It can be described as 
a game between two players, 1 and 2, where both players have two strategies, c i and d i , 
called co-operation and defection, respectively. If both players choose c i , they both 
receive the same utility payoff u 1/2 (c 1 , c 2 ). If they both defect, they receive the payoff 
u 1/2 (d 1 , d 2 ). However, u 1/2 (c 1 , c 2 ) is higher than u 1/2 (d 1 , d 2 ). If one of the players defects 
and the other co-operates, the defector receives a higher utility payoff than the co- 
operator, i.e. u i (d i , c j ) > u j (d i , c j ). Indeed, u i (d i , c j ) is the highest utility payoff and u j (d i , c j ) 
the lowest, i.e. u i (d i , c j ) > u 1/2 (c 1 , c 2 ) > u 1/2 (d 1 , d 2 ) > u j (d i , c j ), with i, j Î {1, 2}. 
The strategic form of a prisoner’s dilemma, with u i (d i , c j ) = 0, u 1/2 (c 1 , c 2 ) = -1, u 1/2 (d 1 , d 2 ) 
= -5, and u j (d i , c j ) = -10, is shown in the following table. 
2 
c2 d2 
c1 -1, -1 -10, 0 1 
d1 0, -10 -5, -5 
Table 10: Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The dilemma arises since defecting strongly dominates co-operating for both players. So, 
if both players behave rationally, they end up with the utility payoffs u 1 (d 1 , d 2 ) and u 2 (d 1 ,
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d 2 ), although they could be better off with the outcomes u 1 (c 1 , c 2 ) and u 2 (c 1 ,c 2 ), which 
they could receive by co-operating. As the only Nash equilibrium of the game is the 
strategy profile (d 1 , d 2 ), which is not Pareto-optimal, the predicted outcome of the game 
is not the best outcome for them. 
The name of the game stems from a story used to illustrate the dilemma: Two prisoners 
have the two options of either confessing to a crime jointly committed, or not to confess 
to the crime. If they both confess, they will be sent to prison for five years. If neither 
confesses, they will be charged with a minor crime and sent to prison for only one year. 
If one of them confesses and the other does not, the confessing prisoner will be released 
as a principal witness, whereas the other will be sentenced for ten years. If the prisoners 
are aware of these conditions, they rationally both confess the crime and are sentenced 
for five years. 
Test persons faced with variations of the prisoner’s dilemma, where the outcomes are 
money or other incentives, overwhelmingly opt for defection. This could be shown in a 
large number of studies with people from various countries. 47 
The dilemma of the commons, which can be used to model conflicts over limited 
resources, is an n-person prisoner’s dilemmas, i.e. an n-person game in which an optimal 
solution can be reached if all players co-operate. If every player defects, the outcome is 
worst for all. However, any individual player can increase his payoff by defecting, given 
that all other players co-operate. Formally, an n-person prisoner’s dilemma can be 
defined as a game with a set of players N = {1, 2, …, n} in which each player i has the 
two strategies c i or d i , and for each player’s utility function, the following conditions hold. 
47 For an overview of these studies up to 1980, see (Dawes 1980).
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(1) u i (c 1 , …, c i-1 , d i , c i+1 , …, c n ) is the highest utility value; 
(2) u i (x 1 , …, x i-1 , c i , x i+1 , …, x n ) < u i (x 1 , …, x i-1 , d i , x i+1 , …, x n ), where x Î {c, d}; 
(3) u i (d 1 , …, d i-1 , c i , d i+1 , …, d n ) is the lowest utility value; 
(4) u i (x 1 , …, x i-1 , c i /d i , x i+1 , …, x n ) < u i (y 1 , …, y i-1 , c i /d i , y i+1 , …, y n ) 
if {x 1 , …, x n } contains more ds than {y 1 , …, y n }. 
Hence, the more players that defect, the lower the utility payoff is for each individual 
player. The dilemma arises as, for every player, defecting is the better option compared to 
co-operating, and, therefore, they all defect and end up with the worst outcome. 
This model provides an explanation for conflicts about resources, such as natural 
resources, or public goods. It was originally used by Garrett Hardin to explain a conflict 
about common pastures typical for English villages. This is why it is called the tragedy of 
the commons or the commons dilemma. The following description of the dilemma is 
cited from Hardin’s original 1968 paper published in Science. 
“The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to 
be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the 
commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries 
because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well 
below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, 
that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this 
point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, 
more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal 
to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component. 
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the 
herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive 
utility is nearly + 1. 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one 
more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, 
the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of - 1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that 
the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And 
another …. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman 
sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that 
compels him to increase his herd without limit -- in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
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destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all.” 48 
Experimental studies simulating the commons dilemma show ambiguous results. For 
instance, Kaori Sato showed that most subjects defect, and, therefore, commonly destroy 
the resource. 49 In other studies, the subjects voluntarily co-operated. 50 
1.4  Political Theories 
International relations scholars have developed theories about the interactions between 
states. These theories provide explanations for inter-state conflicts, as well as conflicts in 
general when their conceptual framework is applied to units other than states. 51 
Moreover, because an increasing number of violent conflicts occur within states, specific 
political theories have been developed to understand intra-state conflicts, such as civil 
wars, revolutions or ethnic wars. 52 
We illustrate two political approaches to the theory of conflict. Both approaches 
originate in the theory of international relations and are primarily intended to explain 
conflicts among states. First, we introduce a number of theories usually classified under 
the name of liberalism. In particular, we follow the historical development of liberalist 
theories starting with classical liberalism and idealism, and continue with neoliberal 
institutionalism, democratic peace theory, and international liberalism. Second, we look at 
48 (Hardin 1969) 
49 (Sato 1988) 
50 (Caporael et al. 1989) 
51 For political theories on inter-state conflicts, see, for instance,(van Creveld 1991). 
52 For an overview over political theories of civil war, see (Waldmann 2003). A recent socio-political theory 
of revolution was presented in (Goldstone 2001). For a monograph on ethnic wars, see (Kaufman 2001).
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theories developed within the realist paradigm. We start with classical realism and follow 
with expositions of the two successors of realism: neorealism and neoclassical realism. 
1.4.1  Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism 
The roots of liberalism can be found in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment 
movement. Ideas of economic and political liberty in the nineteenth century, and 
Woodrow Wilson’s idealism of the early twentieth-century, have further contributed to 
the theory. Post-war liberalism as a general theoretical perspective includes neoliberal 
institutionalism, democratic peace theory, and international liberalism. 
The French Enlightenment philosopher Baron de Montesquieu argues that human 
nature is generally good. As humans are rational beings, so his argument goes, they are 
able to understand the universal laws of nature and human society. In virtue of this 
ability, humans can live together in a peaceful and just society. However, when a person 
enters civil society, the person might be confronted with a corrupt environment which 
makes the person behave irrationally. Thus, Montesquieu concludes that it is the society 
which turns rational human beings into irrational ones, and that conflict is always the 
product of inadequate social institutions. He emphasises the role of education in the 
prevention of conflicts. 
Immanuel Kant, one of the most comprehensive philosophers of the Enlightenment era, 
also argues that humans are primarily rational beings. He advocates the idea that nations 
can overcome difficulties and resolve their conflicts by means of collective action. His 
vision is a federation of sovereign democratic states that are able to settle their conflicts 
without war, and, hence, allow their citizens a peaceful life. In Perpetual Peace, Kant argues
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for a federal order that structures the relations between states and mirrors the rule of law 
which each individual sovereign state is bound by. 53 
In the nineteenth century liberal thought was prominent both in the political and 
economic domain. In On Liberty John Stuart Mill highlights liberty as the main condition 
for humans to achieve happiness. He argues that each individual knows best what is best 
for him and how to achieve this. 54 Rational human beings should, therefore, be left as 
autonomous and free as possible in their pursuit of happiness. 
Political liberalism claims that liberal democracies are the best form of government as 
social institutions of a liberal democracy serve only the one goal of furthering the ends of 
their citizens. Social institutions, such as laws, only exist as a result of free individuals 
who decide to abide by them if it furthers their goals. Liberal democracies also do not 
favour certain citizens over others, and, hence, guarantee a just society without social 
classes. As states only exist for their citizens, individuals must be protected against 
excessive and illegitimate government interferences. 
Economic liberalism propagates the idea that government interference in economic 
matters should be minimal both with regard to the domestic and the international 
market. This implies that there should neither be trade barriers nor governmental 
subsidies or monopolies. The liberalist claim that market forces automatically bring about 
an optimal situation for each individual is expressed by Adam Smith’s famous metaphor 
of the invisible hand. 
53 (Kant 1795(2005)) 
54 (Mill 1859(1975))
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With regard to conflicts, 19th century liberalism claims that conflicts originate in the 
restriction of individual freedom and they can only be avoided if individuals possess a 
maximal amount of freedom. 
In reaction to the excessive human suffering caused by World War I, American president 
Woodrow Wilson published a list of Fourteen Points for Peace, which led to the creation 
of the League of Nations. 55 Wilson’s writings express the idea that war is preventable, 
and that international peace is the ultimate goal nations should strive for. Wilsonian 
idealism introduces the concept of collective security in international relations theory. 
Collective security describes the principle that war can be prevented by a multilateral 
institution consisting of sovereign nations that agree to punish each member that 
behaves aggressively within the international arena. Nations have little incentive to 
engage in violent actions or war if they know they are to be punished by a large number 
of other nations. According to the idealists, conflicts can and should be resolved by 
various means of collective problem solving, such as mediation, arbitration or judicial 
settlement. They advocate for the formation of strong international institutions and 
believe that international law is effective in dealing with conflicts. Idealism also 
recognizes the role of disarmament in preventing international conflicts from escalating. 
Liberal international relations theory was comprehensively reformulated under the name 
of neoliberal institutionalism in the 1970s by the American political scientist Robert 
Keohane. 56 Neoliberal institutionalists combine 19th century liberalism and Wilsonian 
idealism with the principles of game theory. 
55 The text of the original speech can be found in (Wilson 1918). 
56 One of the seminal works of neoliberal institutionalism is Robert Keohane’s book After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Keohane 1984).
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Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that there are two types of actors critical to the 
quality of international relations. These are states and non-state groups, such as 
nongovernmental organisations, multinational corporations or international 
organisations. States and non-state groups can mutually influence one another and 
thereby determine the character of international relations. 
Actors are assumed to be rational to the extent that they make decisions by evaluating all 
potential actions relative to their goals. In contrast to classical liberalists, who assume that 
human beings are naturally good and co-operation is innate to the human species, 
neoliberalists hold that humans are only interested in pursuing their own goals, and co- 
operation is the product of rational behaviour. 
A further neoliberal assumption is that in pursuing their goals, actors depend on each 
other, i.e. goals can be achieved best if all actors co-operate with each other. As a result 
of the inclusive character of goals, the predominant feature of international relations is 
interdependence. 
Finally, neoliberal institutionalism claims that, as a consequence of international 
interdependency, actors build international institutions because they make it easier for 
them to co-operate, and, hence, to achieve their goals. International institutions start to 
develop their own dynamic, i.e. they develop their own rules and norms which, in turn, 
influence the behaviour of the original actors. Institutions are defined broadly. They can 
be international organisations, such as the UN, international regimes, i.e. clusters of 
norms and rules regulating the actors’ behaviour with regard to a certain problem, 
international networks, i.e. clusters of procedural rules for a certain problem area, or 
international organising principles which are not limited to a certain problem area but 
regulate international relations as a whole.
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Neoliberal institutionalists stress the repetitive character of games. 57 If actors can interact 
with each other only once, the most rational option might be defection. However, 
neoliberal institutionalists argue that in international relations, actors have the chance to 
interact with each other repetitively. This makes it more rational for them to co-operate 
as they can react to the other player’s behaviour. Indeed, as political scientist and game 
theorist Robert Axelrod’s results seem to show, in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the 
best strategy is to co-operate as long as the opponent co-operates too, and to punish the 
opponent’s defection by defection. 58 When dealing with conflicts, rational states and non- 
state actors rationally co-operate with each other and, therefore, avoid self-damaging 
behaviour such as wars or arms races. 
After the end of the Cold War, liberal international relations theorists focused on two 
research questions. The first question concerns the relationship between democracies 
and peace and establishes a research tradition known as democratic peace theory. The 
second question is based on the assumption that interstate wars are less frequent than 
they used to be and asks why this is the case. This research tradition has been 
characterised as international liberalism. 59 
The basic hypothesis of democratic peace theory states that liberal democracies do not 
go to war with one another. Conversely, if the hypothesis is true, the main cause of war is 
the absence of democracy, i.e. some sort of authoritarianism. A strength of democratic 
peace theory is its empirical character. The Correlates of War project at the University of 
Michigan, one of the largest databases collecting data on various aspects of wars since 
57 Iterated prisonner’s dilemmas were originally studied by Robert Axelrod (Axelrod 1984). 
58 This strategy is called TIT FOR TAT. See, for instance, (Milinski 1987). 
59 (Mingst and Karns 1995)
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1816, has been used to both confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis. Indeed, as Edward 
Mansfield and Jack Snyder remark: 
“[m]uch of the research on the democratic peace has relied on statistical tests, which 
indicate that democracies become involved in war as frequently as other states, but that 
by reasonably restrictive definitions, they have never fought each other.” 60 
Although not bound to liberalism, democratic peace theory is usually supported by 
liberalists. Liberalism provides an explanation for the assumption of democratic peace 
theory as it identifies causal mechanisms that link democracies to peace. Democratic 
norms restrain their leaders’ power of decision-making to the extent that they can only 
choose actions that are in the interest of the majority of their citizens. War, so the 
argument runs, is never an optimal option for the citizens of a state because of its high 
costs in terms of human losses, destruction of infrastructure, expensive armament, etc. 
Hence, democracies do not go to war because their leaders’ can only choose options in 
the interest of their citizens, and war is never in the interest of their citizens. In addition 
to this general argument, there is a second argument linking democracy and peace. 
Democracies are bound by international institutions which advocate norms that ban war 
as a means of conflict resolution. As democracies, in contrast to authoritarian regimes, 
obey these norms, democracy is both a necessary and sufficient condition for not 
engaging in war. 
Democratic peace theory has been criticised mainly by scholars of the realist tradition. 
They question the statistical significance of the findings that support democratic peace 
theory. Considering all combinatorial possibilities of relations between states, it could be 
only a coincidence that wars occur less frequently between democracies. John Owen 
points out that 
60 (Brown et al. 1996, p. 304)
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“the lack of wars among democracies, even if true, is not surprising. Wars are so rare 
that random chance could account for the democratic peace, much as it could account 
for an absence of war among, say, states whose names begin with the letter K.” 61 
The writings of the American political philosophers Francis Fukuyama and John Mueller 
initiated a controversy about the future of political conflicts. 62 According to them, wars 
are becoming less likely as states tend to consider them morally unacceptable. They argue 
that the spread of Western democracy guarantees that there will be fewer wars in the 
future. This claim is supported by the fact that Western democracies have not fought 
against each other since the end of World War II. In Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence 
of Major War, Mueller argues that the inhuman experience of World War I and II has 
made it morally unacceptable for Western democracies to engage in war again. 63 
Democracy, according to this view, is closely linked to the principles of free market 
economies. In fact, some definitions of democracy involve the concept of market or 
private property economics. 64 
There are several points of criticism that have been raised against international liberalism. 
Common to all of them is the doubt that the idea of Western democracy is universally 
applicable as assumed by international liberalists. 
1.4.2  Realism, Neorealism, and Neoclassical Realism 
Realism and its successors, neorealism and neoclassical realism, make up the second 
school of thought in international relations theory. Realistic thinking is opposed to 
idealism and institutionalism, and is seen as rather pessimistic with regard to international 
61 (Owen 1994, p. 88) 
62 (Fukuyama 1992) 
63 (Mueller 1989) 
64 Cf., for instance, (Doyle 1983).
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conflicts compared to idealism. Realism dates back to the ancient Greek historian 
Thucydides who formulated the fundamental assumptions of the realistic view. Further 
realist thinkers include the Christian bishop Augustine and the English philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes. In the 20 th century realism became the prominent theory of 
international relations after World War II and influenced both the American and the 
European foreign policy of the Cold War era. After the Cold War, political scientists, 
such as Kenneth Waltz, simplified the realist assumptions and eliminated their essentialist 
prerequisites. This simplification of the classical approach has become known as the 
neorealist or structuralist school of realism. In the 1990s, a third generation of realists 
intended to unify the classical and the neorealist views under the new theoretical 
framework of neoclassical realism. 
Classical realism originates in Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War. 65 In his analysis 
Thucydides formulates four assumptions that are still shared by contemporary realists. 
First, he identifies states as the main actors within the international system. Other actors, 
such as individuals or groups of interest, are assumed to have little control over a state’s 
relation to other states. Second, Thucydides believes that states act unitarily, i.e. they 
speak with one voice. Third, he claims that states act rationally. Every state weighs the 
costs and benefits of all available actions and chooses the one that best suits its national 
interest. Fourth, Thucydides specifies what it is for a state to pursue its national interest 
by identifying national interest with security. The most important goal of a states’ foreign 
policy is its protection against enemies. State behaviour is not determined by moral 
principles, but by the goal to increase security. According to Thucydides, this can be 
achieved by increasing domestic capacities, by increasing economic power, or by building 
alliances with other states. 
65 (Thucydides BC431(1972))
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St. Augustine provides an explanation of Thucydides’s assumption that states act 
egoistically by postulating that human nature itself is egoistic and selfish and, 
consequently, states are egoistic and selfish. 
This link between state behaviour and human nature is further elaborated by Thomas 
Hobbes. 66 He argues that states have the right to struggle for their survival similar to 
individuals who have the right to defend themselves and protect their own safety if left 
alone in a war of all against all. His main contribution to realism is his observation that 
the international system is anarchic. Lacking any higher entity that determines and 
controls the behaviour of states within the international system, each state is forced to 
regulate its interactions with other states on its own. Its potential actions are determined 
by its national capacities. Powerful states are more likely to survive than weaker states as 
they have more control over their external relations. From the fact that the international 
system is anarchic, Hobbes concludes that states have the right to protect themselves 
against other states even if this implies war; thus, conflicts and wars are inevitable. 
In 1948, the German immigrant Hans Morgenthau wrote Politics among Nations, the first 
comprehensive standard volume of the realist approach. 67 Morgenthau, as Hobbes, 
assumes that international politics is a struggle for power among sovereign nations. This 
struggle for power manifests itself on three different levels. On the individual level, 
people struggle for their survival. On the state level, unitary and independent states act in 
a way that maximises their national interests. On the international system level, anarchy is 
the predominant condition making it impossible for states to end their constant struggle 
for power. 
66 (Hobbes 1651(2003)) 
67 (Morgenthau 1967)
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Morgenthau identifies various options for states to increase their power. States can 
aggressively try to amass resources by means of an expansive foreign policy. Following 
this strategy, a state has to spend a large amount of his resources on building a strong 
attacking force. Offensive realism is the view according to which states naturally aim at 
expanding their territory and are only limited by their amount of military resources. 68 In 
contrast to offensive realists, defensive realists, such as Stephen Walt, assume that states 
aim at protecting their own territory by investing in a strong defensive armament. 69 A 
third option for states to gain power is to build military alliances with other states. 
According to Morgenthau, the first two options, i.e. investing in a strong offensive or 
defensive force, lead to a security dilemma. A security dilemma evolves if all states try to 
increase their security through increasing their military power. As a whole, this leads to a 
more insecure situation than before. The fact that security gains of one state imply 
security losses for another can be described by a zero-sum game in which the players 
have the option to increase their military expenditure or not to increase it. If one state 
opts for increasing and the other does not, the security gained by the first player is lost by 
the second player. John Herz describes the security dilemma as follows: 
“Striving to attain security from attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and more 
power in order to escape the power of others. This in turn renders the others more 
insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely 
secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious 
circle of security and power accumulation is on.” 70 
If states choose the third option of building alliances with other states, the realist concept 
of a balance of power applies. It refers to an equilibrium state in which all blocks of allied 
states have an equal amount of power, and, consequently, no state has disproportionally 
68 (Mearsheimer 2001) 
69 (Walt 2005) 
70 (Herz 1950, p. 157)
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more power than any other state. In order to avoid war, the foreign policy of states 
should be driven by the goal of balancing power by supporting allied states and 
containing enemies. This concept, which assumes that state relations are exclusively 
determined by their relative military and economic power, has shaped the foreign policy 
of the Cold War era. Various examples can be found, in which either the USA or the 
Soviet Union supported allied states in order to weaken the other superpower’s power. 
Realists frequently argue that nuclear war has only been prevented by a balance of power 
within the international system. 
Several assumptions of Morgenthau’s realism have been criticised. The main point of 
criticism concerns the lack of empirical testability of the theory and the connected 
problem of falsifiability. One of the critics, the American political scientist Kenneth 
Waltz, developed a simplification of classical realism known as neorealism. In his 1979 
book Theory of international Politics, Waltz rejects the realist assumption that bad human 
nature is the cause of international anarchy. 71 He also weakened the realist focus on states 
as the only actors within the international system. Although he recognises the dominant 
role of states, he points out that there are actors above and below the state level that 
influence state behaviour. He shares the realist view that the only goal of a state is to 
increase its power in order to survive within international anarchy. However, states are 
restrained in their actions by the structure of the international system. 
According to Waltz, the international system is ordered by the specific distribution of 
capabilities among states. As individual states are not able to control the structure of the 
international system, or to change their position within it, their actions are restricted by 
the system. For instance, the options available to a superpower and those available to a 
71 (Waltz 1979)
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developing country differ significantly, just because they have a fundamentally different 
position within the international system. 
Depending on their position within the international system, it can be disadvantageous 
for states to co-operate with other states for two reasons. First, even if both states are 
able to increase their power through co-operation, the question of whether this is 
advantageous for both of them depends on how much each state gains from the co- 
operation. If one state’s power increases much more than the other state’s power, the 
latter has a loss in relative power. What counts, according to the neorealist view, is 
relative power rather than absolute power. Second, co-operation makes states dependent 
on one another, and, hence, it restrains their potential actions. Therefore, too much 
dependence lowers a state’s power. As a result of these negative effects of co-operation, 
states distrust one another, and, generally, avoid co-operating. Weak states have two 
strategies according to the neorealist view. When confronted with a stronger state’s 
power, they can either join alliances with other weak states against the stronger state, or 
they can accept the stronger state’s influence and try to gain from supporting it. The 
former strategy is called balancing, the latter bandwagoning. The decision of which 
strategy is to be chosen is a cost-benefit calculation. 
Similar to the realist view, neorealists also are pessimistic with regard to the occurrence 
of violent conflicts. In an atmosphere of mutual distrust and competition for relative 
power, violent conflicts are inevitable. 
Neoclassical realists, the third generation of realists, aim at reunifying classical realism 
and neorealism. They add domestic policy as an intervening variable between the 
international system level and the specific form of foreign policy chosen by states. 
Political scientists like Gideon Rose points out that the foreign policy of a state is
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determined not only by the actual amount of relative power the state has within the 
international system, but also by the national perception of the system and the specific 
national incentives of the state. 72 Hence, in order to predict a state’s foreign policy, we 
first have to look at the distribution of power, and second, we have to consider its 
perception of the international system and its domestic interests. These factors together 
determine, for instance, whether a state goes to war or not, according to neoclassical 
realism. 
1.5  Theories about Attitudes and Social Groups 
Extracting the basic elements of conflicts from the various formal, psychological, and 
political theories introduced in this chapter, we can identify entities such as goals, beliefs, 
emotions, and values as the main elements constituting conflicts. None of these elements 
is specific to conflicts, i.e. they all occur in other human situations. Hence, there are 
general theories dealing with these concepts. In this section we look at theories about 
some of the basic elements that constitute conflicts. 
First, we provide an exposition of theories about attitudes. The reason for this is that 
crucial conflict elements, such as goals, beliefs, emotions, and values, can be understood 
as certain types of attitudes. Indeed, in our logic-based model, we will reconstruct these 
elements as propositional attitudes. First, we introduce the concept of attitudes as 
developed by Gordon Allport. Then, we look at Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein’s theory 
of planned action which links attitudes and actions. 
72 (Rose 1998)
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Second, we address the question of how individual behaviour is linked to group 
behaviour. This is necessary as we want to extrapolate psychological characteristics, such 
as emotions, values, cognitions, etc. to social groups. Without this step, we would not 
have an explanatory basis for intergroup conflicts. We first describe the theory of 
minimal groups and introduce the concept of social norms. Then, we introduce social 
identity theory, the standard theory about the relationship between individual behaviour 
and group behaviour. 
1.5.1  Theories about Attitudes 
The concept of attitudes is a core concept of social psychology. A large number of 
studies in social psychology consist of measuring attitudes by means of questionnaires. 
The importance of studying attitudes is motivated by the fact that they play a major role 
in explaining human interactions. 
The main function of attitudes is their ability to provide orientation towards objects for 
the person holding the attitude. An example illustrating this function is, for instance, the 
attitude that snakes are dangerous. Although not true for every snake, this attitude 
provides a guideline for people to deal with snakes. 
Attitudes are not directly accessible, as they are cognitive structures encoded in the 
human brain. Gordon Allport, an early social psychologist, defined an attitude as 
“[…] a mental and neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a 
directive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and 
situations with which it is related.” 73 
73 (Allport 1935, p. 810)
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Allport’s definition expresses the passive character of attitudes. They only become active 
when a person faces the object or situation, which the attitude is about. Then, the 
attitude determines the person’s reaction to the object or situation. 
Leon Thurstone suggests that attitudes are holistic and consist of only one, 
predominantly affective component. He defines them as a person’s positive or negative 
affect towards a psychological object. 74 Alice Eagly and Shelly Chaiken identify three 
components of an attitude: an affective component, a cognitive component, and a 
behavioural component. 75 The affective component involves all emotional reactions a 
person has towards an object or situation. The cognitive component summarises 
thoughts, beliefs, judgements, opinions, schemes etc. the person holds towards the 
attitude object. The behavioural component can either be the person’s behavioural 
reaction to the attitude object or the person’s intention to react in a certain way, when 
facing the attitude object. 
The dynamics of attitudes, i.e. their formation and change, is explained by a number of 
theories subsumed under the name “cognitive consistency theories”. The basic idea of 
these theories is that a person tries to keep his attitudes consistent with each other. So, if 
someone holds a positive attitude towards pacifism, for instance, and believes at the same 
time that a military intervention is justified, his attitudes are inconsistent or dissonant, as 
Leon Festinger calls it. As dissonance is subjectively aversive, the person tends to drop or 
at least to modify one of his attitudes. The two most prominent cognitive consistency 
74 (Thurstone and Chave 1929) 
75 (Eagly and Chaiken 1993)
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theories are Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance and Fritz Heider’s balance 
theory. 76 
The standard theory about the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is Icek Ajzen 
and Martin Fishbein’s theory of reasoned action and its extension the theory of planned 
behaviour (TPB). 77 According to TPB there are three variables, in addition to a person’s 
attitudes, that determine his behaviour towards an object. In order to explain, for 
instance, why somebody joins a paramilitary group, we have to refer to the person’s 
attitudes, his subjective norms, his perceived behavioural control, and his behavioural 
intention, according to TPB. The first condition is that his attitude towards joining the 
group is positive. Second, the person has to believe that relevant other persons in his 
environment appreciate his decision, i.e. that they believe joining the paramilitary group 
is a proper thing to do (subjective norm). Third, the person has to believe that he has 
control over the performance and consequences of his action. So, he has to believe that 
he has the required resources to join the paramilitary group, and that there will be an 
opportunity for him to do so (perceived behavioural control). If these three conditions 
are met, the person generates an intention to join the paramilitary group. If the intention 
is stable over a certain interval of time, he will finally carry out the action of joining the 
group. Predicting behavioural intentions and behaviour itself on the basis of TPB could 
be shown to be relatively reliable. 78 
76 (Festinger 1957; Heider 1958) 
77 See (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). 
78 See, for instance, (Madden et al. 1992).
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1.5.2  Theories about Social Groups 
The question of whether people behave differently as group members as opposed to 
individuals has been answered both positively and negatively. Connected to this question 
is the question of reductionism: Can group behaviour be completely reduced to the 
behaviour of its members or is there a fundamental difference between the behaviour of 
groups and the behaviour of individuals? 
A simple but surprisingly robust theory about group behaviour, known as the minimal 
group paradigm, has been developed by Henri Tajfel. The theory shows that people 
engage in intergroup competition and ethnocentric behaviour as soon as they enter a 
group, even one arbitrarily formed. 79 Both types of behaviour are examples of group 
behaviour, i.e. individuals show this kind of behaviour only as group members. 
From the perspective of an individual, groups which the individual is a member of are 
called ingroups. All other groups are outgroups. Tajfel tried to state the minimal 
conditions for a person to show group behaviour. His studies have shown that a 
randomly chosen categorisation distinguishing an ingroup from an outgroup is sufficient 
to make people engage in intergroup competition and ethnocentric behaviour. 80 
In his experiment he randomly categorised subjects as X- or Y-group members. The 
subjects then had to distribute points between X- and Y-group members. 
Overwhelmingly, the subjects chose distributions that either maximised the number of 
points for members of their ingroup or maximised the difference in the number of 
points awarded in favour of the ingroup. The maximum ingroup profit strategy and the 
79 For an overview article on the minimal group paradigm, see (Diehl 1990). 
80 (Tajfel et al. 1971)
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maximum difference strategy show that the subjects favoured members of their ingroup, 
although the subjects knew that the groups were formed randomly. 
Tajfel’s result was supported in a number of subsequent studies. Michael Hogg and 
Graham Vaughan conclude from these experiments that 
“[t]he robust finding, from scores of minimal group experiments conducted with a wide 
range of participants, is that the mere fact of being categorised as a group member 
seems to be necessary and sufficient to produce ethnocentrism and competitive 
intergroup behaviour” 81 
In the following, we present the concept of social norms. Social norms are behavioural 
and attitudinal uniformities of a group, such as the behaviour of speaking Spanish 
typically associated with the group Mexicans or the expectation to wear a tie as a member 
of the group politicians. Different social norms define different social groups. They 
describe how members of a social group typically behave, and they prescribe how people 
are expected to behave if they intend to join a group. 
Some social norms, such as the legal system of a country codifying the various norms 
about right and wrong behaviour held in that country, are explicit. Illegal behaviour is 
punished, whereas norm compliant behaviour is often rewarded. Other social norms are 
implicit. They only become explicit if they are violated by a group member. 
The formation of social norms is often explained by majority influence. New group 
members conform to the norms of the majority. Majority influence and group 
conformity were studied in a famous experiment by Solomon Asch. 82 He asked subjects 
to compare the lengths of three lines with the length of a reference line. The subjects had 
to tell which of the three lines was of equal length to the reference line. The tasks were 
81 (Hogg and Vaughan 2002, p. 297) 
82 (Asch 1951
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unambiguous, i.e. the subjects could find the correct answer straightforwardly. 
Nevertheless, if a number of other group members, who were confederates of the 
experimenter, consistently gave a wrong answer, a significant number of subjects also 
gave the wrong answer. 
The minimal group paradigm is explained by, and integrated into, a larger theoretical 
framework called social identity theory. 83 This theory, which was developed by Henri 
Tajfel and John Turner, aims at linking group behaviour on the macro level with 
processes on the individual level by means of the concept of social identity. 
Its first assumption is that in any society, there are social groups, such as workers, men, 
tennis players, politicians, Hindu castes etc. Social identity can then be defined as the part 
of a person’s self-concept that derives from the person’s membership in a social group. A 
person, so the idea goes, has as many social identities as there are groups the person 
identifies with. For example, somebody’s social identity might consist of his identification 
as a man, a tennis player, a politician, a worker, and a member of a certain Hindu caste. 
By distinguishing between personal and social identity, social identity theorists avoid 
having to explain group behaviour merely in terms of personality and interpersonal 
relations. 
Social identity theory claims that parts of a person’s behaviour can only be explained by 
taking into account the person’s social identity. This kind of behaviour can then be 
classified as group behaviour. Social identity theory identifies five characteristics of group 
behaviour. First, members of a group usually see the world through the lenses of this 
group. They evaluate their environment relative to the group’s preferences and, hence, 
engage in ethnocentric behaviour. Second, group members favour other ingroup 
83 (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986)
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members over outgroup members. Therefore, ingroup favouritism is a characteristic of 
group behaviour. Third, people distinguish their ingroups from other groups. Doing this, 
they emphasise differences between their own group and other groups, i.e. they make 
intergroup differentiations. The fourth characteristic of group behaviour is the 
phenomenon of stereotyping which is connected to intergroup differentiations. The 
members of a group widely share simplified pictures of other social groups and their 
members as a means to differentiate between groups. The last feature of ingroup 
behaviour is that people usually tend to conform to ingroup norms. 
Various intergroup processes on the macro level, such as social movements or societal 
changes, could be successfully explained by social identity theory. 84 
1.6  Summary 
The aim of chapter 1 was to provide an overview of theories of conflict. This has been 
achieved to the extent that we have given descriptions of formal theories, psychological 
theories, and political theories of conflict. We have identified game theory as the most 
predominant formal theory of conflict and have seen how this theory reoccurs in 
psychological theories of conflict, such as the theory of social dilemmas, as well as 
political theories, such as neoliberal institutionalism or the security dilemma described by 
realists. 
We have identified the concepts ‘agent’, ‘goal’, ‘attitude’, ‘value’, ‘strategy’, ‘utility’, 
‘emotion’, and ‘probability’ as the concepts used by game theorists, psychologists, and 
political scientists to describe conflicts. Also, we have identified concepts like ‘goal’ 
84 (van Knippenberg and Ellemers 1993)
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‘compatibility’, ‘fighting instinct’, ‘zero-sum utility payoff’, ‘social learning’, ‘frustration’, 
‘relative deprivation’, or ‘outgroup discrimination’ as factors determining the dynamics of 
conflicts. 
The theories give us a conceptual background for the development of our own logic- 
based approach. In particular, we will use the idea of tree structures, as defined in game 
theory, as the underlying temporal structures of conflicts in our model. Also, we will use 
the concepts ‘state’ and ‘agent’ from game theory and the concepts ‘goal’, ‘norm’, ‘belief’ 
and, ‘emotion’ from the psychological theories. 
Having extracted the main concepts of existing conflict theories, we will develop a 
general language to describe conflicts in the following chapter.
89 
CHAPTER 2 
Describing Conflicts 
The Syntax of Conflict Modelling Logic 
2.1  Introduction 
The aim of chapter 2 is to introduce the syntax of Conflict Modelling Logic (CML). As a 
logical system intended to model conflicts, CML consists of a syntax, a semantics, and a 
proof theory. The syntax of CML is constituted by a formal language, which can be used 
to describe conflicts. 
In this chapter we characterise the language of CML, L CML , by defining the set of its 
primitive symbols and stating the formation rules for its formulae. This will allow us to 
express statements about conflicts in terms of formulae of the language of CML. 
As a result of the chapter, we will be able to give answers to the following questions. 
· Which primitive symbols are used in the language of CML to describe conflicts 
and what are their natural language interpretations? 
· How can the primitive symbols of CML be used to construct formulae 
expressing statements about conflicts?
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· How can CML-formulae be used to express specific aspects of temporal 
expressions, attitudes, beliefs, and emotions? 
· How can elements of the Second Congo War be described by CML-formulae? 
An outline of the chapter is given as follows: In section 2.2, we introduce the primitive 
symbols of the language of CML and provide natural language interpretations for them. 
In particular, we introduce symbols for propositions (2.2.1), logical connectives and 
quantifiers (2.2.2), alethic modalities (2.2.3), various constituents of time (2.2.4), beliefs 
(2.2.5), goals (2.2.6), norms (2.2.7), and emotions (2.2.8). In section 2.3, we define the set 
of CML-formulae. First, we state their formation rules (2.3.1), and then we provide 
natural language descriptions for some basic CML-formulae (2.3.2). In section 2.4, we 
show how a number of statements, typically occurring in discussions about time, 
knowledge and belief, and emotions, can be formalised in the language of CML. In 
particular, we formalise expressions for specific aspects of temporal statements (2.4.1), 
attitudes and beliefs (2.4.2), and emotions (2.4.3). Finally, we describe aspects of the 
Second Congo War in the language of CML in order to illustrate the language of CML. 
2.2  Symbols 
The language of CML, L CML , is constituted by a set SYM of primitive symbols. SYM 
consists of three sets of constant symbols: p-CON, t-CON, and a-CON, two sets of 
variable symbols, t-VAR and a-VAR, an indexical symbol n, and a set of operator 
symbols, OPE. 
Definition 15 (Symbols of L CML ) 
SYM = p-CON È t-CON È a-CON È t-VAR È a-VAR È {n} È OPE is the 
set of primitive symbols of L CML , where:
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(1) p-CON = {p 1 , p 2 , …} is a countable set of propositional constants; 
(2) t-CON = {t 1 , t 2 , …} is a countable set of temporal constants; 
(3) a-CON = {a 1 , a 2 , …, a n } is a finite set of agent constants; 
(4) t-VAR = {x 1 , x 2 , …} is a countable set of temporal variables; 
(5) a-VAR = {y 1 , y 2 , …} is a countable set of agent variables; 
(6) OPE = {Ø, Ù, ", =, R, <, □, B, G, N, E} is a set of operators. 
Informally, elements of p-CON refer to propositions, elements of t-CON refer to 
specific time points, and elements of a-CON refer to specific agents. Elements of t-VAR 
range over time points, and elements of a-VAR range over agents. The indexical symbol 
n stands for “now”. OPE includes the truth-functional connectives Ø and Ù, the 
universal quantifier ", the identity symbol =, the temporal realisation operator R, the 
symbol for the temporal precedence relation <, the alethic modal operator □, the belief 
operator B, the goal operator G,  the norm operator N, and the emotion operator E. 
We also use the letters p, q, and r for propositional constants and the letters t, x, a, and y 
for elements of t-CON, t-VAR, a-CON, and a-VAR, respectively. Note that the letter x 
is reserved for temporal variables, whereas the letter y is reserved for agent variables. 
Furthermore, we use CON for the set of all temporal and agent constants, i.e. CON = t- 
CON È a-CON, and VAR for the set of all variables, i.e. VAR = t-VAR È a-VAR. 
As there are constants and variables for time points and agents, we can distinguish 
temporal terms from agent terms. The indexical symbol n is not a term of L CML . Terms 
are defined as follows. 
Definition 16 (Terms of L CML ) 
TER = t-TER È a-TER is the set of terms of L CML where: 
(1) t-TER = t-CON È t-VAR; 
(2) a-TER = a-CON È a-VAR. 
Apart from their semantic category, elements of SYM can also be classified according to 
the domain they are intended to model. This categorisation of SYM will be used in
Chapter 2   Describing Conflicts 
92 
chapter 4 to single out various fragments of CML. The following definition distinguishes 
between modal, temporal, and attitude symbols. 
Definition 17 (Classification of SYM) 
SYM = □-SYM È t-SYM È a-SYM is the set of symbols of L CML where: 
(1) □-SYM = p-CON È {Ø, Ù, □} is the set of modal symbols; 
(2) t-SYM = p-CON È t-TER È {n} È {Ø, Ù, ", =, R, <} is the set of 
temporal symbols; 
(3) a-SYM = p-CON È a-TER È {Ø, Ù, ", =, B, G, N, E} is the set of 
attitude symbols. 
Note that the three categories are not mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive. 
2.2.1  Propositional Constants 
Conflicts can be described by declarative sentences. In such a description, the sentences 
refer to propositions that are in some sense relevant to the conflict. For example, when 
describing the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina the sentence 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina is a recognised, independent state” 
refers to the proposition that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a recognised, independent state. 
This proposition is either true or false, depending on whether Bosnia and Herzegovina is, 
indeed, a recognised, independent state or not. 85 
Following the example, a proposition can be defined as the entity expressed by a 
declarative sentence or the entity a declarative sentence refers to. 86 If a proposition is 
true, it is also called a fact. 
85 In fact, the sentence was false before April 6, 1992 and true afterwards. 
86 This view of propositions as the sense or thought expressed by sentences is due to Gottlob Frege who 
distinguished in his classic paper On Sense and Reference between the sense and the reference of a sentence.
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The example shows that propositions are the bearers of truth-values leading to another 
definition of propositions as the primary bearers of truth-values. 87 In CML a bivalent 
view is adopted with regard to propositions, i.e. every proposition must either have the 
truth-value ‘true’ or the truth-value ‘false’. Furthermore, it is excluded that a proposition 
is true and false at the same time, has no truth-value at all, or has a truth-value other than 
‘true’ or ‘false’. 
Propositions have the ability to occur as the content of propositional attitudes. 
Propositions can be believed, wanted, known, liked, brought about, morally claimed, etc. 
The basic structure of a propositional attitude is A(a, p), where A designates an attitude 
relation, such as believes-that, wants-that, knows-that, etc., the letter a stands for the 
agent holding the propositional attitude, and p is the proposition towards which a holds 
the attitude. 88 
Propositional constants, contained in p-CON, refer to specific propositions relevant to 
the conflict that is modelled. The question whether a proposition is relevant to a conflict 
or not has only a vague answer. If a particular conflict is to be modelled, one can ask the 
parties, which propositions they consider relevant to the conflict. Alternatively, one can 
list all those propositions which are relevant to the conflict from an outside perspective, 
such as the perspective of an expert of the conflict or a research institute. 89 
According to Frege, the sense of a sentence is the thought expressed by the sentence, whereas the referent 
of a sentence is its truth-value. See (Frege 1892(1980)). 
87 A historical overview over theories of propositions is given in (Nuchelmans 1973). 
88 (Salmon and Soames 1988) 
89 The two methods correspond to two views in conflict studies. According to the subjective view, conflicts 
are determined by what is conceived, valued, desired etc. by the parties. See, for instance, (Deutsch 1973, p. 
11). Advocates of the objective view, such as Karl Marx or John Galtung, claim that conflicts exist 
regardless of what the conflicting parties think or feel. See (Galtung 1990, p. 10).
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2.2.2  Logical Symbols 
Logical symbols used in L CML are either truth-functional connectives, quantifiers, or the 
identity symbol. We use the classical negation symbol, Ø, and the classical conjunction 
symbol, Ù, as a complete base of truth-functional connectives. Further connectives for 
classical disjunction (Ú), material implication (É), and the material bi-conditional (≡) are 
defined from the base {Ø, Ù}. The truth-functional connectives are read in the usual 
way, i.e. Ø as “it is not the case that”, Ù as “and”, Ú as “or”, É as “implies”, and ≡ as “if 
and only if”. The identity symbol, =, connects terms of L CML or the indexical symbol n. 
We also use it to define the inequality symbol ≠. 
The basic quantification symbol of L CML is the universal quantifier " which is read as 
“for all”. We can quantify over both temporal and agent variables. Quantification leads to 
the definition of bound and free occurrences of variables in formulae. These definitions 
are given in the usual way, i.e. a variable x or y occurs bound in a formula just in case it 
occurs within the scope of a quantification with respect to x or y, and its occurrence is 
free if it is not bound. Formulae in which all temporal and agent variables occur bound 
are called sentences of L CML . The existential quantifier $, which is read as “for some”, is 
defined from " in the usual way. 
Defined logical symbols used in CML are listed in the definition below. 
Definition 18 (Defined Logical Symbols of L CML ) 
(1) φ Ú ψ for Ø(Øφ Ù Øψ); 
(2) φ É ψ for Ø(φ Ù Øψ); 
(3) φ ≡ ψ for Ø(φ Ù Øψ) Ù Ø(ψ Ù Øφ); 
(4) $νφ for Ø"νØφ where ν Î VAR; 
(5) (τ 1 ≠ τ 2 ) for Ø(τ 1 = τ 2 ) where τ 1 , τ 2 Î TER È {n}.
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2.2.3  Modal Symbols 
In order to express alethic modal properties of propositions, two unary operators are 
used in L CML . The box symbol □ expresses necessity, whereas the diamond symbol ◊ 
expresses possibility. Hence, □ is read as “necessarily” and ◊ as “possibly”. 
We only introduce the necessity operator □ as a primitive symbol and define the 
possibility operator ◊ in the usual way. 
Definition 19 (Defined Modal Symbol of L CML ) 
◊φ for Ø□Øφ. 
2.2.4  Temporal Symbols 
Temporal symbols used in L CML are either temporal terms, the indexical symbol, or 
temporal operators. Temporal terms, summarised in the set t-TER, denote time points. 
The indexical symbol n also denotes a time point. However, it is not classified as a term 
because its value is not determined by a term assignment function. The binary relation 
symbol < expresses the temporal precedence relation between time points, and the 
binary operator R is used to express that a formula is true at a certain time point. 
The temporal symbols of L CML are based on the symbols used in Nicholas Rescher and 
Alastair Urquhart’s R/U-calculus. 90 In contrast to the tense operators F and P of Arthur 
Prior’s tense logic, 91 the operators of the R/U-calculus explicitly link time points to 
propositions. The temporal realisation operator R allows one to build formulae that 
assert the truth of a sub-formula at a specific time point. The temporal precedence 
90 See (Rescher and Urquhart 1971, p. 35). 
91 See (Prior 1967).
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relation U makes it possible to compare time points with regard to their chronological 
order. In the R/U-calculus, it is possible, for instance, to explicitly represent sentences 
like 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised as an independent state on April 6, 
1992”. 
In contrast, if we use tense operators like F or P, we can only represent sentences like 
“At some time in the past, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised as an 
independent state”. 
The expressive power of the R/U-calculus is stronger than the expressive power of tense 
logic as the tense operators F, P, G, and H can be defined within the R/U-calculus. 
Therefore, every formula of tense logic can be translated into a formula of the R/U- 
calculus. 92 
When speaking about time points, it is possible to single out one preferred position: the 
position of “now”. Then, all other time points can be compared with this position and 
identified as past time points or future time points. However, as time passes, so does the 
position of “now”. In L CML , we refer to the preferred position of “now” by the symbol n. 
This symbol is classified as an indexical symbol as it is neither a constant nor a variable. 
Rescher and Urquhart describe the syntactical representation of “now” as follows. 
“The status of n = “now” is, of course somewhat peculiar from the logical standpoint. It 
is neither fish nor fowl, neither constant nor variable. It is not a constant, since it does 
not denote the same T-element [i.e. time point - F.L.] on each occasion of its use, and 
not a variable, since it cannot meaningfully be quantified […]. If we were to assign n to 
any semantical category, it would have to be that of indexicals, i.e., those parts of speech 
92 For the definability of tense operators in the R/U-calculus, see (Rescher and Urquhart 1971, p. 50ff).
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which denote something uniquely in a given context, though not the same thing in every 
context.” 93 
With the syntactical representation of “now”, it is possible to divide the temporal domain 
into three disjoint classes: past, present, and future. Thereby, we obtain descriptions of 
time in the style of John McTaggart’s A-series. 94 Time can also be described in terms of 
series of earlier and later, which McTaggart called B-series. Here, the basic concept is the 
notion of temporal precedence expressed in L CML , by the binary temporal relation symbol 
<. 95 The symbol < stands between any two temporal terms, or between a temporal term 
and the indexical symbol n, and is read as “temporally precedes”. We use the infix 
notation for <. 
In order to express that two time points temporally coincide, we use the identity symbol 
=. In this context, = is read as “temporally coincides with”. Similar to the precedence 
symbol, = stands between temporal terms or a temporal term and the indexical symbol n. 
In order to express that a proposition is true at a certain time point, we use the binary 
temporal realisation operator R. As propositions, expressed by formulae of L CML , can be 
true at any time point including “now”, R links temporal terms or the indexical symbol n 
with formulae of L CML . For the operator R, we use the prefix notation, i.e. statements like 
“φ is realised at the time point t” or “now it is true that φ” are expressed by formulae of 
the form Rtφ and Rnφ, respectively. 
Further temporal ordering relations, such as temporal succession, weak temporal 
precedence, and weak temporal succession can be defined as follows. 
93 (Rescher and Urquhart 1971, p. 35) 
94 (McTaggart 1908) 
95 Rescher and Urquhart use the symbol U for temporal precedence.
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Definition 20 (Defined Temporal Symbols of L CML ) 
(1) τ 1 > τ 2 for τ 2 < τ 1 Ù Ø(τ 1 = τ 2 ) where τ 1 , τ 2 Î t-TER È {n}; 
(2) τ 1 £ τ 2 for τ 1 < τ 2 Ú τ 1 = τ 2 where τ 1 , τ 2 Î t-TER È {n}; 
(3) τ 1 ³ τ 2 for Ø(τ 1 < τ 2 ) where τ 1 , τ 2 Î t-TER È {n}. 
2.2.5  Doxastic Symbol 
In L CML , we use the doxastic operator B to express that an agent believes that a certain 
proposition, expressed by a formula of L CML , is true. The operator is read as “believes 
that”. B is assumed to express a weak belief predicate, i.e. B is neither related to the 
truth/falsity of the believed proposition nor to the agent’s reasons or justifications for 
the belief. 96 
A formula of the form Bαφ, with α Î a-TER, expresses that the agent referred to by α 
believes that φ in the sense that the agent would answer affirmatively to the question “Is 
φ true?”. If the agent were not asked, he would not be aware of the fact that he believes 
that φ. Hence, B is a reactive and unconscious belief operator. 
For instance, the statement 
“Radovan Karadzic believes that the Republic of Srpska should have close 
relations with Serbia” 
can be expressed by a formulae of the form Bap, where the agent constant a refers to the 
agent Radovan Karadzic and p to the proposition expressed by the sentence 
“The Republic of Srpska should have close relations with Serbia”. 
96 For a detailed analysis and classification of doxastic and epistemic predicates, see (Stelzner 1984).
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2.2.6  Symbol for Goals 
Goals pursued by the agents involved in a conflict are expressed in L CML by the goal 
operator G which links agent terms to propositions. G is read as “wants that” or “has the 
goal that”. G expresses that an agent wants that a certain proposition, expressed by a 
formula φ of L CML , is true. 
For example, the statement 
“The citizens of Srebrenica want Srebrenica to be independent from the Republic 
of Srpska” 
can be expressed by the formula Gap, where the agent constant a refers to the agent “the 
citizens of Srebrenica” and p to the proposition expressed by the sentence 
“Srebrenica is independent from the Republic of Srpska”. 
Again, G is assumed to be a reactive and unconscious operator. The fact that an agent 
has a certain goal does not imply that the agent is aware his goal. Formulae of the form 
Gαφ merely express that the agent α would answer affirmatively to the question “Do you 
want φ to be true?”. 
2.2.7  Deontic Symbol 
Unlike deontic logic, CML does not deal with logical interdependencies of normative 
statements. Our only aim is to syntactically represent norms, and values held by agents 
involved in a conflict. This is reflected by the basic norm operator N of L CML . N links 
agent terms to propositions and is read as “considers it a moral/legal norm that”.
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N can be used to express moral or religious values. For instance, the fact that the third 
Pillar of Islam is considered a religious value by religious Bosnian Muslims, which is 
expressed by the sentence 
“Religious Bosnian Muslims believe that one is morally obliged to spend 2.5% of 
his wealth for the benefit of the poor or needy” 
can be modelled by the formula Nap, where the agent constant a refers to the agent “the 
religious Bosnian Muslims” and p is the proposition expressed by the sentence 
“One spends 2.5% of his wealth for the benefit of the poor or needy”. 
N can also be used to model legal norms held by a party. For instance, if we want to 
represent the fact that the European Union considers Article 44 of Protocol I, additional 
to the Geneva Conventions, a legal norm, which is expressed by the sentence 
“The European Union thinks that it should be the case that any combatant who 
falls into the power of an adverse party while not engaged in an attack or in a 
military operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his rights to be a 
combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities” 
we can do this with the formula Nap where the agent constant a refers to the agent 
“European Union” and p to the proposition expressed by the sentence 
“Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse party while not engaged 
in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his 
rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities”. 
The difference between the goal operator G and the norm operator N is a difference in 
the degree of generality. G only expresses that one particular agent wants a certain
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proposition to be true, whereas N represents the case in which an agent claims that every 
agent is obliged to bring about the truth of a certain proposition. 
2.2.8  Symbol for Emotions 
Emotional excitement can be reconstructed as a propositional attitude. 97 The emotional 
operator E expresses that an agent is in a state of emotional excitement, and that this 
state is caused by a certain proposition, expressed by a formula of L CML . The operator 
links agent terms to propositions and is read as “is in a state of emotional excitement 
caused by” or “is emotionally excited about”. 
For example, the statement 
“The citizens of Srebrenica are emotionally excited (anger) because Srebrenica 
belongs politically to the Republic of Srpska” 
can be modelled by the formula Eap where the constant a refers to the agent “the 
citizens of Srebrenica” and p refers to the proposition expressed by the sentence 
“Srebrenica belongs politically to the Republic of Srpska”. 
The polarity of the excitement, i.e. whether the excitement is positive or negative, as well 
as further parameters determining the specific character of the emotion, are not captured 
by the basic operator E. They can, however, be defined by formulae that combine the 
emotional operator with other attitude operators like B or G. 
97 The view of emotions as certain types of propositional attitudes is closely related to a cluster of theories 
of emotion summarised as cognitive appraisal theories. Among the advocates of the cognitive appraisal 
approach to emotions are Richard Lazarus, Nico Frijda, Magda Arnold, and Rainer Reisenzein. See 
(Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Frijda 1986; Frijda et al. 1989; Shields and Kappas 2006; Reisenzein and 
Hofmann 1993).
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2.3  Formulae 
Using the primitive symbols of L CML , we can build CML-formulae. The set of all 
formulae of the language L CML is referred to by FOR and defined recursively by a 
definition in Backus Naur Form (BNF). 98 The BNF makes it possible to decide for every 
string of elements of SYM, whether it represents a well formed CML-formula or not. 
2.3.1  Formation Rules 
Formulae of L CML are defined by the following BNF. 
Definition 21 (Formulae of L CML ) 
FOR is the set of all strings of elements of SYM satisfying the following BNF: 
φ = :: p | Øψ | ψ Ù χ | "νψ | τ 1 = τ 2 | □ψ | Rτ 3 ψ | τ 3 < τ 4 | Oαψ, where p Î p- 
CON, ν Î VAR, τ 1 , τ 2 Î TER È {n}, τ 3 , τ 4 Î t-TER È {n}, αÎ a-TER, O Î {B, 
G, N, E}. 
2.3.2  Interpretation of Basic Formulae 
The following table displays all types of basic formulae of L CML , shows how to read them, 
and gives an example for every formula. 
98 BNF definitions were introduced by John Backus and Peter Naur. For the original paper, see (Naur and 
Backus 1964).
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Table 11: Basic Formulae of CML 
2.4  Complex Expressions 
In the following, we provide formalisations for some expressions typically occurring in 
the context of time, knowledge and belief, goals, norms, and emotions. The statements 
express a number of specific temporal relationships, conscious attitudes, true and false 
beliefs, and the polarity of emotions. 
Formula How to read it Example 
p p Srebrenica belongs to the Republic of Srpska. 
Øp it is not the case that p Srebrenica does not belong to the Republic of Srpska. 
p Ù q p and q 
Srebrenica belongs to the Republic of Srpska and 30% of the 
citizens of Srebrenica are Bosnian Muslims 
"xRxp for all time points Rxp Srebrenica belongs always to the Republic of Srpska. 
"yByp for all agents Byp 
Everybody believes that Srebrenica belongs to the Republic 
of Srpska. 
□(rÉp) it is necessarily the case that (rÉp) 
It is necessarily the case that if the Dayton Agreement is 
implemented, Srebrenica belongs to the Republic of Srpska. 
n = t1 n temporally coincides with t1 Today is April 6, 1992. 
t1 < t2 t1 temporally precedes t2 April 6, 1992 is earlier than December 14, 1995. 
Rt2r r is realised at the time point t2 The Dayton Agreement was signed on December 14, 1995. 
Ba1s a1 believes that s R. Karadzic believes that S. Milosevic is dead. 
Ga2Øp a2 wants that Øp 
The citizens of Srebrenica want Srebrenica to be 
independent from the Republic of Srpska. 
Na3u 
a3 considers it a moral/legal norm 
that u 
The Serbian government considers it a legal norm that war 
criminals should be detained. 
Ea2p 
a is emotionally excited because 
of p 
The citizens of Srebrenica are emotionally excited because 
Srebrenica belongs to the Republic of Srpska.
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2.4.1  Complex Expressions for Specific Temporal Aspects 
First, we look at formulae that express certain temporal aspects. If a statement φ was true 
in the past, is true at present, or will be true in the future, we can express this by the 
following formulae, respectively. 
Past(φ) = "x(x < n É Rxφ); 
Present(φ) = Rnφ; 
Future(φ) = "x(n < x É Rxφ). 
If a statement φ is true during a certain interval in time, this can be formalised by the 
following expression. 
Interval(t 1 , t 2 , φ) = "x(t 1 £ x Ù x £ t 2 É Rxφ). 
Here t 1 is the starting point and t 2 is the endpoint of the interval. 
If we want to express that a statement φ will be true until a time point at which ψ 
becomes true, we can do this by the following formula. 
Until(φ, ψ) = $x 1 (n < x 1 Ù Rx 1 ψ Ù "x 2 (n £ x 2 Ù x 2 < x 1 É Rx 2 φ)). 
Similarly, we can express that φ has been true since a time point at which ψ was true by 
the following formula. 
Since(φ, ψ) = $x 1 (x 1 £ n Ù Rx 1 ψ Ù "x 2 (x 1 £ x 2 Ù x 2 £ n É Rx 2 φ)) 
99 
99 The “Since” and “Until” operators were introduced into temporal logic by Hans Kamp in his PhD 
thesis. See (Kamp 1968).
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As the semantics of CML is based on a discrete model of time, we can formalise 
statements about immediate temporal predecessors and successors. For instance, if we 
want to say that φ is true at the next time point or that φ was true at the previous time 
point, we can do this by the following formulae. 
X(φ) = $x 1 (n < x 1 Ù Rx 1 φ Ù Ø$x 2 (n < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 1 )); 
Y(φ) = $x 1 (x 1 < n Ù Rx 1 φ Ù Ø$x 2 (x 1 < x 2 Ù x 2 < n)). 
2.4.2  Complex Expressions for Conscious Attitudes and False Beliefs 
Consciousness conditions for statements involving propositional attitudes can be 
expressed as conjunctions with the belief operator. We can contrast any unconscious 
belief, goal, norm, and emotion, with its conscious counterpart defined as follows. 
Bconscious(a, φ) = BaBaφ Ù Baφ; 
Gconscious(a, φ) = BaGaφ Ù Gaφ; 
Nconscious(a, φ) = BaNaφ Ù Naφ; 
Econscious(a, φ) = BaEaφ Ù Eaφ. 
The first expression, for instance, expresses that the agent a believes φ and believes that 
he believes that φ, i.e. he is consciously aware of his belief. 
False beliefs and true beliefs can be expressed by formulae of the form 
Bfalse(a, φ) = Baφ Ù Øφ; 
Btrue(a, φ) = Baφ Ù φ.
Chapter 2   Describing Conflicts 
106 
2.4.3  Complex Expressions for Emotions 
Finally, we provide two definitions which make it possible to distinguish between 
positive and negative emotions. Following the goal-relevance approach of emotions, 100 an 
emotion is positive if its attitude object is wanted by the agent, and an emotion is 
negative if the attitude object is not wanted by the agent. A positive emotion is, 
therefore, defined by the following formula. 
Epositive(a, φ) = Eaφ Ù Gaφ. 
A negative emotion is defined by the formula 
Enegative(a, φ) = Eaφ Ù GaØφ. 
In both cases, the agent is emotionally excited about φ. φ is goal-congruent in the first 
case and goal-incongruent in the second case. 
Example: Second Congo War 
In this section, we illustrate how L CML can be used to describe a conflict by applying it to 
the Second Congo War, which took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
between 1998 and 2003. 101 Obviously, this conflict is far too complex to be 
comprehensively represented here. We just focus on some aspects of the conflict. The 
choice of elements is motivated by the aim of illustrating the various operators of L CML . 
100 According to the goal-relevance approach, which was developed in the cognitive appraisal paradigm of 
emotions, emotions only occur as reactions to events that are relevant for an agent. Goal congruent events 
cause positive emotions and goal incongruent emotions cause negative emotions. See (Lazarus and Lazarus 
1994; Arnold and Gasson 1954, p. 294ff). 
101 Comprehensive analyses on the War in the Democratic Republic of Congo can be found in (Weiss 
2000; Nest et al. 2006; ICG 2008a; ICG 2008b).
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The example is intended to show how L CML works in general rather than to give a 
comprehensive representation of the Second Congo War. 
During the First Congo War, from December 1996 to May 1997, an alliance of various 
rebel groups headed by Laurant-Desire Kabila, and supported by Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Angola, overthrew the Mobutu regime that had ruled the country for 31 years. 102 In the 
Second Congo War, from August 1998 to July 2003, Kabila’s former allies Rwanda and 
Uganda turned against him and unsuccessfully tried to topple him as president. The 
Kabila government received support from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, as well as 
other African countries. 103 In the course of the war, Rwanda and Uganda turned against 
each other and fought both direct battles as well as proxy battles through aligned rebel 
groups on the territory of the DRC. Altogether, the Second Congo War was a large scale 
war that cost approximately four million lives. 104 
The factions in the Second Congo War can be grouped as follows: Kabila-aligned forces, 
Rwanda-aligned forces, Uganda-aligned forces, and Hutu-aligned forces. 105 
a1: Kabila-aligned forces 
a2: Hutu-aligned forces 
a3: Rwanda-aligned forces 
a4: Uganda-aligned forces 
Each of these parties can be represented by an agent constant. The agent a 1 includes the 
Congolese national army under Kabila, his allies Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, and a 
number of Congolese nationalistic groups grouped under the name Mai-Mai. The agent 
102 (ICG 2008a) 
103 (Clark 2002) 
104 (Coghlan et al. 2006) 
105 (ICG 2008b; ICG 2008a)
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a 2 is mainly represented by the Hutu rebel organisation “Forces democratiques pour la 
Liberation du Rwanda” (FDLR) 106 , a group formed by former perpetrators of the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda who flew into the neighbouring Congolese Kivu provinces after the 
Tutsi government under Kagame came into power in Rwanda. Furthermore, the agent 
includes Burundian rebels, Congolese Hutu, and aligned Mai-Mai groups. The agent a 3 
includes the national armies of Rwanda and Burundi, and the rebel organisation 
“Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie” (RCD), formed by the Banyamulenge, 
the Congolese Tutsi people. The agent a 4 includes the national Ugandan army, and the 
rebel organisation “Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo” (MLC). 
The following list represents propositions relevant to the Second Congo War, i.e. issues 
the conflict was fought over. 107 Each of them is represented by a propositional constant. 
p1: The DRC is a uniform and sovereign state. 
p2: The national security of Rwanda is protected. 
p3: The national security of Uganda is protected. 
p4: Banyamulenge are attacked in the Kivu provinces. 
p5: Banyamulenge are eradicated. 
p6: Foreign Tutsi forces are expelled from the territory of the DRC. 
p7: The Tutsi government of Rwanda is overthrown. 
p8: The government of the DRC controls the exploitation of the natural resources in the 
Kivu provinces. 
p9: The government of Rwanda controls the exploitation of the natural resources in the 
Kivu provinces. 
p10: The government of Uganda controls the exploitation of the natural resources in the 
Kivu province. 
p11: The FDLR controls the exploitation of the natural resources in the Kivu provinces. 
p12: The conjunction of the statements in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
106 The FDLR is still active in the Eastern Congo until now. Their website is (FDLR 2008). For a 
description of the rebel movement see (ICG 2005). 
107 The list represents issues identified in the Second Congo War by looking at annual reports of the 
Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research. See (HIIK 1999; HIIK 1998; HIIK 2000; HIIK 
2001; HIIK 2002; HIIK 2003).
The Syntax of Conflict Modelling Logic 
109 
p13: An attack is launched against the Kabila government. 
Using the propositional attitude operators B, G, N, and E, we can connect the four agent 
constants with the 13 propositional constants and, thereby, describe some of the beliefs, 
goals, norms, and emotions held by the four factions. The following list contains a 
number of formulae and the respective statememnts that they express. 
Ga1p1: The Kabila-aligned forces want the DRC to be a uniform and sovereign state. 
Ga3p2: The Rwanda-aligned forces want the national security of Rwanda to be protected. 
Ga1p3: The Uganda-aligned forces want the national security of Uganda to be protected. 
Ga3Øp4: The Rwanda-aligned forces want Banyamulenge not to be attacked in the Kivu 
provinces. 
Ea3p4: The Rwanda-aligned forces are emotionally affected by the fact that 
Banyamulenge are attacked in the Kivu provinces. 
Na3Øp4: The Rwanda-aligned forces consider it morally/legally wrong to attack 
Banyamulenge in the Kivu provinces. 
Ba3Ga2p5: The Rwanda-aligned forces believe that the Hutu-aligned forces want to 
eradicate the Banyamulenge. 
Ga2p6 The Hutu-aligned forces want foreign Tutsi forces to be expelled from the 
territory of the DRC. 
Ga3Øp7: The Rwanda-aligned forces want the Tutsi government of Rwanda not to be 
overthrown. 
Ga2(p8 Ù Øp9 Ù Øp10 Ù Ø p11): The Kabila government wants the exploitation of the 
natural resources in the Kivu provinces to be exclusively controlled by the 
government of the DRC. 
Na3p12: The Rwanda-aligned forced consider the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide a norm. 
Ga3p13: The Rwanda-aligned forces want an attack to be launched against the Kabila 
government. 
Ba3Ga2p5: The Rwanda-aligned forces believe that the Hutu-aligned forces want the 
Banyamulenge in the Kivu provinces to be eradicated. 
Ea3Ga2p5: The Rwanda-aligned forces are emotionally affected by the fact that the 
Hutu-aligned forces want the Banyamulenge in the Kivu provinces to be eradicated. 
Using the possibility operator ◊ and the conditional É, we can build more complex 
formulae expressing hypothetical and conditional statements about the conflict.
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◊Øp5: It is possible that the Banyamulenge in the Kivu provinces are not eradicated. 
p5 É p13 : If the Banyamulenge in the Kivu provinces are eradicated, then an attack is 
launched against the Kabila government. 
If we want to describe the temporal component of the conflict we have to introduce 
temporal constants. For the sake of simplicity, we introduce here only one temporal 
constant t 1 standing for the date “August 3, 1998”. 
t1: August 3, 1998 
Using the realisation operator R we can temporally locate our statements. The following 
list displays three simple temporal statements and two more complex statements about 
the Second Congo War. 
Rt1p13: On August 3, 1998 an attack is launched against the Kabila government. 
Rt1Ga3p13: On August 3, 1998 the Rwanda-aligned forces want an attack to be launched 
against the Kabila government. 
Rt1Ea1p13: On August 3, 1998 the Kabila government is emotionally affected by the fact 
that an attack is launched against them 
Ba1$x(n < x Ù Rxp1): The Kabila government believes that the DRC will be a uniform 
and sovereign state at some point in the future. 
Ba1à$x(n < x Ù Rxp13): The Kabila government believes that it is possible that the DRC 
will be a uniform and sovereign state at some point in the future. 
The above statements, formalised in the language of CML, express various statements 
that can be made about the Second Congo War. The statements also show how different 
levels of particularity can be expressed depending on the level of complexity of the 
formulae representing them.
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2.5  Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the syntax of CML. This has been achieved to 
the extent that we have defined the set SYM of primitive symbols of L CML and have 
stated the formation rules for the set FOR of CML-formulae. SYM includes symbols for 
important elements of a conflict. In particular, we have introduced symbols for agents, 
various temporal entities, propositions, modalities, beliefs, goals, norms, and emotions. 
With the BNF formation rules we have given a precise definition of CML-formulae. 
Designing L CML was guided by two considerations. On the one hand, L CML had to be 
expressive enough to express all relevant aspects of a conflict. On the other hand, it had 
to be simple enough to be accessible to computational manipulations. The expressive 
power of L CML was illustrated by formalising statements about the Second Congo War. 
Having introduced the syntax of CML, we are now able to describe conflicts in a uniform 
way by means of a formal language. The syntax of CML allows one to represent conflicts 
in terms of sets of CML-formulae. Finding a uniform and formal description is the first 
step in the process of modelling and resolving a conflict. In the following chapter, we 
will show how the formulae of the language of CML can be interpreted in a general 
semantics.
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CHAPTER 3 
Interpreting Conflicts 
The Semantics of Conflict Modelling Logic 
3.1  Introduction 
The aim of chapter 3 is to introduce the semantics of CML. The semantics of CML 
provides the basis for interpreting CML-formulae and thereby makes it possible to 
interpret statements about conflicts. CML-formulae are evaluated in algebraic structures 
called CML-structures relative to conflict states. 
In this chapter, we define CML-structures and state the conditions under which CML- 
formulae are true relative to a conflict state in a CML-structure. If we take the meaning 
of a statement to be the truth condition of the formula expressing the statement, then the 
semantics of CML provides a general theory of meaning for statements about conflicts. 
The concepts of validity, satisfiability, and semantic consequence, which are closely 
related to the truth conditions of CML, are defined at the end of the chapter. 
As a result of the chapter we will to give answers to the following questions. 
· What are the components of CML-structures?
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· How can CML-formulae be evaluated in CML-structures? 
· What are the truth conditions for the operators used in CML? 
· What does it mean to say that a CML-formula is valid or satisfiable, and when 
does a CML-formula logically follow from other CML-formulae? 
· How can aspects of the Second Congo War be reconstructed as a CML- 
structure? 
An outline of the chapter is as follows: We start with a background section on branching- 
time temporal logic as the semantics of CML is developed in the context of these logics. 
In section 3.2, we introduce the components of CML-structures starting with the set of 
time points (3.2.1), followed by the set of conflict states and the set of conflict histories 
(3.2.2), the set of agents and attitude functions (3.2.3), and the term assignment function 
(3.2.4). In section 3.3, we define some further concepts: the immediate predecessor of a 
time point (3.3.1), the set of conflict states at a fixed time point (3.3.2), the time index 
function (3.3.3), and the accessibility relation (3.3.4). In section 3.4, we state the truth 
conditions for the logical symbols (3.4.1), the modal operator (3.4.2), the temporal 
symbols (3.4.3), and the propositional attitude operators (3.4.4). In section 3.5 we define 
three levels of validity of CML-formulae. First we define validity in states (3.5.1), 
followed by definitions of validity in CML-structures (3.5.2) and general validity in CML 
(3.5.3). Sections 3.6 and 3.7 deal with the concept of satisfiability and the semantic 
consequence relation, respectively. Finally, we apply the concept of CML-structures to 
the second Congo War.
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Background: Branching-Time Temporal Logic 
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of branching-time structures and review some 
of the logics describing them. This will give us a background for constructing our own 
temporal structure underlying the semantic of CML. 
Branching-time temporal logics constitute a research field within temporal logic. 
Temporal logic aims at modelling processes of reasoning specific to the temporal 
components of statements. 108 The motivation for creating branching-time temporal logics 
is the view that the past of any event is determined, whereas its future is indeterminate, 
i.e. the assumption that at any time point, the world has only one unique past history, but 
there may be many potential continuations into the future. As a consequence, statements 
referring to past time points have a fixed truth value, whereas statements referring to 
future time points have a fixed truth value only if the future continuation the world’s 
development will take is specified (Ockhamist view), or they are true or false in all 
potential future continuations (Peircean view). 109 
In the following, we first introduce the concept of forwards-branching, backwards-linear, 
trees, the kind of structures underlying the semantics of branching-time temporal logics. 
Then, we describe three approaches to branching-time temporal logic. First, we 
introduce the modal approach to branching time temporal logic. This approach, 
associated with Prior’s tense logic, uses modal operators to express temporal aspects of 
statements. 110 We will look at two modal systems: Ockhamist logic and Peircean logic. 
108 For a general introduction to temporal logic, see, for instance, (Goldblatt 1992; Rescher and Urquhart 
1971). For the history of temporal logic, see (Ohrstrom and Hasle 1995). A computer-science oriented 
introduction to temporal logic with a focus on state systems is (Kroeger and Merz 2008). 
109 The distinction between the Peircean and Ockhamist view in branching-time temporal logic was 
introduced by Prior. See (Prior 1967). 
110 For an overview of systems of tense logic, see (McArthur 1976).
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Second, we discuss the Rt-approach to branching-time temporal logic. This approach is 
based on first-order logic rather than modal logic. As an example, we present Rescher’s 
system K b . Finally, we introduce computational tree logic (CTL) and its extension full 
computational tree logic (CTL*), the main system developed in the computing school of 
branching-time temporal logic. 
Forwards-branching, backwards-linear, trees are structures of the form (T, <) consisting 
of a set of states/time points T and an irreflexive, transitive, left-linear binary relation < 
on T, i.e. for all t 0 , t 1 , t 2 Î T, it is not the case that t 0 < t 0 (irreflexivity), if t 0 < t 1 and t 1 < 
t 2 , then t 0 < t 2 (transitivity), and if t 0 < t 2 and t 1 < t 2 , then either t 0 < t 1 , t 0 = t 1 , or t 1 < t 0 
(left-linearity). 111 Graphically, we can display forwards-branching, backwards-linear, trees 
as nodes connected by lines. The nodes represent the elements of T, and the lines the 
binary relation <. 
For a given forwards-branching, backwards-linear, tree (T, <), a history h is defined as a 
subset of T, which is linearly ordered by < and maximal for inclusion. The set of all 
histories in a tree (T, <) is denoted by H(T). To complete the general semantic 
framework for branching-time temporal logics, we still have to define an evaluation 
function v. This is done by assigning truth values to propositional constants relative to 
111 (Goranko and Zanardo 2004, p. 2; Hodkinson and Reynolds 2007, p. 660; Gurevich and Saharon 1985, 
668) 
Figure 4: Forwards-branching, Backwards-linear, Tree
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states/time points, i.e. v is a function v: VAR ´ T ® {0, 1}. A branching-time structure 
M can now be defined as a pair consisting of a forwards-branching, backwards-linear, 
tree (T, <) and an evaluation function v, i.e. M = ((T, <), v). 112 
Before we look at particular systems of branching-time temporal logic, we introduce the 
distinction between state-dependent and path-dependent formulae. A formula is path- 
dependent, or a path-formula, if its truth value can only be determined relative to a pair 
consisting of a state/time point t and a history h. If the truth value of a formula only 
depends on the state/time point at which the formula is evaluated, it is a state-formula. 
The distinction between state-formulae and path-formulae applies only to logics in which 
formulae are evaluated relative to states and histories, otherwise, all formulae are 
automatically state-formulae. 
In chapter seven of Past, Present, Future, Prior presents two systems of branching-time 
temporal logic, which he calls “Peircean logic” and “Ockhamist logic”. 113 Both systems 
are developed within the modal paradigm, i.e. temporal operators are understood as 
modal operators quantifying over possible worlds, which are called states or time points 
in the context of temporal logic. The difference between the two systems is that in 
Peircean logic, formulae are evaluated relative to states, whereas in Ockhamist logic 
formulae are evaluated with respect to states and histories. 
Both systems have the same propositional language consisting of a set of propositional 
variables VAR = {p, q, r, …}, the usual Boolean connectives Ø, Ú, Ù, and É, and two 
tense operators P and F. The two tense operators can be used to build complex formulae 
112 See (Zanardo 1996, p. 4). An alternative, but essentially equivalent approach, to the semantics of 
branching-time temporal logic is to start with Kamp-frames, instead of trees, as primitive elements. In 
Kamp-frames, histories are introduced as primitive elements. See (Thomason 1984). 
113 (Prior 1967, p. 113ff)
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of the form Pφ and Fφ which are interpreted as “It has been the case that φ” and “It will 
be the case that φ”, respectively. 
In Peircean logic, formulae are evaluated at states t Î T of a branching-time structure M 
= ((T, <), v) by extending the evaluation function v to arbitrary formulae. The truth 
conditions for the Boolean connectives are just the standard ones. The following two 
conditions apply to the tense operators P Peirce and F Peirce . 
(1) v t (P Peirce φ) = 1 iff for every history h Î H(T), if t Î h, then there is a t’ Î h such 
that t’ < t and v t’ (φ) = 1; 
(2) v t (F Peirce φ) = 1 iff for every history h Î H(T), if t Î h, then there is a t’ Î h such 
that t < t’ and v t’ (φ) = 1. 
The two conditions express that a formula φ “has been true” at a state t iff in every 
history that goes through t, φ is true at some past state t’ in that history, whereas a 
formula φ “will be true” at t iff in every history that goes through t, φ is true at some 
future state t’ in that history. To give an example, we can look at the statement “It will 
rain”. In Peircean logic, the statement is true iff in every potential continuation of the 
world there is some point at which it will rain. 
Validity for Peircean logic is defined in the usual way, i.e. a formula is valid iff it is true in 
every state t Î T of every branching-time structure M. An adequate finite axiomatisation 
of Peircean logic has been provided by John Burgess. 114 Alberto Zanardo has proved a 
completeness theorem for Peircean logic over an infinite axiom system. 115 
114 (Burgess 1980) 
115 (Zanardo 1990)
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In Ockhamist logic, formulae are evaluated at pairs consisting of a state t Î T and a 
history h Î H(T) of a branching-time structure M. Again, the evaluation is done by 
extending the evaluation function v to arbitrary formulae. 
(1) v t,h (P Ockham φ) = 1 iff there is a t’ Î h such that t’ < t and v t’ (φ) = 1; 
(2) v t, h (F Ockham φ) = 1 iff there is a t’ Î h such that t < t’ and v t’ (φ) = 1. 
The two truth conditions express that at a state t a formula φ “has been true” with 
respect to a history h iff φ is true at a past state t’ in h, whereas φ “will be true” with 
respect to h iff φ is true at a future state t’ in h. According to Ockhamist logic, the 
statement “It will rain” is true relative to a specified history iff there is a future point in 
this specified history at which it will rain. 
If a modal operator □ of historical necessity is added to Ockhamist logic, it is possible to 
express the Peircean tense operators in terms of □ and the Ockhamist operators. The 
truth condition for the historical necessity operator is given as follows. 
v t,h (□φ) = 1 iff for every history h’ Î H(T) if t Î h’, then v t, h’ (φ) = 1. 
Note that the truth value of □φ does not depend on the set of histories H(T), i.e. □φ is a 
state formula. The Peircean tense operators, P Peirce and F Peirce , can then be expressed as 
□P Ockham and □F Ockham , respectively. 
A formula is valid in Ockhamist logic iff it is true in every state history pair of every 
branching-time structure M. Adequate finite axiomatisations of Ockhamist logic are 
presented by Nicholas Rescher and Alastair Urquhart, as well as Robert McArthur. 116 
116 (Rescher and Urquhart 1971; McArthur 1976)
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In the Rt-approach to temporal logic, states or time points are explicitly represented by 
terms in the language. The basic operator of these systems is the temporal realisation 
operator R connecting terms for time points with formulae of the language. Formulae of 
the form Rtφ are interpreted as “φ is true at t”. If a binary relation U for “earlier than” is 
added to the logic, we are able to directly express properties of the branching-time 
structure in terms of formulae of the language. Such an approach is chosen in Rescher 
and Urquhart’s R/U-calculus for branching-time temporal logic, which we present as an 
example for the Rt-approach. 117 
The language of the R/U-calculus consists of a set of propositional variables VAR = {p, 
q, r, …}, a set of temporal variables TEM = {x, y, z, …}, the indexical symbol n for 
“now”, the usual Boolean connectives, quantifiers, the identity symbol =, the temporal 
realisation operator R, and the temporal precedence symbol U. The set of formulae is 
given by the following BNF definition. 
φ =:: p | a = b | Uab | "xψ | Øψ | ψ Ù χ | Raψ, where a, b Î TEM È {n}. 
For a given branching-time structure M, formulae are evaluated at states/time points. 
However, as the language contains variables for states, the evaluation v also depends on a 
term assignment function μ assigning elements of T to the temporal variables x, y, z, etc. 
We only provide the truth conditions for R and U. Conditions for all the other symbols 
are standard. 118 
(1) v t, μ (Rxφ) = 1 iff v μ(x), μ (φ) = 1; 
117 See (Rescher 1966; Rescher and Urquhart 1971). A more recent treatment of the approach can be found 
in (Åqvist 2005). 
118 The conditions stated here are a slightly different version of the conditions truth conditions presented in 
(Rescher and Urquhart 1971, p. 45) adjusted to our notation.
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(2) v t, μ (Rnφ) = 1 iff v t, μ (φ) = 1; 
(3) v t, μ (Uxy) = 1 iff μ(x) < μ(y); 
(4) v t, μ (Uxn) = 1 iff μ(x) < t; 
(5) v t, μ (Unx) = 1 iff t < μ(x). 
Special truth conditions are required for the indexical symbol n, which is interpreted as 
the state t at which the formula containing n is evaluated. The conditions for R express 
that a formula Rxφ is true at a state t if φ is true at the μ-value of x. A formula of the 
form Rnφ is true at a state t if φ is true at t. 
Rescher and Urquhart first provide an adequate axiomatisation for a basic system 
without the precedence relation U, which they call the basic system R of temporal logic. 
Then, they add U to the language of R and formulate two conditions for U expressing 
the transitivity and left-linearity of <. The obtained system of branching-time temporal 
logic is called K b . In order to axiomatise K b , they introduce the tense operators P and F 
into the system by means of the following definitions. 
(1) Fφ for $x(Unx Ù Rxφ); 
(2) Pφ for $x(Uxn Ù Rxφ). 
Using the tense operators P and F, Rescher and Urquhart provide an axiomatisation of 
K b for which they prove completeness. Their system is equivalent to Nino Cocchiarella’s 
system CR with an additional axiom expressing left-linearity. 119 
Computer scientists have developed branching-time temporal logics primarily to study 
the specification and verification of transition systems. The most elaborated such system 
is CTL*, full computational tree logic. CTL* is an extension of the simple branching-time 
119 (Cocchiarella 1966; Prior 1967; McArthur 1976)
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temporal logic CTL, computational tree logic. CTL was developed by Edmund Clarke 
and Allen Emerson in the early 1980s 120 and extended to CTL* by Emerson, Joseph 
Halpern, and Prasad Sistla. 121 First, we describe the syntax and semantic of CTL*, then 
we single out CTL as a fragment of CTL*. 
The language of CTL* consists of a set of propositional variables VAR = {p, q, r, …}, 
the classical connectives Ø and Ù, and the temporal connectives X, U and E. Formulae 
are defined by the following BNF. 
φ =:: p | Øψ | ψ Ù χ | Xψ | ψUχ | Eψ. 
Further operators are defined as follows. 
(1) ◊φ for (p Ú Øp)Uφ; 
(2) □φ for Ø((p Ú Øp)UØφ) 
(3) Aφ for ØEØφ 
Formulae of the form Xφ, φUψ and Eφ are interpreted as “at the next state it is the case 
that φ”, “φ is the case until ψ is the case”, and “there is at least one path starting from the 
current state where it is the case that φ”, respectively. 
The temporal operators used in CTL* are significantly different from the ones used in 
tense logic or Rescher’s Rt logic. The next operator X is particularly designed for discrete 
structures, such as transition systems. The until operator U is a binary operator, in 
contrast to the unary operators of tense logic or Rescher’s realisation operator R. 
120 (Clarke and Emerson 1981) 
121 (Emerson and Sistla 1985)
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Formulae of CTL* are evaluated in transitions systems. A transition system M is a 
structure of the form (S, R, g) where S is a nonempty set of states, R is a binary, total 
relation on S, i.e. for all s Î S there is an s’ such that sRs’, and g is a labelling of the states 
with sets of propositional variables, i.e. g is a function assigning subsets of VAR to the 
elements of S. 
Before we state the truth conditions for the temporal operators of CTL*, we still have to 
define the concept of a ‘fullpath’ in a transition system M. If M is a transition system, by 
a fullpath b in M we mean an infinite sequence (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , …) of states of M such that for 
every s i , s i+1 Î N the relation s i Rs i+1 holds. For a given fullpath b = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , …) we write 
b i to designate the state s i in b and b ≥i to designate the fullpath (s i , s i+1 , s i+2 , …). 
The truth value of formulae of CTL* is defined relative to a fullpath b of a transition 
system M. We write M, b ⊨ φ to express that φ is true at (the initial state b 1 ) of the 
fullpath b in the transition system M. The truth conditions for propositional variables 
and the three temporal operators X, U and E can now be given as follows. 122 
(1) M, b ⊨ p iff p Î g(b 1 ); 
(2) M, b ⊨ Xφ iff M, b ≥2 ⊨ φ; 
(3) M, b ⊨ φUψ iff there is some j ≥ 0 such that M, b ≥j ⊨ ψ and for every k, if 1 ≤ k 
< j, then M, b ≥k ⊨ φ; 
(4) M, b ⊨ Eφ iff there is some fullpath b’ such that b 1 = b’ 1 and M, b’ ⊨ φ. 
The truth conditions for the logical connectives are standard. A formula φ is valid in 
CTL* iff M, b ⊨ φ for all fullpaths b in all transition systems M. 
122 We follow a formulation of the truth conditions for CTL* given in (Hodkinson and Reynolds 2007, p. 
681).
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Depending on the particular order of temporal operators occurring in a CTL*-formula, 
its truth value might not be dependent on a fullpath b, but only on a state s Î S. 
Consider, for instance, the formula EXφ. This formula is true at any state s such that 
there is a state s’ with sRs’ and φ is true at s’. Formulae of this kind are state formulae. 
CTL is defined as the fragment of CTL* which contains only state formulae. The 
semantics of CTL is identical with the semantics of CTL*. Its formulae are defined by 
the following BNF. 
φ =:: p | Øψ | ψ Ù χ | EXψ | E(ψUχ). 
Both CTL and CTL* have been adequately axiomatised. An axiomatisation of CTL was 
provided by Emerson and Halpern. 123 CTL* was first axiomatised by Mark Reynolds in 
2001. 124 
3.2  CML­structures 
CML-structures constitute the central concept in the semantics of CML. They are 
algebraic structures constituted by a number of sets, relations, and functions. 125 The sets, 
relations, and functions jointly represent various aspects of conflicts, such as their 
temporal development, the possible states they go through, the parties participating in 
them, and the parties’ beliefs, goals, values, and emotions. 
123 (Emerson and Halpern 1982) 
124 (Reynolds 2001) 
125 Algebraic structures are n-tuples of the form <S1, …, Si, R1, …, Rj, F1, …, Fk, c1, …, cl>, where S1, …, 
Si are sets called the domains of the structure, R1, …, Rj are relations (on S1, …, Si), F1, …, Fk are functions 
(on S1, …, Si) and c1, …, cl are constants. For a definition of algebraic structures, see (Ebbinghaus et al. 
1994, p. 26; Marker 2002, p. 8). In the case of CML-structures, we are dealing with many-sorted structures, 
as they have more than one domain. A discussion of many-sorted structures can be found in (Ebbinghaus 
et al. 1994, p. 45f).
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A general definition of CML-structures is provided as follows. 
Definition 22 (CML-Structure) 
A CML-structure x is a structure of the form <T, ≺, W, H, v, A, b, g, n, e, μ>, 
where: 
(1) T is a set of time points; 
(2) ≺ a binary relation on T; 
(3) W is a set of possible conflict states; 
(4) H is a set of possible conflict histories; 
(5) v is a truth assignment function; 
(6) A is a set of agents; 
(7) b is a belief function; 
(8) g is a goal function; 
(9) n is a norm function; 
(10) e is an emotion function; 
(11) μ is a term assignment function. 
Note that the above definition is just a general characterisation of CML-structures. In 
order for it to work, we will have to introduce further conditions for the sets T, W, H, 
and A, the relation ≺, and the functions v, b, g, n, e, and μ. This will be done in 
subsequent sections. 
CML-structures are defined for two purposes. First, they allow us to evaluate CML- 
formulae with respect to their truth value relative to a given CML-structure x. This, in 
turn, leads to the usual definitions of logical validity and the semantic consequence 
relation and thereby makes it possible to classify formulae as tautologies, contingencies, 
and contradictions, and to determine whether a formula φ semantically follows from a set 
of formulae Φ. 126 Besides this ‘logical purpose’, CML-structures also frame an abstract 
ontology for conflicts. This second ‘ontological purpose’ is achieved to the extent that 
potential conflicts can be reconstructed as CML-structures, i.e. the various aspects of a 
conflict, such as its temporal development, its parties and their beliefs, goals, norms, and 
emotions can be identified with the corresponding components of an appropriate CML- 
126 Various levels of validity for CML-formulae, as well as the semantic consequence relation ⊨, are 
introduced later in the chapter.
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structure. Every CML-structure can, therefore, be regarded as an abstract representation 
of a potential conflict, and vice versa. 127 
3.2.1  Time 
In CML-structures, time is represented by a discrete, strict linear order (T, ≺) without 
endpoints. 128 Such an order consists of a set T = {t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , …} and a transitive, 
irreflexive, trichotomous, and discrete relation ≺ with no endpoints. 129 In the context of 
CML, we call elements of T time points. According to the discreteness condition, every 
time point has a unique immediate predecessor and a unique immediate successor. 130 
Consequently, T has no endpoints with respect to ≺. 
Formally, discrete, strict linear orders without endpoints can be defined as follows. 
Definition 23 (Discrete, Strict Linear Order without Endpoints) 
A discrete, strict linear order without endpoints is a structure of the form (T, ≺), 
where: 
(1) T = {t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , …} is a set of time points; 
(2) ≺ is a binary relation on T such that: 
(i) "t 0 ,t 1 ,t 2 (t 0 ≺ t 1 Ù t 1 ≺ t 2 É t 0 ≺ t 2 ) (transitivity); 
(ii) "t 0 Ø(t 0 ≺ t 0 ) (irreflexivity); 
(iii) "t 0 ,t 1 (t 0 ≺ t 1 Ú t 0 = t 1 Ú t 1 ≺ t 0 ) (trichotomy); 
(iv) "t 0 $t 1 ,t 2 (t 0 ≺ t 1 Ù t 2 ≺ t 0 Ù Ø$t 3 ((t 0 ≺ t 3 Ù t 3 ≺ t 1 ) Ú (t 2 ≺ t 3 Ù t 3 ≺ t 0 ))) 
(discreteness/no endpoints). 
127 CML-structures represent only the logical aspects of a conflict. They can be thought of as mental images 
obtained from looking at a conflict through glasses that filter all but the logical features of the conflict. 
128 An introduction to the theory of linear orders can be found in (Rosenstein 1982). For a detailed 
discussion of various classes of flows of time, see (Hodkinson and Reynolds 2007, p. 658f). 
129 Transitivity, irreflexivity, and trichotomy are the defining properties of a strict linear order. It follows 
that the ordering relation is also antisymmetric. 
130 This definition of discreteness as the property of every element having an immediate successor and an 
immediate predecessor follows Ian Hodkinson and Mark Reynolds. See (Hodkinson and Reynolds 2007, p. 
658f).
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Graphically, discrete, strict linear orders without endpoints can be illustrated by an 
infinite line on which the time points are lined up one after another as shown in the 
following figure. 
Figure 5: Discrete, Strict Linear Order without Endpoints 
In contrast to the semantics of branching-time temporal logics, time points are explicitly 
and independently represented in CML-structures. In particular, they are different from 
states, the entities at which formulae are evaluated. This distinction between time points 
and states is a specific feature of our system. In the semantics of branching-time 
temporal logic, elements of the trees are interchangeably interpreted as time points or 
states. However, for our purpose it is necessary to distinguish between different states a 
conflict can be in at one single time point. Consequently, time points and states must be 
represented by different semantic entities. 
Representing time by a discrete, strict linear order without endpoints provides a useful 
idealisation for the purpose of modelling conflicts. It allows one to break down a conflict 
into a manageable number of conflict states chronologically ordered by ≺. 
Having described time points as elements of discrete, strict linear orders without 
endpoints, we can further characterise them as definite dates. These are expanded points 
or intervals in time, i.e. specific years, months, days, hours, etc. such as “January 16, 
2001”, “The time of Laurant-Désiré Kabila’s assassination”, or “The time before 
Laurant-Désiré Kabila’s assassination”. In contrast to pseudo-dates, such as “now”, 
“yesterday” or “five weeks ago”, definite dates are chronologically stable. They refer to 
the same temporal entity, independent of the context in which they occur. 
… … T 
t1 t0 t2
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When we model a conflict, the choice of dates and their status as points or intervals in 
time depends on the level of granularity at which the conflict is analysed. For example, 
when analysing the Second Congo War, we could look at it annually from its outbreak in 
1998 to its end in 2003, i.e. our dates of interest would be the years from 1998 to 2003. 
Alternatively, we could analyse it more finely and just look at its outbreak in August 
1998. In this case, our dates of interest would be the days of August 1998. Dates are not 
required to have equal temporal expansion. It is possible to examine a conflict with dates 
of vaying levels of granularity. For instance, we can break up the Second Congo War into 
dates like “The time before the RCD offensive”, “The time of the RCD offensive”, “The 
time of the allied counteroffensive”, “The time of internal fighting within the RCD”, etc. 
3.2.2  Conflict States and Conflict Histories 
At each time point, a conflict is in a certain state. In CML-structures, possible conflict 
states are represented by letters w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , etc. 
131 . The set of all conflict states, in which a 
conflict can possibly be, W = {w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , …}, is called the conflict universe. 
Definition 24 (Conflict Universe) 
The conflict universe W = {w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , ….} is a set of possible conflict states. 
Distinguishing between different states, phases, or stages through which a conflict passes 
is common to many conflict models. In his classic work, Anatol Rapoport, for instance, 
identified three stages of a conflict. 132 More recently, Hayward Alker, Ted Gurr and 
Kumar Rupesinghe have developed a typology that distinguishes six phases 133 Eric 
131 Abbreviating possible conflict states by the letter w is inspired by the similarity between possible states 
and possible worlds as used in possible world semantics. 
132 (Rapoport 1960) 
133 (Alker et al. 2001)
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Brahm describes the life cycle of a conflict by differentiating between seven phases. 134 
Conflict scholars typically link the phases of a conflict to its level of violence. In early and 
late phases, the level of violence is low, whereas in middle phases it is high. 135 For the 
current purpose, it is irrelevant, however, whether conflict states are defined relative to 
the level of violence prevalent in the conflict, or whether they are prototypical in the 
sense that every conflict is assumed to pass through the same sequence of states. We only 
presuppose that conflicts can be described in terms of sequences of distinguishable 
states. 
Conflict states can be characterised by sets of propositions. Accordingly, a conflict state 
w can be specified by providing the set of propositions p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , … which are true at w. 
The truth of a proposition p, at a certain state w, is independent from the epistemic 
access an agent may or may not have to it as well as the agent’s goals, norms, or 
emotions. For instance, it is possible that a proposition p is true at a state w even if no 
agent believes that p is true, wants p to be true, considers it a norm that p should be true, 
or is emotionally excited about p. 
The link between propositions and possible conflict states is expressed by the truth 
assignment function v which assigns to every state w the set of basic propositions that 
are true at w. As propositions are represented by members of the set p-CON of 
propositional constants, 136 v can be defined as a function from the conflict universe W 
into the power set of p-CON, where p Î v(w) is interpreted as “p is true at w”, as 
follows. 
134 (Brahm 2003) 
135 The relationship between the progress of time and the level of violence is often illustrated as a reversed 
U-shaped curve in a coordinate-system, in which the x-axis symbolises time and the y-axis stands for the 
level of violence. See, for instance, (Pruitt and Rubin 1986; Baros and Jaeger 2004). 
136 The syntactical representations of propositions are propositional constants summarised in the set p- 
CON. For details, see section 2.2.1.
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Definition 25 (Truth Assignment Function) 
v: W ® Ã(p-CON) is a truth assignment function. 
The truth assignment function v is only defined for basic propositions. For compound 
propositions, expressed by more complex formulae than propositional constants, we will 
provide a recursive extension of v in terms of truth conditions which make it possible to 
calculate the truth value of complex formulae. 
If a conflict is in a certain state w at a certain time point t 0 , it can evolve in different ways. 
At the next time point t 1 , the conflict is in one of a number of possible states w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , 
… . In this sense, each conflict state has an ‘open future’ allowing agents involved in the 
conflict to determine how the conflict develops and external factors to influence the 
course of the conflict. 
As a consequence of the fact that there are a number of different possible states into 
which a conflict can evolve from a given state, we can distinguish between different 
possible conflict histories. A conflict history h is a sequence of possible conflict states 
specifying one unique conflict state w for every time point t. If h specifies the state w for 
the time point t, this means that the conflict is in the state w at t, given that it develops as 
prescribed by the history h. Conflict histories are represented in CML-structures by 
functions from the set of time points T into the conflict universe W. The set of all 
conflict histories is denoted H = {h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , …}. Their formal definition is given as 
follows. 
Definition 26 (Conflict Histories) 
H = {h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , …} Í W 
T is a set of conflict histories such that: 
(1) "h 0 ,h 1 ,t 0 ,t 1 (h 0 (t 0 ) = h 1 (t 1 ) É t 0 = t 1 ); 
(2) "w$h,t(h(t) = w); 
(3) "h 0 ,h 1 $t 0 "t 1 ((t 1 ≼ t 0 É h 0 (t 1 ) = h 1 (t 1 )) Ù (t 0 ≺ t 1 É h 0 (t 1 ) ≠ h 1 (t 1 ))).
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The identity h(t) = w is interpreted as “according to the history h, the conflict is in the 
state w at the time point t” or “w lies on h at t”. 
There are three conditions for conflict histories. According to the first condition, two 
conflict histories can overlap only at identical time points, i.e. if a state w lies on two 
different histories h 0 and h 1 , then this state must be reached by both histories at the same 
time point. In the special the case of h 0 = h 1 , the condition just expresses that every 
conflict history is injective. The second condition describes a global surjectiveness 
property. For every state w, there must be a history h and a time point t such that w is 
the image of t under h. The condition does not require every history h to be surjective; it 
only makes sure that the union of all co-domains of the functions contained in H is 
exhaustive with respect to W. As a consequence, every state can be reached by a possible 
conflict history. The third condition expresses two properties of H. First, for any two 
histories h 0 and h 1 , there is a time point t such that h 0 and h 1 are identical up to t. This 
implies that any two histories in H are connected, and, hence, there are no completely 
parallel histories. Second, once two histories h 0 and h 1 have split, they do not intersect 
again. The motivation for this is that if two different states w 0 and w 1 can be reached at a 
time t, the two possible histories going through w 0 and w 1 , respectively, can never be the 
same; they differ at least with respect to the propositions true in the conflict state at t. 
The picture obtained from ordering the conflict states relative to their occurrence in 
possible conflict histories is shown in the following figure.
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Figure 6: Conflict Histories 
The possible conflict states together with the histories constitute a forwards-branching, 
backwards-linear, tree. 137 The backwards-linearity corresponds to the determinacy of the 
past, whereas the forwards-branching corresponds to the indeterminacy of the future. As 
described in the background section on branching-time temporal logic, backwards-linear, 
forwards-branching, trees are used in the semantics of various logics of branching- 
time. 138 Hence, with the introduction of conflict histories, we have linked our semantics 
to semantics of branching-time temporal logic. However, in our semantics conflict 
histories are defined as functions from the set of time points into the set of states, 
whereas in the semantics of most branching-time temporal logics they are defined as 
inclusion maximal subsets of a set of states. Our functional approach, which is due to our 
distinction between time points and states, is similar to an approach suggested by Brian 
Chellas in the context of a semantics for a logic of action. 139 
137 A proof that the three conditions for possible conflict histories are sufficient to characterise W and H as 
a backwards-linear, forwards-branching, tree is given in section 3.3.4. The picture of forwards-branching, 
backwards-linear, trees is closely related to the extensive form of games. Indeed, the main reason for using 
these kind of structures as the underlying framework for modelling conflicts is the fact that they allow us to 
incorporate useful elements of game theory into CML without having to deal with more problematic 
notions of this approach, such as the concepts of utility and probability. 
138 See, for instance, (Prior 1967; Thomason 1970; Thomason 1984; Chellas 1969; Belnap 1991). 
139 (Chellas 1969) 
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3.2.3  Agents and Attitudes 
Most conflict models explicitly represent the parties involved in a conflict and to some 
extent the parties’ beliefs, goals, values, and emotions. 140 Depending on the discipline, 
conflict parties are called actors, parties, stakeholders, or factions. 141 We use the general 
term “agent” because it is neutral and can be used in different contexts. 
In CML-structures, agents involved in a conflict are represented by a finite and 
nonempty set A = {a 0 , a 1 , … a n } of agents. Each a Î A stands for a unique agent 
involved in the conflict. Agents are assumed to be social units that can be distinguished 
from each other and from their environment. They are located either at the individual 
level or at a higher social level. Agents on the individual level are individual persons. 
Micro level conflicts include small groups, such as businesses, pressure groups, or 
minority groups. Agents on the macro level are social institutions, such as armies, rebel 
groups or political parties, entire nations, or ethnic groups. 142 
Agents in a conflict have beliefs about the issues relevant to the conflict, they pursue 
goals, hold moral or legal norms, and have emotions. In CML-structures, all these 
cognitive and emotional states in which agents can be are expressed by four propositional 
attitude functions b, g, n, and e. Beliefs are represented by the belief function b, goals by 
the goal function g, values by the norm function n, and emotions by the emotion 
function e. The underlying reason for modelling beliefs, goals, norms, and emotions by 
four independent functions is the assumption that these mental states do not impact the 
truth values of propositions. For instance, the fact that an agent believes that p does not 
140 See, for instance, (Deutsch 1991; Burton 1996; Rapoport 1960). 
141 Political scientists tend to talk about actors or factions, whereas the term “party” is used more 
frequently in the psychological literature. 
142 For an overview over the theory of social institutions, see (Knight and Sened 1998).
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affect the truth value of p. In this sense, attitudes can be characterised as subjective. The 
subjectivity of cognitive and emotional states is also mirrored by the limited epistemic 
access we have to other agents’ mental states. Only an agent himself can verify whether 
or not he has a certain belief, goal, norm, or emotion. 
The belief function b assigns a set of CML-formulae to pairs consisting of an agent a and 
a state w. This set, called the agent’s belief set at w, represents the agent’s beliefs at the 
state w. Every formula φ Î b(w, a) is believed to be true by the agent a at the state w. 
Formally, b is a function from W ´ A into the power-set of the set of CML-formulae 
FOR. 
Definition 27 (Belief Function) 
b: W ´ A ® Ã(FOR) is a belief function. 
The goal function g assigns a set of CML-formulae to pairs consisting of an agent a and a 
state w. Here, the set represents the agent’s goals at the state w and is called the agent’s 
goal set at w. If a formula φ is in an agent’s goal set at the state w, i.e. φ Î g(w, a), a 
wants φ to be true at the state w. Formally, g is a function from W ´ A into the power-set 
of FOR. 
Definition 28 (Goal Function) 
g: W ´ A ® Ã(FOR) is a goal function. 
The norm function n and the emotion function e follow the same pattern as the 
functions b and g. They assign sets of CML-formulae to pairs of agents and states. In the 
case of n, the set is called the agent’s norm set at w and is interpreted as the set of norms 
held by the agent at the state w. These can be moral, legal or religious norms or values. 
Formally, n is a function from W ´ A into Ã(FOR).
The Semantics of Conflict Modelling Logic 
135 
Definition 29 (Norm Function) 
n: W ´ A ® Ã(FOR) is a norm function. 
In the case of e, e(a, w) is interpreted as the set of formulae which trigger a state of 
emotional excitement in the agent a at the state w. Every formula φ Î e(w, a), causes an 
emotional response in a at the state w. Formally, e is a function from W ´ A into 
Ã(FOR). 
Definition 30 (Emotion Function) 
e: W ´ A ® Ã(FOR) is an emotion function. 
A graphical illustration of the four propositional attitude functions b, g, n and e is shown 
in the following figure. 
Figure 7: Propositional Attitude Functions 
The figure illustrates the beliefs, goals, norms and emotions held by an agent a 2 at the 
possible conflict state w 0 . As the figure shows, the agent a 2 believes p 0 , wants p 0 and p 1 , 
considers p 2 a norm, and is emotionally excited about Øp 1 and Øp 2 . 
w0 
w2 
w1 
a2 
a1 
a0 
A W 
´ 
p1 
p0 
g(w0, a2) 
p2 
n(w0, a2) 
Øp1 
Øp2 
e(w0, a2) 
p0 
b(w0, a2) 
(w0, a2)
Chapter 3   Interpreting Conflicts 
136 
A basic condition for a proposition to qualify as the content of a propositional attitude is 
that the proposition must trigger some kind of cognitive or emotional reaction when 
presented to the agent who holds the attitude. 143 As a further distinction, we can look at 
consequences following from the fact that an agent a holds a particular type of 
propositional attitude. If the agent believes p, he believes that the world is structured 
such that the state of affairs corresponding to p holds. If an agent wants p, he prefers a 
world in which p is true to one in which p is not true. This preference holds independent 
of whether p is actually true or not or whether the agent believes that p is true or not. If 
an agent considers p a legal or moral norm, he thinks that a world in which p is true is a 
better world in some moral, legal, or religious sense than one in which p is not true. If an 
agent is emotionally excited about p, he exhibits a certain type of bodily reaction when 
confronted with p. 144 
3.2.4  The Term Assignment Function 
In order to state truth conditions for quantifiers and to provide a notion of validity for 
open formulae, we need an interpretation for terms. This is done by means of the term 
assignment function μ, which assigns elements of T and A to terms of the language of 
CML, i.e. it is a function from the set TER of CML-terms into the union T È A. 
As introduced in chapter 2.2, there are two types of terms in L CML : temporal terms and 
agent terms. For constants, μ is fixed, i.e. the μ-value of a temporal constant t is a 
specific time point t, and the μ-value of an agent constant a is a specific agent a. We use 
143 A number of different approaches to the notion of propositional attitudes are discussed in (Baeurle and 
Cresswell 1989). A purely modal approach to propositional attitudes is described in (Moss and Tiede 2006, 
p. 1038ff). 
144 For a concise introduction to emotional psychology see, for instance, (Oatley and Jenkins 1996). A more 
neurologically oriented introduction to emotions can be found in (Simonov 1986).
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the same letter in bold for the element a constant refers to. With regard to variables, we 
have to make sure that μ assigns time points to temporal variables and agents to agent 
variables. Altogether, we get the following definition. 
Definition 31 (Term Assignment Function) 
μ: TER ® T È A is a term assignment function such that: 
(1) μ(t) = t, for all t Î t-CON; 
(2) μ(x) Î T, for all x Î t-VAR; 
(3) μ(a) = a, for all a Î a-CON; 
(4) μ(y) Î A, for all y Î a-VAR. 
Fixed term assignments are defined as usual. As there are two types of variables, it is 
possible to either fix a temporal variable or an agent variable. In the temporal case, the 
expression μ[t/x] denotes the term assignment function that assigns t to x and is equal to 
μ for all terms different from x. Similarly, μ[a/y] assigns a to y and is equal to μ for all 
terms different from y. Formally, we get the following definition. 
Definition 32 (Fixed Term Assignment) 
Fixed term assignments are defined as follows: 
(1) μ[t/x](τ) = μ(τ), for all τ ≠ x; 
(2) μ[t/x](τ) = t, for τ = x; 
(3) μ[a/y](α) = μ(α), for all α ≠ y; 
(4) μ[a/y](α) = a, for α = y. 
3.3  Further Definitions 
In this section, four further concepts are introduced. First, we define the immediate 
predecessor t-1 of a time point t. Second, we introduce the concept of a set of possible 
states at a fixed time point t. Third, we introduce a time index function which assigns to 
every state w the corresponding time point t at which the state occurs in the conflict 
universe. Finally, we define a binary accessibility relation R between states. R links the 
concept of possible histories as used in our semantics to relational semantics in which a
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set W of possible worlds together with a binary accessibility relation R ⊆ W 2 are used as 
the primitive constituents of the semantics. 145 We use these concepts to prove that the set 
of all sets of possible conflict states, at fixed time points, provides a partition of the 
conflict universe W (Theorem 3) and that the structure generated by the conflict universe 
W and the set of possible conflict histories H is a forwards-branching, backwards-linear, 
tree without endpoints (Theorem 5). 
3.3.1  Immediate Predecessor of a Time Point 
The immediate predecessor t-1 of a time point t is defined as follows. 
Definition 33 (Immediate Predecessor of a Time Point) 
The immediate predecessor t-1 of a time point t is defined as follows: 
t-1 = t 0 iff t 0 ≺ t Ù Ø$t 1 (t 0 ≺ t 1 Ù t 1 ≺ t). 
The definition is possible as, by definition of ≺, every time point has exactly one unique 
immediate predecessor. 
3.3.2  Conflict States of a Fixed Time Point 
At every time point t, a conflict is in one of a number of possible conflict states w 0 , w 1 , 
w 2 , etc. It is useful to collect all these states in a set W t defined as the set of states in 
which a conflict can be at the fixed time point t. 
145 Possible world semantics provide the standard semantic interpretation for a large number of logics, such 
as modal, deontic, epistemic and temporal logics. The basic ideas of possible world semantics were 
independently developed in the late 1950 and early 1960 by Saul Kripke, Jaakko Hintikka and Stig Kanger. 
See (Kripke 1959; Kripke 1963; Hintikka 1962; Kanger 1957).
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Definition 34 (States at a Fixed Time Point) 
The set of possible conflict states at the fixed time point t is defined as follows: 
W t ={w Î W | $hÎH(h(t) = w)}. 
As every state occurs only at one unique time point, the sets W t partition the conflict 
universe W, i.e. any two sets W t 1 and W t 2 are mutually disjoint and the union U 
T 
W 
Î t 
t is 
equal to W. 
Theorem 3 (Partition of W) 
{W t | t Î T} is a partition of W. 
Proof 
(Disjointness) We prove by reductio. Let W t 1 , W t 2 Î {W t | t Î T} with 
t 1 ¹ t 2 . Assume now there is a w Î W with w Î W t 1 Ç W t 2 . Then, there are h 1 , h 2 
Î H with h 1 (t 1 ) = w and h 2 (t 2 ) = w by Definition 34. Then, t 1 = t 2 by Definition 
26. This contradicts t 1 ¹ t 2 . Hence, there is no w Î W t 1 Ç W t 2 = Æ. 
(Exhaustiveness) Let w Î W. Then, by Definition 26, there is a t Î T 
and a h Î H such that h(t) = w. Then, w Î W t by Definition 34, and, hence, w Î 
U 
T 
W 
Î t 
t . Now let w Î U 
T 
W 
Î t 
t . Then, by Definition 34, w Î W t 0 for some t 0 Î T, 
and, hence, w Î W as W t 0 Í W. As w was chosen arbitrarily we get U T 
W 
Î t 
t = W. 
QED 
A graphical illustration of the partition {W t | t Î T} is shown in the following figure. 
Figure 8: Partition of the Conflict Universe 
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3.3.3  The Time Index Function 
As a consequence of Theorem 3, every conflict state w can be associated with a unique 
time point t at which it occurs in the conflict universe W. In the following, we define a 
time index function || assigning this unique time point to every state w. 
Definition 35 (Time Index Function) 
||: W ® T is a time index function defined as follows: 
|w| = t iff w Î W t . 
|w| is called the time index of w. The function is well defined because {W t | t Î T} is a 
partition of W, and, hence, every w belongs to only one set W t , i.e. if w 0 = w 1 , then |w 0 | 
= |w 1 | for all w 0 , w 1 Î W. 
The relationship between the time index function and individual conflict histories is 
expressed in the following theorem. 
Theorem 4 (Time Index Function and Possible Conflict Histories) 
For all h Î H and t Î T, |h(t)| = t. 
Proof 
Let h Î H and t Î T. As h is a function from T into W, there is a w Î W 
such that h(t) = w. Then, w Î W t by Definition 34, and, hence, |w| = t by 
Definition 35. Altogether we get |h(t)| = |w| = t. 
QED 
The theorem shows that if || is restricted to the co-domain of a conflict history h, it is 
the inverse function of h.
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3.3.4  The Accessibility Relation 
In the semantics of CML, both the set of possible conflict states W and the set of 
possible conflict histories H are introduced as primitive concepts of CML-structures. 146 
Instead of starting with possible states and possible histories as the primitive concepts, 
we could have built our semantics around the concept of backwards-linear, forwards- 
branching, trees. Then, we could have defined the set of histories H in terms of the 
binary relation constituting the trees. 147 
Conflict states and histories together constitute a backwards-linear, forwards-branching, 
tree. To prove this, we define a binary relation R on W, which we show to be irreflexive, 
transitive, and treelike. The accessibility relation R is defined in terms of the time index 
function || and the set of possible conflict histories H. 
Definition 36 (Accessibility Relation) 
R Í W ´ W is an accessibility relation defined as follows: 
w 0 Rw 1 iff |w 0 | ≺ |w 1 | and $h(w 0 ,w 1 Î Im(h)). 
According to this definition, a state w 1 is accessible from a state w 0 if and only if w 0 
temporally precedes w 1 , i.e. the time index of w 0 is smaller than the time index of w 1 , and 
the two states lie on a common history h, i.e. both w 0 and w 1 are elements of the image 
of h, Im(h). 
In the context of conflicts, the accessibility relation R can be interpreted as a transition 
relation between conflict states. If a conflict is in a state w 0 , and a state w 1 is accessible 
146 The strategy of defining a set of states W and a set of histories, understood as functions from a discrete 
set of time points into W, as the primitive constituents of the semantics, was also chosen by Chellas in his 
logical system of action statements. See (Chellas 1969). 
147 This approach is taken in many branching-time temporal logics as discussed in the respective 
background section, but also in STIT theory, where treelike structures are introduced as a primitive 
component of the semantics. Histories are then defined as maximal sets of linearly ordered moments of the 
structure. See (Belnap 1991; Belnap et al. 2001).
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from w 0 , i.e. w 0 Rw 1 , it is possible for the conflict to develop from the state w 0 into the 
state w 1 . 
The following theorem expresses that the structure (W, R), consisting of the conflict 
universe W and the accessibility relation R, constitutes a backwards-linear, forwards- 
branching, tree without endpoints. 
Theorem 5 (Tree) 
(W, R) is a tree without endpoints. 
Proof 
We have to show that R is irreflexive, transitive, treelike, and has no 
endpoints.
(Irreflexivity) Let w Î W. Assume that wRw. Then, |w| ≺ |w| by 
Definition 36. Then, there is a t Î T such that and t ≺ t by Definition 35. This 
contradicts the irreflexivity of ≺. 
(Transitivity) Let w 0 , w 1 , w 2 Î W. Assume that w 0 Rw 1 and w 1 Rw 2 . Then, 
|w 0 | ≺ |w 1 |, |w 1 | ≺ |w 2 | and there are h 0 , h 1 Î H such that w 0 , w 1 Î Im(h 0 ) 
and w 1 , w 2 Î Im(h 1 ) by Definition 36. Because w 1 Î Im(h 0 ) and w 1 Î Im(h 1 ) we 
get h 0 (|w 1 |) = h 1 (|w 1 |), and, hence, h 1 (|w 0 |) = h 0 (|w 0 |) by Definition 26. 
Altogether we get h 1 (|w 0 |) = w 0 , h 1 (|w 2 |) = w 2 and |w 0 | ≺ |w 2 | by the 
transitivity of ≺, and, hence, w 0 Rw 2 by Definition 36. 
(Left-Linearity). Let w 0 , w 1 , w 2 Î W. Assume that w 0 Rw 2 and w 1 Rw 2 . 
Then, |w 0 | ≺ |w 2 |, |w 1 | ≺ |w 2 | and there are h 0 , h 1 Î H such that w 0 , w 2 Î 
Im(h 0 ) and w 1 , w 2 Î Im(h 1 ) by Definition 36. Because w 2 Î Im(h 0 ) and w 2 Î 
Im(h 1 ) we get h 0 (|w 2 |) = h 1 (|w 2 |), and, hence, h 0 (|w 0 |) = h 1 (|w 0 |) and  h 0 (|w 1 |) 
= h 1 (|w 1 |) by Definition 26. Altogether we have h 1 (|w 0 |) = w 0 , h 1 (|w 1 |) = w 1 , 
h 1 (|w 2 |) = w 2 , and |w 0 | ≺ |w 1 |, |w 0 | = |w 1 | or |w 1 | ≺ |w 0 | by the 
trichotomy of ≺. Hence, w 0 Rw 1 , w 0 = w 1 or w 1 Rw 0 by Definition 36. 
(No endpoints) Let w 0 Î W. Then, there is a h Î H and t 0 Î T such 
that h(t 0 ) = w 0 by Definition 26. Then, there are t 1 , t 2 Î T such that t 1 ≺ t 0 and t 0 
≺ t 2 because ≺ has no endpoints. Then, there are w 1 , w 2 Î W such that h(t 1 ) = w 1 
and h(t 2 ) = w 2 because h is function from T into W. Altogether there is a h Î H 
such that h(|w 0 |) = w 0 , h(|w 1 |) = w 1 , h(|w 2 |) = w 2 , and |w 1 | ≺ |w 0 | and 
|w 0 |≺ |w 2 |, and, hence, w 1 Rw 0 and w 0 Rw 2 by Definition 36. 
QED 
The theorem shows that history functions can be used to define an accessibility relation 
R and a corresponding tree (W, R), given that they satisfy the three conditions of 
Definition 26.
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3.4  Truth Conditions 
The meaning of a CML-formula φ is provided by specifying the conditions under which 
φ is true in a given CML-structure x. These conditions are referred to as the truth 
conditions of φ. In order to make sure that every formula of L CML can be evaluated, we 
follow the usual recursive strategy, i.e. we start with a truth condition for atomic 
formulae and continue with conditions for compound formulae assuming that their 
constituents can already be evaluated. In the atomic case the truth condition is already 
provided by the truth assignment function v. 148 In the following, we extend the truth 
assignment function to all other operators and relations of L CML . When we do this, we 
have to include the term assignment function μ because formulae with free occurrences 
of variables can only be evaluated once it is specified which objects the terms occurring 
in them refer to. As a result, v depends on the term assignment function μ. Furthermore, 
v depends on the conflict universe W because formulae are evaluated relative to possible 
conflict states. 149 
3.4.1  Conditions for the Logical Connectives, Identity, and the Quantifier 
The truth conditions for logical connectives, the identity relation, and the quantifier are 
just the usual conditions of classical propositional and first-order logic. 150 The only 
difference is that CML-formulae are evaluated relative to a possible conflict state w. 
148 A propositional constant p is true at a possible conflict state w if and only if w Î v(p). 
149 To evaluate formulae relative to points is a common practice in possible word semantics. The points are 
typically interpreted as worlds, states, time points or situations, depending on the nature of the intended 
application of the semantics. 
150 For a typical list of truth conditions for first-order formulae, see, for instance, (Ebbinghaus et al. 1994, 
p. 31).
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Definition 37 (Truth Conditions for Logical Connectives, Identity, and the 
Quantifier) 
(1) Øφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Ï v μ (w); 
(2) φ Ù ψ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î v μ (w) and ψ Î v μ (w); 
(3) τ 0 = τ 1 Î v μ (w) iff Î μ(τ 0 ) = μ(τ 1 ), where τ 0 , τ 1 Î TER; 
(4) "xφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î v μ[t/x] (w) for all t Î T; 
(5) "yφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î v μ[a/y] (w) for all a Î A. 
The first two conditions deal with the negation and conjunction symbol, respectively. 
The negation of a formula is true at a possible conflict state w if and only if the negated 
formula is false at w. A conjunction is true at w if and only if the constituent conjuncts 
are true at w. The third condition deals with formulae built with the identity symbol. As 
usual, the identity relation holds between two terms if and only if their respective μ- 
values are identical. The last two conditions deal with the universal quantifier. Two 
separate conditions are required because CML-structures are two-sorted structures 
distinguishing between temporal variables and agent variables. In the case of temporal 
variables, a universally quantified formula is true at a state w if and only if the formula 
itself is true at w for every t-alternative to μ. In the case of agent variables, a universally 
quantified formula is true at w if and only if the formula is true at w for every a- 
alternative to μ. Conditions for the defined connectives and the existential quantifier can 
be derived in the usual way. 
3.4.2  Conditions for the Modal Operator 
The truth condition for the modal operator □ is given as follows. 
Definition 38 (Truth Condition for the Modal Operator) 
□φ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î v μ (h 1 (|w|)) for all h 1 Î H such that h 1 (|w|-1) = h 0 (|w|-1) for 
some h 0 Î H such that h 0 (|w|) = w.
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According to the definition, a formula of the form □φ is true at a possible conflict state 
w, if φ is true at all states which have the same time index as w, and lie on histories going 
through the immediate predecessor h 0 (|w|-1) of w. As the truth condition for □ does 
not depend on the set of conflict histories H, formulae with □ as their main operator are 
state formulae. 151 
Graphically, the truth condition for □ can be illustrated as follows. 
Figure 9: Truth Condition of the Necessity Operator 
The figure shows that □φ is true at w 4 , because φ is true at w 4 and w 5 , the only two states 
having the common immediate predecessor w 2 . φ is not required to be true at w 3 , as w 3 is 
not accessible from w 2 . 
The modal operator expresses a type of necessity which is characterised by the concept 
of historical inevitability. Historical inevitability means that a formula φ is necessarily true 
at a state w if the truth of the formula was inevitable at the state immediately preceding 
w. Following Rescher and Urquhart, we can describe historical necessity by characterising 
151 Indeed, all CML-formulae are state formulae. 
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a formula φ as necessarily true at a state w if φ would have held at w “no matter what the 
course of history”. 152 
The notion of historical necessity used in the semantics of CML is a special case of the 
more general notion of nodally relativised necessity. 153 The underlying idea of nodally 
relativised necessity is to define necessity relative to nodes, worlds, or the like. A formula 
φ is necessarily true relative to a state w if and only if the truth of φ was inevitable at w. 
In the semantics of CML, the state which the necessity operator is relative to is fixed to 
be the immediate predecessor of the state at which the formula is evaluated. 
3.4.3  Conditions for the Temporal Operator and other Temporal Symbols 
In this section, we specify the truth conditions for the temporal realisation operator R, 
the temporal indexical symbol n, and the temporal precedence relation <. The conditions 
are defined as follows. 
Definition 39 (Truth Conditions for the Temporal Operator and other 
Temporal Symbols) 
(1) Rτφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î h(μ(τ)) for all h Î H such that h(|w|) = w, where τ Î 
t-TER; 
(2) Rnφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î v μ (w); 
(3) τ = n Î v μ (w) iff μ(τ) = |w|, where τ Î t-TER; 
(4) τ < n Î v μ (w) iff μ(x) ≺ |w|, where τ Î t-TER; 
(5) τ 0 < τ 1 Î v μ (w) iff μ(τ 0 ) ≺ μ(τ 1 ), where τ 0 , τ 1 Î t-TER. 
The first condition describes the behaviour of the temporal realisation operator R. A 
formula of the form Rτφ is true at a state w if and only if φ is true at the μ-value of τ of 
every history h going through w. Note that the truth condition for R does not depend on 
152 See (Rescher and Urquhart 1971, p. 133). 
153 See (Kripke 1963; Rescher and Urquhart 1971, p. 133; Thomason 1984).
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the set of conflict histories H. Hence, formulae with R as their main operator are state 
formulae. 154 If μ(τ) lies in the future of w, i.e. |w| < μ(τ), φ must be true at all states 
occurring at the time point μ(τ) into which the conflict can possibly develop from w. If 
μ(τ) lies in the past of w or is equal to w, i.e. μ(τ) < |w|or μ(τ) = |w|, φ must be true at 
the unique state occurring at the time point μ(τ) which lies on the unique past of w. 155 
The above truth conditions characterises R as a Peircean operator. The Peircean 
approach interprets a proposition of the form “it will be the case that φ” in the sense that 
φ is bound to happen in every possible future. This is reflected by the truth condition for 
R. 156 
Graphically, we can illustrate the truth condition for R as follows. 
Figure 10: Truth Condition of the Temporal Realisation Operator (Future) 
154 The distinction between state formulae and path formulae was introduced in the background section on 
branching-time temporal logic. For a further discussion of the topic, see (Goranko and Zanardo 2004). 
155 Due to the past determinacy and future indeterminacy of our semantics, there is only one unique state 
w0 that lies on a history through w if μ(τ) refers to a point in the past of w, but there can be more than one 
possible states that lie on histories going through w and have an identical time index lying in the future of 
w. 
156 We have introduced the Peircean view and the Ockhamist view in branching-time temporal logic in the 
background section on branching-time temporal logic. For further details, see (Prior 1967; Venema and 
Muidergracht 2001, p. 14; Thomason 1984). 
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The figure illustrates the states at which φ must be true if Rτφ is assumed to be true at w 2 . 
It shows that φ must be true at w 4 and w 5 as those two states lie on histories going 
through w 2 and occur at the time point μ(τ). φ does not need to be true at w 3 as w 3 does 
not lie on a history going through w 2 . 
The following figure is similar to Figure 10. It also illustrates the conditions under which 
Rτφ is true at w 2 . Here, however, the μ-value of τ lies in the past of w. As the figure 
shows, for Rτφ to be true at w 2 , φ has only to be true at w 0 since this is the only state with 
a time index equal to the μ-value of τ lying on a history going through w 2 . 
Figure 11: Truth Condition of the Temporal Realisation Operator (Past) 
The second condition provides a semantic interpretation of the indexical symbol n. 157 
According to the condition, a formula of the form Rnφ is true at a possible state w if and 
only if φ is true at w. Hence, n can be used to syntactically refer to the possible state at 
which a formula is evaluated. In contrast to terms, n does not have a fixed μ-value. Its 
interpretation depends on the possible state at which the formula containing n is 
157 A detailed semantic analysis of the indexical “now” can be found in (Kamp 1971). Burgess gives a 
concise overview of Kamp’s analysis in (Burgess 1984, p. 30f). 
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evaluated. A similar interpretation of n is given in Rescher’s system K b of temporal 
logic. 158 
The third and fourth conditions deal with formulae in which the indexical symbol n 
occurs as part of an identity statement or in the context of the temporal precedence 
relation <. In both conditions, n is interpreted as the time index |w| of the state w at 
which the formula is evaluated. Thus, τ = n is true at a possible state w if and only if the 
μ-value of τ is equal to |w|. Similarly, τ < n is true at a possible state w if and only if the 
μ-value of τ temporally precedes |w|. 
The fifth condition provides an interpretation for formulae built with the temporal 
precedence symbol <. Formulae of the form τ 0 < τ 1 are true at a possible state w if and 
only if the corresponding order relation ≺ holds between the μ-value of τ 0 and the μ- 
value of τ 1 . 
159 The condition shows that the truth value of a formula of the form τ 0 < τ 1 
does not depend on the possible state w at which it is evaluated. As a consequence, such 
formulae are either true at every possible state or false at every possible state in the 
conflict universe. 
3.4.4  Conditions for the Propositional Attitude Operators 
The truth conditions for the propositional attitude operators all follow the same pattern. 
A formula of the form Bαφ, Gαφ, Nαφ, or Eαφ is true at a state w just in case φ is in the 
respective belief set, goal set, norm set, or emotion set at w of the agent designated by 
the μ-value of α. As these sets are referred to by the images of the propositional attitude 
158 Cf. (Rescher and Urquhart 1971, p. 51). 
159 The condition makes sure that the temporal precedence symbol is interpreted as ≺ on T.
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functions b, g, n, and e, respectively, we can state the truth conditions for the four 
attitude operators as follows. 
Definition 40 (Truth Conditions for the Propositional Attitude Operators) 
(1) Bαφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î b(w, μ(α)); 
(2) Gαφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î g(w, μ(α)); 
(3) Nαφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î n(w, μ(α)); 
(4) Eαφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î e(w, μ(α)). 
The truth conditions show that the truth values of formulae having a propositional 
attitude operator as their main operator depend neither on the structure of the conflict 
universe, i.e. on how the possible states in the conflict universe are connected with each 
other, nor on the initial truth assignment function v. The truth value of such formulae is 
entirely determined by the term assignment function μ and the respective propositional 
attitude function b, g, n or e. 160 
3.5  Validity 
Validity is defined in the usual way, i.e. valid formulae are those formulae that are 
invariantly true. The invariance can occur on different levels. At the most local level, a 
formula φ can be true at a state w under every term assignment function μ. In this case, 
we call the formula valid at w. One step higher, we can define a formula φ to be valid in a 
CML-structure x if it is valid at every state w in the conflict universe W of x under every 
truth assignment function v. General CML-validity is the property of a formula φ to be 
valid in every CML-structure. 
160 The propositional attitude functions are primitive in the definition of CML-structures.
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3.5.1  Validity at States 
On the most local level, we can define a formula φ to be valid at a possible conflict state 
w if the truth value of φ is true independent of how the terms occurring in φ are 
interpreted. In this case the truth value of φ does not depend on the term assignment 
function μ. Symbolically, we write x, w ⊨ φ to express that the formula φ is valid at the 
state w in the CML-structure x. 
Definition 41 (Validity at States) 
A formula φ is valid at the possible conflict state w in the CML-structure x, i.e. x, 
w ⊨ φ, iff φ Î v μ (w) for all term assignment functions μ. 
The definition of validity at a state w is just an expansion of the notion of truth at that 
state. The difference between a formula being true at a state w and being valid is that the 
formula is true at w under a specific term assignment function μ, whereas it is valid at w 
under every term assignment function. As the truth value of closed formulae does not 
depend on how the terms occurring in them are interpreted, the notion of validity at a 
state w and the notion of truth at a state w is identical for closed formulae. Open 
formulae are valid at a state w just in case their universal closure is true at w. 
3.5.2  Validity in CML­Structures 
Having defined validity at conflict states w, we can now generalise the concept and define 
a formula φ to be valid in a CML-structure x if the formula is valid at every state w in the 
universe of x under every truth assignment function v. Symbolically, we write x ⊨ φ to 
express that the formula φ is valid in the CML-structure x. 
Definition 42 (Validity in CML-Structures) 
A formula φ is valid in the CML-structure x, i.e. x ⊨ φ, iff x, w ⊨ φ for all truth 
assignment functions v and all possible conflict states w Î W.
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To say that a formula φ is valid in a CML-structure x means that φ is valid in every CML- 
structure that is identical with x except for its term assignment function μ and its truth 
assignment function v. 
3.5.3  Validity in CML 
On the most global level, we can define a formula φ to be CML-valid if φ is valid in every 
CML-structure. Symbolically, we write ⊨ CML φ to express that the formula φ is generally 
valid in CML. 
Definition 43 (CML-Validity) 
A formula φ is CML-valid, i.e. ⊨ CML φ, iff x ⊨ φ for all CML-structures x. 
The definition of CML-validity follows the standard practice in possible-world semantics 
to define validity relative to a pre-defined class of algebraic structures. In our case, this 
class is the class of CML-structures. Thus, a formula is valid in the logical system CML if 
it is true at every point in every CML-structure. 
3.6  Satisfiability 
Using the notion of validity as defined in the previous sections, we can define two 
further concepts. Satisfiability is defined in the usual way, i.e. a formula φ is CML- 
satisfiable if there is a CML-structure x and a possible conflict state w in the universe W 
of x, such that φ is true at w. 
Definition 44 (CML-Satisfiability) 
A formula φ is CML-satisfiable iff there is a CML-structure x and a state w in the 
universe of x such that φ Î v μ (w), where μ is the term assignment function of x.
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3.7  The Semantic Consequence Relation 
The semantic consequence relation ⊨, which holds between sets of formulae and single 
formulae, is defined in the usual way: a formula φ semantically follows from a set of 
formulae Φ if φ is valid in every CML-structure x in which all formulae contained in Φ 
are valid. 
Definition 45 (Semantic Consequence Relation) 
A formula φ semantically follows from a set of formulae Φ, i.e. Φ ⊨ φ, iff x ⊨ φ 
for every CML-structure x such that x ⊨ Φ, where x ⊨ Φ iff x ⊨ ψ for all ψ Î 
Φ. 
Example: Second Congo War 
In this section, we apply the semantics of CML to our example of the Second Congo 
War. In particular, we show how aspects of this conflict can be reconstructed as elements 
of a CML-structure. 
The first component of a CML-structure is the set T of time points. When we identify 
time points in our example, we thereby fix the level of granularity at which we analyse the 
Second Congo War. We identify six time points at which we look at the conflict: t 0 , t 1 , t 2 , 
t 3 , t 4 , and t 5 standing for the years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. 
161 
The six time points are ordered by the temporal precedence relation ≺ in the natural 
order. 
At each of the six time points, the Second Congo War was in a corresponding state w 0 , 
w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 and w 5 . Furthermore, we assume that in each of the years from 1999 to 
161 Our data is based on reports by the Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict, see (HIIK, 1998; 
HIIK, 1999; HIIK, 2000; HIIK, 2001; HIIK, 2002; HIIK, 2003) and descriptions of the conflict by the 
International Crisis Group, see (ICG 2003b; ICG 2005; ICG 2008b; ICG 2008a; ICG 2003a).
Chapter 3   Interpreting Conflicts 
154 
2003 the Second Congo War could have been in a different state w 6 , w 7 , w 8 , w 9 , and w 10 , 
respectively. 
At each time point other than t 0 , the Second Congo War could have been in two 
different states. Hence, there are six different possible conflict histories h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 , 
and h 5 . 
t0: 1998 
t1: 1999 
t2: 2000 
t3: 2001 
t4: 2002 
t5: 2003 
T = {t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5} 
≺ = {<t0, t1>, <t1, t2>, <t2, t3>, <t3, t4>, <t4, t5>} 
W = {w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9, w10} 
H = {h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5} 
Graphically, we can illustrate the CML-structure representing parts of the Second Congo 
War as follows. 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
w0 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 
w6 w7 w8 w9 w10 
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 
h0
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Next, we identify propositions that are true or false at the eleven conflict states. We 
identify propositions in such a way that certain facts about the Second Congo War can be 
represented. The facts we look at are listed in the following box. 
In 1998 an offensive was launched against the Kabila government. 
In 1999 the rebel group RCD split into two factions, the RCD-Goma and the RCD- 
Kisangani. 
In 2000 the peace keeping mission MONUC is launched in the DRC. 
In 2001 Laurant-Désiré Kabila is assassinated and replaced by his son Joseph Kabila. 
In 2002 a peace agreement in Sun City, South Africa, is signed. 
In 2003 a transitional government is appointed for the DRC. 
In order to express these facts about the Second Congo War within the semantics of 
CML, we now identify six corresponding propositions. 
p0: An offensive is launched against the Kabila government. 
p1 The rebel group RCD splits into two factions, the RCD-Goma and the RCD- 
Kisangani. 
p2: The peace keeping mission MONUC is launched in the DRC. 
p3: Laurant-Désiré Kabila is assassinated and replaced by his son Joseph Kabila. 
p4: A peace agreement in Sun City, South Africa, is signed. 
p5: A transitional government is appointed for the DRC. 
As expressed by the facts, each proposition is true in at least one of the conflict states of 
each time point. We assume that the states w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 and w 5 represent the states 
in which the six propositions are true, respectively. The states w 6 , w 7 , w 8 , w 9 , and w 10 
represent the states in which the Second Congo War would have been if the 
corresponding propositions had not been true. 
The truth of the propositions is expressed by the value assignment function v as follows. 
v(w0) = {p0} 
v(w1) = {p1} 
v(w2) = {p2}
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v(w3) = {p3} 
v(w4) = {p4} 
v(w5) = {p5} 
v(w6) = v(w7) = v(w8) = v(w9) = v(w10) = Æ 
The reconstruction shows, for instance, that the Second Congo War could have been in 
the state w 10 instead of w 5 or that the proposition p 5 expressing that a peace agreement in 
Sun City, South Africa, is signed is not true at w 10 . Hence, w 10 represents the possible 
state in which the Second Congo War would have been if the Sun City peace agreement 
had not been signed. Similar considerations can be made for the other states and 
propositions. Each state is characterised by the complete set of propositions that are true 
at that state. 
The fifth component of CML-structures is the set of agents involved in the conflict. In 
our example we only look at three agents. 
a0: Rwanda-aligned forces 
a1: UN 
a2: Kabila-aligned forces 
A = {a0, a1, a2} 
Finally, we have to specify the four propositional attitude functions representing the 
agents’ beliefs, goals, norms, and emotions in the context of the Second Congo War. We 
assume that the functions are given as follows. 
b(w2, a0) = b(w2, a1) = b(w2, a2) = b(w3, a0) = b(w3, a1) = b(w3, a2) = b(w4, a0) = b(w4, 
a1) = b(w4, a2) = b(w5, a0) = b(w5, a1) = b(w5, a2) ={p2} 
b(w3, a0) = b(w3, a1) = b(w3, a2) = b(w4, a0) = b(w4, a1) = b(w4, a2) = b(w5, a0) = b(w5, 
a1) = b(w5, a2) ={p3} 
g(a1, w1) = g(a1, w2) = {p2} 
e(a0, w3) = {p3}
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According to the above specification of the propositional attitude functions, every agent 
believes that the propositions p 2 and p 3 are true, i.e. every agent believes from 2000 on 
that the peace keeping mission MONUC has been launched in the DRC, and every agent 
believes from 2001 on that Laurant-Désiré Kabila has been assassinated and replaced by 
his son Joseph Kabila. 
The goal function shows that the goal of launching a peacekeeping mission in DRC was 
pursued by the UN in 1999 and then again in 2000, the year in which the mission was 
actually launched. 162 
The fact that the Rwanda-aligned forces were emotionally excited by Laurant-Désiré 
Kabila’s assassination and his replacement by his son Joseph Kabila is expressed by the 
emotion function e. 
The CML-structure reconstructed so far expresses various aspects of the Second Congo 
War. Furthermore, it allows one to determine the truth value of formulae expressing 
statements made about the conflict. 
3.8  Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the semantics of CML. This has been achieved 
to the extent that we have defined the general structures within which CML-formulae 
can be evaluated and have stated the truth conditions for the operators of the language of 
CML. All relevant aspects of a conflict are represented by the components of CML- 
structures. In particular, a CML-structure reflects the temporal and modal dimensions of 
162 (MONUC 2008)
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a conflict, the agents involved in it, and the goals, beliefs, norms, and emotions that 
constitute the conflict. 
Having defined the semantics of CML, we can now interpret statements about conflicts 
in a uniform way by looking at the conditions under which they are true. Furthermore, 
we can check whether a set of CML-formulae is satisfiable, and, hence, whether the 
statements expressed by the set can simultaneously be true. This gives us a first means of 
checking whether a set of CML-formulae represents a conflict or not. Having a uniform 
and formal way of interpreting statements about a conflict is the second step in the 
process of modelling and resolving it. 
In the following chapter, we will further analyse the notion of inconsistency by 
axiomatising CML and showing that it is equivalent to the notion of unsatisfiability. 
Once we have precisely defined what it means for a set of CML-formulae to be 
inconsistent, we will continue with a general conflict definition.
159 
CHAPTER 4 
Axiomatising Conflicts 
The Axiomatics of Conflict Modelling Logic 
4.1  Introduction 
The aim of chapter 4 is to state an axiom system for CML and prove that the system is 
sound and complete over the semantics of CML. In order to axiomatise CML, we single 
out the modal fragment of CML, the temporal fragment of CML, and the propositional 
attitude fragment of CML, and then treat them individually. For the first two fragments 
we provide axiom systems. For the propositional attitude fragment, we only provide a list 
of ‘conditions’ as it is not a logical system. Finally, we show that the axioms of the 
temporal fragment also provide an axiomatisation of CML as a whole. 
As a result we will be able to answer to the following questions. 
· What are the axioms characterising the modal fragment of CML? 
· What are the axioms characterising the temporal fragment of CML? 
· Which conditions does an agent need to satisfy in order to qualify as a consistent 
believer?
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· Why do the axioms of the temporal fragment provide an axiomatisation of CML 
as a whole? 
An outline of the chapter is as follows: In section 4.2, we present an axiomatisation of 
the modal fragment. Before we state its axioms (4.2.2), we provide a semantic 
characterisation of the fragment and prove its equivalence to the modal system S5 (4.2.1). 
Once the equivalence between the two systems is proven, it is easy to prove soundness 
(4.2.3) and completeness (4.2.4) as we can assume the corresponding theorems for S5. In 
section 4.3, we axiomatise the temporal fragment. Again, we first provide a semantic 
characterisation of the fragment (4.3.1) followed by its axiom system (4.3.2) which we 
prove to be sound (4.3.3) and complete (4.3.4). Section 4.4 deals with the propositional 
attitude fragment of CML. As this fragment is not a logical system, we just state a 
number of ‘conditions’ for one of the attitude functions. The conditions, which we state 
exemplarily for the belief function b in (4.4.1), characterise different types of consistent 
believers. In section 4.5, we provide an axiomatisation of CML as a whole by showing 
that the axiomatisation of the temporal fragment, indeed, provides an axiomatisation of 
the whole system. 
4.2  The Modal Fragment 
The modal fragment of CML, □-CML, is constituted by the syntax and semantics of 
those CML-formulae which can be used to express modal properties of a conflict. 
Formulae contained in the modal fragment of CML are referred to as □-formulae. The 
set of all □-formulae is called □-FOR. Obviously, □-FOR is a subset of the set of all 
CML-formulae, i.e. □-FOR Í FOR.
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□-formulae are formed by propositional constants, the logical connectives, and the 
necessity operator □. 
Definition 46 (Modal Fragment) 
□-FOR is the set of all strings of elements of SYM satisfying the following BNF: 
φ = :: p | Øψ | (ψ Ù χ) | □ψ, where p Î p-CON. 
As the formation rules for □-formulae are identical with the formation rules for formulae 
of propositional modal logic, the modal fragment of CML is syntactically equivalent with 
the set of all formulae of propositional modal systems, such as S5. This syntactical 
identity is expressed in the following theorem. 
Theorem 6 (□-CML and S5) 
□-FOR = S5-FOR, where S5-FOR is the set of formulae of S5. 
Proof 
The formation rules for □-formulae are identical with the formation rules 
for S5-formulae. Hence, every □-formula can also be formed by the formation 
rules for S5-formulae and every S5-formula can be formed by the formation rules 
for □-formulae. And so, every □-formula is also an S5-formula and vice versa. 
QED 
Every CML-formula φ can be reduced to a □-formula φ* which we call the modal core of 
φ. The modal core does not contain operators other than the logical connectives and the 
necessity operator □. We obtain the modal core φ* of a CML-formula φ by consecutively 
translating sub-formulae of φ according to the principles stated in the following 
definition.
Definition 47 (Modal Core) 
The modal core φ* of a CML-formula φ is obtained by the following rules: 
(1) (p)* = p; 
(2) (Øφ)* = Ø(φ)*; 
(3) (φ Ù ψ)* = (φ)* Ù (ψ)*; 
(4) (□φ)* = □(φ)*; 
(5) ("νφ)* = (Rτ 0 φ)* = (τ 0 < τ 1 )* = (τ 2 = τ 3 )* = (Oαφ)* = p n , where p n is a fresh 
propositional constant and O Î {B, G, N, E}.
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According to condition five, all non-logical and non-modal operators are eliminated. 
Every sub-formula whose main operator is not a logical or modal operator is replaced by 
a new propositional constant p n . As a result, the modal core φ* of a CML-formula φ may 
contain different, and possibly more, propositional constants than the original formula 
φ. 163 
Theorem 7 (Modal Core and □-FOR) 
The modal core φ* of every CML-formula φ is a □-formula. 
Proof 
The proof is a simple induction on the formation of CML-formulae. 
QED 
4.2.1  Semantic Characterisation of □­CML 
In the previous section, we singled out a certain set of CML-formulae as the modal 
fragment of CML and showed how arbitrary CML-formulae can be reduced to their 
modal core. Now, we look at the semantic side of □-CML. We identify the parts of 
CML-structures necessary for providing an interpretation of □-formulae. Then, we prove 
that the set of CML-valid □-formulae is identical with the set of valid S5-formulae. This 
result, expressed in Theorem 13, enables us to use the proof theory of S5 for the modal 
fragment of CML. 
If we want to evaluate a □-formula φ within a CML-structure x, we only need particular 
information about x. Information about the agents’ attitudes, encoded by the four 
propositional attitude functions, for instance, is irrelevant as there are no agent symbols 
in φ. In order to interpret □-formulae, we can, therefore, reduce CML-structures to 
163 Consider, for example, the formula Bap Ù Ø□q and its modal core (Bap Ù Ø□q)* = r Ù Ø□q.
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substructures containing only those components necessary for the evaluation of □- 
formulae. We call such substructures □-structures. 
As the truth condition for □ depends only on the set of possible conflict states W, the 
truth assignment function v, and the set of histories H which, in turn, depends on the set 
of time points T and the binary relation ≺, we can define □-structures as substructures of 
CML-structures containing only the four components T, ≺, W, v, and H. 
Definition 48 (□-Structure) 
A □-structure x is a structure of the form <T, ≺, W, H, v>, where: 
(1) T is a set of time points; 
(2) ≺ is a binary relation on T as defined in Definition 23; 
(3) W is a set of possible conflict states; 
(4) v: W ® Ã(p-CON) is a truth assignment function; 
(5) H is a set of possible conflict histories as defined in Definition 26. 
For a given CML-structure x, we can obtain a corresponding □-structure x* by removing 
the modally irrelevant components A, b, g, n, e, and μ. If a formula is valid in every □- 
structure, we say that the formula is valid in □-CML. Due to the substructure lemma, 
every □-formula φ is valid in CML, i.e. ⊨ CML φ, iff φ is also valid in □-CML, i.e. ⊨ □ φ. 
Theorem 8 (CML-Validity and □-Validity) 
⊨ CML φ iff ⊨ □ φ for all □-formulae φ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a □-formula. Assume ⊭ □ φ. Then, there is a □-structure x and a 
state w such that φ Ï v(w). Expand x to a CML-structure x* by adding an 
arbitrary, nonempty set A of agents, arbitrary propositional attitude functions b, 
g, n, e and an arbitrary term assignment function μ. Then, the extended structure 
x* is a CML-structure and φ Ï v(w). Hence, ⊭ CML φ. 
Assume now ⊭ CML φ. Then, there is a CML-structure x and a state w of x 
such that φ Ï v μ (w). Reduce x to a □-structure x* by eliminating the set of agents 
A, the propositional attitude functions b, g, n and e, and the term assignment 
function μ. Then, x* is a □-structure and φ Ï v(w). Hence, ⊭ □ φ. 
Altogether, we get ⊭ □ φ iff ⊭ CML φ and by contraposition ⊨ □ φ iff ⊨ CML φ.
QED
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The main theorem of this section states that every □-formula that is valid in □-CML is 
also valid in S5 and every S5-valid formula is valid in □-CML. Hence, we can characterise 
the modal fragment of CML as the modal system S5. To prove this claim, we define two 
functions f 1 and f 2 which link □-structures and finite S5-structures. f 1 maps □-structures 
to S5-structures and f 2 assigns □-structures to finite S5-structures. f 1 is defined in such a 
way that the f 1 -image of a □-structure is invariant with respect to the truth values of □- 
formulae, i.e. if a □-formula φ is true/false at a state w of a □-structure x, then there is a 
possible world w* in the universe of the S5-structure f 1 (x) at which φ is true/false. The 
same is true in the opposite direction for f 2 , i.e. if an S5-formula φ is true/false at w in a 
finite S5-model x, then there is a possible conflict state w* in the universe of the □- 
structure f 2 (x) at which φ is true/false. 
First, we define f 1 , show that the f 1 -image of a □-structure is an S5-structure, and prove 
the truth value preservation property of f 1 . f 1 is defined as follows. 
Definition 49 (f 1 ) 
f 1 is a function from the set of □-structures to the set of finite S5-structures 
defined by f 1 (<T, ≺, W, H, v>) = <W*, R*, v*>, where: 
(1) W* = W; 
(2) w 0 R*w 1 iff there are h 0 ,h 1 Î H, such that h 0 (|w 0 |) = w 0 , h 1 (|w 1 |) = w 1 , and 
h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 1 (|w 0 |-1); 
(3) v*(w) = v(w). 
The following theorem expresses that the f 1 -image of a □-structure is an S5-structure. In 
particular, R* is an equivalence relation on W*. 
Theorem 9 (f 1 -Images and S5-Structures) 
f 1 (x) is an S5-structure for every □-structure x. 
Proof 
Let x = <T, ≺, W, H, v> be a □-structure and <W*, R*, v*> the f 1 - 
image of x, i.e. f 1 (x) = <W*, R*, v*>. To show that <W*, R*, v*> is an S5 
structure, we have to prove that W* is a nonempty set, R* is an equivalence 
relation on W*, and v* is a function from W* into Ã(p-CON).
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W* is a nonempty set as W* = W and W is a nonempty set. 
To prove that R* is an equivalence relation on W* we have to show that 
R* is reflexive, transitive and symmetrical. 
(Reflexivity) Let w Î W*. Then, w Î W, as W* = W, so there is an h 0 Î 
H such that h 0 (|w|) = w by Definition 26. Let now h 1 = h 0 . Therefore, we have 
h 0 , h 1 Î H such that h 0 (|w|) = w, h 1 (|w|) = w and h 0 (|w|-1) = h 1 (|w|-1). 
Hence, wR*w. 
(Transitivity). Let w 0 , w 1 , w 2 Î W*. Suppose w 0 R*w 1 and w 1 R*w 2 . Then, 
w 0 , w 1 , w 2 Î W, as W* = W and there are h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 Î H such that h 0 (|w 0 |) = 
w 0 , h 1 (|w 0 |) = w 1 , h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 1 (|w 0 |-1), h 2 (|w 1 |) = w 1 , h 3 (|w 1 |) = w 2 and 
h 2 (|w 1 |-1) = h 3 (|w 1 |-1). As h 1 (|w 0 |) = h 2 (|w 1 |), we get h 1 (|w 0 |-1) = h 2 (|w 0 |-1) 
by condition iii) of Definition 26. Then, there are h 0 , h 3 Î H such that h 0 (|w 0 |) = 
w 0 , h 3 (|w 0 |) = w 2 and h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 3 (|w 0 |-1). Hence, we have w 0 R*w 2 . 
(Symmety) Let w 0 , w 1 Î W* Assume w 0 R*w 1 . Then, there are h 0 , h 1 Î H 
such that h 0 (|w 0 |) = w, h 1 (|w 0 |) = w 1 and h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 1 (|w|-1). Then, |w 1 | 
= |h 1 (|w 0 |)| = |w 0 | by Theorem 4. Therefore, we have h 0 , h 1 Î H such that 
h 1 (|w 1 |) = w 1 , h 0 (|w 1 |) = w 0 and h 1 (|w 1 |-1) = h 0 (|w 1 |-1). Hence, we have 
w 1 R*w 0 . 
v* is a function from W* into Ã(p-CON), as v* = v and W* = W and v 
is a function from W into Ã(p-CON). 
QED 
Having proven that f 1 maps □-structures to S5-structure, we now show that f 1 is truth 
value preserving with respect to □-formulae. 
Theorem 10 (Truth Value Preservation Property of f 1 ) 
Let x = <T, ≺, W, H, v> be a □-structure and f 1 (x) = <W*, R* v*> be the f 1 - 
image of x. Then, φ Î v(w) iff φ Î v*(w) for every □-formula φ and every w Î 
W. 
Proof 
Let x = <T, ≺, W, H, v> be a □-structure, w Î W, f 1 (x) = <W*, R* v*>, 
and φ an arbitrary □-formula. The proof now continues as an induction on the 
formation of φ. 
(p) Assume p Î v(w). Then, w Î W*, as W = W* and p Î v*(w), as v(w) 
= v*(w). 
Assume now p Î v*(w). Then, w Î W, as W = W* and p Î v(w), as v(w) 
= v*(w). Hence, p Î v(w) iff p Î v*(w). 
(Induction Hypothesis) We now assume ψ Î v(w) iff ψ Î v*(w) for 
every sub-formulae ψ of φ. 
(Øψ) Assume Øψ Î v(w). Then, ψ Ï v(w). Hence, ψ Ï v*(w) by the 
induction hypothesis, and so Øψ Î v*(w) by the truth conditions of S5. 
Assume now Øψ Î v*(w). Then, ψ Ï v*(w) by the truth conditions of S5. 
Hence, ψ Ï v(w) by the induction hypothesis, and so Øψ Î v(w). Hence, Øψ Î 
v(w) iff Øψ Î v*(w).
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(ψ Ù χ) Assume ψ Ù χ Î v(w). Then, ψ Î v(w) and χ Î v(w). Therefore, ψ 
Î v*(w) and χ Î v*(w) by the induction hypothesis, and, hence, ψ Ù χ Î v*(w) by 
the truth conditions of S5. 
Assume now ψ Ù χ Î v*(w). Then, ψ Î v*(w) and χ Î v*(w) by the truth 
conditions of S5. Therefore,, ψ Î v(w) and χ Î v(w) by the induction hypothesis, 
and, hence, ψ Ù χ Î v(w). Hence, ψ Ù χ Î v(w) iff ψ Ù χ Î v*(w). 
(□ψ) Assume □ψ Î v(w 0 ). Then, ψ Î v(w 1 ) for all w 1 such that there are 
h 0 , h 1 Î H  with h 0 (|w 0 |) = w 0 , h 1 (|w 0 |) = w 1 and h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 1 (|w 0 |-1). 
Thus, ψ Î v*(w 1 ) for all w 1 such that there are h 0 , h 1 Î H with h 0 (|w 0 |) = w 0 , 
h 1 (|w 0 |) = w 1 and h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 1 (|w 0 |-1) by the induction hypothesis. Hence, ψ 
Î v*(w 1 ) for all w 1 such that w 0 R*w 1 , and so □ψ Î v*(w 0 ) by the truth conditions 
of S5. 
Assume now □ψ Î v*(w 0 ). Then, ψ Î v*(w 1 ) for all w 1 such that w 0 R*w 1 
by the truth conditions of S5. Thus, ψ Î v*(w 1 ) for all w 1 such that there are h 0 , h 1 
Î H with h 0 (|w 0 |) = w 0 , h 1 (|w 0 |) = w 1 and h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 1 (|w 0 |-1). Hence, ψ Î 
v(w 1 ) for all w 1 such that there are h 0 , h 1 Î H with h 0 (|w 0 |) = w 0 , h 1 (|w 0 |) = w 1 
and h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 1 (|w 0 |-1) by the induction hypothesis, and so □ψ Î v(w 0 ). 
Therefore, □ψ Î v(w 0 ) iff □ψ Î v*(w 0 ). 
QED 
Now we turn to the definition of f 2 . 
Definition 50 (f 2 ) 
f 2 is a function from the set of finite S5-structures to the set of □-structures 
defined by f 2 (<W*, R*, v*>) = <T, ≺, W, H, v>, where: 
(1) T = {t i | i Î ℤ} is a set of time points, one for each integer i Î ℤ; 
(2) t i ≺ t j iff i < j; 
(3) W = K – È K 0 È K 1 È K + where: 
(i) K – = {w (i) | i Î ℤ 
– } is a set of conflict states, one for each negative 
integer i Î ℤ – ; 
(ii) K 0 = {w [w*] | [w*] Î W*\R*} is a set of conflict states, one for each 
equivalence class [w*] Î W*\R*; 
(iii) K 1 = W*; 
(iv) K + = {w (w*, i) | w* Î W* and i Î ℤ 
+ \{1}} is a set of conflict states, one 
for each pair consisting of an element w* of W* and a positive integer i Î 
ℤ + \{1}; 
(4) H = {h w* }is a set of functions from T into W, one for each w* Î W* such 
that: 
(i) h w* (t i ) = w (i) if i Î ℤ 
– ; 
(ii) h w* (t i ) = w [w*] if i = 0; 
(iii) h w* (t i ) = w* if i = 1; 
(iv) h w* (t i ) = w (w*, i) if i Î ℤ 
+ \{1}; 
(5) v(w) = v*(w) if w Î W*, and ∅ if w Ï W*.
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The definition of f 2 encodes a rule telling us how to construct a □-structure on the basis 
of a finite S5-structure. This construction works only for finite S5-structures as it 
assumes that there is only a finite number of equivalence classes [w*] in the quotient set 
W*\R*. 164 The □-structure obtained from a finite S5-structure by applying f 2 can be 
described as follows: the elements of the original set W* = K 1 are stacked on top of each 
other at the time point t 1 . Elements of an equivalence class [w*] Î W*\R* are all linked 
by a common, unique, immediate predecessor w [w*] Î K 0 , occurring at the time point t 0 . 
At time points earlier than t 0 , the structure consists of a linear order constituted by 
elements of K – . At time points later than t 1 , the structure consists of parallel, linear orders 
constituted by elements of K + . 
Graphically, we can illustrate the construction as follows. 
Figure 12: Transformation of a Finite S5-Structure into a □-Structure 
164 In fact, the construction also works for infinite S5-structures with the property that their quotient set 
W\R is finite. 
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The following theorem expresses that the f 2 -image of a finite S5-structure <W*, R*, v*> 
is a □-structure. 
Theorem 11 (f 2 -Images and □-Structures) 
f 2 (x) is a □-structure for every finite S5-structure x. 
Proof 
Let x = <W*, R*, v*> be a finite S5-structure and <T, ≺, W, H, v> be 
the f 2 -image of x, i.e. f 2 (x) = <T, ≺, W, H, v>. To show that <T, ≺, W, H, v> is 
a □-structure, we have to prove that (T, ≺) is a discrete, strict linear order 
without endpoints, W is a set, H is a set of functions as defined in Definition 26, 
and v is a function from W into Ã(p-CON). 
(T, ≺) is a discrete, strict linear order without endpoints as it is by 
definition isomorphic to (ℤ, <) and (ℤ, <) is a discrete, strict linear order without 
endpoints.
W is a nonempty set since W* ⊆ W, by definition, and W* is a nonempty 
set by definition of an S5-structure. 
By definition H is a set of functions from T into W. To prove that H is a 
set of functions according to Definition 26 we have to show that elements of H 
satisfy the three conditions stated in the definition. 
(i) Let h w0* , h w1* Î H, t n , t m Î T and h w0* (t n ) = h w1* (t m ) = w. Then, w Î W 
as h w0* , h w1* are functions from T into W. Then, w Î K - È K 0 È K 1 È K + by 
definition of W. Consider now the following four cases: 
(w Î K – ) If w Î K – , then h w0* (t n ) = h w1* (t m ) = w (i) for some i Î ℤ 
– by 
definition of K – . By definition of H we get n = m = i, and, hence, t n = t m . 
(w Î K 0 ) If w Î K 0 , then n = m = 0 by definition of H. Hence, t n = t m . 
(w Î K 1 ) If w Î K 1 , then n = m = 1 by definition of H. Hence, t n = t m . 
(w Î K + ) If w Î K + , then h w0* (t n ) = h w1* (t m ) = w (w*, i) for some i Î ℤ 
+ \{1} 
by definition of K + . By definition of H we get n = m = i, and, hence, t n = t m . 
(ii) Let w Î W. Then, w Î K – È K 0 È K 1 È K + by definition of W. 
Consider now the following four cases: 
(w Î K – ) If w Î K – , then w = w (i) for some i Î ℤ 
– by definition of K - . 
Then, h w* (t i ) = w for all h w* Î H by definition of H. Hence, there is an h w0* Î H 
and t i Î T such that h w0* (t i ) = w. 
(w Î K 0 ) If w Î K 0 , then w = w [w*] for some w* Î W* by definition of 
K 0 . Then, h w* (t 0 ) = w by definition of H. Hence, there is an h w* Î H and t 0 Î T 
such that h w* (t 0 ) = w. 
(w Î K 1 ) If w Î K 1 , then w = w* for some w* Î W* by definition of K 1 . 
Then, h w* (t 1 ) = w by definition of H. Hence, there is an h w* Î H and t 1 Î T such 
that h w* (t 1 ) = w. 
(w Î K + ) If w Î K + , Then, w = w (w*, i) for some w* Î W* and i Î 
ℤ + \{1} by definition of K + . Then, h w* (t i ) = w by definition of H. Hence, there is 
an h w* Î H and t i Î T such that h w* (t i ) = w. 
(iii) Let h w0* , h w1* Î H with h w0* ≠ h w1* . Consider now the following two 
cases:
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(h w0* (t 0 ) = h w1* (t 0 )) If h w0* (t 0 ) = h w1* (t 0 ), then h w0* (t i ) = h w1* (t i ) = w (i) for all i 
Î ℤ – by definition of H. Hence, h w0* (t i ) = h w1* (t i ) for all t i ≼ t 0 by definition of T 
and ≺. By definition of H we also get h w0* (t 1 ) = w 0 * ≠ w 1 * = h w1* (t 1 ) and h w0* (t i ) = 
w (w0*, i) ≠ w (w1*, i) = h w1* (t i ) for all i Î ℤ 
+ \{1}. Hence, h w0* (t i ) ≠ h w1* (t i ) for all t 0 ≺ t i 
by definition of T and ≺. Altogether, there is a t 0 Î H such that h w0* (t i ) = h w1* (t i ) 
for all t i ≼ t 0 and h w0* (t i ) ≠ h w1* (t i ) for all t 0 ≺ t i . 
(h w0* (t 0 ) ≠ h w1* (t 0 )) If h w0* (t 0 ) = h w1* (t 0 ), then h w0* (t i ) = h w1* (t i ) = w (i) for all i 
Î ℤ – by definition of H. Hence, h w0* (t i ) = h w1* (t i ) for all t i ≼ t -1 by definition of T 
and ≺. By definition of H we also get h w0* (t 1 ) = w 0 * ≠ w 1 * = h w1* (t 1 ) and h w0* (t i ) = 
w (w0*, i) ≠ w (w1*, i) = h w1* (t i ) for all i Î ℤ 
+ \{1}. Hence, h w0* (t i ) ≠ h w1* (t i ) for all t -1 ≺ t i 
by definition of T and ≺. Altogether, there is a t -1 Î H such that h w0* (t i ) = h w1* (t i ) 
for all t i ≼ t -1 and h w0* (t i ) ≠ h w1* (t i ) for all t -1 ≺ t i . 
v is a function from W into Ã(p-CON) as v is identical with v* for all w 
Î W* and v* is a function from W into Ã(p-CON) by definition of S5-structures 
and the v-image of every w Î W\W* is the empty set ∅ which is trivially an 
element of Ã(p-CON). 
QED 
Having proven that the f 2 -image of a finite S5-structure x is indeed a □-structure, we now 
show that f 2 is truth value preserving, i.e. the truth value of an S5-formula φ at w in a 
given S5-structure x is equal to the truth value of φ at w in the □-structure f 2 (x). Note 
that every element w of an S5-structure x also appears in the conflict universe W of the 
□-structure f 2 (x) because W* = K 1 Í W by definition of f 2 . 
Theorem 12 (Truth Value Preservation Property of f 2 ) 
Let x = <W*, R* v*> be a finite S5-structure and f 2 (x) = <T, ≺, W, H, v> the 
f 2 -image of x. Then, for every S5-formula φ and every w Î W*, we have φ Î 
v*(w) iff φ Î v(w). 
Proof 
Let x = <W*, R* v*> be an S5-structure, w Î W*, f 2 (x) = <T, ≺, W, H, 
v> the f 2 -image of x and φ an arbitrary S5-formula. The proof now continues as 
an induction on the formation of φ. 
(p) Assume p Î v*(w). Then, w Î W, as W* = K 1 ⊆ W. Then, p Î v(w), 
as v(w) = v*(w) for all w Î W*. Assume now p Î v(w). Then, p Î v*(w), as v(w) 
= v*(w) for all w Î W*. Hence, p Î v*(w) iff p Î v(w). 
(Induction Hypothesis) Assume ψ Î v*(w) iff ψ Î v(w) for all sub- 
formulae ψ of φ. 
(Øψ) Assume Øψ Î v*(w). Then, ψ Ï v*(w) by the truth conditions of S5. 
Then, ψ Ï v(w) by the induction hypothesis. Then, Øψ Î v(w). Assume now Øψ
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Î v(w). Then, ψ Ï v(w). Then, ψ Ï v*(w) by the induction hypothesis. Then, Øψ 
Î v*(w) by the truth conditions of S5. Hence, Øψ Î v*(w) iff Øψ Î v(w). 
(ψ Ù χ) Assume ψ Ù χ Î v*(w). Then, ψ Î v*(w) and χ Î v*(w) by the 
truth conditions of S5. Then, ψ Î v(w) and χ Î v(w) by the induction hypothesis. 
Then, ψ Ù χ Î v(w). Assume now ψ Ù χ Î v(w). Then, ψ Î v(w) and χ Î v(w). 
Then, ψ Î v*(w) and χ Î v*(w) by the induction hypothesis. Then, ψ Ù χ Î v*(w) 
by the truth conditions of S5. Hence, ψ Ù χ Î v*(w) iff ψ Ù χ Î v(w). 
(□ψ) Assume □ψ Î v*(w 0 ). Then, ψ Î v*(w i ) for all w i with w 0 R*w i by the 
truth conditions of S5. Then, ψ Î v*(w i ) for all w i such that w i Î [w 0 ] as R* is an 
equivalence relation in S5. Then, ψ Î v(w i ) for all w i such that w i Î [w 0 ] by the 
induction hypothesis. Then, ψ Î v(h wi* (|w 0 |) for all h wi* such that there is an h w0* 
Î H with h w0* (|w 0 |-1) = h wi* (|w 0 |-1) and h w0* (|w 0 |) = w 0 . Hence, □ψ Î v(w 0 ). 
Assume now □ψ Î v(w 0 ). Then, ψ Î v(h 1 (|w 0 |)) for all h 1 such that there 
is an h 0 Î H with h 0 (|w 0 |-1) = h 1 (|w 0 |-1) and h 0 (|w 0 |) = w 0 . Then, ψ Î v(h 1 (t 1 )) 
for all h 1 such that there is an h 0 Î H with h 0 (t 0 ) = h 1 (t 0 ) = w [w0] and h 0 (t 1 ) = w 0 by 
definition of H. Then, ψ Î v(w i ) for all w i Î [w 0 ]. Then, ψ Î v(w i ) for all w i with 
w 0 R*w i as R* is an equivalence relation in S5. Then, ψ Î v*( w i ) for all w i with 
w 0 R*w i by the induction hypothesis. Then, □ψ Î v*(w 0 ) by the truth conditions 
of S5. Hence, □ψ Î v*(w 0 ) iff □ψ Î v(w 0 ). 
QED 
We can now prove the semantic equivalence between □-CML and S5. 
Theorem 13 (Semantic Equivalence between □-CML and S5) 
⊨ □ φ iff ⊨ S5 φ for all □-formulae φ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a □-formula. We prove the by contraposition. Assume φ is not 
valid in S5. Then, there is a finite S5-structures x = <W*, R*, v*> and a w Î W*, 
such that φ Ï v*(w), as S5 has the finite model property. Then, f 2 (x) = <T, ≺, W, 
H, v> is a □-structure by Theorem 11 and φ Ï v(w) by Theorem 12. Hence, φ is 
not valid in □-CML. 
Assume now φ is not valid in □-CML. Then, there is a □-structure x = 
<T, ≺, W, H, v> and a w Î W, such that φ Ï v(w). Then, f 1 (x) = <W*, R*, v*> 
is an S5-structure by Theorem 9 and φ Ï v(w) by Theorem 10. Hence, φ is not 
valid in S5. 
Altogether we get φ is not valid in S5 iff φ is not valid in □-CML and by 
contraposition φ is valid in S5 iff φ is valid in □-CML. 
QED
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4.2.2  Axioms for □­CML 
Having shown that □-CML is semantically equivalent to S5 we can exploit the fact that 
S5 is adequately characterised by a simple axiom system. We can use the S5 axioms as an 
axiomatic characterisation of □-CML. Following our notational convention, we call the 
axioms characterising □-CML □-axioms. 
Definition 51 (□-Axioms) 
(PC) Axioms of propositional logic; 
(K) □(φ É ψ) É (□φ É □ψ); 
(T) □φ É φ; 
(E) ◊φ É □◊φ; 
(MP) ⊢ φ É ψ, φ Þ ⊢ ψ; 
(N) ⊢ φ Þ ⊢ □φ. 
Provability is defined in the usual way. 
Definition 52 (□-Provability) 
Let φ be a □-formula. Then, φ is □-provable, i.e. ⊢ □ φ, iff there is a finite 
sequence of □-formulae such that the last formula of the sequence is φ and every 
other formula in the sequence is either a □-axiom or the result of applying a rule 
of inference to formulae occurring earlier in the sequence. 
Having defined the concept of □-provability, we can define □-inconsistency and the 
syntactic consequence relation. First, we define what it means for a □-formula φ to follow 
syntactically from a set of □-formulae Φ. 
Definition 53 (Syntactic Consequence Relation for □-CML) 
Let Φ be a set of □-formulae and φ be a t-formula. Then, the syntactic 
consequence relation holds between Φ and φ, i.e. Φ ⊢ □ φ, if and only if there is a 
finite sequence of □-formulae such that the last formula of the sequence is φ and 
every other formula in the sequence is either a □-axiom, an element of Φ, or the 
result of applying a rule of inference to formulae occurring earlier in the 
sequence. 
Now we define the notion of □-inconsistency and, its complement, the notion of □- 
consistency.
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Definition 54 (□-Inconsistency/□-Consistency) 
Let Φ be a set of □-formulae and ⊥ any □-formula of the form φ Ù Øφ. Then, Φ 
is □-inconsistent if and only if Φ ⊢ □ ⊥ and Φ is □-consistent if and only if Φ is 
not □-inconsistent. 
Before we prove soundness and completeness for □-CML, we provide a theorem 
expressing the proof theoretical equivalence between □-CML and S5. Its proof is trivial, 
as both systems have the same axiomatic proof theory, and, hence, every formula 
provable in S5 is also provable in □-CML and vice versa. 
Theorem 14 (Proof Theoretical Equivalence between □-CML and S5) 
□-CML is proof theoretically equivalent to S5 in the sense that for every □- 
formula/S5-formula φ: ⊢ □ φ iff ⊢ S5 φ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a □-formula such that ⊢ □ φ. Then, there is a finite sequence of 
□-formulae such that the last formula of the sequence is φ and every other 
formula in the sequence is either a □-axiom or the result of applying a rule of 
inference to formulae occurring earlier in the sequence. Then, there is a finite 
sequence of □-formulae such that the last formula of the sequence is φ and every 
other formula in the sequence is either a S5-axiom or the result of applying a rule 
of inference to formulae occurring earlier in the sequence, because the □-axioms 
and □-rules of inference are identical with the S5-axioms and S5-rules of 
inference. Hence, ⊢ S5 φ. 
The reverse direction is proven analogously. 
QED 
4.2.3  Soundness of □­CML 
Soundness of □-CML follows directly from the semantic and syntactic equivalence 
between □-CML and S5, and the soundness theorem for S5. To show that the axiom 
system of □-CML is sound, we have to prove that every □-formula provable in □-CML is 
□-valid. In the proof, we assume that S5 is sound and complete. 165 
165 For a completeness proof of S5, see, for instance, (Hughes and Cresswell 1996, p. 119).
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Theorem 15 (Soundness of □-CML) 
If ⊢ □ φ, then ⊨ □ φ for all □-formulae φ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a □-formula such that ⊢ □ φ. Then, ⊢ S5 φ by Theorem 14. Then, 
⊨ S5 φ by the soundness of S5. Then, ⊨ □ φ by Theorem 13. 
QED 
4.2.4  Completeness of □­CML 
Completeness of □-CML follows from the semantic and syntactic equivalence between 
□-CML and S5, and the completeness theorem for S5. To show that the axiom system of 
□-CML is complete, we have to prove that every □-formula valid in □-CML is □- 
provable. 
Theorem 16 (Completeness of □-CML) 
If ⊨ □ φ, then ⊢ □ φ for all □-formulae φ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a □-formula such that ⊨ □ φ. Then, ⊨ S5 φ by Theorem 13. Then, 
⊢ S5 φ by the completeness of S5. Then, ⊢ □ φ by Theorem 14. 
QED 
4.3  The Temporal Fragment 
The temporal fragment of CML, t-CML, consists of those CML-formulae which can be 
used to express temporal properties of a conflict. We call such formulae t-formulae and 
refer to the set of all t-formulae by t-FOR. 
t-formulae are formed by using only propositional constants, temporal constants and 
variables, the indexical symbol n, logical connectives and quantifiers, the identity symbol,
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the temporal precedence symbol, and the temporal realisation operator as primitive 
symbols. 
Definition 55 (Temporal Fragment) 
t-FOR is the set of all strings of elements of t-SYM satisfying the following BNF: 
φ = :: p | Øψ | ψ Ù χ | τ 0 < τ 1 | τ 0 = τ 1 | Rτ 0 ψ | "xφ, where p Î p-CON, τ 0 , τ 1 Î 
t-TER È {n}, x Î t-VAR. 
Similar to the modal core, we can reconstruct the temporal core of CML-formulae by 
replacing sub-formulae whose main operator is a non-logical or non-temporal operator 
by new propositional constants. The temporal core φ* represents just the temporal 
properties of φ and is obtained from φ by applying the translation principles stated in the 
following definition. 
Definition 56 (Temporal Core) 
The temporal core φ* of a CML-formula φ is obtained by the following rules: 
(1) (p)* = p; 
(2) (τ 0 < τ 1 )* = τ 0 < τ 1 ; 
(3) (τ 0 = τ 1 )* = τ 0 = τ 1 ; 
(4) (Øφ)* = Ø(φ)*; 
(5) (φ Ù ψ)* = (φ)* Ù (ψ)*; 
(6) ("xφ)* = "x(φ)*; 
(7) (Rτ 0 φ)* =Rτ 0 (φ)*; 
(8) (□φ)* = ("yφ)* = (α 0 = α 1 )* = (Oα 0 φ)* = p n where p n is a fresh 
propositional constant and O Î {B, G, N, E}. 
The definition allows us to eliminate all the non-logical and non-temporal operators 
within a formula φ. As a result, the temporal core φ* of a CML-formula φ is always a t- 
formula. 
Theorem 17 (Temporal Core and t-CML) 
The temporal core φ* of every CML-formula φ is a t-formula. 
Proof 
Induction on the formation of formulae. 
QED
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Before we continue with the semantic characterisation of t-CML, we restate the 
definitions for free and bound occurrences of t-variables and the indexical symbol n. We 
call the occurrence of a t-variable x bound if and only if x lies within the scope of a 
quantification of the form "x or $x. The indexical symbol n is bound by the temporal 
realisation operator R, i.e. the occurrence of n is bound if and only if n lies within the 
scope of a temporal realisation of the form Rτ, where τ Î t-TER. Free occurrences of t- 
variables or n are occurrences that are not bound. As usual, in the case of a term- 
replacement φ[τ/x] or φ[τ/n], we replace x or n only at their free occurrences. 
4.3.1  Semantic Characterisation of t­CML 
In order to evaluate a t-formula φ, we have to look only at those components of CML- 
structures which are relevant for the interpretation of t-symbols. We define t-structures 
as substructures of CML-structures containing only the components necessary for the 
interpretation of t-formulae. 
Definition 57 (t-Structure) 
A t-structure x is a structure of the form <T, ≺, W, H, v, μ>, where: 
(1) T is a set of time points; 
(2) ≺ is a binary relation on T as defined in Definition 23; 
(3) W is a set of possible conflict states; 
(4) H is a set of possible conflict histories as defined in Definition 26; 
(5) v: W ® Ã(p-CON) is a truth assignment function; 
(6) μ: t-TER ® T is a term assignment function as defined in Definition 31. 
As the definition shows, t-structures are substructures of CML-structures. They are 
CML-structures from which the set of agents A, and the propositional attitude functions 
b, g, n and e, have been removed.
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With the truth conditions for the temporal operators, as stated in Definition 39, we can 
evaluate every t-formula φ in a t-structure x. We use the expression ⊨ t φ, to express that 
a t-formula φ is t-valid, i.e. φ is true at all states w of all t-structures x. 
As t-structures are substructures of CML-structures, t-formulae are t-valid if and only if 
they are CML-valid. 
Theorem 18 (CML-Validity and t-Validity) 
⊨ t φ iff ⊨ CML φ for all t-formulae φ. 
Proof 
We prove by reduction Let φ be a t-formula. Assume ⊭ t φ. Then, there is 
a t-structure x and a state w such that φ Ï v μ (w). Expand x to a CML-structure x* 
by adding an arbitrary, nonempty set A of agents and arbitrary propositional 
attitude functions b, g, n, e and extending the domain of μ to a-TER assigning 
arbitrary members of A to a-terms. Then, the extended structure x* is a CML- 
structure and φ Ï v μ (w). Hence, ⊭ CML φ. 
Assume now ⊭ CML φ. Then, there is a CML-structure x and a state w of x 
such that φ Ï v μ (w). Reduce x to a t-structure x* by eliminating the set of Agents 
A and the propositional attitude functions b, g, n and e, and restricting the 
domain of μ to t-TER. Then, x* is a t-structure and φ Ï v μ (w). Hence, ⊭ t φ. 
Altogether, we get ⊭ t φ iff ⊭ CML φ and by contraposition ⊨ t φ iff ⊨ CML φ. 
QED 
In the case of the modal fragment □-CML, we were able to show that □-CML is 
equivalent to S5. For t-CML, the situation is different as there is no simple temporal 
system that t-CML is equivalent to. Thus, we provide our own axiom system for t-CML 
and show that the axiom system is sound and complete over the semantic of t-CML. 
4.3.2  Axioms for t­CML 
We call axioms characterising the temporal fragment of CML t-axioms. t-axioms fall into 
three categories. Being based on first-order logic with identity, the first group of t-axioms 
contains axioms of propositional logic, first-order logic and identity theory. Here, the
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choice of the particular axioms and rules is irrelevant. The second group of t-axioms 
includes five axioms dealing with the temporal precedence relation <. The five order 
axioms characterise < as a discrete, strict linear order relation without endpoints. The 
third group contains t-axioms specific to t-CML. They reflect the forwards-branching, 
backwards-linear character of t-structures by providing axiomatic conditions for the 
logical connectives and quantifiers, the temporal realisation operator, and the indexical 
symbol n. 
The list of t-axioms is given as follows. 
Definition 58 (t-Axioms) 
(FOL = )Axioms of first-order logic with identity; 
(O1) "xØ(x < x); 
(O2) "x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù x 1 < x 2 É x 0 < x 2 ); 
(O3) "x 0 ,x 1 (x 0 < x 1 Ú x 0 = x 1 Ú x 1 < x 0 ); 
(O4) "x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù Ø(x 0 < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 1 )); 
(O5) "x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 1 < x 0 Ù Ø(x 1 < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 0 )); 
(T1) "x(x ≤ n É (RxØφ ≡ ØRxφ)); 
(T2) "x(n < x É (RxØφ É ØRxφ)); 
(T3) "x((Rxφ Ù Rxψ) ≡ Rx(φ Ù ψ)); 
(T4) Rτ"xφ ≡ "xRτφ, where τ Î t-TER È {n} and τ ¹ x; 
(T5) "x 0 ,x 1 (n ≤ x 0 É (Rx 1 φ É Rx 0 Rx 1 φ)); 
(T6) "x 0 ,x 1 (x 0 ≤ n É (Rx 0 Rx 1 φ É Rx 1 φ)); 
(T7) Rnφ ≡ φ; 
(T8) $x(x = n); 
(T9) Rτφ ≡ Rτφ[τ/n], where τ Î t-TER È {n}; 
(") ⊢ φ É ψ Þ ⊢ φ É "xψ, where x is not free in φ; 
(MP) ⊢φ É ψ, φ Þ ⊢ ψ; 
("R) ⊢ φ Þ ⊢ "xRxφ, where x and n are not free in φ. 
t-provability, the syntactic consequence relation, and t-consistency are defined as usual. 
Definition 59 (t-Provability) 
Let φ be a t-formula. Then, φ is t-provable, i.e. ⊢ t φ, if and only if there is a finite 
sequence of t-formulae such that the last formula of the sequence is φ and every 
other formula in the sequence is either a t-axiom or the result of applying a rule 
of inference to formulae occurring earlier in the sequence.
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Definition 60 (Syntactic Consequence Relation for t-CML) 
Let Φ be a set of t-formulae and φ be a t-formula. Then, the syntactic 
consequence relation holds between Φ and φ, i.e. Φ ⊢ t φ, if and only if there is a 
finite sequence of t-formulae such that the last formula of the sequence is φ and 
every other formula in the sequence is either a t-axiom, and element of Φ or the 
result of applying a rule of inference to formulae occurring earlier in the 
sequence. 
Definition 61 (t-Inconsistency/t-Consistency) 
Let Φ be a set of t-formulae and ⊥ any t-formula of the form φ Ù Øφ. Then, Φ is 
t-inconsistent if and only if Φ ⊢ t ⊥ and Φ is t-consistent if and only if Φ is not t- 
inconsistent. 
4.3.3  Soundness of t­CML 
To show that the axiom system for t-CML is sound, i.e. ⊨ t φ if ⊢ t φ, we have to prove 
that every t-axiom is t-valid and every rule of inference preserves t-validity. We omit the 
proofs for (FOL = ), (MP) and (U) as they are standard. 
Theorem 19 (Validity of t-axioms) 
If φ is one of the axioms O1, O2, O3, O4, O5 or T1 to T8, then ⊨ t φ. 
Proof 
We prove by reductio. 
(O1) Assume ⊭ t "xØ(x < x). Then, there is a t-structure x and a state w 
such that x, w ⊨ Ø"xØ(x < x). Then, there is a t Î T such that t ≺ t. This is a 
contradiction to the irreflexivity of ≺. Hence, ⊨ t "xØ(x < x). 
(O2) Assume ⊭ t "x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù x 1 < x 2 É x 0 < x 2 ). Then, there is a t- 
structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù x 1 < x 2 É x 0 < x 2 ). 
Then, there are t 0 , t 1 , t 2 Î T such that t 0 ≺ t 1 and t 1 ≺ t 2 and t 0 ⊀ t 2 . This is a 
contradiction to the transitivity of ≺. Hence, ⊨ t "x 0 ,x 1 ,x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù x 1 < x 2 É x 0 
< x 2 ). 
(O3) Assume ⊭ t "x 0 ,x 1 (x 0 < x 1 Ú x 0 = x 1 Ú x 1 < x 0 ). Then, there is a t- 
structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x 0 ,x 1 (x 0 < x 1 Ú x 0 = x 1 Ú x 1 < x 0 ). 
Then, there are t 0 , t 1 Î T such that t 0 ⊀ t 1 and t 0 ≠ t 1 and t 1 ⊀ t 0 . This is a 
contradiction to the trichotomy of ≺. Hence, ⊨ t "x 0 ,x 1 (x 0 < x 1 Ú x 0 = x 1 Ú x 1 < 
x 0 ). 
(O4) Assume ⊭ t "x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù Ø(x 0 < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 1 )). Then, there 
is a t-structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù Ø(x 0 < x 2 
Ù x 2 < x 1 )). Then, there is a t 0 Î T such that there is no t 1 Î T such that t 0 ≺ t 1 
and there is no t 2 Î T such that t 0 ≺ t 2 and t 2 ≺ t 1 . This is a contradiction to the
The Axiomatics of Conflict Modelling Logic 
179 
fact that every t Î T has an immediate successor. Hence, ⊨ t "x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù 
Ø(x 0 < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 1 )). 
(O5) Assume ⊭ t "x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 1 < x 0 Ù Ø(x 1 < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 0 )). Then, there 
is a t-structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 1 < x 0 Ù Ø(x 1 < x 2 
Ù x 2 < x 0 )). Then, there is a t 0 Î T such that there is no t 1 Î T such that t 1 ≺ t 0 
and there is no t 2 Î T such that t 1 ≺ t 2 and t 2 ≺ t 0 . This is a contradiction to the 
fact that every t Î T has an immediate predeccessor. Hence, ⊨ t "x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 1 < 
x 0 Ù Ø(x 1 < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 0 )). 
(T1) Assume ⊭ t "x(x ≤ n É (RxØφ ≡ ØRxφ)). Then, there is a t- 
structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x(x ≤ n É (RxØφ ≡ ØRxφ)). Then, 
there is a t Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such that t ≼ |w| and one of 
the following two cases holds: 
(i) Øφ Î v μ (h(t)) for all h Î H such that h(|w|) = w and φ Î v μ (h(t)) for 
all h Î H such that h(|w|) = w by the truth condition for R. Then, φ Ï v μ (h(t)) 
for all h Î H by the truth condition for Ø. This is a contradiction to φ Î v μ (h(t)). 
(ii) There is an h 0 Î H such that h 0 (|w|) = w and Øφ Ï v μ (h 0 (t)) and 
there is an h 1 Î H such that h 1 (|w|) = w and Øφ Î v μ (h 1 (t)) by the truth 
condition for R. Then, h 0 (t) = h 1 (t) by the definition of H and, hence, by identity 
we get Øφ Ï v μ (h 1 (t)). This is a contradiction to Øφ Ï v μ (h 0 (t)). 
As we get contradictions in both cases, ⊨ t "x(x ≤ n É (RxØφ ≡ ØRxφ)). 
(T2) Assume ⊭ t "x(n < x É (RxØφ É ØRxφ)). Then, there is a t- 
structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x(n < x É (RxØφ É ØRxφ)). Then, 
there is a t Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such that |w| ≺ t and Øφ Î 
v μ (h(t)) for all h Î H such that h(|w|) = w and φ Î v μ (h(t)) for all h Î H such 
that h(|w|) = w by the truth condition for R. Then, Øφ Ï v μ (h(t)) for all h Î H 
by the truth condition for Ø. This is a contradiction to Øφ Î v μ (h(t)). Hence, ⊨ t 
"x(n < x É (RxØφ É ØRxφ)). 
(T3) Assume ⊭ t "x(Rxφ Ù Rxψ ≡ Rx(φ Ù ψ)). Then, there is a t-structure 
x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x(Rxφ Ù Rxψ ≡ Rx(φ Ù ψ)). Then, one of the 
following two cases holds: 
(i) There is a t Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such that φ Î 
v μ (h(t)) for all h Î H and ψ Î v μ (h(t)) for all h Î H such that h(|w|) = w and 
there is an h Î H such that h(|w|) = w and φ Ù ψ Ï v μ (h(t)) by the truth 
condition for R. Then, φ Ï v μ (h(t)) or ψ Ï v μ (h(t)), by the truth condition for Ù, 
and, we have a contradiction. 
(ii) There is a t Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such that φ Ù ψ Î 
v μ (h(t)) for all h Î H such that h(|w|) = w and either there is an h Î H such that 
h(|w|) = w and φ Ï v μ (h(t)) or there is an h Î H such that h(|w|) = w and ψ Ï 
v μ (h(t)) by the truth condition for R. Then, φ Î v μ (h(t)) and ψ Î v μ (h(t)), by the 
truth condition for Ù, we have a contradiction. 
As we get contradictions in both cases, ⊨ t "x(Rxφ Ù Rxψ ≡ Rx(φ Ù ψ)). 
(T4) Assume ⊭ t Rτ"xφ ≡ "xRτφ, where τ Î t-TER È {n} and τ ¹ x. 
Then, there is a t-structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø(Rτ"xφ ≡ "xRτφ). 
Then, one of the two following cases holds: 
(i) There is a t 0 Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such that μ(τ) = t 0 
and "xφ Î v μ (h(t 0 )) for all h Î H such that h(|w|) = w by the truth condition
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for R and "xRτφ Ï v μ (w). Then, there is a t 1 Î T such that Rτφ Ï v μ[t 1 /x] (w) by the 
truth condition for ". Then, there is an h Î H such that φ Ï v μ[t 1 /x] (h(t)) by the 
truth condition for R and the fact that μ(τ) = t 0 . On the other hand we have φ Î 
v μ[t 2 /x] (h(t 0 )) for all t 2 Î T by the truth condition for " and the fact that "xφ Î 
v μ (h(t 0 )) and, thus, φ Î v μ[t 1 /x] (h(t 0 )). This is a contradiction. 
(ii) There is a t 0 Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such that μ(τ) = 
t 0 and there is an h Î H such that h(|w|) = w  and "xφ Ï v μ (h(t 0 )) by the truth 
condition for R and Rτφ Î v μ[t 1 /x] (w) for all t 1 Î T by the truth condition for ". 
Then, φ Î v μ[t 1 /x] (h(t 0 )) for all t 1 Î T for all h Î H such that h(|w|) = w by the 
truth condition for R and there is a t 2 Î T such that φ Ï v μ[t 2 /x] (h(t 0 )) by the truth 
condition for ". Then, φ Î v μ[t 2 /x] (h(t 0 )) and, hence, we have a contradiction. 
As we get contradictions in both cases, ⊨ t Ra"xφ ≡ "xRaφ. 
(T5) Assume ⊭ t "x 0 ,x 1 (n ≤ x 0 É (Rx 0 φ É Rx 1 Rx 0 φ)). Then, there is a t- 
structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x 0 ,x 1 (n ≤ x 0 É (Rx 0 φ É Rx 1 Rx 0 φ)). 
Then, there are t 0 , t 1 Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such that |w| ≼ t 0 
and φ Î v μ (h 0 (t 1 )) for all h 0 Î H such that h 0 (|w|) = w and there is an h 1 Î H 
such that h 1 (|w|) = w and Rx 1 φ Ï v μ (h 1 (t 0 )) by the truth condition for R. Then, 
there is an h 2 Î H such that h 2 (|h 1 (t 0 )|) = h 2 (t 0 ) = h 0 (t 0 ) and φ Ï v μ (h 2 (t 1 )) by the 
truth condition for R. Then, h 2 (|w|) = h 0 (|w|) by the definition of H and, 
hence, φ Î v μ (h 2 (t 1 )). This is a contradiction. Hence, ⊨ t "x 0 ,x 1 (n ≤ x 0 É (Rx 0 φ É 
Rx 1 Rx 0 φ)).
(T6) Assume ⊭ t "x 0 ,x 1 (x 0 ≤ n É (Rx 1 Rx 0 φ É Rx 0 φ)). Then, there is a t- 
structure x and a state w such that x, w ⊨ Ø"x 0 ,x 1 (x 0 ≤ n É (Rx 1 Rx 0 φ É Rx 0 φ)). 
Then, there are a t 0 , t 1 Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such that t 0 ≼ |w| 
and Rx 1 φ Î v μ (h 0 (t 0 )) for all h 0 Î H such that h(|w|) = w and there is an h 1 Î H 
such that h 1 (|w|) = w and φ Ï v μ (h 1 (t 1 )) by the truth condition for R. Then, Rx 1 φ 
Î v μ (h 0 (t 0 )) and, hence, φ Î v μ (h 2 (t 0 )) for all h 2 Î H such that h 2 (|h 1 (t 0 )|) = h 2 (t 0 ) 
= h 1 (t 0 ) by the truth condition for R. Then, φ Î v μ (h 1 (t 0 )). This is a contradiction. 
Hence, ⊨ t "x 0 ,x 1 (x 0 ≤ n É (Rx 1 Rx 0 φ É Rx 0 φ)). 
(T7) Assume ⊭ t Rnφ ≡ φ. Then, there is a t-structure x and a state w 
such that x, w ⊨ Ø(Rnφ ≡ φ). Then, one of the two following cases holds: 
(i) There is a truth assignment function v μ such that Rnφ Î v μ (w) and φ Ï 
v μ (w). Then, φ Î v μ (w) by the truth condition for Rn. Hence, we have a 
contradiction. 
(ii) There is a truth assignment function v μ such that Rnφ Ï v μ (w) and φ 
Î v μ (w). Then, φ Ï v μ (w) by the truth condition for Rn. Hence, we have a 
contradiction. 
As we get contradictions in both cases, ⊨ t Rnφ ≡ φ. 
(T8) Assume ⊭ t $x(x = n). Then, there is a t-structure x and a state w 
such that x, w ⊨ Ø$x(x = n). Then, (x = n) Ï v μ[t/x] (w) for all t Î T by the truth 
condition for ". On the other hand we have (x = n) Î v μ[t/x] (w) for t = |w| by 
the definition of |w|. This is a contradiction and, hence, ⊨ t $x(x = n). 
QED
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Next, we show that the rule (TR) preserves t-validity. 
Theorem 20 (Correctness of TR) 
Let φ be a t-formula such that ⊨ t φ, where x and n are not free in φ. Then, ⊨ t 
"xRxφ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a t-formula such that ⊨ t φ, where x and n are not free in φ. 
Assume now that ⊭ t "xRxφ. Then, there is a t-structure x and a state w such that 
x, w ⊨ Ø"xRxφ. Then, there is a t Î T and a truth assignment function v μ such 
that Rxφ Ï v μ[t/x] (w). Then, there is an h Î H such that h(|w|) = w and φ Ï 
v μ[t/x] (h(t)). Hence, there is a t-structure x and a state h(t) Î W such that x, h(t) ⊭ 
φ. This is a contradiction to the assumptions that ⊨ t φ. Hence, ⊨ t "xRxφ. 
QED 
Having proven that all t-axioms are t-valid and that TR preserves t-validity, it follows that 
the axiom system is sound over the semantics of t-CML. 
Theorem 21 (Soundness of t-CML) 
If ⊢ t φ then ⊨ t φ for all t-formulae φ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a t-formula such that ⊢ t φ. Then, every formula in the proof 
sequence for φ is either a t-axiom, and, hence, t-valid by Theorem 19, or the 
result of applying TR to a t-valid formula, and, hence, t-valid by Theorem 20. 
Hence, every formula in the proof sequence for φ is t-valid and, thus, φ, being the 
last element of the sequence, is t-valid. 
QED 
4.3.4  Completeness of t­CML 
To show that the axiom system for t-CML is complete over the semantic of t-CML, we 
prove that every t-consistent set of t-sentences is t-satisfiable. The proof involves two 
steps. Starting with an arbitrary t-consistent set of t-formulae Φ, we first show, by means 
of a Henkin construction, that there is a superset Ψ of Φ which is maximal consistent 
and has the witness property. Then, we define the canonical model M Ψ for Ψ and show
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that M Ψ satisfies all formulae contained in Ψ. Once we have proven that every t- 
consistent set of t-sentences has a model, it is only a small step to show that ⊨ t φ implies 
⊢ t φ. 
We start with some standard definitions and a proof that the set of all t-formulae is 
enumerable. In the first definition we define t-sentences as t-formulae with no free 
occurrences of variables. 
Definition 62 (t-Sentences) 
A t-sentence φ is a t-formula in which all variables occurring in φ are bound. The 
set of all t-sentences is abbreviated by t-FOR 0 . 
Next, we define the notion of maximal t-consistency. 
Definition 63 (Maximal t-Consistency) 
A set Ψ of t-sentences is maximal t-consistent iff: 
(1) Ψ is t-consistent; 
(2) Either φ Î Ψ or Øφ Î Ψ for every t-sentence φ. 
Finally, we define what it means for a set of t-sentences to have the witness property. 
Definition 64 (Witness Property) 
A set Ψ of t-sentences has the witness property iff: 
If $xψ Î Ψ, then there is a t-constant t* such that ψ[t*/x] Î Ψ for every t- 
sentence of the form $xψ. 
The last requirement before we can define the Henkin construction is the enumerability 
of t-FOR 0 . 
Theorem 22 (Enumerability of t-FOR 0 ) 
The t-FOR 0 is enumerable.
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Proof 
t-FOR 0 is a subset of the set of all finite sequences consisting of elements 
of t-SYM. t-SYM is countable and, hence, enumerable as it is the union of the 
countable sets p-CON, t-CON, t-VAR, {n} and {Ø, Ù, ", (, ), =, < R}. Hence, t- 
FOR 0 is enumerable as it is a subset of the set of all finite sequences of t-SYM.
QED 
Now we turn to the construction of a maximal t-consistent superset Ψ of a t-consistent 
set Φ of t-sentences that has the witness property. Starting with a t-consistent set Φ of t- 
sentences we follow the usual procedure of adding new t-sentences to Φ and witnessing 
all t-sentences of the form $xψ contained in the construction. This method was 
introduced by Leon Henkin in his 1947 doctoral thesis to prove the completeness of 
first-order predicate logic. 
Definition 65 (Henkin Construction) 
Let L t be the language of t-CML and let t-CON* = {t 1 *, t 2 *, …} be a countably 
infinite set of new constant symbols. Define L t * = L t È t-CON*. Let t-FOR 0 * be 
the set of t*-sentences, i.e. sentences of L t *. 
Let now Φ be a t-consistent set of t-sentences and φ 1 , φ 2 , … be an enumeration 
of t-FOR 0 *. 
For every n Î ℕ we define inductively a superset Φ n of Φ as follows: 
Φ 0 = Φ; 
Φ n È {φ n+1 } if Φ n È {φ n+1 } is t-consistent and φ n+1 is not of the form 
$xψ; 
Φ n+1 = Φ n È {φ n+1 } È {ψ[t n */x]} if Φ n È {φ n+1 } is t-consistent and φ n+1 is of 
the form $xψ, where t n * Î t-CON* not occurring in Φ n È {φ n+1 }; 
Φ n È {Øφ n+1 } if Φ n È {φ n+1 } is t-inconsistent. 
Define now Ψ = U 
N nÎ 
Φ n . 
By definition, each Φ n is a superset of Φ and, hence, Ψ, being the union of all Φ n , is a 
superset of Φ. We still need to show that Ψ is maximal t-consistent and has the witness 
property. To do this, we first prove that every Φ n is t-consistent. Then, we show that Ψ 
is t-consistent, maximal, and has the witness property.
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Theorem 23 (t-Consistency of Φ n ) 
Φ n is t-consistent for every n Î ℕ. 
Proof 
We prove by induction on n. 
(n = 0) Φ 0 = Φ is t-consistent, as the original set Φ was assumed to be t- 
consistent. 
(Induction Hypothesis) We assume that Φ k is t-consistent. 
(n = k+1) By definition of Φ k+1 we have to consider three cases: 
(i) If Φ k+1 = Φ k È {φ k+1 }, where Φ k È {φ k+1 } is t-consistent and φ k+1 is 
not of the form $xtψ, then Φ k+1 is t-consistent by definition. 
(ii) If Φ k+1 = Φ k È {φ k+1 } È {ψ[t*/x]}, where Φ k È {φ k+1 } is t-consistent 
and φ k+1 is of the form $xψ, then Φ k+1 is t-consistent. Assuming Φ k+1 to be t- 
inconsistent implies that Φ k È {φ k+1 } is t-inconsistent as Φ k È {$xψ} ⊢ ψ[t*/x] 
by FOL = and the fact that t* Î t-CON* not occurring in Φ n È {φ n+1 }. This is a 
contradiction to the assumption. 
(iii) If Φ k+1 = Φ k È {Øφ k+1 }, where Φ k È {φ k+1 } is t-inconsistent, then 
Φ k+1 is t-consistent. Assuming Φ k+1 to be t-inconsistent implies that Φ k is t- 
inconsistent as Φ k ⊢ Øφ k+1 by FOL = and the fact that Φ k È {φ k+1 } is t- 
inconsistent. This is a contradiction to the assumption. 
QED 
Now, we show that Ψ is t-consistent. 
Theorem 24 (t-Consistency of Ψ) 
Ψ is t-consistent. 
Proof 
We prove by reductio. Assume Ψ to be t-inconsistent. Then, Ψ ⊢ ⊥. 
Then, there is a finite subset Ψ 0 Í Ψ such that Ψ 0 ⊢ ⊥ as we have a finitary 
proof theory. Then, there is a Φ n Í Ψ such that Ψ 0 Í Φ n . Then, Φ n ⊢ ⊥ and, 
hence, Φ n is t-inconsistent. This is a contradiction to Theorem 23. 
QED 
Next, we prove that Ψ is maximal t-consistent. 
Theorem 25 (Maximal t-Consistency of Ψ) 
Ψ is maximal t-consistent. 
Proof 
Ψ is t-consistent by Theorem 24. We must show that Ψ is maximal. Let φ 
Î t-SEN* such that φ Ï Ψ. As a t*-sentence, φ occurs somewhere in the 
enumeration φ 1 , φ 2 , … of all t-FOR 0 *. Let n be the position at which φ occurs in
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φ 1 , φ 2 , …. Then, Φ n-1 È {φ} must be inconsistent as otherwise φ Î Φ n Í Ψ. 
Hence, Øφ Î Φ n Í Ψ by construction of Φ n . 
QED 
Finally, we show that Ψ has the witness property. 
Theorem 26 (Witness Property of Ψ) 
Ψ has the witness property. 
Proof 
Let φ Î t-FOR 0 * be of the form $xψ with φ Î Ψ. As a t*-sentence, φ 
occurs somewhere in the enumeration φ 1 , φ 2 , … of all t-FOR 0 *. Let n be the 
position at which φ occurs in φ 1 , φ 2 , …. Then, Φ n = Φ n-1 È {$xψ} È {ψ[t*/x]} by 
construction of Φ n . Hence, there is a constant t* such that ψ[t*/x] Î Φ n Í Ψ. 
QED 
Altogether we get the desired result. 
Theorem 27 (Existence of Ψ) 
If Φ is a t-consistent set of t-sentences, then there is a maximal t-consistent set Ψ 
that has the witness property such that Φ Í Ψ. 
Proof 
Starting with a t-consistent set Φ of t-sentences we construct Ψ as 
described in Definition 65. Then, Ψ is maximal t-consistent by Theorem 25 and 
has the witness property by Theorem 26. 
QED 
Having shown that every t-consistent set Φ Í t-FOR 0 can be expanded to a maximal t- 
consistent set Ψ that has the witness property, we turn now to the construction of the 
canonical model M Ψ for Ψ. M Ψ is a t-structure of the form <T Ψ , ≺ Ψ , W Ψ , H Ψ , v Ψ , μ Ψ > 
which has the property that there is a w Î W Ψ such that φ Î v μ 
Ψ (w) for all φ Î Ψ, i.e. M Ψ 
satisfies all φ Î Ψ.
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Before we define M Ψ some prerequisite concepts are needed. For this purpose, we 
assume from now on that w is a maximal t-consistent set of t-sentences that has the 
witness property. 
First, we define an equivalence relation ~ w on t-CON on the basis of w. 
Definition 66 (~ w ) 
t i ~ 
w t j iff w ⊢ t i = t j . 
The following theorem expresses that ~ w is an equivalence relation. 
Theorem 28 (Equivalence Relation) 
~ w is an equivalence relation. 
Proof 
We have to prove that ~ w is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. 
(Reflexive) Let t Î t-CON. Then, w ⊢ t = t by FOL = and the maximal 
t-consistency of w. Hence, t ~ w t by definition of t ~ w t. 
(Symmetrical) Let t i , t j Î t-CON. Then, w ⊢ t i = t j É t j = t i by FOL 
= and 
the maximal t-consistency of w. Assume now t i ~ 
w t i . Then, w ⊢ t i = t j by 
definition of ~ w and, hence, w ⊢ t j = t i by FOL 
= . Hence, t j ~ 
w t i by definition of 
~ w . 
(Transitive) Let t i , t j , t k Î t-CON. Then, w ⊢ t i = t j Ù t j = t k É t i = t k by 
FOL = and the maximal t-consistency of w. Assume now t i ~ 
w t i and t j ~ 
w t k . Then, 
w ⊢ t i = t j and w ⊢ t j = t k by definition of ~ 
w . Then, w ⊢ t i = t k by FOL 
= . Hence, 
t i ~ w t k by definition of ~ 
w . 
QED 
Now we define T w as the set of all equivalence classes generated by ~ w on t-CON. 
Definition 67 (T w ) 
T w = t-CON/~ w . 
As a convention, we refer to elements of T w by letters t, t 0 , t 1 etc. such that t = [t], t 0 = 
[t 0 ], t 1 = [t 1 ] etc. Furthermore, if w is a maximal t-consistent set of t-sentences that has 
the witness property, we use the t-constant t w to refer to an arbitrary constant such that w 
⊢ t w = n. Formally, we can define t w and t w as follows.
The Axiomatics of Conflict Modelling Logic 
187 
Definition 68 (t w ) 
t w = {t Î t-CON | w ⊢ t = n}; 
t w is an arbitrary element of t w . 
Note that t w is a constant symbol, whereas t w is an equivalence class of constant symbols. 
Note also that t w is well defined as for all t i , t j Î t-CON such that w ⊢ t i = n and w ⊢ t j 
= n we have t i ~ t j . It remains to show that there is always a t w such that w ⊢ t w = n. 
Theorem 29 (Existence of t w ) 
Let w be a maximal t-consistent set of t-sentences that has the witness property. 
Then, there is a t-constant t w such that w ⊢ n = t w . 
Proof 
w ⊢ $x(x = n) as $x(x = n) is the t-axiom (T8) and w is maximal t- 
consistent. Then, w ⊢ t w = n for some constant t w Î t-CON as w has the witness 
property. Hence, there is a t-constant t w such that w ⊢ t w = n. 
QED 
In the next two definitions, we define two functions called Past and Future. They assign to 
every maximal t-consistent set w of t-sentences that has the witness property, sets Past(w) 
and Future(w) of maximal t-consistent sets of t-sentences. 
First, we define Past(w), the past of w. The idea behind this definition is that for every t 
Î T w such that w ⊢ t ≤ n, w uniquely determines a set of t-sentences. This set can be 
interpreted as a complete description of the state in which the conflict was at the time 
point t according to w. The Past function selects all these sets. 
Definition 69 (Past(w)) 
Past(w) = U 
w T Î t 
p w (t) where: 
{{φ | w ⊢ Rtφ}} if w ⊢ t ≤ n; 
p w (t) = 
Æ if w ⊢ n < t.
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Note that Past(w) Í Ã(t-FOR 0 ), i.e. Past(w) is a set of subsets of t-FOR 0 . For every t Î 
T w such that w ⊢ t ≤ n, Past(w) contains exactly one set of t-sentences. As we will show 
in Theorem 30, this set is maximal t-consistent and has the witness property. For all t Î 
T w such that w ⊢ n < t, p w (t) is the empty set and, hence, nothing is added to Past(w). 
Similar to the past of w, we can define its future Future(w). Here the situation is more 
complicated. First, if t lies in the future of w, i.e. w ⊢ n < t, then w determines, in 
general, more than one set of t-sentences because of the forwards-branching property of 
t-structures. f w (t), the future equivalent to p w (t), is, therefore, not a singleton, as in the 
case of p w (t), but a set of possibly infinite cardinality. Second, f w (t) is generally not 
uniquely determined by w. In order to make the definition unique, we define f w (t) as the 
set of all sets of t-sentences that are compatible with the description of t according to w. 
f w (t) can be interpreted as an exhaustive description of the set of all states at the time 
point t, into which the conflict can possibly develop, according to w. 
Definition 70 (Future(w)) 
Future(w) = U 
w T Î t 
f w (t) where: 
{w 0 Í t-FOR 0 | w 0 is maximal t-consistent, w 0 has the witness 
f w (t) = property, if w ⊢ Rtφ and w ⊢ n < t, then φ Î w 0 }; 
Æ if w ⊢ t ≤ n. 
Note that Future(w) Í Ã(t-FOR 0 ), i.e. Future(w) is a set of subsets of t-FOR 0 . For every t 
Î T w such that w ⊢ n < t, f w (t) is uniquely defined as the set of all maximal t-consistent 
sets that have the witness property and contain all t-sentences φ such that Rtφ Î w. For 
all t Î T w such that w ⊢ n < t, f w (t) is the empty set and, hence, nothing is added to 
Future(w).
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In the following, we prove three theorems expressing properties of Past(w) and Future(w). 
The theorems will be used in the completeness proof for t-CML. The first theorem 
shows that elements of Past(w) and Future(w) are maximal t-consistent sets of t-sentences 
that have the witness property. 
Theorem 30 (Elements of Past(w) and Future(w)) 
If w 0 Î Past(w) È Future(w), then w 0 is maximal t-consistent and has the witness 
property. 
Proof 
If w 0 Î Future(w), then w 0 is maximal t-consistent and has the witness 
property by definition of Future(w). 
Let w 0 Î Past(w). 
(t-Consistency) We prove by reductio. Assume w 0 is t-inconsistent. 
Then, w 0 ⊢ φ Ù Øφ for some φ Î t-FOR 0 . Then, w ⊢ Rt w 0 (φ Ù Øφ) and w ⊢ (t w 0 
≤ n) by definition of Past(w). Hence, w ⊢ Rt w 0 φ Ù ØRt w 0 φ by (FOL 
= ) and the t- 
axioms (T1) and (T3). Hence, w is t-inconsistent. This is a contradiction to the 
assumption. 
(Maximality) Assume φ Ï w 0 . Then, w ⊬ Rt w 0 φ and w ⊢ (t w 0 ≤ n) by 
definition of Past(w). Hence, w ⊢ ØRt w 0 φ by the maximality of w. Then, w ⊢ 
Rt w 0 Øφ by (FOL 
= ) and the t-axiom (T1). Hence, Øφ Î w 0 by definition of Past(w). 
(Witness Property) Assume $xφ Î w 0 . Then, w ⊢ Rt w 0 $xφ and w ⊢ (t w 0 
≤ n) by definition of Past(w). Hence, w ⊢ $xRt w 0 φ by (FOL 
= ), the t-axioms (T1) 
and (T4), and the equivalence between Ø"Ø and $. Then, w ⊢ (Rt w 0 φ)[t*/x] for 
some t-constant t* as w has the witness property. Then, w ⊢ Rct w 0 φ[t*/x] by 
definition of substitution. Then, w ⊢ φ[t*/x] by definition of Past(w). Hence, 
there is a constant t* such that φ[x/t*] Î w 0 . 
QED 
The second theorem links the two concepts Past(w) and Future(w) via their respective 
membership relation. 
Theorem 31 (Relationship between Past(w) and Future(w)) 
w 0 Î Future(w 1 ) iff w 1 Î Past(w 0 ). 
Proof 
First we prove that w 0 Î Future(w 1 ) implies w 1 Î Past(w) by reductio. 
Assume w 0 Î Future(w 1 ) and w 1 Ï Past(w 0 ). Then, w 1 ⊢ Rt w 0 φ implies φ Î w 0 for 
all φ Î t-FOR 0 , by the definition of Future(w), and there is a ψ Î w 1 such that w 0
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⊬ Rt w 0 ψ by definition of Past(w). Then, w 1 ⊢ Rt w 1 ψ by (FOL 
= ), the t-axiom (T7) 
and because w 1 ⊢ n = t w 1 by Theorem 29. We also have w 1 ⊢ t w 1 < t w 0 by 
definition of Future(w) and, hence, w 1 ⊢ n < t w 0 by (FOL 
= ). Then, w 1 ⊢ Rt w 0 Rt w 1 ψ 
by (FOL = ) and the t-axiom (T5). Hence, w 0 ⊢ Rt w 0 ψ. This is a contradiction to w 0 
⊬ Rt w 0 ψ. 
Now we show by reductio that w 1 Î Past(w 0 ) implies w 0 Î Future(w 1 ). 
Assume w 1 Î Past(w 0 ) and w 0 Ï Future(w 1 ). Then, φ Î w 1 implies w 0 ⊢ Rt w 1 φ for 
all φ Î t-FOR 0 by definition of Past(w) and there is a ψ Ï w 0 such that w 1 ⊢ Rt w 0 ψ 
by definition of Future(w). Then, w 0 ⊢ Rt w 1 Rt w 0 ψ. We also have w 0 ⊢ t w 1 < t w 0 by 
definition of Past(w) and, hence, w 0 ⊢ t w 1 < n by (FOL 
= ) and because w 0 ⊢ n = 
t w 0 by Theorem 29. Then, w 0 ⊢ Rt w 0 ψ by (FOL 
= ) and the t-axiom (T6). Then, w 0 
⊢ Rnψ by (FOL = ) and, hence, w 0 ⊢ ψ by the t-axiom (T7). This is a contradiction 
to ψ Ï w 0 . 
QED 
In the third theorem we prove that the past of w contains w itself. 
Theorem 32 (Reflexivity of Past(w)) 
w Î Past(w). 
Proof 
Assume ψ Î w. Then, w ⊢ Rt w ψ and w ⊢ (t w ≤ n) by (FOL 
= ) and the t- 
axiom (T7). Hence, p w (t w ) = {{φ | w ⊢ Rt w φ}} = {w}.Thus, p w (t w ) = {w}. 
Hence, w Î Past(w). 
QED 
Now we can define the canonical model M w for a maximal t-consistent set w of t- 
sentences that has the witness property. 
Definition 71 (Canonical Model) 
Let w be a maximal t-consistent set that has the witness property. The canonical 
model M w = <T w , ≺ w , W w , H w , v w , μ w > for w is defined by: 
(1) T w = t-CON/~ w such that t i ~ 
w t j iff w ⊢ t i = t j ; 
(2) ≺ w ⊆ T w ´ T w such that t i ≺ 
w t j iff w ⊢ t i < t j ; 
(3) W w = U 
) w ( w 0 Past Î 
Future(w 0 ); 
(4) H w is the smallest set of functions h: T w ® W w such that: 
(i) "h,t: t = n Î h(t) ; 
(ii) "w$h,t: h(t) = w; 
(iii) "w,h,t: w Î Past(h(t)) iff w = h(t w ) and t w ≼ 
w t; 
(5) v w : W w ® Ã(p-CON) such that "w: v w (w) = w Ç p-CON;
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(6) μ w : t-TER ® T w such that μ w (t) = [t] = t if a Î t-CON and μ w (x) is an 
arbitrary element of T w if x Î t-VAR. 
The definition of M w is motivated by two goals. On the one hand, we have to make sure 
that M w turns out to be a t-structure. On the other hand we want M w to satisfy every 
element of w. 
T w is the quotient set t-CON modulo ~ w , where ~ w is the equivalence relation defined in 
Definition 66. ≺ w is a binary relation on T w such that ≺ w holds between two elements t i , 
t j of T 
w if and only if the t-sentence t i < t j is derivable from w, where t i represents the 
equivalence class t i , and t j represents the equivalence class t j . The elements of W 
w are 
maximal t-consistent sets of t-sentences that have the witness property. W w is 
constructed as the union of all futures Future(w 0 ) where w 0 is in the past of the original 
set w, Past(w). This definition works, as the elements of Past(w) are maximal t-consistent 
sets of t-sentences as shown in Theorem 30. The set of histories, H w , resembles the 
definition of H for CML-structures. Elements of H w are functions from T w into W w 
satisfying three conditions of which the last links them with the past function Past(w) and 
the order relation ≺ w . The truth assignment function v w assigns to every element w of 
W w the set of propositional constants that are contained in w. The term assignment 
function μ w interprets t-constants by their corresponding equivalence classes and t- 
variables by arbitrary elements of T w . 
The following theorem expresses that if w is a maximal t-consistent set of t-sentences 
that has the witness property, then M w is a t-structure. To prove this, we show in a 
number of lemmas that the components of M w have the required properties. It is always 
assumed that w is a maximal t-consistent set of t-sentences that has the witness property 
and that M w = <T w , ≺ w , W w , H w , v w , μ w > is the canonical model of w.
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Lemma 1 
T w ≠ ∅. 
Proof 
Consider the following derivation. 
1. w ⊢ $x(x = n) (T8) 
2. w ⊢ t = n for some t witness property 
Hence, t Î t-CON ≠ ∅ and, therefore, [t] = t Î T w ≠ ∅. 
QED 
Lemma 2 
(T w , ≺ w ) is a discrete, strict linear order with no endpoints. 
Proof 
≺ w ⊆ T w ´ T w by definition. We have to show that ≺ w is irreflexive, 
transitive and trichotomous and every t Î T w has a unique predecessor and a 
unique successor. 
(Irreflexivity) Let t Î T w . Consider now the following derivation: 
1. w ⊢ "xØ(x < x) (O1) 
2. w ⊢ Ø(t < t) (FOL = ), 1 
Hence, w ⊬ t < t and, therefore, t ⊀ w t. 
(Transitivity) Let t 0 , t 1 , t 2 Î T 
w such that t 0 ≺ 
w t 1 and t 1 ≺ 
w t 2 . Consider 
the following derivation: 
1. w ⊢ t 0 < t 1 by definition of ≺ 
w 
2. w ⊢ t 1 < t 2 by definition of ≺ 
w 
3. w ⊢ "x 0 x 1 x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù x 1 < x 2 É x 0 < x 2 ) (O2) 
4. w ⊢ t 0 < t 1 Ù t 1 < t 2 É t 0 < t 2 (FOL 
= ), 3 
5. w ⊢ t 0 < t 2 (FOL 
= ), 1, 2, 4 
Hence, t 0 ≺ 
w t 2 . 
(Trichotomy) Let t 0 , t 1 Î T 
w . Then: 
1. w ⊢ "x 0 x 1 (x 0 < x 1 Ú x 0 = x 1 Ú x 1 < x 0 ) (O3) 
2. w ⊢ t 0 < t 1 Ú t 0 = t 1 Ú t 1 < t 0 (FOL 
= ), 1 
Hence, w ⊢ t 0 < t 1 or w ⊢ t 0 = t 1 or w ⊢ t 1 < t 1 and, therefore, t 0 ≺ 
w t 1 or t 0 = t 1 
or t 1 ≺ 
w t 0 . 
(Predecessor/Successor) Let t 0 Î T 
w . We have: 
1. w ⊢ "x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 0 < x 1 Ù Ø(x 0 < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 1 )) (O4) 
2. w ⊢ "x 2 (t 0 < t 1 Ù Ø(t 0 < x 2 Ù x 2 < t 1 )) for some t 1 (FOL 
= ), 1, witness 
property 
3. w ⊢ t 0 < t 1 (FOL 
= ), 2 
4. w ⊢ "x 2 Ø(t 0 < x 2 Ù x 2 < t 1 ) (FOL 
= ), 3 
Hence, there is a t 1 Î T 
w such that t 0 ≺ 
w t 1 and for all t 2 Î T 
w either t 0 ⊀ 
w t 2 or t 2 
⊀ w t 1 . Thus, t 1 is the immediate successor of t 0 . Furthermore, we have: 
1. w ⊢ "x 0 $x 1 "x 2 (x 1 < x 0 Ù Ø(x 1 < x 2 Ù x 2 < x 0 )) (O5) 
2. w ⊢ "x 2 (t 1 < t 0 Ù Ø(t 1 < x 2 Ù x 2 < t 0 )) for some t 1 (FOL 
= ), 1, witness 
property
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3. w ⊢ t 1 < t 0 (FOL 
= ), 2 
4. w ⊢ "x 2 Ø(t 1 < x 2 Ù x 2 < t 0 ) (FOL 
= ), 3 
Hence, there is a t 1 Î T 
w such that t 1 ≺ 
w t 0 and for all t 2 Î T 
w either t 1 ⊀ 
w t 2 or t 2 
⊀ w t 0 . Thus, t 1 is the immediate predecessor of t 0 . 
QED 
Lemma 3 
W w ≠ ∅. 
Proof 
w Î Past(w) by Theorem 32. Then, w Î Future(w) by Theorem 31. Hence, 
w Î U 
) w ( w 0 Past Î 
Future(w 0 ) = W 
w ≠ ∅. 
QED 
Lemma 4 
H W = is a set of functions from T w into W w such that 
(1) "h 0 ,h 1 ,t 0 ,t 1 (h 0 (t 0 ) = h 1 (t 1 ) É t 0 = t 1 ) 
(2) "w$h,t (h(t) = w) 
(3) "h 0 ,h 1 $t 0 "t 1 ((t 1 ≼ t 0 É h 0 (t 1 ) = h 1 (t 1 )) Ù (t 0 ≺ t 1 É h 0 (t 1 ) ≠ h 1 (t 1 ))) 
Proof 
H w is a set of functions from T w into W w by definition. 
(i) Let h 0 , h 1 Î H 
w and t 0 , t 1 Î T 
w such that h 0 (t 0 ) = h 1 (t 1 ). Then, there is a 
w 0 Î W 
w such that w 0 Î Past(w) and h 0 (t 0 ) Î Future(w 0 ) by definition of W 
w . 
Then, w Î Future(w 0 ) and w 0 Î Past(h 0 (t 0 )) by Theorem 31. Consider now the 
following derivation. 
1. h 0 (t 0 ) ⊢ t 0 = n by definition of H 
w 
2. h 1 (t 1 ) ⊢ t 1 = n by definition of H 
w 
3. h 0 (t 0 ) ⊢ t 1 = n as h 0 (t 0 ) = h 1 (t 1 ) 
4. h 0 (t 0 ) ⊢ t 0 = t 1 (FOL 
= ), 1, 3 
5. h 0 (t 0 ) ⊢ "xRx(t 0 = t 1 ) ("R), 4 
6. h 0 (t 0 ) ⊢ Rt w 0 (t 0 = t 1 ) (FOL 
= ), 5 
7. w 0 ⊢ t 0 = t 1 as w 0 Î Past(h 0 (t 0 )) 
8. w 0 ⊢ "xRx(t 0 = t 1 ) ("R), 7 
9. w 0 ⊢ Rt w (t 0 = t 1 ) (FOL 
= ), 8 
10. w ⊢ t 0 = t 1 as w Î Future(w 0 ) 
Hence, t 0 ~ 
w t 1 and, therefore, t 0 = [t 0 ] = [t 1 ] = t 1 . 
(ii) "w$h,t(h(t) = w) by condition ii) of the definition of H w . 
(iii) Let h 0 , h 1 Î H 
w with h 0 ¹ h 1 . 
First, we show that there is a t Î T w such that h 0 (t) = h 1 (t). As h 0 ¹ h 1 
there is a t Î T w such that h(t) ¹ h(t). Then, there are w 0 , w 1 Î W 
w such that w 0 , 
w 1 Î Past(w), h 0 (t) Î Future(w 0 ) and h 1 (t) Î Future(w 1 ) by definition of W 
w . Then, 
w 0 Î Past(h 0 (t)) and w 1 Î Past(h 1 (t)) by Theorem 31. Then, h 0 (t w 0 ) = w 0 and h 1 (t w 1 ) 
= w 1 by definition of H 
w .
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By definition of H w there is an h 2 Î H 
w such that h 2 (t w ) = w, as w Î W 
w 
by Lemma 3. Then, w 0 , w 1 Î Past(h 2 (t w )). Then, h 2 (t w 0 ) = w 0 and h 2 (t w 1 ) = w 1 by 
definition of H w . By trichotomy of ≺ w we get t w 0 ≺ 
w t w 1 or t w 0 = t w 1 or t w 1 ≺ 
w t w 0 . 
If t w 0 ≺ 
w t w 1 , then w 0 Î Past(h 2 (t w 1 )) = Past(w 1 ) = Past(h 1 (t w 1 )) by definition 
of H w . Hence, h 1 (t w 0 ) = w 0 = h 0 (t w 0 ). 
If t w 0 = t w 1 , then h 0 (t w 0 ) = w 0 = h 2 (t w 0 ) = h 2 (t w 1 ) = w 1 = h 1 (t w 1 ) = h 1 (t w 0 ). 
If t w 1 ≺ 
w t w 0 , then w 1 Î Past(h 2 (t w 0 )) = Past(w 0 ) = Past(h 0 (t w 0 )) by definition 
of H w . Hence, h 0 (t w 1 ) = w 1 = h 1 (t w 1 ). 
As in all three cases there is a t Î T w such that h 0 (t) = h 1 (t), the set {t | 
h 0 (t) = h 1 (t)} Í T 
w is nonempty. Define t max as the maximum of {t | h 0 (t) = 
h 1 (t)} with respect to ≺ 
w . Then, h 0 (t max ) = h 1 (t max ). 
Let t 0 Î T 
w such that t 0 ≼ 
w t max . Then, h 0 (t 0 ) Î Past(h 0 (t max )) = 
Past(h 1 (t max )) by definition of H 
w and, therefore, h 1 (t 0 ) = h 1 (t h 0 (t 0 ) ) = h 0 (t 0 ). 
Let t 0 Î T 
w such that t max ≺ 
w t 0 . Then, t 0 Ï {t | h 0 (t) = h 1 (t)}. Hence, 
h 0 (t 0 ) ≠ h 1 (t 0 ). 
QED 
Lemma 5 
v w is a function from W w into Ã(p-CON). 
Proof 
v w is a function from W w into Ã(p-CON) by definition of M w . 
QED 
Lemma 6 
μ is a function from t-TER into T w . 
Proof 
μ is a function from t-TER into T w by definition of M w . 
QED 
Now it follows readily from Lemma 1 to Lemma 6 that M w is a t-structure. 
Theorem 33 (M w and t-Structures) 
If w is a maximal t-consistent set of t-sentences that has the witness property, 
then M w is a t-structure. 
Proof 
All components of M w satisfy the conditions of a t-structure by Lemma 1 
to Lemma 6. Hence, M w is a t-structure. 
QED
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Having proven that M w is a t-structure we show now that for a given set w of maximal t- 
consistent sentences, M w satisfies all elements of w. To do this, we have to show that 
there is a state w 0 Î W 
w such that φ Î v μ 
w (w 0 ) if and only if φ Î w for all φ Î w. The state 
w 0 which has this property is w itself. The choice of w is possible as w Î W 
w by Lemma 
3. 
Theorem 34 (Satisfiability of w) 
If w is a maximal t-consistent set of t-sentences 166 that has the witness property 
and M w = <T w , ≺ w , W w , H w , v w , μ w > is the canonical model of w, then φ Î v μ 
w (w) 
iff φ Î w, for every φ Î t-FOR 0 . 
Proof 
We prove by induction on the formation of φ. 
(p) Assume p Î w. Then, p Î w Ç p-CON = v μ 
w (w) by definition of v μ 
w . 
Hence, p Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now p Ï w. Then, p Ï w Ç p-CON = v μ 
w (w) by definition of 
v μ 
w . Hence, p Ï v μ 
w (w). 
(t 0 = t 1 ) Assume t 0 = t 1 Î w. Then, w ⊢ t 0 = t 1 and, hence, t 0 ~ w t 1 by 
definition of ~ w . Then, μ w (t 0 ) = t 0 = t 1 = μ 
w (t 1 ) by definition of μ 
w . Hence, t 0 = t 1 
Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now t 0 = t 1 Ï w. Then, w ⊬ t 0 = t 1 as w is maximal t-consistent 
and, hence, t 0 ≁ w t 1 by definition of ~ w . Then, μ w (t 0 ) = t 0 ¹ t 1 = μ w (t 1 ) by definition 
of μ w . Hence, t 0 = t 1 Ï v μ 
w (w). 
(n = t) Assume n = t Î w. Then, w ⊢ n = t and w ⊢ t w = n by definition 
t w . Then, w ⊢ t w = t by (FOL = ). Then, |w| = t w = t = μ w (t) as in the previous 
case. Hence, n = t Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now n = t Ï w. Then, w ⊬ n = t as w is maximal t-consistent and 
w ⊢ t w = n by definition of t w . Then, w ⊬ t w = t by (FOL = ). Then, |w| = t w ¹ t = 
μ w (t) as in the previous case. Hence, n = t Ï v μ 
w (w). 
166 The result also holds for open t-formulae as we can transform every open t-formula φ into a t-sentence 
φ # such that φ is satisfied if φ # is satisfied by the following construction. For a given maximal t-consistent 
set Φ of (possibly open) t-formulae that has the witness property, we first ensure that all free variables 
occurring in Φ are distinct from each other by replacing some of the free variables as required. Second, we 
extend our language by a countably infinite set CON # of new constants and define an injective function f 
from the set of (distinct) free variables occurring in Φ into the set CON # . Next, we replace each open 
formula φ Î Φ by a formula φ # = φ[x1/f(x1), …, xn/f(xn)], where x1, … xn are the free variables occurring 
in φ. This gives us a set Φ # of t-sentences, for which the satisfiability theorem holds, i.e. every formula 
φ[x1/f(x1), …, xn/f(xn)] is satisfied by the canonical model M Φ 
# . Then, an induction on the formation of t- 
formulae shows that M Φ # ⊨t φ[x1/f(x1), …, xn/f(xn)] implies M Φ # ⊨t, μ[x 1 /f(x 1 ), …, x n /f(x n )] ⊨t φ. Note that we can 
choose μ[x1/f(x1), …, xn/f(xn)] as μ(x) can be an arbitrary element of T Φ 
# in the canonical model M Φ # .
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(c i < c j ) Assume t 0 < t 1 Î w. Then, w ⊢ t 0 < t 1 , and, hence, t 0 ≺ w t 1 by 
definition of ≺ w . Then, μ w (t 0 ) = t 0 ≺ 
w t 1 = μ 
w (t 1 ) by definition of μ 
w . Hence, t 0 < 
t 1 Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now t 0 < t 1 Ï w. Then, w ⊬ t 0 < t 1 as w is maximal t-consistent 
and, hence, t 0 ⊀ 
w t 1 by definition of ≺ 
w . Then, μ w (t 0 ) = t 0 ⊀ 
w t 1 = μ 
w (t 1 ) by 
definition of μ w . Hence, t 0 < t 1 Ï v μ 
w (w). 
(n < t) Assume n < t Î w. Then, w ⊢ n < t and w ⊢ t w = n by definition 
of t w . Then, w ⊢ t w < t by (FOL = ). Then, |w| = t w ≺ w t = μ w (t) as in the previous 
case. Hence, n < t Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now n < t Ï w. Then, w ⊬ n < t as w is maximal t-consistent and 
w ⊢ t w = n by definition of t w . Then, w ⊬ t w < t by (FOL = ). Then, |w| = t w ⊀ w t 
= μ w (t). Hence, n < t Ï v μ 
w (w). 
(Induction Hypothesis) We assume ψ, χ Î v μ 
w (w) iff ψ, χ Î w for all 
sub-formulae ψ and χ of φ. 
(Øψ) Assume Øψ Î w. Then, ψ Ï w as w is maximal t-consistent. Then, ψ 
Ï v μ 
w (w) by the induction hypothesis and, hence, Øψ Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now Øψ Ï w. Then, ψ Î w as w is maximal t-consistent. Then, ψ 
Î v μ 
w (w) by the induction hypothesis and, hence, Øψ Ï v μ 
w (w). 
(ψ Ù χ) Assume ψ Ù χ Î w. Then, ψ Î w and χ Î w as w is maximal t- 
consistent. Then, ψ Î v μ 
w (w) and χ Î v μ 
w (w) by the induction hypothesis and, 
hence, ψ Ù χ Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now ψ Ù χ Ï w. Then, ψ Ï w or χ Ï w as w is maximal t- 
consistent. Then, ψ Ï v μ 
w (w) or χ Ï v μ 
w (w) by the induction hypothesis and, 
hence, ψ Ù χ Ï v μ 
w (w). 
("xψ) Assume "xψ Î w. Let t Î T w . Then, ψ[t/x] Î w by (FOL = ) and 
the maximal t-consistency of w. Then, ψ[t/x] Î v μ 
w (w) by the induction 
hypothesis. Then, ψ Î v μ[t/x] 
w (w). As t was chosen arbitrarily, we get ψ Î v μ[t/x] 
w (w) 
for all t Î T w and, hence, "xψ Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now "xψ Ï w. Then, Ø"xψ Î w as w is maximal t-consistent. 
Then, $xØψ Î w by definition of $. Then, Øψ[t/x] Î w for some t-constant t as 
w has the witness property. Then, ψ[t/x] Ï w as w is maximal t-consistent and, 
hence, ψ[t/x] Ï v μ 
w (w) by the induction hypothesis. Then, ψ Ï v μ[t/x] 
w (w). Thus, 
there is a t Î T w such that ψ Ï v μ[t/x] 
w (w) and, hence, "xψ Ï v μ 
w (w). 
(Rtψ) Assume Rtψ Î w. Then, w ⊢ t < n Ú t = n Ú n < t by the t-axiom 
(O3) and (FOL = ) Then, t < n Î w or t = n Î w or n < t Î w. 
If t < n Î w or t = n Î w, let h Î H w be such that h(|w|) = w. Define w t 
= {ψ | Rtψ Î w}. Then, ψ Î w t and {w t }= p w (t) by definition of p w Hence, w t Î 
Past(w) = Past(h(|w|)). Then, w t = h(t w t ) = h(t) by definition of H 
w and, hence, ψ 
Î h(t) = h(μ w (t)) by definition of μ w . As h was chosen arbitrarily, we get ψ Î 
h(μ w (t)) for all h Î H w such that h(|w|) = w. Hence, Rtψ Î v μ 
w (w). 
If n < t Î w, let h Î H w such that h(|w|) = w. Then, ψ Î w t for all w t Î 
f w (t) by definition of f w . Now we show that h(t) Î f w (t). We have w ⊢ t w < t by 
(FOL = ) and by definition of t w and, hence, |w| = t w ≺ 
w t by definition of ≺ w . 
Then, w Î Past(h(t)) by definition of H w . Then, h(t) Î Future(w) by Theorem 31. 
Then, h(t) Î f w (t) by definition of Future and, hence, ψ Î h(t) = h(μ 
w (t)) by
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definition of μ w . As h was chosen arbitrarily we get ψ Î h(μ(t)) for all h Î H w 
such that h(|w|) = w. Hence, Rtψ Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume now Rtψ Ï w. Then, w ⊢ t < n Ú t = n Ú n < t by the t-axiom 
(O3) and (FOL = ) Then, t < n Î w or t = n Î w or n < t Î w. 
If t < n Î w or t = n Î w, then ØRtψ Î w as w is maximal t-consistent 
and, hence, RtØψ Î w by (FOL = ) and the t-axiom (T1). Let now h Î H w such 
that h(|w|) = w. Define w t = {ψ | Rtψ Î w}. Then, Øψ Î w t and {w t }= p w (t) by 
definition of p w Hence, w t Î Past(w) = Past(h(|w|)). Then, w t = h(t w t ) = h(t) by 
definition of H w and, hence, Øψ Î h(t) = h(μ w (t)) by definition of μ w . Then, ψ Ï 
h(μ w (t)) and, hence, there is an h Î H w such that h(|w|) = w and ψ Ï h(μ w (t)). 
Hence, Rtψ Ï v μ 
w (w). 
If n < t Î w, then there is a w t Î f w (t) such that ψ Ï w t by definition of f w . 
Let now h Î H w such that h(t) = w t . We show that h(|w|) = w. We have w ⊢ t w 
< t by (FOL = ) and by definition of t w and, hence, |w| = t w ≺ 
w t by definition of 
≺ w . 
We also have w t Î Future(w) as w t Î f w (t). Then, w Î Past(w t ) = Past(h(t)) 
by Theorem 31 and, hence, h(t w ) = h(|w|) = w by definition of H 
w . Hence, there 
is an h Î H w such that h(|w|) = w and ψ Ï h(t) = h(μ w (t)) by definition of μ w . 
Hence, Rtψ Ï v μ 
w (w). 
(Rnψ) Assume Rnψ Î w. Then, ψ Î w by the t-axiom (T7). Then, ψ Î 
v μ 
w (w) by the induction hypothesis. Hence, Rnψ Î v μ 
w (w). 
Assume Rnψ Ï w. Then, ψ Ï w by the t-axiom (T7) and the maximal t- 
consistency of w. Then, ψ Ï v μ 
w (w) by the induction hypothesis. Hence, Rnψ Ï 
v μ 
w (w). 
QED 
With the satisfiability theorem, we have shown that every maximal t-consistent set w that 
has the witness property is satisfied by its canonical model M w , i.e. M w , w ⊨ φ for all φ Î 
w. We now show that that every t-consistent set Φ is satisfiable. This is a simple 
consequence of our Henkin construction. 
Theorem 35 (Satisfiability of Φ) 
Let Φ be a t-consistent set of t-sentences. Then, Φ is satisfiable. 
Proof 
Let Φ be a t-consistent set of t-sentences. Then, there is a maximal t- 
consistent superset Ψ of Φ that has the witness property by Theorem 27. Then, 
M Ψ , Ψ ⊨ Ψ by Theorem 34. Then, M Ψ , Ψ ⊨ Φ as Φ Í Ψ. Hence, Φ is satisfiable. 
QED
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Finally we prove the completeness theorem for t-CML, i.e. we show that ⊨ t φ implies ⊢ t φ 
for every t-sentence φ. 
Theorem 36 (Completeness of t-CML) 
If ⊨ t φ, then ⊢ t φ, for every t-sentence φ. 
Proof 
We prove by reduction. Let φ be a t-sentence. Assume ⊨ t φ and ⊬ t φ. 
Then, {Øφ} is t-consistent and, hence, satisfiable by Theorem 35. Hence, there is 
a t-structure x and a state w in x such that x, w ⊨ t Øφ and, hence, x ⊭ t φ. This is a 
contradiction to ⊨ t φ. 
QED 
4.4  The Propositional Attitude Fragment 
The propositional attitude fragment of CML, p-CML, is significantly different from the 
other CML-fragments in that it is not a logical system. The reason for this is that we have 
made no restrictions on the four propositional attitude functions b, g, n, and e. As a 
consequence, there are no theorems involving the propositional attitude operators other 
than substitution instances of theorems of the other fragments. 
We have not restricted the propositional attitude functions because real agents’ 
propositional attitudes, i.e. their beliefs, goals, norms, and emotions, are generally not 
restricted. Agents hold arbitrary combinations of propositional attitudes. In particular, 
agents are often not logically omniscient, their beliefs are inconsistent, they pursue 
contradictory goals, and they feel uncommitted to the logical consequences of the norms 
they hold. Putting constraints on b, g, n, or e, or formulating axioms for the 
propositional attitude operators B, G, N or E, would require agents to satisfy conditions 
of consistency, rationality, morality, or emotional coherence. Such conditions, which are 
typically imposed on belief operators of epistemic logic, goal operators of preference
The Axiomatics of Conflict Modelling Logic 
199 
logic, or norm operators of deontic logic, have the effect that only artificial agents’ 
propositional attitudes can be described by these logics. 
Although agents are not required to satisfy certain conditions with regard to their 
propositional attitudes, they are not prohibited from it either. Hence, we can formulate 
conditions for b, g, and n which, if satisfied by an agent, qualify the agent as a consistent 
believer, a rational agent, or a morally coherent agent. The conditions allow one to check 
various levels of consistency of an agent’s propositional attitudes. In the following, we 
formulate some constraints on the belief function b as an example illustrating how 
attitude functions can be constrained. 
4.4.1  Consistent Believers 
The following conditions express different aspects of epistemic consistency. Each of 
them is assumed to hold for every formula φ and every state w. 
Definition 72 (Consistency Conditions) 
(1) If φ Î b(a, w), then Øφ Ï b(a, w); 
(2) If φ Î b(a, w) and φ É ψ Î b(a, w), then Øψ Ï b(a, w); 
(3) If φ Î b(a, w) and φ É ψ Î b(a, w), then ψ Î b(a, w); 
(4) If φ Î b(a, w) and ⊢ CML φ É ψ, then Øψ Ï b(a, w); 
(5) If φ Î b(a, w) and ⊢ CML φ É ψ, then ψ Î b(a, w); 
(6) If ⊢ CML φ, then φ Î b(a, w); 
(7) If φ Î b(a, w), then Baφ Î b(a, w). 
An agent a satisfying the first condition is excluded from believing that a statement is 
true at the same time as believing that the negation of the statement is true. In other 
words, the belief set b(a, w) cannot contain a formula φ and its negation Øφ. The 
condition is rather weak. It neither prevents agents from believing contradictions, such as 
φ Ù Øφ, nor commits them to believing in the logical consequences of their beliefs. If the
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condition is assumed to hold for all agents and all formulae, the scheme "x(Bxφ É 
ØBxØφ) becomes valid in CML. 
The second condition can be interpreted as follows. If an agent believes φ as well as that 
ψ is a consequence of φ, then the agent does not believe that the negation of ψ is true. 
The condition is a generalisation of the first consistency condition, although it is 
independent from it. The first condition follows from the second one only if the agent 
believes that φ É φ is true. The corresponding scheme for the second condition is 
"x(Bx(φ É ψ) É (Bxφ É ØBxØψ)), which is valid in CML for all formulae φ and ψ if the 
condition is assumed to hold. 
We can strengthen the second condition by requiring agents to believe that ψ is true, 
when they believe that φ is true and that ψ is a consequence of φ. This is expressed in the 
third consistency condition which is also independent from the first two conditions. The 
third and first condition, however, jointly imply the second one. The third condition can 
be characterised as an internal epistemic closure principle for agents. It requires agents to 
believe in the truth of statements they believe to be the consequences of other beliefs 
they hold. It does not require agents to be logically omniscient in the sense that they are 
committed to believe that all the logical consequences of their beliefs are true. 
Furthermore, it does not require agents to be consistent with regard to their beliefs. This 
can be seen by looking at an agent a who believes φ and Øφ, but does not believe ψ Ú 
Øψ. The agent satisfies condition three, although his belief set is inconsistent and he does 
not believe ψ Ú Øψ, even though this follows logically φ. Hence, he is neither a consistent 
believer nor logically omniscient. The corresponding scheme, which is true if the third 
condition is assumed to hold, is "x(Bx(φ É ψ) É (Bxφ É Bxψ)).
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The fourth and fifth condition are similar to the previous two. The difference is that in 
their antecedents, agents are no longer required to believe that a certain conditional is 
true. Instead, the conditional in question must be a theorem of CML. In the case of 
condition five, for example, an agent who believes φ is committed to believing that ψ is 
true if φ logically implies ψ, i.e. if φ É ψ is a theorem of CML. The fourth condition can 
be characterised as an external consistency condition. Agents satisfying the condition are 
excluded from believing in statements that are logically inconsistent with other beliefs 
they hold. The fifth condition describes external, or logical, omniscience. Agents 
satisfying the condition are required to believe that a statement is true if it logically 
follows from a belief they hold. This condition implies that agents who have at least one 
belief also believe any theorem of CML is true since CML-theorems follow from 
arbitrary beliefs. Both conditions are independent from the other conditions. 
The sixth consistency condition requires agents to believe that any theorem of CML is 
true. It is similar to condition five, but stronger in the sense that even agents who do not 
have a single belief (other than a theorem) are forced to believe at least all theorems of 
CML. Hence, the condition also expresses a form of logical omniscience which is even 
stronger than the logical omniscience expressed in condition five. If the condition is 
assumed to hold in the semantics of CML, the following rule of inference becomes 
correct: if ⊢ CML φ, then ⊢ CML "xBxφ. 
The last condition expresses the KK-principle of epistemic logic. This condition, which 
expresses positive introspection for agents, makes all formulae of the form "x(Bxφ É 
BxBxφ) valid in CML. It makes sure that every agent who believes φ also believes that he 
believes that φ.
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More consistency conditions can be formulated in addition to the above seven. In 
particular, conditions dealing with beliefs that involve other connectives, such as Ù or Ú, 
as well as conditions dealing with the belief operator itself, are relevant. 
The logical relationships among the conditions are as follows. Condition one and three 
jointly imply condition two. Condition two and six jointly imply condition one and four. 
Condition three and six jointly imply condition five. Condition three and four jointly 
imply condition two. Condition four implies condition one. 
4.5  Axioms for CML 
In the following section, we show that the axioms provided for the temporal fragment of 
CML provide also an axiomatisation of CML as a whole. The reason for this is that the 
modal operator □ can be defined in terms of temporal symbols and, as explained in 
section 4.4, the propositional attitude operators B, G, N, and E do not require any 
axioms as there are no restrictions on the four propositional attitude functions b, g, n, 
and e. From this, it follows that all elements of L CML , i.e. all connectives and operators, 
can be axiomatically characterised by the temporal axioms alone. 
Note that, although we can define the modal operators in terms of temporal operators, 
the completeness result of section 4.2 for the modal fragment provides an independent 
construction making sure that the modal fragment can be used even if we do not want to 
rely on the temporal fragment 
Before we state the definitions for □ and ◊ in terms of temporal symbols, we look at the 
semantic relationship between □-CML, t-CML, and CML itself. Taking into account that 
□-structures are substructures of t-structures which are, in turn, substructures of CML-
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structures, we obtain the following theorem expressing the substructure relation Ì with 
respect to □-structures, t-structures, and CML-structures. 
Theorem 37 (Substructure Relation) 
If x Ì y expresses that x is a substructure of y, then the following substructure 
relations hold: □-structure Ì t-structure Ì CML-structure. 
Proof 
The relations hold by definition of the respective structures. 
QED 
Now we turn to the axiomatisation of CML. To do this, we have to express the modal 
operators in terms of temporal symbols. First we repeat two abbreviations introduced in 
section 2.4.1. There we defined the next operator X expressing that a formula φ is true at 
the next time point and the yesterday operator Y expressing that φ is true at the 
immediately preceding time point. 
Definition 73 (Next Operator) 
The next operator, X, is defined as follows: 
Xφ = "x 0 (n < x 0 Ù Ø$x 1 (n < x 1 Ù x 1 < x 0 ) É Rx 0 φ). 
Definition 74 (Yesterday Operator) 
The yesterday operator, Y, is defined as follows: 
Yφ = "x 0 (x 0 < n Ù Ø$x 1 (x 0 < x 1 Ù x 1 < n) É Rx 0 φ). 
The antecedents of the two definitions express that x 0 is an immediate successor in the 
case of X and an immediate predecessor in the case of Y. As < is a discrete, strict linear 
order relation, the successor and the predecessor of an arbitrary element of T are 
uniquely defined. 
We now define the two modal operators, □ and ◊, in terms of X and Y. The definitions 
show that the modal operators can be expressed entirely in the temporal language of t- 
CML. First, we define the necessity operator.
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Definition 75 (Temporal Definition of the Necessity Operator) 
The historical necessity operator □ is defined as follows: 
□φ = YXφ. 
Now we define the possibility operator in the usual way. 
Definition 76 (Temporal Definition of the Possibility Operator) 
The historical possibility operator ◊ is defined as follows: 
◊φ = ØYXØφ. 
In order to make sure that the above definitions are semantically well defined, we have to 
show that the respective formulae have the same truth conditions. 
Theorem 38 (□ and YX) 
If φ is a CML-formula, then YXφ Î v μ (w) iff □φ Î v μ (w). 
Proof 
YXφ Î v μ (w) iff φ Î v μ (h 0 (|w|)) for all h 0 Î H such that there is a h 1 Î H 
with h 0 (|w|-1) = h 1 (|w|-1) and h 1 (|w|) = w iff □φ Î v μ (w). 
QED 
The theorem shows that □-CML can entirely be expressed in t-CML. An analogues 
theorem holds for ◊ and ØYXØφ. 
Theorem 39 (◊ and ØYXØ) 
If φ is a CML-formula, then ØYXØφ Î v μ (w) iff ◊φ Î v μ (w). 
Proof 
ØYXØφ Î v μ (w) iff Ø□Øφ Î v μ (w) by Theorem 38 iff ◊φ Î v μ (w) by 
definition of ◊. 
QED 
As a consequence of the two theorems, we can axiomatise CML by using the definition 
of □ as an additional axiom to the axioms of t-CML. 
Definition 77 (CML-Axioms) 
(t-CML) Axioms of t-CML;
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(□) □φ = YXφ, where Y and X are defined as in Definition 73 and 
Definition 74 
(") ⊢ φ É ψ Þ ⊢ φ É "xψ, where x is not free in φ; 
(MP) ⊢φ É ψ, φ Þ ⊢ ψ; 
("R) ⊢ φ Þ ⊢ "xRxφ, where x and n are not free in φ. 
CML-consistency, CML-inconsistency, and CML-provability are defined in the usual 
way. 
Definition 78 (CML-Provability) 
Let φ be a CML-formula. Then, φ is CML-provable, i.e. ⊢ CML φ, iff there is a 
finite sequence of CML-formulae such that the last formula of the sequence is φ 
and every other formula in the sequence is either a CML-axiom or the result of 
applying a rule of inference to formulae occurring earlier in the sequence. 
Definition 79 (Syntactic Consequence Relation for CML) 
Let Φ be a set of CML-formulae and φ be a t-formula. Then, the syntactic 
consequence relation holds between Φ and φ, i.e. Φ ⊢ CML φ, if and only if there is 
a finite sequence of CML-formulae such that the last formula of the sequence is φ 
and every other formula in the sequence is either a CML-axiom, and element of 
Φ or the result of applying a rule of inference to formulae occurring earlier in the 
sequence. 
Definition 80 (CML-Inconsistency/CML-Consistency) 
Let Φ be a set of CML-formulae and ⊥ any CML-formula of the form φ Ù Øφ. 
Then, Φ is CML-inconsistent if and only if Φ ⊢ CML ⊥ and Φ is CML-consistent 
if and only if Φ is not CML-inconsistent. 
Soundness and completeness of CML follow directly from the respective theorems for t- 
CML. 
4.6  Summary 
The aim of chapter 4 was to axiomatise CML. This has been achieved to the extent that 
we have provided axiom systems for the modal fragment and the temporal fragment, and 
have shown why the axiom system for the temporal fragment also provides an 
axiomatisation for CML as a whole. An axiomatisation of the propositional attitude
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fragment has been shown to be redundant as this fragment does not constitute a logical 
system. For this fragment we have exemplarily stated various conditions, which constrain 
agents’ beliefs. 
The two completeness proofs are the most technical result of the thesis. In particular, the 
completeness proof for the temporal fragment has required a relatively large amount of 
abstract definitions and theorems. They were required, though, as only axiom systems 
make it possible to define the notion of inconsistency in a precise, proof theoretical, way. 
Having provided a sound and complete axiomatisation of CML, we can check whether a 
set of CML-formulae is inconsistent or not. The axiomatisation of CML can be seen as 
the third step in the process of modelling and resolving a conflict as it brings us a step 
closer to a general definition of conflict and a criterion for what counts as a solution to a 
conflict. 
In the following chapter we will use the notion of inconsistency to formulate a general 
conflict definition. Furthermore, we will use the notion in a number of specific 
definitions stressing different aspects of conflicts and making it possible to classify them.
207 
CHAPTER 5 
Defining Conflicts 
The Classification Scheme of Conflict Modelling Logic 
5.1  Introduction 
The aim of chapter 5 is to provide a general conflict definition, and a classification 
scheme for conflicts, based on the formal framework of CML. For the general definition, 
we need to clarify the relationship between conflicts and the concept of inconsistency. 
The classification scheme differentiates between six parameters for the description of 
conflicts and allows us to identify the specific types of conflicts. 
As a result we will be able to answer to the following questions. 
· What is the defining property of conflicts? 
· How is the concept of inconsistency related to the definition of conflicts? 
· How can conflicts be classified with respect to their temporal structure, the type 
and number of agents occurring in them, their relationship to the outside world, 
the issues they are about, and their emotional load?
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· How can descriptions of conflicts in terms of CML-formulae be transformed 
into a unified propositional form? 
· How can sub-conflicts of the Second Congo War be identified and classified 
within the formal framework of CML? 
An outline of the chapter is as follows: We start with a background section on conflict 
definitions. This is followed by a general characterisation of conflicts in section 5.2. In 
section 5.3, we look at the temporal dimension of conflicts, and contrast their synchronic 
description with the diachronic description of conflicts. In section 5.4, we define three 
social levels on which conflicts can occur, and, in section 5.5, we classify them, according 
to the number of agents occurring in them, as either intra-agent or inter-agent conflicts. 
Then, we define subjective and objective conflicts in section 5.6 and in section 5.7 we 
further distinguish them with regard to the type of issues they are about. In particular, we 
identify factual disputes (5.7.1), conflicts over goals (5.7.2), and conflicts over values 
(5.7.3). In section 5.8, we deal with the emotional load of conflicts and in section 5.9 we 
show how the various conflict definitions can be combined with each other. In section 
5.10 we explain, how conflicts can be transformed into a unique form called the 
propositional form of a conflict. Conflicts have to be transformed into propositional 
form, in order to input them into the resolution algorithms which we will introduce in 
the last two chapters of the thesis. Finally, we apply the definitions to our example of the 
Second Congo War. 
Background: Conflict Definitions 
In the following section we present a number of conflict definitions as proposed by 
various conflict scholars or defined in dictionaries. We present the definitions without
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further comment just as a background for our own conflict definition and classification 
scheme. 
We start by looking at six definitions of conflict from dictionaries. According to the 
American Heritage Dictionary a conflict is 
“1. [a] state of open, often prolonged fighting; a battle or war. 
2. A state of disharmony between incompatible or antithetical persons, ideas, or 
interests; a clash. 
3. Psychology A psychic struggle, often unconscious, resulting from the opposition or 
simultaneous functioning of mutually exclusive impulses, desires, or tendencies. 
4. Opposition between characters or forces in a work of drama or fiction, especially 
opposition that motivates or shapes the action of the plot.” 167 
In Roget’s II: The New Thesaurus a conflict is defined as 
“[a] state of disagreement and disharmony. 
Synomyms: clash, confrontation, contention, difference, difficulty, disaccord, discord, 
discordance, dissension, dissent, dissentience, dissidence, dissonance, faction, friction, 
inharmony, schism, strife, variance, war, warfare.” 168 
The Concise Encyclopedia Britannica provides the following definition of conflict. 
“In psychology, a struggle resulting from incompatible or opposing needs, drives, 
wishes, or demands. Interpersonal conflict represents such a struggle between two or 
more people, while internal conflict is a mental struggle. A child experiencing internal 
conflict, for example, may be dependent on his mother but fear her because she is 
rejecting and punitive. Conflicts that are not readily resolved may cause the person to 
suffer helplessness and anxiety.” 169 
The Oxford Dictionary lists three conflict definitions. 
“1. An overt struggle between individuals or groups. Conflict occurs whenever the 
action of one person or group prevents, obstructs, or interferes with the goal 
achievement or action of another person. 
167 (Dictionary 2000) 
168 (Roget 1996) 
169 (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2002)
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2. A group motive where the group functions together to overcome natural obstacles or 
the opposition. The group motive will be to beat the opposition, or to struggle against 
opposing forces, whether those forces are from the natural environment or other 
people. 
3. The tension or stress involved when the satisfaction of specific needs is thwarted by 
equally attractive or unattractive desires.” 170 
Now we look at conflict definitions suggested by a number of individual conflict scholars 
including psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists. The political scientists 
Thorsten Bonacker and Peter Imbusch define social conflicts as follows. 
“Social facts which involve at least two parties and are based on differences in the social 
position and/or interests of the parties involved. […] In general, social conflicts consist 
of incompatible expectations of at least two parties. The incompatibility must be 
perceived by the parties as such and can be reflected, for instance, in a clash of interests 
or diverging norms.” 171 
The social psychologist Morton Deutsch provides the following definition. 
“A broad definition of destructive conflict sees it as a social situation in which there are 
perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two (or more) parties, attempts by 
the parties to control one another, and antagonistic feelings toward each other. […]  The 
definition stresses that incompatibilities by themselves do not constitute conflict, since 
the parties could live in peaceful coexistence. However, when there are attempts to 
control the other party in order to deal with the incompatibility, and when such 
interactions result in and are fuelled by antagonistic emotions, destructive conflict 
exists.” 172 
The political scientist Jacob Bercovitch defines a conflict as a 
“situation which generates incompatible goals or values among different parties.” 173 
The sociologist Georg Simmel defines conflict as that which is 
“designed to resolve divergent dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity, 
even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties.” 174 
170 (Simpson and Weiner 2004) 
171 Author’s translation of (Bonacker and Imbusch 1999, p. 75) 
172 (Deutsch et al. 2006, p. 178) 
173 (Bercovitch 1984, p. 6) 
174 (Simmel 1955, p. 13)
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For the sociologist Lewis Coser a conflict is 
“the clash of values and interests, the tension between what is and what some groups 
feel ought to be.” 175 
The educational psychologist Joseph Folger defines conflict as 
“the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and 
interference from each other in achieving those goals.” 176 
The legal scholar Gregory Tillett provides the following definition. 
“[…] conflict exists when two or more parties perceive that their values or needs are 
incompatible. Values are incompatible if each contradicts or opposes the other (for 
example, a belief that abortion is always murder and a belief that abortion is not 
murder). One need would be seen as incompatible with another if meeting that need is 
thought to prevent , obstruct, interfere with, or in some way make meeting the other 
need less likely or effective (for example, two job applicants competing for the same, 
single position.)” 177 
The sociologist Louis Kriesberg defines social conflicts as follows. 
“A social conflict exists when two or more parties believe they have incompatible 
objectives.” 178 
The sociologist JamesSchellenberg uses the definition of social conflict 
“as the opposition between individuals and groups on the basis of competing interests, 
different identities, and/or differing attitudes.” 179 
The political scientist and former diplomat John Burton defines conflict as 
“a relationship in which each party perceives the other’s goals, values, interests or 
behaviour as antithetical to its own.” 180 
175 (Coser 1957, p. 197) 
176 (Folger et al. 1993, p. 4) 
177 (Tillett 1999, p. 16) 
178 (Kriesberg 1982, p. 17) 
179 (Schellenberg 1996, p. 8) 
180 (Burton 1993, p. 11)
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5.2  General Conflict Definition 
With L CML , the language of CML, it is possible to describe social conflicts in terms of sets 
of CML-formulae. The semantics of CML provides an unambiguous interpretation for all 
the formulae contained in such a set. 
However, L CML is a general language able to describe more than just conflicts. Containing 
operators for propositional attitudes and modalities, as well as their temporal 
occurrences, L CML can be used to describe all sorts of social situations in which agents 
hold certain attitudes. Indeed, there is nothing in L CML which makes it exclusive to the 
description of conflicts. 
Although the generality of L CML corresponds with our view of conflicts as a special type 
of social situations, we have to address the question of what distinguishes a conflict, 
understood as a set of CML-formulae, from any other arbitrary set of CML-formulae. 
Suppose we have two sets of CML-formulae, C 1 and C 2 , such that C 1 is a description of a 
social conflict, whereas C 2 represents the description of my last birthday party. How can 
we then formally determine that C 1 is the description of a conflict, whereas C 2 is not? 
In order to distinguish sets of CML-formulae that represent conflicts from sets that do 
not, we need a precise conflict definition. We provide such a definition in two steps. 
First, we define a general condition that every set C of CML-formulae has to satisfy in 
order to be classified as a conflict. In the second step, we define a number of further 
conditions for specific conflict sets, each of which constitutes a certain type of conflict. 
We refer to the first condition as the general conflict definition, because it applies to 
every conflict. The conditions defined in the second step provide the classification 
scheme of CML.
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Looking at the conflict definitions proposed by conflict scholars, we can see that almost 
all of them include the notion of inconsistency or a related notion, such as 
incompatibility, clash, competition, disharmony, opposition, difference, etc. Hence, the 
general characteristic of a conflict seems to be the existence of some kind of 
inconsistency among its elements. With the axiom system for CML, we have pinned 
down the notion of consistency/inconsistency of sets of CML-formulae, and, as the 
axiom system is complete over the semantics of CML, this notion corresponds with the 
notion of satisfiability/unsatisfiability. 
In a first approach, we might think that a set C of CML-formulae must be inconsistent in 
order to be characterised as a conflict. Inconsistency, however, is too weak as a general 
condition for conflicts There are sets that represent typical conflicts, but are not 
inconsistent within the framework of CML. For instance, the set C = {Ga 1 p, Ga 2 Øp} 
represents a conflict in which two agents pursue goals that are directly opposed to each 
other. However, the set is not inconsistent according to CML. 
We have defined inconsistency in such a way that sets like C do not fall under its scope 
because the fact that two agents pursue contradictory goals does not constitute an 
inconsistency itself. Indeed, there are many situations in which this is the case. The 
property characterising sets like C as a conflict, is the fact that they describe inconsistent 
situations without being inconsistent themselves. For instance, the situation in which 
both goals contained in C are satisfied at the same time is inconsistent; the fact that two 
agents pursue contradictory goals is not. 
Generally, sets of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, goals, or norms, describe 
certain ideal situations. A set of beliefs describes a situation in which all the beliefs are 
true, i.e. it describes how the world would be if all the beliefs contained in the set were
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true. In the case of a set of goals, we get a description of a situation in which all the goals 
in the set are satisfied. From the point of view of the agents pursuing the goals, such a 
situation represents a perfect state as all their goals are satisfied. Going back to the 
example of the set C = {Ga 1 p, Ga 2 Øp}, we can represent the situation described by C by 
the set C* = {p, Øp}. C* represents a situation in which all the goals contained in C are 
satisfied. Obviously, C* is inconsistent and, hence, C is a conflict. The situation is 
analogues for beliefs and norms. For instance, if we have a set of norms C = {Na 1 φ 1 , 
Na 2 φ 2 , … Na n φ n }, C describes an ideal situation which is represented by the set C* = {φ 1 , 
φ 2 , … φ n }, a situation in which all the norms contained in C are realised. If C* is 
inconsistent, then C is a conflict. 
Before we state the general conflict definition, we still have to define what it means for a 
set C to describe another set C*. As illustrated by the example, the set C*, described by a 
set C, represents a situation in which all beliefs contained in C are true, all goals 
contained in C are satisfied, and all norms contained in C are realised. C* also contains 
the formulae that were already contained in C. 
Definition 81 (Described Set) 
If C is a finite set of CML-formulae, then C describes the set C*, where C* is 
defined by C* = C È {φ | C ⊢ CML $y(Byφ Ú Gyφ Ú Nyφ)}. 
The definition makes sure that the content of every belief, goal, and norm held by any 
agent occurring in C is contained in C*. Not only is the content of propositional attitudes 
directly contained in C added to C*, but also the content of propositional attitudes that 
logically follow from C. This closure condition is needed as otherwise there could be 
propositional attitudes contained in C which are not satisfied in C*. Consider, for 
example, the set C = {Ba 1 φ Ù Ba 2 ψ}. If C* contained only the content of propositional 
attitudes directly contained in C, then neither φ nor ψ would be an element of C*.
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However, if an agent a 1 believes φ and an agent a 2 believes ψ, the set C*, representing a 
situation in which all beliefs contained in C are true, should contain both φ and ψ. 
Having defined C*, we can now state the general conflict definition as follows. 
Definition 82 (General Conflict Definition) 
If a set C of CML-formulae represents a conflict, then C* is CML-inconsistent. 
Note that any inconsistent set C is immediately a conflict as C Í C*. 
The definition reflects the view that conflicts are sets of propositional attitudes, such as 
goals, beliefs, norms, or emotions, which have the property that it is not possible to 
simultaneously realise all the propositional attitudes contained in the set. The 
impossibility of realising the propositional attitudes is reflected, in turn, by the 
inconsistency of the situation resulting from simultaneously realising all propositional 
attitudes. 
The conflict definition does not incorporate the behavioural aspect of conflicts, although 
actions, or intentions to act, have been proposed as a part of some conflict definitions. 
The reason why we have not included behavioural components in our model is that the 
formalisation of action statements requires a complex theoretical framework in itself, 
which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, incorporating a logic of action, 
such as STIT theory, into CML remains an important task that could be achieved in a 
further project.
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5.3  Synchronic versus Diachronic Conflicts 
If we describe a social situation with L CML , we obtain a finite set C of CML-formulae. 
Applying the general conflict definition to C, we can check whether C represents a 
conflict by checking whether C*, the set described by C, is inconsistent. 
Most conflict definitions, including the ones we have listed in the background section on 
conflict definitions, make no explicit reference to the temporal dimension of conflicts. 
They are synchronic definitions, i.e. they state properties of a conflict looked at from one 
time point. However, the temporal development of conflicts is studied as its own subject 
in conflict studies, usually under the name “conflict dynamics”. The general approach is 
to divide up conflicts in stages, phases, or states, i.e. to adopt a diachronic view of 
conflicts and to look at them from different time points. 
To analyse the temporal structure of conflicts, we define conflict sets C t for every t- 
constant t occurring in C. C t represents the situation at the time point t as described by 
the agents’ beliefs, goals, and norms, i.e. C t contains all the formulae that would be true at 
the time point t if all beliefs, goals, and norms contained in C were satisfied. Every C t 
provides a description of a snapshot of the conflict C at a certain time point. Hence, 
every C t represents a synchronic description of C. 
Formally we can define C t as follows. 
Definition 83 (Synchronic Conflict Description) 
Let C be a conflict. Then, the synchronic conflict description at the time point t 
is defined by the set C t = {φ|C* ⊢ Rtφ}. 
To illustrate the definition, we look at the set C = {Ga 1 Rt 0 φ, Ga 2 Rt 0 Øφ, Ga 1 Rt 1 φ, 
Ga 2 Rt 1 ψ}. C describes the set C* = C È {Rt 0 φ, Rt 0 Øφ, Rt 1 φ, Rt 1 ψ}. Hence, we get C t 0 =
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{φ, Øφ} and C t 1 = {φ, ψ}. This shows that the conflict between the agents a 1 and a 2 can 
be identified as a disagreement about what the world should be like at the time point t 0 . 
As a special case we can build the set C n which represents the conflict at the current time 
point. C n contains all formulae that would be true at the current time point if all agents’ 
propositional attitudes were satisfied. 
Constructing the set C t for a number of t-constants t 0 , t 1 , etc., we obtain a diachronic 
description of the conflict, i.e. we obtain a description of the development of the conflict 
through time, which allows us to track its history and its possible future development. 
The diachronic description is complete if we can construct C t for every t occurring in C. 
This leads to the following definition of diachronic conflict description. 
Definition 84 (Diachronic Conflict Description) 
If C is a conflict, then the diachronic conflict description of C is defined by C dia = 
{C t |t occurs in C}. 
The complete diachronic description of a conflict can only be constructed if formulae of 
the form Rtφ can be deduced from C* for all relevant time points t 0 , t 1 etc. If this is not 
the case, we only get a partial description of the history of C. If no such formulae can be 
deduced from C*, the best description of the conflict we can get is the set C* itself. C* 
provides a description of the conflict which makes no reference to its temporal structure. 
5.4  Conflicts on the Individual, Micro, and Macro Level 
Apart from their temporal structure, we can classify conflicts according to the social level 
on which they occur, i.e. the social level on which the agents involved in the conflict are 
located.
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The distinction between individual level, micro level, and macro level conflicts is also 
reflected by some established conflict definitions. Here, categories like interpersonal 
conflict, group conflict, social conflict, class conflict, etc. are often used to differentiate 
between the different social levels of conflicts. 
As CML itself does not distinguish between different kinds of agents, we rely on other, 
external theories, capable of distinguishing between agents on the individual level, agents 
on the micro level, and agents on the macro level. Presupposing that there are such 
theories, the agents occurring in a conflict C can be classified according to these 
categories. Hence, we can talk about individual-agents, micro-agents, and macro-agents. 
Typical examples of individual-agents are, for instance, individual persons, such as a 
family member in a family conflict or a staff member in a work related conflict. 
Examples of micro-agents are social groups, such as conflicting minority groups or the 
group of employers and the group of employees in a collective bargaining round. 
Examples of macro-agents are, for instance, social institutions, such as states, rebel 
organisations, or political movements involved in a political conflict. 
Having identified the social level of the agents involved in a conflict, we can provide the 
following definition. 
Definition 85 (Individual, Micro, and Macro Level Conflicts) 
If C is a conflict, then: 
(1) C is an individual level conflict C ind iff every agent a occurring in C is an 
individual-agent; 
(2) C is a micro level conflict C mic iff every agent a occurring in C is a micro- 
agent; 
(3) C is a macro level conflict C mac iff every agent a occurring in C is a macro- 
agent.
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We say that an agent a occurs in a set C if there is a formula in C, in which the agent 
constant a designating the agent a occurs. As mentioned above, the definition only works 
in combination with a theory of social strata. 
5.5  Intra­Agent and Inter­Agent Conflicts 
Next, we look at the number of agents involved in a conflict. With regard to this 
parameter, we establish a dichotomy between intra-agent conflicts on the one hand, and 
inter-agent conflicts on the other. This dichotomy expresses a common distinction made 
in many conflict definitions occurring in the literature. 
Intra-agent conflicts are conflicts in which only one agent occurs, i.e. situations in which 
the propositional attitudes held by a single agent describe an inconsistent situation. Inter- 
agent conflicts involve at least two agents conflicting with each other. 
Definition 86 (Intra- and Inter-Agent Conflicts) 
If C is a conflict, then: 
(1) C is an intra-agent conflict C intra iff exactly one agent a occurs in C; 
(2) C is an inter-agent conflict C inter among the agents a 0 , a 1 , … a n iff the agents 
a 0 , a 1 , … a n occur in C and 1 < n. 
The definition shows that not only conflicts between different parties, but also intra- 
agent conflicts, can be modelled by CML. From a logical point of view, it does not 
matter whether the propositional attitudes describing an inconsistent set are held by 
different agents or only one agent. In both cases, it is the inconsistency of the described 
set C* which qualifies C as a conflict.
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5.6  Subjective versus Objective Conflicts 
The distinction between subjective and objective definitions of conflict has been 
discussed by various conflict scholars. Scholars like Morton Deutsch emphasise the 
subjectivity of conflict, whereas scholars like John Galtung argue for an objective notion 
of conflict independent of the parties’ beliefs, goals, norms, or emotions. 
The underlying question of this debate is whether the inconsistency among the 
propositional attitudes is merely an inconsistency perceived by the agents involved in the 
conflict or whether it is a real inconsistency. If the former is the case, we are dealing with 
a subjective conflict, if the latter is the case, we are looking at an objective conflict. In 
CML we can grasp both the subjective and objective view by providing definitions for 
both of them. 
A subjective conflict exists if at least one agent believes that the goals, beliefs, or norms 
held by the conflict parties are inconsistent, although they are, in fact, consistent. If the 
goals, beliefs, or norms held by the agents are inconsistent, then the agents are facing an 
objective conflict. Within our framework, we can characterise these two notions of 
conflicts by the following definition. 
Definition 87 (Subjective and Objective Conflicts) 
If C is a set of CML-formulae, then: 
(1) C is a subjective conflict C sub iff there is an agent a in C such that Ba( Ù 
Î j * C 
É 
^) and C* ⊬ ^, i.e. C* is consistent; 
(2) C is an objective conflict C obj iff C is a conflict. 
Note that the definition of objective conflicts is identical with the general conflict 
definition stated in Definition 82, whereas the definition of subjective conflicts does not 
satisfy the general conflict definition. Thus, subjective conflicts can be detected by CML, 
although they do not fall under the general conflict definition.
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The above definition establishes a dichotomy: no subjective conflict can be objective and 
vice versa. However, there are objective conflicts which are also recognised as a conflict 
by at least one of the conflict parties. Such recognised objective conflicts can be defined 
as follows.
Definition 88 (Recognised Objective Conflicts) 
If C is a conflict, then C is a recognised objective conflict C rec iff there is an agent 
a in C such that Ba( Ù 
Î j * C 
É ^) and C is a conflict. 
Furthermore, the definition of subjectivity is relative to the agents involved in the 
conflict, i.e. we can identify conflicts which are recognised by some agents but not by 
others. For instance, a situation described by a set C of CML-formulae can be perceived 
as a conflict by an agent a 1 , i.e. Ba 1 ( Ù 
Î j * C 
É ^) holds, whereas another agent a 2 does not 
consider C a conflict, i.e. Ba 2 ( Ù 
Î j * C 
É ^) does not hold. 
5.7  Conflict Issues 
In the previous three sections, we have focused on structural properties of C. First, we 
looked at the temporal structure of C, then we classified conflicts according to the social 
strata and the number of agents involved in them, and, finally, we assessed the real or 
perceived inconsistency of C. In the following sections, we analyse the nature of conflicts 
in terms of the type of propositional attitudes constituting them. 
Conflicts can arise because agents have incompatible, i.e. inconsistent, beliefs about the 
world, because they pursue inconsistent goals, or because they hold norms that are 
mutually incompatible. Using the framework of CML, we can identify each such type of 
conflict by looking at the propositional attitude operators used to describe them. The
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distinction between factual disputes, goal conflicts, value conflicts, etc. is also reflected in 
the literature. 
5.7.1  Factual Disputes 
First, we define a factual dispute as a conflict C which is constituted by inconsistent 
beliefs. 
Definition 89 (Factual Dispute) 
If C is a conflict, then C b is a factual dispute iff C b = {φ| C ⊢ CML $yByφ} is 
inconsistent. 
C b represents a situation in which all beliefs contained in C are realised. It represents the 
world as jointly believed to be the case by the agents occurring in C. If C b is inconsistent, 
the agents disagree about the way the world is structured and are, therefore, engaged in a 
factual dispute. Note that C b Í C* as C ⊢ CML $yByφ implies C ⊢ CML $y(Byφ Ú Gyφ Ú 
Nyφ). 
5.7.2  Conflicts over Goals 
Conflicts over goals are characterised by the fact that the goals pursued by a group of 
agents are inconsistent. This can be defined as follows. 
Definition 90 (Conflicts over Goals) 
If C is a conflict, then C g is a conflict over goals iff C g = {φ| C ⊢ CML $yGyφ} is 
inconsistent. 
C g represents a situation in which all goals contained in C are satisfied. It represents the 
world as the agents in C jointly desired it to be. If C g is inconsistent, the agents pursue
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goals which are impossible to satisfy simultaneously and are, hence, engaged in a conflict 
over goals. Again we have C g Í C*. 
5.7.3  Conflicts over Values 
Finally, we define a conflict over values as a set of formulae which has the property that 
the norms contained in the set describe an inconsistent set. 
Definition 91 (Conflicts over Values) 
If C is a conflict, then C n is a conflict over values iff C n = {φ| C ⊢ CML $yNyφ} is 
inconsistent. 
C n describes a situation in which all norms contained in C are abode by, i.e. a situation 
that is jointly considered to be morally or legally desirable by the agents occurring in C. If 
C n is inconsistent, it is impossible to abide by all norms held by the agents simultaneously 
and, hence, the agents are facing a conflict over values. Again, C n is a subset of C*. 
5.8  The Emotional Load of Conflicts 
The emotion operator E does not constitute its own type of conflict as emotional 
excitement expressed by E is not directional. As a consequence, it is not necessarily the 
case that inconsistencies among the content of emotions held by a group of agents gives 
rise to a conflict among these agents. For example, the two formulae Ea 0 φ and Ea 1 Øφ 
just express that the agent a 0 is emotionally excited because of φ and the agent a 1 is 
excited because of Øφ. As the type of excitement is not specified, we cannot conclude 
that a 0 and a 1 are facing a conflict with regard to their emotions.
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However, the emotional load of a conflict C, i.e. the level of emotional involvement of 
the agents in the conflict C, can be expressed by the number of emotions contained in C. 
The more emotions contained in C, of the form Eaφ, the higher the degree of emotional 
involvement in the conflict. This gives rise to the following definition of the emotional 
content C e of a conflict and the emotional load emo(C) of a conflict C. 
Definition 92 (Emotional Content and Degree of Emotional Involvement) 
If C is a conflict, then: 
(1) C e = {φ| C ⊢ CML $yEyφ} is the emotional content of C; 
(2) emo(C) = |C e |, i.e. the size of C e , is the emotional load of C. 
5.9  Combining the Definitions 
Starting with a general conflict description C, i.e. a set of CML-formulae having the 
property that C*, the set described by C, is inconsistent, we can simultaneously apply the 
conflict definitions introduced in the previous sections. This allows us to characterise the 
specific nature of the conflict and to identify and classify the sub-conflicts constituting it. 
In order to identify and classify the sub-conflicts of a conflict C, we have to combine the 
specific conflict definitions of CML. This is necessary as conflicts typically consist of a 
number of different sub-conflicts, such as goal conflicts, value conflicts, factual disputes, 
etc., which occur at different time points within the temporal development of the 
conflict, and which are sometimes recognised by some parties and sometimes not. Also, a 
conflict can occur among parties on different social levels and can contain intra-agent, as 
well as inter-agent, components. 
For a given conflict C, we can, for instance, identify two of its sub-conflicts C t 0 and C t 1 
occurring at the time points t 0 and t 1 , respectively. C t 0 could, for instance, be further 
classified as a subjective, inter-agent, micro level goal conflict, and C t 1 as a recognised
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objective, inter-agent, macro level conflict over goals and values. This example merely 
illustrates how the definitions can be combined. Depending on the available information 
about a particular conflict, we can identify and classify different sub-conflicts. 
5.10  Conflicts in Propositional Form 
In order to be able to input sub-conflicts described by CML-formulae into the resolution 
algorithms to be introduced in chapter 7, we have to transform them into a unique form 
called the propositional form C p . A sub-conflict C p in propositional form is a description 
of the original sub-conflict C in the language of propositional logic, i.e. all non- 
propositional symbols are removed from C. 181 
Similar to the definition of the modal core or the temporal core of a formula, we can 
define the propositional core of a CML-formula by providing a set of translation rules 
which allow us to transform arbitrary CML-formulae into propositional formulae. We 
obtain the propositional core φ* of a CML-formula φ by successively translating sub- 
formulae of φ according to the principles stated in the following definition. 
Definition 93 (Propositional Core) 
The modal core φ* of a CML-formula φ is obtained by the following rules: 
(1) (p)* = p; 
(2) (Øφ)* = Ø(φ)*; 
(3) (φ Ù ψ)* = (φ)* Ù (ψ)*; 
(4) (□φ)* = ("νφ)* = (Rτ 0 φ)* = (τ 0 < τ 1 )* = (τ 2 = τ 3 )* = (Oαφ)* = p n , where p n 
is a fresh propositional constant and O Î {B, G, N, E}. 
181 Note that aspects of the logical system CML are still reflected insofar as the original description C of a 
conflict is a set of CML-formulae and we have to make use of the operators of CML, in order to single out 
the sub-conflicts from C. However, the development of resolution algorithms that allow one to directly 
input sets of CML-formulae would be a promising research project.
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The definition lists four translation rules for CML-operators assuming that translations 
for sub-formulae are already available. The fourth condition ensures that all non- 
propositional operators are eliminated. Sub-formulae, whose main operators are not 
propositional connectives, are replaced by new propositional constants. 
As all non-propositional operators are removed when translating a CML-formula φ into 
its propositional core φ*, φ* is a formula of propositional logic. 
Theorem 40 (Propositional Core and Propositional Logic) 
The propositional core φ* of every CML-formula φ is a formula of propositional 
logic. 
Proof 
The proof is an induction on the formation of formulae. 
QED 
Having defined the propositional core of arbitrary CML-formulae, we can now define the 
propositional form of a conflict C as follows. 
Definition 94 (Propositional Form) 
If C is a set of CML-formulae representing a conflict, then the propositional 
form of C is defined by C p = {φ* | φ Î C}. 
Example: Second Congo War 
In the following section, we apply some of the conflict definitions introduced in this 
chapter to our example of the Second Congo War. The classification scheme allows one 
to identify and categorise some sub-conflicts within this war. 
We assume that C is a description of the Second Congo War in terms of CML-formulae. 
To illustrate the concept of C*, i.e. the set of formulae described by C, we assume that 
the four formula Ga 1 p, Ga 1 Øq, Ga 2 p, and Ga 2 (p É q) are contained in C. The
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interpretation of the agent constants a 1 and a 2 , and the propositional constants p and q, is 
given as follows. 182 
a1: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) 
a2: Kabila government 
p: The combatants of the RCD are integrated into the Congolese national army. 
q: High ranking officers of the RCD are replaced. 
Hence, the four formulae express the following claims. 
Ga1p: The RCD wants its combatants to be integrated into the Congolese national army. 
Ga1Øq: The RCD does not want its high ranking officers being replaced. 
Ga2p: The Kabila government wants the combatants of the RCD to be integrated into 
the Congolese national army. 
Ga2(p É q): The Kabila government wants the combatants of the RCD only to be 
integrated into the Congolese national army if its high ranking officers are replaced. 
{Ga1p, Ga1Øq, Ga2p, Ga2(p É q)} Í C 
Looking at the set C* described by C, we get the following membership relations. 
{p, Øq, p É q} Í C* 
p Î C*, because C ⊢ $yGyp 
Øq Î C*, because C ⊢ $xGxØq 
p É q Î C*, because C ⊢ $xGx(p É q) 
C* ⊢ ^ 
From this we can conclude that C represents a conflict as C*, the set described by C, is 
inconsistent. Note that C itself is not inconsistent and that the two agents partly pursue 
the same goals. However, the situation resulting from all agents’ goals being realised 
182 The integration of the combatants of the RCD was a major issue in the peace negotiations of the 
conflict. For details of the integration process, see chapter 10 and 11 of the Lusake Ceasefire Agreement. 
(UNSC 1999)
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simultaneously, expressed by C*, is inconsistent as it would require the high ranking 
officers of the RCD to be replaced and not to be replaced at the same time. 
Next, we illustrate the concept of a synchronic conflict description at a time point t. Let 
us assume that C contains the formulae Ga 1 Rt 1 p, Ga 1 Rt 1 Øq, and Ga 2 Rt 1 (p É q) as well as 
the formulae Ba 1 Rt 2 r and Ba 2 Rt 2 Ør, where the two temporal constants t 1 and t 2 and the 
propositional constant r have the following interpretations. 
t1: 2003 
t2: 1998 
r: Banyamulenge are threatened to be attacked by Hutu-aligned forces in Kivu. 
{Ga1Rt1p, Ga1Rt1Øq, Ga2Rt1(p É q), Ba1Rt2r, Ba2Rt2Ør} Í C 
Then, C t 1 , the synchronic conflict description of the Second Congo War in 2003, and C t 2 , 
the synchronic conflict description of the Second Congo War in 1999, are given as 
follows. 
{p, Øq, p É q} Í Ct 1 
p Î Ct 1 because C* ⊢ Rt1p 
Øq Î Ct 1 because C* ⊢ Rt1Øq 
p É q Î Ct 1 because and C* ⊢ Rt1(p É q) 
Ct 0 ⊢ ^ 
{r, Ør } Í Ct 2 
r Î Ct 2 , because C* ⊢ Rt2r 
Ør Î Ct 1 , because C* ⊢ Rt2Ør 
Ct 1 ⊢ ^ 
Both C t 1 and C t 2 are inconsistent. Thus, the goals of the Kabila government and the 
RCD, with regard to the situation of the conflict in 2003, constitute a conflict as do the 
beliefs shared by the two parties with regard to the situation in 1999. The factual dispute
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between the two parties with regard to the situation in 1999 is straightforward: The RCD 
believes that Banyamulenge are threatened to be attacked by Hutu-aligned forces in Kivu, 
whereas the Kabila government believes that this is not the case. C t 1 and C t 2 express how 
the situation would have looked in 2003 and 1999, respectively, if all goals of the two 
parties had been realised and all beliefs had been true. 
The distinction between subjective, objective, and recognised objective conflicts can be 
used when analysing the Second Congo War as follows. Using the two agent constants a 1 
and a 2 and the propositional constants p and q as above, we assume that Ga 1 p Î C, 
Ga 1 Øq Î C, Ga 2 p Î C and Ga 2 (p É q) Î C. 
{Ga1p, Ga1Øq, Ga2p, Ga2(p É q)} Í C 
{p, Øq, p É q} Í C* 
If Ba1(p Ù Øq Ù (p É q) É ⊥) or Ba2(p Ù Øq Ù (p É q) É ⊥) holds, then Crec 
If neither Ba1(p Ù Øq Ù (p É q) É ⊥) nor Ba2(p Ù Øq Ù (p É q) É ⊥) holds, then Cobj 
The reason why C can be classified as a recognised objective conflict in the first case, but 
not in the second case, is that in the first case either the RCD or the Kabila government 
is aware of the fact that their goals clash and, therefore, constitute a conflict, whereas in 
the second case, their goals clash but neither of the two parties recognise this clash. 
A subjective conflict can be identified as follows. Assume that Ga 1 s Î C and Ga 2 t Î C 
where the interpretation of s and t are given as follows. 
s: The exploitation of the natural resources in the Kivu provinces is controlled by the 
RCD. 
t: The exploitation of the natural resources in the Kivu provinces is controlled by the 
Kabila government. 
{Ga1s, Ga2t} Í C 
{s, t} Í C* 
If Ba1(s Ù t É ⊥) or Ba2(s Ù t É ⊥) holds, then Csub
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In this case, at least one of the two parties falsely believes that the exploitation of the 
natural resources in the Kivu provinces cannot be jointly controlled by the RCD and the 
Kabila government. However, various forms of joint control over the natural resources 
in the Kivu provinces are possible and have been proposed by mediators. 
Finally, we identify a factual dispute, a goal conflict, and a value conflict within the 
Second Congo War. Assume that Ba 1 r Î C and Ba 2 Ør Î C. 
r: Banyamulenge are threatened to be attacked by Hutu-aligned forces in Kivu 
{Ba1r, Ba2Ør} Í C 
{r, Ør} Í Cb 
r Î Cb because C ⊢ $yByr 
Ør Î Cb because C ⊢ $yByØr 
Cb ⊢ ^ 
C b expresses the factual dispute between the RCD and the Kabila government about the 
threat of Banyamulenge being attacked by Hutu-aligned forces in Kivu: the RCD believes 
that there is such a threat, whereas the Kabila government denies this. 183 
A goal conflict within the Second Congo War has already been described earlier in the 
section. We just repeat it here, stressing the aspect of it being a goal conflict. 
{Ga1p, Ga1Øq, Ga2p, Ga2(p É q)} Í C 
{p, Øq, p É q} Í Cg 
p Î Cg because C ⊢ $yGyp 
Øq Î Cg because C ⊢ $yGyØq 
p É q Î Cg because C ⊢ $yGy(p É q) 
Cg ⊢ ^ 
183 Indeed the main justification of the RCD for their military action was the protection of Banyamulenge 
against Hutu-aligned forces, such as the FDLR, in the Kivu provinces. See (ICG 2005).
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Hence, C g is inconsistent and expresses the goal conflict between the RCD and the 
Kabila government with regard to the integration of the combatants of the RCD into the 
Congolese national army. 
A value conflict between the two parties RCD and Hutu-aligned forces, represented by 
the agent constants a 1 and a 3 , respectively, can be identified as follows. 
a1: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) 
a2: Hutu-aligned forces 
u: The perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda are extradited from the territory of 
the DRC 
{Na1u, Na3Øu} Í C 
{u, Øu} Í Cn 
u Î Cn because C ⊢ $yNyu 
Øu Î Cn because C ⊢ $yNyØu 
Cg ⊢ ^ 
Hence, C n is inconsistent and expresses the value conflict between the RCD and the 
Hutu-aligned forces about the extradition of the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda from the territory of the DRC. The RCD considers it a moral obligation to 
extradite the perpetrators, whereas the Hutu-aligned forces consider it a moral obligation 
to keep them in the country. 184 
5.11  Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a general conflict definition and a classification 
scheme for conflicts. This has been achieved to the extent that we have provided a 
general conflict definition based on the idea that the defining feature of a conflict is an 
184 (Magsam 2005)
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inconsistency in the set of propositions described by the attitudes of the agents involved 
in the conflict. Inconsistency, as such, is too weak to function as a general conflict 
definition because, as we showed in the chapter, there are consistent sets of formulae 
which, nevertheless, express conflicts. However, inconsistency is sufficient for a conflict 
definition as any inconsistent set immediately constitutes a conflict. 
A number of definitions for specific sub-conflicts have been established by singling out 
certain subsets of a conflict and checking the consistency of the sets described by them. 
In particular, we have provided definitions for synchronic and diachronic conflicts, for 
subjective, objective, and recognised objective conflicts, for individual-, micro-, and 
macro level conflicts, for intra- and inter-agent conflicts, for factual disputes, conflicts 
over goals, and conflicts over values. Overall, we have established a classification scheme 
which allows us to identify the specific type of the sub-conflicts that constitute a conflict. 
Having provided a general conflict definition and a classification scheme based on 
concepts of the syntax, semantics, and axiomatics of CML, we can now check whether a 
set of CML-formulae constitutes a conflict or not. Furthermore, we can identify sub- 
conflicts within a conflict and describe them along the dimensions of our classification 
scheme. The process of defining and classifying a conflict, as well as identifying its sub- 
conflicts, is the fourth step in the process of modelling and resolving conflicts. 
In the following chapter, we will introduce two measures which can be used to assess the 
elements of conflicts: the claims made by the conflicting parties and the conflict as a 
whole. This will give us a quantitative measure for assessing conflicts.
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CHAPTER 6 
Measuring Conflicts 
Potential Conflict Power and Degrees of Inconsistency 
6.1  Introduction 
The aim of chapter 6 is to introduce the concept of potential conflict power, a measure of 
how likely it is for a propositional formula to be inconsistent with arbitrary other 
propositional formulae, and the concept of degrees of inconsistency, a measure of the depth 
of inconsistency of a set of propositional formulae. 
The concept of potential conflict power can be used to assess and compare conflict 
elements, such as goals, beliefs, norms, and emotions with respect to the role they play in 
a given conflict. We provide a semantic and a syntactic definition for the potential 
conflict power which we then prove to be equivalent to each other. 
The degree of inconsistency of a set of propositional formulae is intended to express 
how easy it is to resolve the conflict described by the set. We discuss three proposals for 
measuring this concept and argue for the superiority of one of the three approaches. 
As a result of the chapter, we will be able to give answers to the following questions.
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· How can the potential conflict power of propositional formulae be measured? 
· How can the potential conflict power of propositional formulae be defined 
semantically? 
· How can the potential conflict power of propositional formulae be defined 
syntactically, and why is this definition equivalent to the semantic definition? 
· How can the degree of inconsistency of an inconsistent set of propositional 
formulae be measured? 
· How can claims made by parties in the Second Congo War be assessed with 
respect to their potential conflict power and how can sub-conflicts of the Second 
Congo War be assessed with respect to their degree of inconsistency? 
An outline of the chapter is as follows: We start with a background section on the AGM 
model, the prevalent theory of belief revision. In sections 6.2 and 6.3, we define the 
potential conflict power of propositional formulae, first semantically and then 
syntactically, and show that the two definitions are equivalent. In section 6.4, we explore 
some properties of the potential conflict power. In particular, we look at how the 
measure behaves with respect to the logical connectives and the consequence relation. 
We also compare it with Peter Gärdenfors’s binary relation of epistemic entrenchment. 
Section 6.5 deals with the definition of the degree of inconsistency of a set of 
propositional formulae. 
Background: Belief Revision 
The theory of belief revision has been developed as a formal framework to model 
changes taking place in the belief sets of agents. A typical situation in which such changes 
occur is a situation where an agent receives new information. If the new information is to
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be added to the agent’s beliefs, it might be necessary to revise the agent’s already existing 
beliefs, i.e. we may have to delete those beliefs which are incompatible or inconsistent 
with the new information. 
The most influential model of belief revision is the so-called AGM model. It was initially 
presented by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson in their 1985 
paper On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. 185 Their 
model combines two research traditions in the area of belief change. In the philosophy of 
science tradition, philosophers were concerned with the development of scientific 
theories over time and criteria for rational belief change. In the computer science 
tradition, procedures to update databases were developed in order to maintain the 
consistency of a database. 
Following the seminal paper by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, a large number 
of papers on the subject has been published in which the AGM model has been further 
developed and applied to new areas. The model, which was originally based on classical 
propositional logic, has been applied to non-classical logics, such as paraconsistent 
logic 186 , non-monotonic logic 187 , and intuitionistic logic 188 . A comprehensive monograph 
on the AGM model is Gärdenfors’s 1988 Knowledge in Flux. 189 A textbook on the topic 
was published by Sven Hansson in 1999. 190 
The basic concept of the AGM model is the notion of a belief set. In order to define 
belief sets, we first have to provide a representation for beliefs and specify the concept of 
185 (Alchourrón et al. 1985) 
186 (Mares 2002; Tanaka 2005) 
187 (Bochman 2001; Rott 2001) 
188 (Tennant 2005) 
189 (Gärdenfors 1988) 
190 (Hansson 1999b)
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a consequence operator Cn. It is assumed that beliefs are represented by sentences p, q, r, 
etc. of a formal language, such as the language of classical propositional logic. Sets of 
beliefs are expressed by capital letters A, B, C, etc. 191 A consequence operator Cn is 
assumed to be a function assigning a set of beliefs Cn(A) to every set of beliefs A. 
In the original AGM model Cn is assumed to be supraclassical, inclusive, monotone, and 
iterative, i.e. for all beliefs p and all sets of beliefs A, it is assumed that 
(1) If A ⊢ PC p, then p Î Cn(A) (Supraclassicality); 
(2) A Í Cn(A) (Inclusion); 
(3) If A Í B, then Cn(A) Í Cn(B) (Monotony); 
(4) Cn(A) = Cn(Cn(A)) (Iterativity). 192 
A belief set can now be defined as a set of beliefs K which is closed under Cn, i.e. for 
which the identity K = Cn(K) holds. Belief sets contain all the logical consequences of 
their members. In the following, K will always be assumed to be a belief set. 
As belief sets are infinite and require the epistemic agent holding the beliefs to be 
logically omniscient, they only provide an idealisation of the sets of beliefs held by real 
epistemic agents. They express what an agent is committed to believe rather than what he 
actually believes. 193 
In addition to the concept of logically closed belief sets, the AGM theory also deals with 
simple sets of beliefs, i.e. collections of beliefs of the form A = {p, q, r, etc.} which are 
191 Note that sets of beliefs are arbitrary collections of beliefs, such as A = {p, q, r}, whereas the term 
“belief set” is reserved to only one specific type of sets of beliefs as defined below. 
192 See (Hansson 2006). 
193 (Levi 1991)
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not closed under Cn. Such sets are called belief bases. Although they more closely 
represent the beliefs held by real agents, they are technically harder to deal with. 194 
For a given belief set K, three basic change operators were proposed and defined in the 
original AGM model. These are expansion, contraction and revision. Expansion is the 
addition of a sentence p to a belief set K such that the newly obtained set K+p is the 
smallest, logically closed superset containing p. Contraction is the removal of a sentence 
p from a belief set K such that the newly obtained set K¸p is a subset of K not 
containing p. Revision is the addition of a sentence p to a belief set K such that the newly 
obtained set K*p is consistent and contains p. In order to ensure the consistency of K*p, 
it might be necessary to remove some elements of K. All three change operators can be 
applied to either belief sets or belief bases. 
Further operators of belief change have been proposed. Among them are operators for 
update, consolidation, semi-revision, selective revision, screened revision, shielded 
contraction, replacement, multiple contraction, multiple revision, indeterministic belief 
change, as well as special operations for extended languages. 195 In the following, we will 
describe the three basic operations of expansion, contraction, and revision. Then, we will 
look at the operations of consolidation 196 and screened revision as these two operations 
are of particular interest for the process of conflict resolution. 197 
Expansion is the simplest operation of belief change. Indeed, there is not much to say 
about it as the expansion K+p of a belief set K by a sentence p is simply defined as the 
set Cn(KÈ{p}). As expansion, in contrast to revision, does not require making the newly 
194 For a monograph on belief base change, see (Williams 1994). 
195 For an overview of these and other operators of belief change, see (Williams and Rott 2001). 
196 (Hansson 1991; Hansson 1999a; Fuhrmann 1997) 
197 (Makinson 1997; Hansson 1999a)
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obtained belief set consistent, we can just add the sentence p to K, and then apply the 
consequence operator. 
At first glance, the contraction operation looks equally simple. However, in actuality the 
situation is more complicated. In order to remove a sentence p from a belief set K, it is 
not enough to just delete p from K and then apply the consequence operator Cn because, 
being closed under logical consequence, the set Cn(K\{p}) might contain p again. 198 We 
have to make sure that the result of the contraction K¸p does not logically imply p. 
A trivial candidate for K¸p is Æ. However, this would result in a complete loss of 
information; we would lose all beliefs previously held by the agent. In order to minimise, 
or at least to control the informational loss accompanying the contraction of a belief set 
K by p, the authors of the AGM model proposed looking at inclusion-maximal subsets 
of K not implying p. These sets can be defined as follows. If K is a belief set, then A Í 
K is an inclusion-maximal subset of K not implying p if and only if A ⊬ p and there is 
no B Í K such that B ⊬ p and A Ì B. The set of all inclusion-maximal subsets of a 
belief set K not implying p is called the remainder set of K and denoted by K⊥p. 
With K⊥p, we have a set of potential candidates for K¸p as every element of K⊥p is a 
subset of K not implying p. Hence, we can apply the consequence operator to elements 
of K⊥p without thereby adding p. Furthermore, if minimising informational loss was the 
only criterion we cared about, K¸p could be chosen as an element of K⊥p. However, 
there are reasons for choosing a selection of elements of K⊥p, and then defining K¸p as 
the intersection of the selected elements. This approach to contraction is called partial 
meet contraction. 
198 This is the case if K\{p} ⊢ p.
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For partial meet contraction, a selection function γ is defined which assigns a selection of 
elements of the remainder set K⊥p to every pair consisting of a belief set K and a 
sentence p, i.e. γ(K, p) Í K⊥p. It is not specified which elements of K⊥p are to be 
selected by γ. Intuitively, γ is assumed to select the ‘best’ elements of K⊥p, where ‘best’ 
is defined by some external criterion. For a given selection function γ, partial meet 
contraction is defined by the intersection of the elements of K⊥p selected by γ, i.e. K¸p 
= I γ(K, p). 
Two extreme cases of partial meet contraction can be singled out. The case in which γ(K, 
p) has only one element, i.e. K¸p Î K⊥p, is called maxichoice contraction. The case in 
which γ(K, p) = K⊥p, i.e. in which γ selects all elements of K⊥p, is called full meet 
contraction. 
Partial meet contraction is characterised by the six basic AGM postulates, each of which 
describes a property of the partial meet contraction operation. 199 
Basic AGM Postulates 
(1) K¸p = Cn(K¸p) (Closure); 
(2) If p Ï Cn(Æ), then p Ï Cn(K¸p) (Success); 
(3) K¸p Í K (Inclusion); 
(4) If p Ï K, then K¸p = K (Vacuity); 
(5) If p ≡ q Î Cn(Æ), then K¸p = K¸q (Extensionality); 
(6) K Í (K¸p)+p (Recovery). 
199 (Alchourrón et al. 1985, p. 513)
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The closure condition expresses that the result of partial meet contraction is itself a belief 
set. The success condition stipulates that p is actually removed by the contraction. This 
condition is proviso p not being a tautology (as expressed by the antecedent p Ï Cn(Æ)). 
The inclusion condition ensures that nothing is added to the belief set by partial meet 
contraction. Vacuity claims that if p is not in K, and, therefore, not entailed by K, 
nothing needs to be removed. Extensionality expresses that logically equivalent sentences 
are treated equivalently with regard to partial meet contraction, i.e. they are either 
removed together or maintained together. The recovery condition, which has been 
disputed most among the six postulates, claims that the set obtained from contracting a 
belief set K by p, and then expanding the resulting set by p, contains at least all the 
sentences originally contained in K. 
A representation theorem for partial meet contraction, expressing that an operator ¸ is 
an operator of partial meet contraction if and only if it satisfies the basic AGM 
postulates, was proven by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. 200 
Besides partial meet contraction, there are stronger contraction operations in the sense 
that they satisfy further postulates. Two such operations are transitively relational partial 
meet contraction and entrenchment-based contraction. It was proven that these two 
contraction operations are equivalent. 201 In the following, we briefly describe the 
entrenchment-based approach. 
The idea behind entrenchment-based contraction is that not all beliefs of a belief set are 
of equal value. Some of the beliefs are more valuable than others to the extent that they 
have more ‘explanatory power’ or ‘informational value’ than others. In the context of 
200 (Alchourrón et al. 1985, p. 513) 
201 (Gärdenfors and Makinson 1988)
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contraction, this means that when deciding which beliefs to give up and which to 
maintain, one should give up beliefs of lower value and maintain beliefs of higher value. 
In the AGM model the value relation between beliefs is expressed by a binary relation ≤ 
of epistemic entrenchment. Gärdenfors and Makinson describe the entrenchment 
relation as follows. 
“Even if all sentences in a knowledge set are accepted or considered as facts (so that 
they are assigned maximal probability), this does not mean that all sentences are of equal 
value for planning or problem-solving purposes. Certain pieces of our knowledge and 
beliefs about the world are more important than others when planning future actions, 
conducting scientific investigations, or reasoning in general. We will say that some 
sentences in a knowledge system have a higher degree of epistemic entrenchment than 
others. This degree of entrenchment will, intuitively, have a bearing on what is 
abandoned from a knowledge set, and what is retained, when a contraction or a revision 
is carried out.” 202 
Expressions of the form p ≤ q are read as “p is, at most, as entrenched as q”. Two 
further relations, º and <, which are read as “p is equally entrenched as q” and “p is less 
entrenched than”, respectively, are defined as follows. 
(1) p º q iff p ≤ q Ù q ≤ p; 
(2) p < q iff p ≤ q Ù Ø(q ≤ p). 
The entrenchment relation is characterised by the five postulates for epistemic 
entrenchment, each of which expresses a property of the entrenchment relation. 203 
Postulates for Epistemic Entrenchment 
(1) If p ≤ q and q ≤ r, then p ≤ r (Transitivity) 
(2) If p ⊢ q, then p ≤ q (Dominance) 
(3) For any p and q, p ≤ p Ù q or q ≤ p Ù q (Conjunctiveness) 
202 (Gärdenfors and Makinson 1988, p. 88) 
203 (Gärdenfors and Makinson 1988, p. 89)
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(4) If K is consistent, then p Ï K iff p ≤ q, for all q (Minimality) 
(5) If q ≤ p for all q, then p Î Cn(Æ) (Maximality) 
As a consequence of the postulates, it can be shown that the entrenchment relation is 
connective, i.e. for all p and q either p ≤ q or q ≤ p. 
Gärdenfors gives justifications for each of the five postulates. We just look at his 
justification for the dominance condition. If p logically entails q, and we are forced to 
give up either p or q, there would be less informational loss in giving up p and 
maintaining q than giving up q since giving up q would immediately force us to give up p 
as well. Maintaining p would force us to maintain q because q Î Cn({p}). Hence, if p ⊢ 
q, we should rather give up p than q, and, thus, p is less entrenched than q. 
The entrenchment relation can be combined with the contraction operation in two ways. 
Starting with a belief set K, we can define an epistemic entrenchment ordering using a 
given contraction operation, or we can use a given entrenchment relation to define an 
operation of entrenchment-based contraction. Gärdenfors provides conditions for both 
approaches and proves various theorems for them. We just state the conditions without 
explaining or justifying them. Motivations for the conditions can be found in Gärdenfors 
and Makinson’s paper Revisions of Knowledge Systems Using Epistemic Entrnchment. 204 
The condition for defining an entrenchment relation ≤ for a given belief set K and 
contraction operation ¸ is given as follows. 
p ≤ q iff p Ï K¸(p Ù q) or p Ù q Î Cn(Æ). 205 
204 (Gärdenfors and Makinson 1988) 
205 (Gärdenfors and Makinson 1988, p. 89)
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The condition for the other direction is 
q Î K¸p iff q Î K and either p ≤ p Ú q or p Î Cn(Æ). 206 
Having presented partial meet contraction and entrenchment-based contraction, we now 
look at belief revision. In belief revision, a sentence p is added to belief set K such that 
the newly obtained set K*p is consistent. The revision operator * can be defined in terms 
of expansion and contraction. If we first contract K by Øp, i.e. we build K¸(Øp), we can 
add p to K¸(Øp) without loss of consistency. This works because K¸(Øp) does not 
imply Øp, i.e. Øp Ï Cn(K¸(Øp)). Thus, the revision of a belief set K by a sentence p can 
be defined as K*p = K¸(Øp)+p. 
If the underlying contraction operator used to define a revision operator * is a partial 
meet contraction operator, then * is a partial meet revision operator. Similarly, if ¸ is an 
entrenchment-based contraction operator, * is an operator for entrenchment-based 
revision. Similar to the basic AGM postulates for partial meet contraction, Gärdenfors 
has provided six postulates for partial meet revision and has proved a representation 
theorem for them. 
In the last part of the section, we look at two further belief change operators: 
consolidation and screened revision. Consolidation is the operation of making an 
inconsistent belief set (or belief base) consistent. For a given belief set K (or belief base 
A), the result of applying the consolidation operator ! to K (or A) is a consistent belief set 
K! (or consistent belief base A!). Consistency is obtained by removing elements of the 
respective set until it is consistent. 207 For a belief base A, consolidation can be defined by 
206 (Gärdenfors and Makinson 1988, p. 89) 
207 The symbol ! for consolidation was introduced by Andre Fuhrman in (Fuhrmann 1997).
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contracting A by the falsum ⊥, i.e. A! = A¸⊥. A¸⊥ must be consistent as otherwise we 
could deduce ⊥ from it. 208 This definition, however, works only for belief bases. In the 
case of a belief set K, we are faced with the problem that there exists only one 
inconsistent belief set, the set Cn(⊥). As a consequence, consolidation would have the 
same result for all belief sets. Hansson describes this problem as follows. 
“Once an inconsistent belief set has been obtained, all distinctions have been lost, and 
consolidation cannot restore them.” 209 
A possible solution to this indiscriminatory aspect of classical logic with respect to 
maximal inconsistent sets would be to change the underlying logic. In a paraconsistent 
logic, for example, it is possible to distinguish between different types of maximally 
inconsistent sets of formulae. Hence, in these logics there is more than one inconsistent 
belief set. 
Screened revision is a revision operation which has the property that certain pre-defined 
elements of the revised belief set K are immune to revision, i.e. they are not removed in 
the process of revision. The idea of screened revision was introduced by Makinson in 
order to provide a revision operator which weighs the newly received information against 
old information contained in the belief set with no special priority assigned to the new 
information for its novelty. 210 In screened revision, a set X of potential core beliefs is 
specified. Core beliefs are immune to revision. To perform the screened revision K#p of 
a belief set K by a sentence p, we have to go through two steps. In the first step it is 
decided whether K is to be revised by p or not. The condition for revising K is that p is 
consistent with the core beliefs contained in K, i.e. K is only revised if the set (K Ç X) È 
208 (Hansson 1991) 
209 (Hansson 2006, p. 17) 
210 (Makinson 1997)
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{p} is consistent. If (K Ç X) È {p} is inconsistent, then K#p = K. If (K Ç X) È {p} is 
consistent, then K is revised by p with the proviso that no elements of (K Ç X) are 
removed from K. 
6.2  The Semantic Definition of Potential Conflict Power 
Propositional formulae can be assessed with respect to their potential conflict power. 
The idea behind this measure is that some claims made by an agent can be harder to 
satisfy than other claims. Claims that are hard to satisfy should be expected to have more 
potential for producing a conflict when confronted with other, arbitrary, claims than 
claims that are easy to satisfy. If claims are expressed in terms of propositional formulae, 
formulae expressing claims that are hard to satisfy should, therefore, have a higher degree 
of potential conflict power than formulae expressing claims that are easy to satisfy. 
The potential conflict power, conf(φ), of a propositional formula φ is defined as a 
measure between 0 and 1 expressing how likely the formula produces a conflict when it 
represents a claim by an agent. Tautologies, being compatible with all other formulae, 
and contradictions, representing conflicts in themselves, make up the two boundaries of 
the measure, i.e. tautologies have the value 0 and contradictions the value 1. 
In the following, we provide a first definition of conf which we call the semantic 
definition as it is based on the semantic concept of value assignment functions. 
According to the semantic definition, conf(φ) is defined as the ratio of the value 
assignments restricted to the propositional constants occurring in φ which make φ false 
to the total number of value assignments restricted to the propositional constants 
occurring in φ. Restricting the domain of value assignments to constants occurring in φ is
Chapter 6   Measuring Conflicts 
246 
required since value assignments are generally defined as functions from the set of all 
propositional constants into the set of truth values {0, 1}. Hence, there are infinitely 
many value assignments. This, however, makes it impossible to come up with a finite 
ratio. 
First, we introduce some abbreviations. If φ is a propositional formula, let pro(φ) be the 
set of propositional constants occurring in φ, E φ be the set of value assignment whose 
domain is restricted to pro(φ), i.e. E φ is the set of all function from pro(φ) into {0, 1}, and 
mod φ (φ) be the set of value assignment restricted to pro(φ) which make φ true, i.e. 
mod φ (φ) = {e Î E φ | v(φ, e) = 1}, where v is the usual evaluation function of classical 
propositional logic. 
We can now define conf(φ) as follows. 
Definition 95 (Semantic Definition of Potential Conflict Power) 
The potential conflict power conf(φ) of a propositional formula φ is defined as 
conf(φ) = 1 - |mod φ (φ)|/2 
|pro(φ)| . 
The definition makes use of the fact that |E φ | = 2 
|pro(φ)| , i.e. there are 2 |pro(φ)| value 
assignments restricted to the propositional constants occurring in φ, and that 2 |pro(φ)| - 
mod φ (φ) value assignments make φ false. If φ is a tautology, every value assignment makes 
φ true, i.e. |mod φ (φ)| = |E φ | = 2 
|pro(φ)| , and, hence, conf(φ) = 0. If φ is a contradiction, 
every value assignment makes φ false, i.e. |mod φ (φ)| = 0, and, hence, conf(φ) = 1. Note 
that conf is equally suitable for measuring the information content of propositions. 
To illustrate the definition, we look at the two formulae p Ù Øq and p É q. We have 
|pro(p Ù Øq)| = |pro(p É q)| = |{p, q}| = 2, |mod pÙØq (p Ù Øq)| = 1, and |mod pÉq (p 
É q)| = 3. Hence, we can calculate the potential conflict power of the two formulae as 
follows.
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conf(p Ù Øq) = 1 - 1/2 2 = 1 - .25 = .75; 
conf(p É q) = 1 - 3/2 2 = 1 - .75 = .25. 
Although conf is defined relative to the set of propositional constants occurring in φ, it 
does not depend fully on pro(φ). Indeed, we can look at value assignment restricted to 
any finite set of propositional constants as long as the constants occurring in φ are 
among them. For instance, if we take {p, q, r} as the set of propositional constants 
instead of {p, q}, in the example above, we also get 
conf(p Ù Øq) = 1 - 2/2 3 = .75; 
conf(p É q) = 1 - 6/2 3 = .25. 
This partial independence is important as we want to be able to compare the potential 
conflict power of arbitrary formulae even if they do not have common propositional 
constants. In order to prove the partial independence, we generalise the concept of a set 
E φ of value assignments whose domain is restricted to the set of propositional constants 
occurring in a formula φ to sets of propositional formulae Φ. We write E Φ to designate 
the set of value assignments restricted to the constants occurring in Φ and mod Φ (φ) to 
refer to the set of all value assignments restricted to pro(Φ) which make φ true. The 
following theorem expresses the partial independence of conf(φ) from the set of 
propositional constants occurring in φ. 
Theorem 41 (Partial Independence of conf) 
Let φ be a propositional formula and P 1 and P 2 any two finite sets of 
propositional constants s. t. pro(φ) Í P 1 and pro(φ) Í P 2 . Then, 1 - 
|mod P 1 (φ)|/2 
|P 1 | = 1 - |mod P 2 (φ)|/2 
|P 2 | . 
Proof 
Assume, wlog, that |P 1 | ≤ |P 2 |. Then, |P 1 | = |P 2 | - d, for some d Î 
ℕ 0 . By combinatorics we get |mod P 1 (φ)| = |mod P 2 (φ)|/2 
d . This gives us 1 -
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|mod P 1 (φ)|/2 
|P 1 | = 1 - (|mod P 2 (φ)|/2 
d )/2 (|P 2 |-d) = 1 - (|mod P 2 (φ)|/2 
d )(2 d /2 |P 2 | ) = 
1 - |mod P 2 (φ)|/2 
|P 2 | . 
QED 
6.3  The Syntactic Definition of Potential Conflict Power 
In the semantic definition of conf, the idea was to weight the number of situations in 
which a formula is unsatisfied against the total number of possible situations. The harder 
it is to satisfy a formula, the higher its degree of potential conflict power. 
Now we present a syntactic approach to the potential conflict power of formulae which 
makes use of the syntactic notion of inconsistency. Here, the underlying idea is to 
compare a formula with relevant other formulae, and then count the number of formulae 
with which the formula is inconsistent. The more formulae a formula is inconsistent 
with, the higher its degree of potential conflict power should be. For a given formula φ, 
the main task will be to find an appropriate selection of formulae that we compare φ 
with. 
As there are infinitely many potential propositional formulae a particular formula can 
potentially be compared with, we have to limit the number of formulae that we look at. 
This is done in two steps. Starting with a formula φ for which we want to compute 
conf(φ), we first single out a set of formulae FOR φ containing all formulae that can be 
built using only propositional constants occurring in φ. As FOR φ is still an infinite set, we 
then ‘finitise’ FOR φ , by factorising it modulo the syntactic equivalence relation ⊣⊢. This 
leaves us with a finite set of representants of the quotient set FOR φ \⊣⊢. 
The definition of FOR φ is given as follows.
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Definition 96 (FOR φ ) 
Let φ be a propositional formula and pro(φ) be the set of propositional constants 
occurring in φ, then FOR φ is defined as the set FOR φ = {ψ | pro(ψ) Í pro(φ)}. 
As the definition shows, FOR φ is the set of propositional formulae that can be built using 
only propositional constants occurring in φ. FOR φ represents the set of all possible claims 
that can be made with respect to what is expressed by the basic propositions contained in 
φ. If each element of FOR φ represents, for instance, the content of a belief, FOR φ 
represents the set of all possible beliefs concerning the basic propositions contained in φ. 
As the formation rules of propositional formulae allow infinite iterations, FOR φ is an 
infinite set. To reduce FOR φ to a finite set, thereby making it possible to compare φ to a 
finite number of formulae, we use the fact that in classical logic any two formulae φ and 
ψ that are provably equivalent, i.e. for which both φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ holds, express the 
same content. As usual, we write φ ⊣⊢ ψ as an abbreviation for φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ. ⊣⊢ 
constitutes an equivalence relation on FOR φ , and, hence, we can factorise FOR φ modulo 
⊣⊢. The quotient set FOR φ \⊣⊢ which is usually called the Lindenbaum algebra 
consists of 2 2 
|pro(φ)| 
equivalence classes each being a set of provably equivalent formulae 
built from propositional constants occurring in φ. By choosing one element from each 
equivalence class contained in FOR φ \⊣⊢, we can define a finite set REL φ of 
representants of FOR φ \⊣⊢ as follows. 
Definition 97 (REL φ ) 
Let FOR φ \⊣⊢ be the quotient set of FOR φ modulo the syntactic equivalence 
relation ⊣⊢. Then, REL φ is defined by REL φ = {ψ|[ψ] Î FOR φ \⊣⊢ and [ψ] ≠ 
[χ] for all χ Î REL φ }. 
With REL φ , we have a finite set of formulae containing only formulae that are relevant to 
φ. Each cell of FOR φ \⊣⊢ is represented in REL φ by exactly one member. As FOR φ \⊣⊢ 
is finite, REL φ is finite too.
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Before we provide the formal syntactic definition of conf we still have to introduce the 
set INC φ of all formulae of REL φ with which φ is inconsistent. 
Definition 98 (INC φ ) 
Let REL φ be the set of formulae relevant to φ as defined in Definition 97. Then, 
INC φ is defined by INC φ (φ) = {ψ Î REL φ | φ Ù ψ ⊢ ^}. 
INC φ , which is a subset of REL φ , can be obtained from φ by consecutively comparing φ 
with each element of REL φ . In each case, we can decide whether or not φ is consistent 
with the formula we are comparing φ with. If the formula is inconsistent with φ, we add it 
to INC φ . 
Now we can syntactically define the potential conflict power conf(φ) of a propositional 
formula φ as follows. 
Definition 99 (Syntactic Definition of Potential Conflict Power) 
The potential conflict power conf(φ) of a propositional formula φ is syntactically 
defined as conf(φ) = log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| |INC φ (φ)|. 
The syntactical definition of conf(φ) is based on the number |INC φ (φ)| of relevant 
formulae with which φ is inconsistent. The logarithm function of base 2 2 
|pro(φ)| 
is applied 
to |INC φ (φ)| in order to standardise the measure. This makes sure that conf(φ) is always 
a number between 0 and 1. Furthermore, if φ is a contradiction, then |INC φ (φ)| = 
2 2 
|pro(φ)| 
as φ is inconsistent with every element of REL φ . Hence, we get conf(φ) = 1. If φ 
is a tautology, then |INC φ (φ)| = 1 as φ is only inconsistent with ^. This results in conf(φ) 
= 0. As the logarithm function is monotonically increasing, the more formulae there are 
with which φ is inconsistent, the higher conf(φ). The definition reflects the intuitive 
assumption that the potential conflict power of a statement should be proportional to the 
number of statements with which it would potentially constitute a conflict.
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Finally, we prove that the two definitions of potential conflict power, i.e. the semantic 
definition conf(φ) = 1 - |mod φ (φ)|/2 
|pro(φ)| and the syntactic definition conf(φ) = 
log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| |inc φ (φ)|, indeed, pick the same number. 
Theorem 42 (Semantic and Syntactic Conflict Power) 
1 - |mod φ (φ)|/2 
|pro(φ)| = log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| |INC φ (φ)| for every propositional formulae φ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a propositional formula, pro(φ) be the set of constants occurring 
in φ, and mod φ (φ) be the set of value assignment functions from pro(φ) that make 
φ true. Then, there are 2 |pro(φ)| - |mod φ (φ)| value assignments from pro(φ) making 
φ false. By combinatorics, there are 2 (2 
|pro(φ)| - |mod φ (φ)|) formulae, up to semantic 
equivalence, built from pro(φ), which are unsatisfiable in conjunction with φ. This 
is because every formula that is false under every value assignment under which φ 
is true, is unsatisfiable together with φ. Holding |mod φ (φ)|, the number of value 
assignments making φ true, fixed, there are still 2 (2 
|pro(φ)| - |mod φ (φ)|) permutations of 
value assignments. Each of them represents one equivalence class of semantically 
equivalent formulae. 
By completeness of propositional logic, there are 2 (2 
|pro(φ)| - |mod φ (φ)|) 
formulae, up to syntactic equivalence, built from pro(φ), which are inconsistent 
with φ. Hence, |INC φ (φ)| = 2 
(2 |pro(φ)| - |mod φ (φ)|) . Substituting |INC φ (φ)| in the 
syntactic definition of conf(φ), along with some stipulations on the logarithm 
function, gives us the following identities: 
log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| |INC φ (φ)| 
= log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| (2 (2 
|pro(φ)| - |mod φ (φ)|) ) 
= log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| (2 2 
|pro(φ)| 
/2 |mod φ (φ)|) ) 
= log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| (2 2 
|pro(φ)| 
) - log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| (2 |mod φ (φ)|) ) 
= 1 - |mod φ (φ)| log 2 2 
|pro(φ)| (2) 
= 1 - |mod φ (φ)|/2 
|pro(φ) . 
QED 
6.4  Some Properties of Potential Conflict Power 
The potential conflict power, defined semantically or syntactically, is a function from the 
set of all propositional formulae FOR into the rational interval [0, 1] Ì ℚ. It is neither an 
injective function, as different formulae can have the same potential conflict power, nor
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is it a surjective function since the image of conf contains only fractions of the form 
m\2 n where m, n Î ℕ and m < 2 n , and not every element of the rational interval [0, 1] 
can be expressed as such a fraction. 
Assigning numbers to formulae, conf induces a linear ordering on FOR. Any two 
formulae φ and ψ can be compared with each other with respect to their potential conflict 
power, and one of three cases must hold: conf(φ) < conf(ψ), conf(φ) = conf(ψ), or 
conf(ψ) < conf(φ). Contradictions, having the highest degree of potential conflict power, 
are at the top end of the induced linear order. Tautologies, having no potential conflict 
power at all, are at the bottom end. Singular claims, expressed by singular propositional 
constants p, q, r, etc., are in the middle of the order as conf(p) = .5 for all propositional 
constants p. 
In the following section, we look at some properties of conf. In particular, we are 
interested in its behaviour regarding the consequence relation ⊢ and the propositional 
connectives Ø, Ú, and Ù. 
Our first theorem expresses the relationship between conf and the consequence relation 
⊢. 
Theorem 43 (Conf and ⊢) 
If φ ⊢ ψ, then conf(ψ) ≤ conf(φ) for all propositional formulae φ, ψ. 
Proof 
Let φ, ψ be two propositional formulae such that φ ⊢ ψ. Then, mod {φ, ψ} (φ) 
Í mod {φ, ψ} (ψ) by completeness and the definition of ⊢. Then, |mod {φ, ψ} (φ)| ≤ 
|mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)| and, hence, conf(ψ) = 1 - |mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)|/2 
var{φ, ψ} ≤ 1 - |mod {φ, 
ψ} (φ)|/2 
var{φ, ψ} = conf(φ). 
QED
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The above theorem can be interpreted as follows: If a propositional formula entails 
another formula, its potential conflict power is at least as high as the conflict power of 
the formula entailed by it. The theorem reflects the intuition that if a formula φ entails 
another formula ψ, φ contains more information than ψ because φ makes a more specific 
claim about the world than ψ. As more specific claims are harder to satisfy than less 
specific claims, their potential to produce a conflict is higher compared to less specific 
claim. 
The theorem has some simple but interesting consequences. First, equivalent formulae 
have the same degree of potential conflict power because φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ implies 
conf(φ) ≤ conf(ψ) and conf(ψ) ≤ conf(φ), which amounts to conf(φ) = conf(ψ). Second, 
the theorem reiterates the role of tautologies and contradictions in the linear ordering 
induced by conf. As contradictions entail any other formula φ, they can be characterised 
by the property of having an equal or higher conflict power than every other formula φ, 
i.e. conf(φ) ≤ ⊥ for all φ. In contrast, tautologies are entailed by any other formula φ. 
Hence, every other formula has an equal or higher potential conflict power than a 
tautology, i.e. ⊤ ≤ conf(φ) for all φ. Third, the conflict power of a formula φ is always at 
least as high as the conflict power of a disjunction of φ with an arbitrary other formula ψ, 
i.e. conf(φ Ú ψ) ≤ conf(φ). Replacing a formula φ by a disjunction φ Ú ψ is, therefore, a 
way to reduce the potential conflict power of a formula. On the other hand, replacing a 
formula φ by a conjunction φ Ù ψ, where ψ is an arbitrary formula, increases the potential 
conflict power, i.e. conf(φ) ≤ conf(φ Ù ψ). This is because φ ⊢ φ Ú ψ and φ Ù ψ ⊢ φ. 
As expressed by the following two theorems, the relationship between conf and the 
logical connectives can be characterised in a more specific way. For the negation symbol 
we can prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 44 (Conf and Ø) 
conf(Øφ) = 1 - conf(φ) for all propositional formulae φ. 
Proof 
Let φ be a propositional formula. By the bivalence principle of 
propositional logic, we have |mod φ (Øφ)| = 2 
|pro(φ)| - |mod φ (φ)|. Hence, we get 
conf(Øφ) = 1 - |mod φ (Øφ)|/2 
|pro(φ)| = 1 - (2 |pro(φ)| - |mod φ (φ)|)/2 
|pro(φ)| = 1 - (1 - 
|mod φ (φ)|)/2 
|pro(φ)| ) = 1 - conf(φ). 
QED 
The next theorem addresses the relationship between conf and the connectives Ù and Ú. 
Theorem 45 (Conf and Ù and Ú) 
conf(φ Ù ψ) = conf(φ) + conf(ψ) - conf(φ Ú ψ) for all propositional formulae φ, ψ. 
Proof 
Let φ, ψ be two propositional formulae. By definition of the truth 
conditions for Ù and Ú, we have the following identities: mod {φ, ψ} (φ Ù ψ) = mod {φ, 
ψ} (φ) Ç mod {φ, ψ} (ψ) and mod {φ, ψ} (φ Ú ψ) = mod {φ, ψ} (φ) È mod {φ, ψ} (ψ). By set 
theory, |mod {φ, ψ} (φ) Ç mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)| = |mod {φ, ψ} (φ)| + |mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)| - |mod {φ, 
ψ} (φ) È mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)|. Consider now the following identity: 
conf(φ Ù ψ) 
= 1 - |mod {φ, ψ} (φ Ù ψ)|/2 
|var{φ, ψ}| 
= 1 - |mod {φ, ψ} (φ) Ç mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)|/2 
|var{φ, ψ}| 
= 1 - (|mod {φ, ψ} (φ)| + |mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)| - |mod {φ, ψ} (φ) È mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)|)/2 
|var{φ, ψ}| 
= 1 - |mod {φ, ψ} (φ)|/2 
|var{φ, ψ}| + 1 - |mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)|/2 
|var{φ, ψ}| 
- (1 - |mod {φ, ψ} (φ) È mod {φ, ψ} (ψ)|/2 
|var{φ, ψ}| ) 
= conf(φ) + conf(ψ) - conf(φ Ú ψ). 
QED 
The theorem allows us to calculate the conflict power of a conjunction if the individual 
conflict powers of its components and the conflict power of their disjunction are known. 
Its proof relies on the fact that the set of models of a conjunction is the set theoretic 
intersection of the set of models of its constituents, whereas the set of models of a 
disjunction is the union of the sets of models of its constituents. 
The theorem has two interesting consequences as it provides upper bounds for the 
conflict power of disjunctions and conjunctions. Both the conflict power of a disjunction
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and the conflict power of a conjunction are at most as high as the sum of the conflict 
powers of their respective constituents, i.e. conf(φ Ú ψ) ≤ conf(φ) + conf(ψ) and conf(φ Ù 
ψ) ≤ conf(φ) + conf(ψ) for all propositional formulae φ, ψ. 
Finally, we compare the concept of potential conflict power with Gärdenfors’s notion of 
epistemic entrenchment. As introduced in the background section on belief revision, 
Gärdenfors’s concept is intended to express how deeply sentences of a propositional 
language are epistemically entrenched in a given knowledge set. He explains this notion 
as follows. 
“Even if all sentences in a knowledge set are accepted or considered as facts […] this 
does not mean that all sentences are of equal value for planning or problem-solving 
purposes. Certain pieces of our knowledge and beliefs about the world are more 
important than others when planning future actions, conducting scientific investigations, 
or reasoning in general. We will say that some sentences in a knowledge system have a 
higher degree of epistemic entrenchment than others.” 211 
One might think that the ordering relation induced by conf also satisfies Gärdenfors’s 
postulates for epistemic entrenchment 212 and, therefore, represents an entrenchment 
relation. The two relations have in common that they are both intended to reflect the 
informational value of propositional formulae. Gärdenfors considers sentences with a 
high amount of information more valuable for an epistemic agent than sentences 
containing less information. Similarly, propositional formulae that contain a high amount 
of information are harder to satisfy than formulae with a low degree of informational 
value and have, therefore, a higher potential conflict power than the latter ones. 
Although there are similarities between the two concepts, there are also fundamental 
differences. Whereas entrenchment is a qualitative measure of how hard it is to give up a 
belief, conf is rather a measure of its information content. In fact, if we define a binary 
211 (Gärdenfors and Makinson 1988) 
212 See the background section on belief revision.
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relation ≺ on FOR by φ ≺ ψ iff def conf(φ) < conf(ψ), then ≺ satisfies Gärdenfors’s 
postulates of transitivity and conjuctiveness, i.e. φ ≺ ψ and ψ ≺ χ implies φ ≺ χ  and φ ≼ 
φ Ù ψ or ψ ≼ φ Ù ψ 213 . In the case of Gärdenfors’s dominance postulate, which states that 
if p ⊢ q, then q is epistemically more entrenched than p, the situation is inverted. To 
understand the difference between the two relations we have to look at Gärdenfors’s 
justification for his dominance postulate. 
“[I]f A entails B and either A or B must be retracted from the belief set K, then it is a 
smaller change to give up A and retain B rather than to give up B, because then A must 
also be retracted if we want the revised theory to be closed under logical 
consequences.” 214 
For Gärdenfors, the question is how to minimise the overall informational loss when 
giving up certain elements of a belief set. This can lead to situations in which a sentence 
with more informational value than another sentence is given up in order to minimise the 
overall informational loss. In contrast, conf directly reflects the informational value of 
propositional formulae. 
Also, Gärdenfors’s maximality postulate is satisfied by ≼ in the opposite direction. 
Whereas for Gärdenfors, tautologies are maximally epistemically entrenched, i.e. all other 
formulae are less entrenched than them, conf assigns the minimal value of 0 to them. 
The difference is that Gärdenfors wants tautologies to be the last sentences to be given 
up if a belief set is revised; whereas in our framework they represent the least conflicting 
statements. 
Gärdenfors’s minimality postulate explicitly refers to the notion of knowledge sets, a 
concept which is not directly applicable to the conflict power function conf. 
213 ≼ even satisfies φ ≼ φ Ù ψ and ψ ≼ φ Ù ψ, for all φ, ψ. 
214 (Gärdenfors 1988, p. 89)
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6.5  Degrees of Inconsistency 
With conf, we can assess the potential conflict power of propositional formulae, and, 
hence, the role they play within a conflict. However, the function does not provide a 
method for assessing conflicts, understood as inconsistent sets of formulae, as a whole. 
In fact, conf can only be applied to individual formulae and not to sets of formulae. 
Generalising conf to sets of formulae, e. g. by defining conf(Φ) as the conflict power of 
the conjunction of all formulae contained in Φ, does not provide a solution as every 
inconsistent set would immediately have the potential conflict value 1. 
The underlying idea of the concept of degrees of inconsistency is the assumption that not 
all conflicts are equally difficult to resolve. Some conflicts seem to have a more complex 
structure than others. In order to solve them, it is not sufficient to change just one of 
their parts. Instead, their overall structure is interlinked so deeply that resolving them 
requires changing a significant number of the components that constitute them. 
To motivate the definition of the degree of inconsistency, we look at three inconsistent 
sets of propositional formulae. 
Φ 1 = {p Ú Øq, q, p ≡ q, Øp Ù q}; 
Φ 2 = {p Ù q, Øp Ù q, p ≡ q, p Ù Øq}; 
Φ 3 = {p Ù q, Øp Ù q, Øp Ù Øq, p Ù Øq}. 
Each of them can be understood as a conflict among four agents. Each of the four 
formulae contained in a set represents one agent’s claim. To assess how deep the 
conflicts are, we can ask the question: what is the minimum number of formulae that 
need to be changed in order to make the set consistent? By changing a formula we mean
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to replace it by a formula with a lower degree of potential conflict power that is as close 
as possible to the original formula. 
In the case of Φ 1 , we can make the set consistent by replacing just one formula: Øp Ù q. 
We replace this formula by the weaker formula q. The new set Φ 1 * = {p Ú Øq, q, p ≡ q, 
q} is consistent, conf(q) is smaller than conf(Øp Ù q) and q is as close as possible at Øp Ù 
q as it is logically entailed by Øp Ù q. 
In the case of Φ 2 , it is not sufficient to replace just one formula to make the set 
consistent because the remaining three formulae will still be inconsistent with each other. 
However, there is a way to make Φ 2 consistent by changing the two formulae Øp Ù q 
and p Ù Øq. Replacing the former by q and the latter by p, we obtain the consistent set 
Φ 2 * = {p Ù q, q, p ≡ q, p}. Again, the new formulae are entailed by the original ones and 
have a lower degree of potential conflict power. 
Φ 3 can only be made consistent by replacing three formulae simultaneously. Replacing p 
Ù q by q, Øp Ù Øq by Øp and p Ù Øq by p ≡ Øq produces the required result. 
Weakening just one or two elements of Φ 3 is not enough as the remaining formulae are 
still inconsistent with each other. 
The process of replacing formulae by formulae with less potential conflict power 
corresponds to the process of weakening the agents’ claims until a solution to their 
conflict is found. Altogether, the example shows that not every inconsistent set of 
formulae can be made consistent equally easily. Taking the degree of change required for 
making an inconsistent set consistent as the degree of its inconsistency, we can conclude 
that Φ 1 should have a lower degree of inconsistency than Φ 2 , and Φ 2 should have a lower 
degree of inconsistency than Φ 3 .
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In the following section we propose three different functions, inc-1, inc-2, and inc-3, to 
measure the degree of inconsistency of a set Φ of propositional formulae. For each of 
the three functions, we present an absolute and a relative version, depending on whether 
the size of Φ itself is taken into account. The relative version is indicated by an asterisk. 
After having introduced and discussed the three measures, we will argue for inc-1*, the 
relative version of the first proposal, as the most plausible function for expressing the 
degree of inconsistency of a set. 
As in earlier sections, we denote the set of all value assignments from a fixed set of 
propositional constants into the set {0, 1} by E Φ , i.e. if pro(Φ) is the set of propositional 
constants occurring in Φ, then E Φ = 2 
pro(Φ) . mod Φ (φ) is the set of all truth value 
assignments restricted to pro(Φ) which make φ true, i.e. mod Φ (φ) = {e Î E Φ | v(φ, e) = 
1} where pro(φ) Í pro(Φ). 
Now we define the absolute density and relative density of a value assignment e as 
follows. 
Definition 100(Density of a Value Assignment) 
Let Φ be a set of propositional formulae and e Î E Φ a value assignment 
restricted to pro(Φ), then: 
d Φ (e) = |{φ Î Φ | e Ï mod Φ (φ)}| is the absolute density of e with respect to Φ; 
d Φ *(e) = |{φ Î Φ | e Ï mod Φ (φ)}|/|Φ| is the relative density of e with respect 
to Φ. 
d Φ (e) is a function from the set of all value assignments E Φ into ℕ. d Φ *(e) is a function 
from E Φ into the rational interval [0, 1] Î Q. The density of a value assignment e with 
respect to a set Φ expresses how many elements of Φ are false under e. In the absolute 
case d Φ (e) reflects just the number of such formulae, whereas in the relative case d Φ *(e) 
reflects the proportion of such formulae to the total number of formulae contained in Φ. 
We have chosen the name ‘density’ for this function as it can graphically be illustrated as
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the density of the layers of 0s generated by the elements of a set Φ of propositional 
formulae in the truth table for the formulae. 
The following table illustrates the absolute and relative densities of the set Φ = {p, p Ù q, 
q, p Ú Øq}. 
p 1 1 0 0 
p Ù q 1 0 0 0 
q 1 0 1 0 
p Ú Øq 1 1 0 1 
dΦ(ei) 0 2 3 3 
dΦ*(ei) 0 .5 .75 .75 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=0 q=1 
e3 
p=1 q=0 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 12: Absolute and Relative Density 
The table shows that Φ is consistent as there is a truth value assignment, e 1 , such that 
d Φ (e 1 ) = 0. 
Using the density function, we can now define three pairs of functions measuring the 
degree of inconsistency of a set Φ of propositional formulae: inc-1, inc-2, and inc-3. 
Definition 101 (Degree of Inconsistency) 
The degree of inconsistency of a set of propositional formulae Φ can be 
measured by the following three pairs of functions: 
(1) inc-1(Φ) = min{d Σ (e) | e Î E Φ }; 
(2) inc-1*(Φ) = min{d Φ *(e) | e Î E Φ }; 
(3) inc-2(Φ) = ∑ 
∈ Φ E e 
Φ ) e ( d /2 
|pro(Φ)| ; 
(4) inc-2*(Φ) = ) e ( * d 
Φ E e 
Φ 
∑ 
∈ 
/2 |pro(Φ)| ; 
(5) inc-3(Φ) = ) e ( d 
Φ E e 
Φ 
∏ 
∈ 
; 
(6) inc-3*(Φ) = ) e ( * d 
Φ E e 
Φ 
∏ 
∈ 
.
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The first pair of functions, inc-1(Φ) and inc-1*(Φ), defines the degree of inconsistency of 
a set Φ of propositional formulae as the minimal absolute density of the set in the case of 
inc-1, and as the minimal relative density in the case of inc-1*. This definition directly 
reflects the consideration that the degree of inconsistency of a set is measured by the 
degree of difficulty to make the set consistent. inc-1(Φ) reflects the number of elements 
of Φ that need to be changed in order to make Φ consistent, whereas inc-1*(Φ) 
expresses the proportion of elements of Φ that need to be changed. In our previous 
example of the three sets Φ 1 , Φ 2 , and Φ 3 we get 
inc-1(Φ 1 ) = 1, inc-1*(Φ 1 ) = .25; 
inc-1(Φ 2 ) = 2, inc-1*(Φ 2 ) = .5; 
inc-1(Φ 3 ) = 3, inc-1*(Φ 3 ) = .75. 
Using the minimal density as a measure of the degree of inconsistency, every consistent 
set has the value 0. Furthermore, inc-1*, which assigns only values between 0 and 1, 
assigns the value 1 to sets containing only contradictions. These extreme values reflect 
the intuition that consistent sets have a minimal degree of inconsistency, whereas the 
maximal value is only assigned to sets in which every element needs to be changed to 
make the set consistent. 
The second proposal takes inc-2 to be the average absolute density of a set Φ and inc-2* 
as the average relative density. In our example we get 
inc-2(Φ 1 ) = 2, inc-2*(Φ 1 ) = .5; 
inc-2(Φ 2 ) = 2.75, inc-2*(Φ 2 ) = .6875; 
inc-2(Φ 3 ) = 3, inc-1*(Φ 3 ) = .75.
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Comparing inc-1 with inc-2, we observe that the intuitively plausible order for the three 
sets is reflected by both functions. However, the distance between the respective values 
is much narrower in the case of inc-2 as opposed to inc-1. 
The rationale behind inc-2 is to take into account not only the minimal density of a set, 
i.e. the minimal number of formulae that need to be changed to make the set consistent, 
but to look at every possible way to make the set consistent and then average the 
amounts of changes needed in each case. It has the advantage over inc-1 that it reflects in 
more detail the truth table for the set in question. However, it has the disadvantage that 
consistent sets can have a positive degree of inconsistency. Even more counterintuitively, 
a consistent set can have a higher degree of inconsistency than an inconsistent set as 
illustrated by the two sets A ={p Ù q, q} and B = {p, Øp}. Here, we get inc-2*(A) = .625 
and inc-2*(B) = .5, although A is consistent, whereas B is not. 
The third proposal is intended to repair the defect of the second one. It still takes into 
account all value assignments relevant to the set Φ, but does not have the property of 
assigning a degree of inconsistency greater than 0 to consistent sets. It defines inc-3 as 
the product of all absolute densities and inc-3* as the product of all relative densities. If a 
set is consistent, one of its densities is equal to 0, and, hence, the product of its densities 
automatically also equals 0. Looking at our example we get the following degrees of 
inconsistency. 
inc-3(Φ 1 ) = 12, inc-3*(Φ 1 ) = .046875; 
inc-3(Φ 2 ) = 54, inc-3*(Φ 2 ) = .2109375; 
inc-3(Φ 3 ) = 81, inc-1*(Φ 3 ) = .31640625. 
Again, inc-3 reflects the natural order of the three sets regarding their degree of 
inconsistency. However, the absolute version inc-3 assigns very large numbers to the
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sets, whereas the relative version inc-3* does the opposite and assigns very small 
numbers to the three sets. In general, it remains unclear how the degrees of inconsistency 
assigned to sets by inc-3 can be interpreted in a natural way. 
In conclusion, inc-1* seems to be the most plausible choice for expressing the degree of 
inconsistency of sets of propositional formulae. The reasons are as follows. First, inc-1* 
reflects the intuitive assumption that the degree of inconsistency of a set Φ should be 
expressed by the complexity of the process of making Φ consistent. Second, inc-1* 
assigns the minimal value 0 to consistent sets and the maximal value 1 to sets containing 
only contradictions. Third, inc-1* is standardised, i.e. its values are elements of the 
interval [0, 1]. Fourth, it seems justified to look at just the minimal density of Φ as all 
other densities are unnecessary when it comes to making Φ consistent. 
Example: Second Congo War 
In this section we apply the concept of potential conflict power and degree of 
inconsistency, as defined above, to our example of the Second Congo War. In the case of 
the definition of potential conflict power, we look at an example of a goal conflict within 
the Second Congo War which we have already examined. Suppose the agent RCD has 
the goal to become part of the national Congolese army without replacing its high 
ranking officers, and the Kabila government wants the RCD only to become part of the 
Congolese national army if it replaces its high ranking officers. Then, the former claim by 
the RCD is harder to satisfy than the latter claim by the Kabila government. This is 
evident because there are more scenarios in which the RCD’s claim is unsatisfied than 
there are scenarios in which the Kabila government’s claim is unsatisfied. We now justify 
this difference of the two goals by computing and comparing their potential conflict
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powers. If the RCD’s claim is, indeed, harder to satisfy than the claim made by the 
Kabila government, then the potential conflict power of the RCD’s claim should be 
higher than the potential conflict power of the claim by the Kabila government. 
Using the language of CML, the two claims can be symbolised by the formulae Ga 1 (p Ù 
Øq) and Ga 2 (p É q), respectively. Hence, the goal conflict C g is given as follows. 
a1: RCD 
a2: Kabila government 
p: The RCD is part of the national Congolese army 
q: The RCD replaces its high ranking officers 
C: {Ga1(p Ù Øq), Ga2(p É q)} 
Cg: {p Ù Øq, p É q} 
We calculate the potential conflict power of the two formulae via the semantic route, i.e. 
by looking at their truth table and taking the ratio of the situations in which they are 
satisfied and the number of all possible situations. The truth table for the formulae is 
shown below. 
p Ù Øq p É q 
p=1, q=1 0 1 
p=1, q=0 1 0 
p=0, q=1 0 1 
p=0, q=0 0 1 
Table 13: Truth Table for Cg 
The table shows that p Ù Øq has one model, and p É q has three models. Hence, we can 
compute conf(p Ù Øq) and conf(p É q) as follows. 
conf(p Ù Øq) = 1 - 1/2 2 = 1 - 1/4 = .75 
conf(p É q) = 1 - 3/2 2 = 1 -3/4 = .25
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Altogether, we can conclude that the RCD’s claim of being part of the national 
Congolese army without replacing their high ranking officers has more potential conflict 
power than the conditional claim of the Kabila government according to which the RCD 
can only become part of the national Congolese army if they replace their high ranking 
officers. 
Next, we illustrate the concept of degrees of inconsistency in the context of the Second 
Congo War. Again, we look at two sub-conflicts of the Second Congo War which have 
been used for the purpose of illustration before. We calculate the degree of inconsistency 
for the two conflicts and compare them with each other in order to judge which of the 
two conflicts is more difficult to solve. 
The first conflict is, again, the goal conflict between the RCD and the Kabila government 
regarding the integration of combatants of the RCD into the national Congolese army. 
a1: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) 
a2: Kabila government 
p: The combatants of the RCD are integrated into the Congolese national army. 
q: High ranking officers of the RCD are replaced. 
C = {Ga1p, Ga1Øq, Ga2p, Ga2(p É q)} 
Cg = {p, p, Øq, p É q} 
Note that p occurs twice in C g as both parties have the goal of integrating the combatants 
of the RCD into the national Congolese army. 
Using a horizontal arrangement for the truth table for the four formulae which displays 
the four possible value assignments at the bottom row, we can easily read off the 
densities of the value assignments by counting the 0s in the respective columns.
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p 1 1 0 0 
p 1 1 0 0 
p É q 1 0 1 1 
Øq 0 1 0 1 
dC g *(ei) .25 .25 .75 .5 
EC g 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=0 q=1 
e3 
p=1 q=0 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 14: Relative Densities of Cg 
The minimal densities are the densities of the two value assignments e 1 and e 2 , each 
having a relative density with respect to C g of .25. Using inc-1*, the most plausible 
measure for the degree of inconsistency of a set, we can compute inc-1*(C g ) as follows. 
inc-1*(Cg) = min{ dC g *(ei) | ei Î EC g } = .25 
The goal conflict between the RCD and the Kabila government regarding the integration 
of combatants of the RCD into the national Congolese army has a degree of 
inconsistency of .25. This number can be interpreted as follows. In order to come to a 
solution, 25% of the claims made by the two agents need to be weakened. 
The second conflict for which we calculate the degree of inconsistency is the simple 
factual dispute between the RCD and the Kabila government regarding the potential 
threat of Banyamulenge being attacked in the Kivu provinces. The RCD believes that 
there is a threat, whereas the Kabila government believes that there is none. 
a1: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) 
a2: Kabila government 
r: Banyamulenge are threatened to be attacked in the Kivu provinces 
C = {Ba1r, Ba2Ør} 
Cb = {r, Ør}
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The truth table for C b , displaying the relative densities of the value assignments, is given 
as follows. 
r 1 0 
Ør 0 1 
dC b *(ei) .5 .5 
EC b 
e1 
r=1 
e2 
r=0 
Table 15: Relative Densities of Cb 
The minimal densities are the densities of the two value assignments e 1 and e 2 each 
having a relative density with respect to C b of .5. Hence, we get inc-1*(C b ) as follows. 
inc-1*(Cb) = min{ dC b *(ei) | ei Î EC b } = .5 
Thus, the factual dispute between the RCD and the Kabila government regarding the 
security situation of the Banyamalunge in the Kivu provinces has a degree of 
inconsistency of .5 which means that 50% of the beliefs need to be weakened in order to 
come to a solution. 
Comparing the degree of inconsistency of the two conflicts, we can conclude that the 
goal conflict is easier to solve than the factual dispute in the sense that a smaller 
percentage of elements needs to be weekened. 
6.6  Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the concept of potential conflict power as a tool 
to assess the role propositional formulae play within a conflict as well as the concept of 
degrees of inconsistency as a tool to measure the depth of a conflict. This has been
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achieved to the extent that we have given two independent, but equivalent, definitions of 
the potential conflict power of propositional formulae and three definitions for the 
degree of inconsistency of a set of propositional formulae, from which we have chosen 
inc-1* as the most plausible definition. 
The semantic definition of potential conflict power is based on the idea that formulae 
that are hard to satisfy should have a higher degree of potential conflict power than 
formulae that are easy to satisfy. The idea behind the syntactic definition is to look at the 
number of formulae that are inconsistent with the formula in question and to assign a 
degree of potential conflict power to the formula that is equal to the logarithm of that 
number. 
Having provided definitions for the potential conflict power and the degree of 
inconsistency, we can assess how much a claim, expressed by a propositional formula, 
contributes to a conflict, and, thus, which role it plays in a conflict. Furthermore, we can 
assess how difficult it is to solve a conflict expressed by a set of propositional formulae. 
The degree of inconsistency gives us a hint about how many elements of the conflict 
must be changed in order to resolve it. 
Assessing formulae and sets of formulae with respect to the two introduced measures 
constitutes the fifth step in the process of modelling and resolving a conflict. It is the 
first step that goes beyond a purely descriptive and classificatory level. 
In the following chapter, we will use the notions of potential conflict power and degrees 
of inconsistency as part of our definitions of five resolution algorithms which generate 
potential solutions to conflicts modelled by CML.
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CHAPTER 7 
Generating Solutions 
The Resolution Algorithms of Conflict Resolution Logic 
7.1  Introduction 
The aim of chapter 7 is to specify five algorithms jointly referred to as Conflict 
Resolution Logic (CRL). The algorithms generate potential solution sets to conflicts 
having been modelled by CML. Each algorithm consists of two stages. In the first stage, 
a set of value assignments is computed for a given input of a set of propositional 
formulae. In the second stage, the algorithms generate a consistent solution set for each 
of the identified value assignments. Each of the five algorithms realises a different 
principle of conflict resolution by choosing different value assignments in the first stage. 
As a result of the chapter we will be able to give answers to the following questions. 
· What are the general conditions for a resolution algorithm, i.e. what kind of input 
does it require and what is its output? 
· How can a consistent set of propositional formulae be generated on the basis of 
a given value assignment function?
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· How can a set of value assignment functions be selected on the basis of a set of 
propositional formulae? 
· How do the five algorithms of CRL generate solution sets to conflicts previously 
modelled by CML? 
· What complexity class are the algorithms in? 
· How can the algorithms of CRL generate potential solutions to sub-conflicts of 
the Second Congo War? 
An outline of the chapter is as follows: We start with a background section on dialogue 
logic. Then, we provide a general characterisation for the resolution algorithms of CRL in 
section 7.2. In section 7.3, we describe the part of the resolution algorithms of CRL 
which generates solution sets on the basis of given value assignments. This part is 
identical for all five algorithms. In section 7.4 we introduce the specific algorithms. Each 
of them selects a set of value assignments on the basis of an input set of propositional 
formulae. We describe each of the five algorithms and explain the principle realised by 
them in a separate section.CRL-1 is introduced in 7.4.1, CRL-2 in 7.4.2, CRL-3 in 7.4.3, 
CRL-4 in 7.4.4, and CRL-5 in 7.4.5. In section 7.5, we briefly address the aspect of 
computability and complexity of the algorithms. Finally, we illustrate the five algorithms 
by generating solutions to some sub-conflicts of the Second Congo War. 
Background: Dialogue Logic 
Dialogue logic, or dialogical logic, was developed by Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz in 
the 1960s as a logic intended to model dialogues, or arguments, among interlocutors. 
Their aim was to find a logical representation for the correct defence or refutation of 
assertions made by a disputant against an opponent disputant, which would represent
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more closely the dynamics of the argument than a proof theoretical deduction from a 
number of premises or an axiom system. With their system of dialogue logic, Lorenzen 
and Lorenz also provided a new semantic characterisation of classical and intuitionist 
logic which incorporated pragmatic aspects into the semantics, such as the speech acts of 
asserting, attacking, and defending statements. 
Their dialogue logic was designed as a game to be played by two players. The game can 
be won or lost by either of the two players, and, thereby, decides whether the initially 
asserted statement is refuted or defended. The game character of dialogue logic made it 
possible to link it with other game-theoretic approaches in logic, in particular with Jaakko 
Hintikkas ‘Semantic Games’. 215 
The seminal text on dialogue logic is Lorenz’s 1961 doctoral thesis Arithmetic and Logic as 
Games. 216 His ideas were further developed by Lorenzen, Wilhelm Kamlah, Walther 
Kindt, Wolfgang Stegmueller, Walter Felscher, Shahid Rahman, Erik Krabbe, as well as 
himself, in a number of papers. 217 The most comprehensive monograph on the topic is 
Lorenz and Lorenzen’s Dialogische Logik from 1978. 218 
In the following, we introduce the classical and the intuitionist versions of dialogue logic 
and illustrate them with some examples. 
Dialogue logic is based on the idea of a dialogue between a proponent P, who asserts an 
initial thesis, and an opponent O, who tries to attack the thesis in order to prove the 
proponent wrong. The proponent P and the opponent O start a sequence of moves, 
215 (Hintikka 1973; Hintikka and Sandu 1997) 
216 (Lorenz 1961) 
217 For an overview over recent developments in dialogue logic see, for instance, (Krabbe 2006; Felscher 
2003; Hodges 2004). 
218 (Lorenzen and Lorenz 1978)
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each of which is the utterance of a certain assertion. Each assertion is either an attack on 
one of the other player’s previous assertions or a defence of an assertion previously 
attacked by the other player. Altogether, a dialogue is constituted by a series of attacks 
and defences made by the two players P and O. A player wins the dialogue if the other 
player has no more moves left, i.e. if he is not able to attack or defend any more. 
Graphically, dialogues are displayed in two columns. The left column contains assertions 
made by the opponent O, the right column contains the assertions made by the 
proponent P. Assertions are expressed by closed formulae of first-order logic. P starts 
the game by asserting a closed first-order formula φ. The dialogue proceeds by alternating 
moves which are governed by six particle rules. The particle rules describe how the 
players can attack a formula asserted by the other player or defend themselves against an 
attack made by the other player. The type of attack or defence depends on the main 
operator of the formula that is attacked or defended. There are particle rules for each of 
the logical connectives Ø, Ù, Ú, É and for the quantifiers $ and ". The particle rules are 
displayed in the following table. 219 
Attack Defence 
Øφ φ No defence 
?l φ 
φ Ù ψ 
?r ψ 
φ 
φ Ú ψ ? 
ψ 
φ É ψ φ ψ 
$xφ ? φ[n/x] 
"xφ ?n φ[n/x] 
Table 16: Particle Rules 
219 The table is a slightly different version of the table presented in (Lorenzen 1969).
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Attacks are symbolised by the question mark. Atomic formulae can neither be attacked 
nor defended. Negated formulae can only be attacked but not defended. Conjunctions 
can be attacked and defended in two ways. Either the left or the right constituent can be 
attacked and must be defended accordingly. Disjunctions can be attacked only as a whole 
but there are two possible defences for them. In the case of an existentially quantified 
formula, the defender can chose an individual constant n with which he defends the 
formula. If the formula is quantified by a universal quantifier the attacker can choose an 
arbitrary n. Note that not every attack involves the assertion of a new statement. Only 
attacking a negation or an implication requires the attacker to assert a statement himself 
which can then be attacked by the other player. 
In addition to the particle rules, which govern the individual moves of the players, there 
are further rules describing how the whole process of a dialogue proceeds. These global 
rules are called structural rules for formal dialogues. We quote them from a paper by 
Shahid Rahman and Walter Carnielli as they provide a particularly simple presentation of 
the structural rules. 220 
Starting Rule 
The Proponent begins by asserting a thesis. 
Moves 
The players make their moves alternately. Each move, with the exception of the 
starting move, is an attack or a defence. 
220 (Rahman and Carnielli 2000)
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Formal Rule 
Atomic statements cannot be attacked. The Proponent may use an atomic 
statement in a move if and only if the Opponent has already stated the same 
statement before. 
Winning Rule 
If any player cannot make any further move (without producing a repetition of 
identical rounds) the other has won. 
Intuitionistic Rule 
In any move, each player may attack a (complex) statement asserted by his 
partner or he may defend himself against the last not already defended attack, 
according to the particle and the other structural rules. 
Classical Rule 
In any move, each player may attack a (complex) statement asserted by his 
partner or he may defend himself against any attack (including already defended 
ones) of the Opponent, according to the particle and the other structural rules. 
Using the particle rules and the structural rules, we can construct a dialogue for any 
closed first-order formula φ asserted as a thesis by the proponent P. 
Before we illustrate the rules with an example, we look at the link between dialogues, as 
described by dialogue logic, and classical and intuitionistic logic. A formula φ is classically 
valid if there is a wining strategy for a proponent P starting with φ as a thesis in a 
dialogue that satisfies the Classical Rule, i.e. it is possible for P to make moves that 
necessarily bring O into a situation in which he cannot make any more moves. A formula
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φ is intuitionistically valid if there is a wining strategy for a proponent P starting with φ as 
a thesis in a dialogue that satisfies the Intuitionistic Rule. 
Attempts to prove equivalence theorems between dialogue logic and 
classical/intuitionistic logic were made by Lorenz. 221 However, his proofs contained 
mistakes. A first correct proof was given by Kindt. 222 Further simpler proofs were 
presented by Krabbe, Barth, and Felscher. 223 
To illustrate dialogue logic, we construct dialogues for the three formulae ØØp É p, Øp 
Ù q, and Ø(p Ù Øp). The players’ moves are numbered in brackets. Numbers in square 
brackets behind the attacks and defences refer to the formulae that are attacked and 
defended, respectively. A question mark symbolises an attack, whereas an exclamation 
mark represents a defence. 
A dialogue for ØØp É p is given as follows. 
O P 
(1) ØØp É p 
(2) ØØp [?1] (3) Øp [?2] 
(4) p [?3] (5) p [!1] 
O has no move left P wins 
Table 17: Dialogue for ØØp É p 
Move (5) is not allowed according to the intuitionistic rule as the formula Øp was 
attacked by O in move (3) but not defended by P. As the intuitionistic rule allows P to 
defend himself only against the last not already defended attack, P is required to defend 
221 (Lorenz 1961; Lorenz 1968) 
222 (Kindt 1972) 
223 (Krabbe 1982; Barth and Krabbe 1982; Felscher 1985)
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Øp first before defending ØØp É p. The dialogue is compatible with the classical rule, 
though, and so ØØp É p is classically, but not intuitionistically, valid. Note that P would 
not be allowed to defend himself immediately against O’s attack of ØØp É p in move (3) 
by asserting p because O has not stated p yet at that stage. 
A dialogue for Øp Ù q is given as follows. 
O P 
(1) Øp Ù q 
(2) ?l [?1] (3) Øp [!1] 
(4) p [?3] (5) P has no move left 
O wins 
Table 18: Dialogue for Øp Ù q 
In this dialogue, every move is compatible with both the classical and the intuitionist rule. 
However, the dialogue does not prove that the formula is either classically or 
intuitionistically valid since O wins. This does not necessarily mean that the formula is 
invalid as there might be other winning strategies for P. 
Finally we look at a formula which is both classically and intuitionistically valid. A 
dialogue in which P has a winning strategy for the formula Ø(p Ù Øp) is shown in the 
following table. 
O P 
(1) Ø(p Ù Øp) 
(2) p Ù Øp [?1] (3) ?r [?2] 
(4) Øp [!2] (5) ?l [?2] 
(6) p [!2] (7) p [?4] 
(8) O has no move left P wins 
Table 19: Dialogue for Ø(p Ù Øp)
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As every move in the dialogue is compatible with both the classical and the intuitionistic 
rule, P has a winning strategy for Ø(p Ù Øp) in classical and intuitionistic dialogue logic. 
Hence, the formula is classically and intuitionistically valid. 
Dialogue logic has been extended in various directions. Extensions have proven 
particularly fruitful for the modelling of dialogues involving further linguistic elements, 
such as questions, answers, or commands. 224 Dialogue logic has also been applied as a 
constructive proof theory for other logical systems, such as modal logic and 
paraconsistent logic. 225 
7.2  General Characterisation of the Resolution Algorithms 
For a given conflict C, we can generate solutions by making consistent the inconsistent 
sets representing its sub-conflicts. To do this, we first have to transform the sub-conflicts 
into propositional form. The consistent sets we generate represent potential solutions to 
the sub-conflicts which the parties involved can reach. The consistency of the solution 
set guarantees that it is possible to realise all the propositions that are either directly 
contained in the set or follow logically from it. 
Once a solution is generated, we can look at the agents’ original propositional attitudes 
and check which of them are fully satisfied according to the solution, which are partly 
satisfied, and which are not satisfied at all. For instance, if a party a has the goal Ga(p Ù 
q), this goal would be fully satisfied if p and q were in the solution set, it would be 
partially satisfied if only p were contained in the solution set, and it would not be satisfied 
224 (Atkinson et al. 2008; Girle 1996) 
225 (Rueckert and Rahman 1999; Rahman and Carnielli 2000)
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at all if neither p nor q were in the solution set. Obviously, not all of the original 
propositional attitudes making up the conflict can be fully satisfied in a solution as then 
the parties would not have had a conflict in the first place. However, for each party some 
of its propositional attitudes might be fully or partly satisfied. 
A generated solution can be proposed to the agents involved in the conflict. As the 
solution indicates which propositional attitudes need to be abandoned, as well as which 
ones will be partly and fully satisfied, the solution set provides the means of convincing 
the agents to accept the solution by pointing out their potential gains. 
At the core of the process of generating solutions to a given conflict is the task of 
transforming an inconsistent set of propositional formulae into a consistent one. This 
task is accomplished by a number of algorithms which we jointly call Conflict Resolution 
Logic (CRL). Each algorithm of CRL allows us to generate possible solutions to a 
conflict given in propositional form. 
As there are many different ways of making an inconsistent set of formulae consistent, 
we first characterise the resolution algorithms of CRL by a general condition. This 
general characterisation outlines the overall procedure of how consistency is obtained 
and introduces the main concepts of an input set and a solution set. 
The general characterisation of CRL is given as follows. 
Definition 102(General Characterisation of CRL) 
The resolution algorithms of CRL take as an input a finite set Φ of propositional 
formulae and generate as an output a number of finite, consistent, sets Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, 
…, Φ n * such that each Φ i * is obtained from Φ by replacing the formulae φ Î Φ 
by formulae φ* satisfying the three conditions: 
(1) φ ⊢ φ*; 
(2) conf(φ*) ≤ conf(φ); 
(3) pro(φ*) Í pro(Φ); 
until a consistent set of formulae is obtained.
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The general characterisation of CRL specifies that the algorithms of CRL take an 
arbitrary finite set Φ of propositional formulae as an input and output a number of finite 
consistent sets Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, …, Φ n * of propositional formulae. It is not excluded that the 
input set Φ is already consistent. If this is the case, the algorithms just output Φ. The 
process of obtaining the output sets Φ i * involves running through a sequence of steps by 
which a number of formulae contained in the input set Φ are replaced by other formulae. 
The process of replacing a formula φ by φ* is governed by three conditions. First, φ* has 
to be a logical consequence of φ. This makes sure that φ is replaced by a formula which is 
as close as possible at the original formula. Being a logical consequence of φ, φ* 
represents a statement whose truth has already been claimed by φ. Second, the potential 
conflict power of φ* has to be smaller than that of φ. This condition makes sure that the 
set containing the new formula φ* is more likely to be consistent than the set containing 
φ. Indeed, if we did not reduce the potential conflict power of the formulae of Φ, we 
would not make Φ consistent. The third condition, according to which the new formula 
φ* is not allowed to contain propositional constants other than the constants already 
contained in Φ, is required in order to make sure that formulae are not replaced by new 
formulae containing arbitrary new propositions that are irrelevant to the original conflict. 
Before we turn to the details of the five resolution algorithms of CRL in the following 
section, we compare CRL with the AGM model of belief revision and Lorenz’s dialogue 
logic. 
As described in the background section on belief revision, the operation of making an 
inconsistent set consistent is captured by the consolidation operator ! in the AGM model. 
We also showed that ! can only be defined reasonably for belief bases. For a given 
contraction operator ¸, ! is defined as contraction by the falsum ⊥, i.e. if A is a belief
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base, we get A! = A¸⊥. Both ! and the algorithms of CRL require sets of propositional 
formulae as input and outputs consistent sets. With regard to the input, CRL requires a 
finite set of propositional formulae, whereas ! can be applied to any set of propositional 
formulae. With regard to the output, CRL produces a number of consistent solution sets, 
whereas ! produces only one consistent set. 
The main difference between the two approaches lies in the way consistency is achieved. 
In contrast to the AGM model, where sets are made consistent by removing formulae, 
the algorithms of CRL only replace the elements of an inconsistent set by formulae that 
have a lower degree of potential conflict power. Thus, the algorithms of CRL achieve 
consistency with a smaller loss of information compared to the update operator of AGM. 
As a result, the agents holding propositional attitudes towards propositions contained in 
a set are not forced to completely abandon their propositional attitudes once the set is 
made consistent. They only have to weaken some of their attitudes by replacing them 
with attitudes having a lower degree of potential conflict power. 
Although both models are intended to model arguments, CRL has a fundamentally 
different focus than dialogue logic. In order to compare dialogue logic with CRL, we 
interpret dialogues as decision algorithms that take a proponent’s initial thesis as an input 
and come up with an answer to the question of whether or not the initial thesis is a 
theorem of classical/intuitionistic logic. Understood this way, dialogues are decision 
procedures that can be applied to single formulae. In contrast, the algorithms of CRL are 
applied to sets of formulae. 
The main difference between CRL and dialogue logic is that dialogues always have a 
winner and a loser, i.e. the formula is either defended or refuted by the dialogue, whereas 
the solution sets generated by the algorithms of CRL offer gains and losses to all parties
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involved in a conflict. Hence, in CRL there are no winners and losers as in the arguments 
modelled by dialogue logic. 
7.3  The Algorithm Generating Solution Sets 
The general characterisation of CRL given thus far does not define an algorithm as there 
are infinitely many ways to replace the elements of the input set Φ. Thus, we have to 
specify the conditions of the general characterisation of CRL. In particular, we have to 
determine the unique output sets Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, …, Φ n * generated by CRL for a given input 
set Φ. 
The specification of CRL is based on the semantic concept of value assignment 
functions. For a given input set Φ each algorithm of CRL first identifies a set of value 
assignments e 0 , e 1 , … e n Î E Φ . Each of these value assignments e i determines a unique 
consistent solution set Φ i *, which is generated by the algorithms in the second step. 
Finally, the algorithms output all the generated solution sets Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, …, Φ n *. 
The first part of the algorithms, the selection of the value assignments, is carried out 
differently by each of the five algorithms. The second part of the algorithms, the process 
of generating a solution set Φ i * on the basis of the input set Φ and a value assignment e i , 
is identical for all five algorithms of CRL and is carried out by an independent algorithm 
called SOL 226 which is defined as follows. 
Definition 103 (SOL) 
The algorithm SOL takes as an input a finite set Φ of propositional formulae and 
a value assignment e Î E Φ . It runs through the following steps: 
Step 0: Input Φ, e; 
226 The acronym SOL indicates that the algorithm generates solution sets to a given conflict.
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Step 1: Generate the set LIT e = {p | e(p) = 1} È {Øp | e(p) = 0}; 
Step 2: Generate the formula α e = ∧ 
∈ e LIT β 
β; 
Step 3: Generate the set Φ* = {φ Ú α e | φ Î Φ}; 
Step 4: Output Φ*. 
For a given input Φ, e, SOL collects all the propositional constants true under e and the 
negation of all the constants false under e (step 1). This is a finite process as the value 
assignment e is restricted to the finite set of constants occurring in the finite set Φ. Next, 
the algorithm generates the finite conjunction over all these literals and names this 
conjunction α e (step 2). Then, the algorithm generates the set of all disjunctions φ Ú α e 
constituted by a formula φ Î Φ and α e and names this set Φ* (step 3). Finally, the 
algorithm outputs Φ* (step 4). 
Note that due to step 3, every formula contained in Φ* is satisfied by e. Furthermore, if a 
formula φ contained in Φ is already satisfied by e, it remains unchanged, up to logical 
equivalence, in the solution set because φ Ú α e is logically equivalent to φ if α e ⊨ φ. 
In the following we prove that the output set Φ* satisfies the three conditions specified 
in the general characterisation of CRL, i.e. it is finite, consistent, and, for every φ* Î Φ*, 
there is an element φ Î Φ such that φ ⊢ φ*, conf(φ*) < conf(φ), and pro(φ*) Í pro(Φ). 
Theorem 46 (SOL and the General Characterisation of CRL) 
Let Φ be a finite set of propositional formulae and e Î E Φ a value assignment 
restricted to pro(Φ). Then, the output set Φ*, i.e. the result of applying the 
algorithm SOL to Φ and e, is finite and consistent and for every φ* Î Φ* there is 
a φ Î Φ such that φ ⊢ φ*, conf(φ*) < conf(φ), and pro(φ*) Í pro(Φ). 
Proof 
(Finiteness) Φ* is finite as Φ is finite and, by definition of Φ*, for every 
element φ* Î Φ* there is a unique element φ Î Φ such that φ* is of the form φ Ú 
α e . 
(Consistency) By definition of α e e is a model of α e . Hence, by the truth 
condition for Ú, e is a model of any formula of the form φ Ú α e . By definition of
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Φ* every element φ* Î Φ* is of the form φ Ú α e for some φ Î Φ. Hence, e is a 
model of Φ*. Therefore, Φ* is consistent by completeness. 
(φ ⊢ φ*) By definition of Φ* for every element φ* Î Φ* there is an 
element φ Î Φ such that φ* is of the form φ Ú α e . Then, φ ⊢ φ Ú α e , and, hence, φ 
⊢φ*. 
(conf(φ*) < conf(φ)) By definition of Φ* for every element φ* Î Φ* 
there is an element φ Î Φ such that φ* is of the form φ Ú α e . As conf(φ Ú φ e ) < 
conf(φ) we get conf(φ*) < conf(φ). 
(pro(φ*) Í pro(Φ)) By definition of Φ* every element φ* Î Φ* is of the 
form φ Ú α e for some φ Î Φ. By definition of α e we get pro(φ e ) Í pro(Φ) and 
pro(φ) Í pro(Φ) as φ Î Φ. Hence, pro(φ*) = pro(φ Ú α e ) Í pro(α e ) È pro(φ) Í 
pro(Φ). 
QED 
7.4  Algorithms Selecting Value Assignments 
With SOL we have an algorithm which produces a consistent set of formulae Φ* if 
applied to a set of formulae Φ and a value assignment function e. As mentioned above, 
SOL provides the second part of each of the five algorithms CRL-1, CRL-2, CRL-3, 
CRL-4, and CRL-5. 
In the first part of the algorithms, a set E of value assignments is determined on the basis 
of a set of propositional formulae Φ. This process differs for each of the five algorithms. 
Before we describe the algorithms, we reiterate the concept of absolute density of a value 
assignment e with respect to a set of formulae Φ, as introduced in Definition 100. By the 
absolute density d Φ (e) of a value assignment e Î E Φ with respect to the set of formulae 
Φ, we mean the number of formulae of Φ which are false under e, i.e. d Φ (e) = |{φ Î Φ 
| e Ï mod Φ (e)}|.
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7.4.1  The Density Minimising Algorithm 
We now describe the first algorithm CRL-1, called the density minimising algorithm. Its 
formal definition is given as follows. 
Definition 104(CRL-1) 
The algorithm CRL-1 takes a finite set Φ of propositional formulae as input and 
outputs a finite set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *} of finite and consistent sets Φ i *. It runs 
through the following steps: 
Step 0: Input Φ; 
Step 1: Generate the set E Φ ; 
Step 2: Generate the set DEN = {d Φ (e) | e Î E Φ }; 
Step 3: Generate the set E minDen = {e | d Φ (e) =  min(DEN)}; 
Step 4: For each e i Î E minDen , apply SOL to Φ, e i ; 
Step 5: Collect the outputs of step 4 in the set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}; 
Step 6: Output {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}. 
For a given input Φ, CRL-1 first generates the set E Φ of all possible value assignments 
restricted to the constants occurring in Φ (step 1). It then computes, for every value 
assignment e Î E Φ , its absolute density d Φ (e) and collects them in the set DEN (step 2). 
Next, the algorithm identifies those value assignments whose density is minimal, i.e. 
those e Î E Φ for which d Φ (e) = min(DEN) holds, and collects them in the set E minDen 
(step 3). Note that E minDen can contain more than one element as there can be more than 
one value assignment with the same minimal absolute density. Next, the algorithm SOL 
is applied to each e i Î E minDen (step 4). As a result, for each value assignment e i contained 
in E minDen , a corresponding consistent solution set Φ i * is generated. All generated solution 
sets are collected in a set (step 5) which constitutes the output of CRL-1 (step 6). 
Without providing the details, it is assumed that each step of CRL-1 is computable. In 
each step the algorithm only applies simple computable operations to finite sets 
generating further finite sets. Hence, in each step only a finite number of stipulations is 
executed.
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With CRL-1 we have an algorithm which generates a set of consistent sets {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … 
Φ n *} for a given finite set Φ. Each of these sets can be suggested to the parties involved 
in the conflict as a potential solution. We will provide an interpretation of the type of 
solutions generated by CRL-1 in the last chapter. Note that if the input set Φ is already 
consistent, CRL-1 just produces Φ itself as an output. 
7.4.2  The Density Minimising, Δ Preserving Algorithm 
The second algorithm of CRL-2 called density minimising, Δ preserving algorithm is 
defined as follows. 
Definition 105(CRL-2) 
The algorithm CRL-2 takes a finite set Φ of propositional formulae and a 
consistent subset Δ Í Φ as input and outputs a finite set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *} of 
finite and consistent sets Φ i *. It runs through the following steps: 
Step 0: Input Φ, Δ; 
Step 1: Generate the set E Φ ; 
Step 2: Generate the set mod Φ (Δ); 
Step 3: Generate the set DENΔ = {d Φ (e) | e Î mod Φ (Δ)}; 
Step 4: Generate the set E minDenΔ = {e | d Φ (e) =  min(DENΔ)}; 
Step 5: For each e i Î E minDenΔ , apply SOL to Φ, e i ; 
Step 6: Collect the outputs of step 5 in the set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}; 
Step 7: Output {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}. 
The algorithm CRL-2 differs from the other algorithms with respect to the input it 
requires. In addition to the input set Φ, it requires a set Δ of propositional formulae 
which is a consistent subset of Φ. For a given input, CRL-2 generates the set mod Φ (Δ) of 
all values assignments that satisfy the formulae contained in Δ (step 2). It then generates 
the set DENΔ of all absolute densities of these value assignments (step 3). From here it 
continues in a similar way to CRL-1, i.e. it generates the set E minDenΔ of value assignments 
contained in mod Φ (Δ) whose absolute density is minimal in DENΔ (step 4) and produces 
a consistent solution set Φ i * for each e i Î E minDenΔ by virtue of the algorithm SOL.
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We will postpone the interpretation of the additional input Δ, as well as the type of 
solutions generated by CRL-2, to the final chapter. Again, if the input set Φ is already 
consistent, CRL-2 just produces Φ itself as an output. 
7.4.3  The Minimax Algorithm 
The third algorithm, CRL-3, called the minimax algorithm, requires a finite, exhaustive 
collection {Φ i } iÎI of subsets Φ i Í Φ as an input in addition to the set Φ. By exhaustive 
we mean that the union 
I i 
i Φ 
∈
U is equal to Φ, where I can be any finite index set. We call 
elements of {Φ i } iÎI cells. Note that {Φ i } iÎI is not required to be exclusive, i.e. elements 
of Φ can appear in different cells Φ i , Φ j Î {Φ i } iÎI . From now on, we assume that {Φ i } iÎI 
always refers to a finite, exhaustive collection of subsets Φ i Í Φ. 
CRL-3 is defined as follows. 
Definition 106(CRL-3) 
The algorithm CRL-3 takes a finite set Φ of propositional formulae and a finite, 
exhaustive collection {Φ j } jÎI of subsets Φ j Í Φ as input and outputs a finite set 
{Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *} of finite and consistent sets Φ i *. It runs through the 
following steps: 
Step 0: Input Φ, {Φ i } iÎI ; 
Step 1: Generate the set E Φ ; 
Step 2: For every e Î E Φ , generate the set {d Φ i (e) | i Î I}; 
Step 3: For every e Î E Φ , identify max e = max({d Φ i (e) | i Î I}); 
Step 4: Generate the set MAX = {max e | e Î E Φ }; 
Step 5: Generate the set E minMax = {e | d Φ (e) =  min(MAX)}; 
Step 6: For each e i Î E minMax , apply SOL to Φ, e i ; 
Step 7: Collect the outputs of step 6 in the set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}; 
Step 8: Output {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}. 
In contrast to CRL-1, CRL-3 does not generate the absolute densities of value 
assignments with respect to the whole set Φ. Instead, for every value assignment e Î E Φ ,
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it calculates the set of all densities d Φ i (e) with respect to the cells Φ i of {Φ i } iÎI (step 2). It 
then identifies the maxima of these sets and collects them in the set MAX. Finally, it 
proceeds, like the previous algorithms, by generating the set E minMax of value assignments 
whose absolute density is minimal in MAX (step 5) and producing a consistent solution 
set Φ i *, for each e i Î E minMax , by virtue of the algorithm SOL. 
The interpretation of the additional input {Φ i } iÎI , and the type of solutions generated by 
CRL-3, will be given in the final chapter. If the input set Φ is already consistent, CRL-3 
produces Φ itself as an output. 
7.4.4  The Difference Minimising Algorithm 
Similar to CRL-3, the fourth algorithm, CRL-4, called difference minimising algorithm, 
also requires {Φ i } iÎI as an input in addition to Φ. It is defined as follows. 
Definition 107(CRL-4) 
The algorithm CRL-4 takes a finite set Φ of propositional formulae and a finite, 
exhaustive collection {Φ j } jÎI of subsets Φ j Í Φ as input and outputs a finite set 
{Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *} of finite and consistent sets Φ i *. It runs through the 
following steps: 
Step 0: Input Φ, {Φ i } iÎI ; 
Step 1: Generate the set E Φ ; 
Step 2: For every e Î E Φ , generate the set {d Φ i (e) | i Î I}; 
Step 3: For every e Î E Φ , identify max e = max({d Φ i (e) | i Î I}); 
Step 4: For every e Î E Φ , identify min e = min({d Φ i (e) | i Î I}); 
Step 5: Generate the set DIF = {max e - min e | e Î E Φ }; 
Step 6: Generate the set E minDif = {e | max e - min e = min(DIF)}; 
Step 7: For each e i Î E minDif , apply SOL to Φ, e i ; 
Step 8: Collect the outputs of step 7 in the set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}; 
Step 9: Output {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}. 
CRL-4 starts, like CRL-3, by computing, for every value assignment e Î E Φ , the sets of 
absolute densities d Φ i (e) with respect to the cells Φ i of the partition {Φ i } iÎI (step 2). It
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then identifies the maximum max e (step 3) and the minimum min e (step 4) of these sets 
and generates the set DIF of all differences of the form max e - min e (step 5). Next, the 
algorithm generates the set E minDif of all value assignments e for which max e - min e is a 
minimum of DIF (step 6). From then, it proceeds like the other algorithms. 
7.4.5  The Conflict Power Balancing Algorithm 
Finally, we provide a definition for the last of the five algorithms, CRL-5, called conflict 
power balancing algorithm. CRL-5 also requires {Φ i } iÎI as an input in addition to Φ. Its 
formal definition is given as follows. 
Definition 108(CRL-5) 
The algorithm CRL-5 takes a finite set Φ of propositional formulae and a finite, 
exhaustive collection {Φ j } jÎI of subsets Φ j Í Φ as input and outputs a finite set 
{Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *} of finite and consistent sets Φ i *. It runs through the 
following steps: 
Step 0: Input Φ, {Φ i } iÎI ; 
Step 1: Generate the set E Φ ; 
Step 2: Generate the set {conf(φ) | φ Î Φ}; 
Step 3: Generate the set {mod Φ (φ) | φ Î Φ}; 
Step 4: For every e Î E Φ , generate the set Φ e = {φ | e Î mod Φ (φ)} ; 
Step 5: For every e Î E Φ , generate the set { ∑ 
∩ ∈ i e Φ Φ φ 
) φ ( conf | i Î I}; 
Step 6: For every e Î E Φ , identify max e = max({ ∑ 
∩ ∈ i e Φ Φ φ 
) φ ( conf | i Î I}); 
Step 7: For every e Î E Φ , identify min e = min({ ∑ 
∩ ∈ i e Φ Φ φ 
) φ ( conf | i Î I}); 
Step 8: Generate the set DIFCON = {max e - min e | e Î E Φ }; 
Step 9: Generate the set E minDifCon = {e | max e - min e = min(DIFCON)}; 
Step 10: For each e i Î E minDifCon , apply SOL to Φ, e i ; 
Step 11: Collect the outputs of step 10 in the set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}; 
Step 12: Output {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}. 
CRL-5 makes use of the concept of potential conflict power conf. For every cell Φ i of 
{Φ i } iÎI , and every value assignment e Î E Φ , it calculates the sum ∑ 
∩ ∈ i e Φ Φ φ 
) φ ( conf of the 
potential conflict power of formulae which are elements of this cell true under e and
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collects these sums in a set (step 5). The algorithm then continues by identifying the 
maximum max e (step 6) and minimum min e (step 7) of these sets for every e Î E Φ . Next, 
it generates the set DIFCON of differences of the form max e - min e for every e Î E Φ 
(step 8) and identifies the set E minDifCon of value assignments for which max e - min e is 
minimal in DIFCON (step 9). From there, it proceeds in a similar way to the other 
algorithms. 
7.5  Computability and Complexity 
In this section we have a brief look at some computational aspects of the five algorithms 
of CRL. We have described them all in the same way. For a given input, they all run 
through a number of steps and produce a finite set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *} of finite and 
consistent sets Φ i *. They all require a finite set Φ of propositional formulae as an input. 
CRL-2 requires a consistent subset Δ Í Φ as an additional input, whereas CRL-3, CRL-4, 
and CRL-5 require a finite, exhaustive collection, {Φ i } iÎI of subsets Φ j Í Φ as an 
additional input. In all cases, the input consists of a finite string of symbols of the 
language of propositional logic. 
The steps executed by the algorithms represent lists of sub-tasks. Each sub-task is 
achieved by a number of sub-steps. In our description, we have not provided 
descriptions of the sub-steps for the sake of clarity. The sub-tasks represented by the 
steps are simple, in most cases set theoretic, operations on sets. They include tasks like 
generating the set of all value assignments E Φ , generating the set of all absolute densities 
{d Φ (e) | e Î E Φ }, or identifying the minimum of a set. In general, they start with a given 
finite set and generate another finite set.
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As an example, we describe one sub-task in more detail. Step 1 of each algorithm 
represents the sub-task of generating the set of all value assignments E Φ restricted to the 
set of constants occurring in Φ. This task can be performed by the following sub-steps. 
Definition 109(Sub-steps of Step 1) 
Step 1.1: Input Φ; 
Step 1.2: Generate the set pro(Φ); 
Step 1.3: Calculate |pro(Φ)|; 
Step 1.4: Enumerate pro(Φ) = {p i } iÎ{1,…, |pro(Φ)|} ; 
Step 1.5: Generate the Cartesian product {0, 1} |pro(Φ)| ; 
Step 1.6: Enumerate {0, 1} |pro(Φ)| = {e i } iÎ{1, …, 2 |pro(Φ)| } ; 
Step 1.7: Output E Φ = {e i } iÎ{1, …, 2 |pro(Φ)| } . 
The definition illustrates which sub-steps are needed in order to generate E Φ . However, it 
is still not at the most basic level as the sub-steps represent tasks which might not be 
primitive in the implementation language of the algorithm. For instance, the sub-step 1.2, 
generating the set of constants occurring in Φ, consists of further sub-tasks, such as 
scanning the symbols of Φ, deciding whether they are constants or not and collecting the 
constants in a set. The question of which tasks count as primitive and which do not 
depends on the actual implementation language used to program the algorithm. 
For us the crucial facts are the following. 
(1) Each of the five algorithms of CRL is comprised of a finite number of steps. 
(2) Each step can be executed by a finite number of sub-steps. 
(3) Each sub-step is deterministic, i.e. for a given input, each sub-step will always 
produce the same output and will always pass through the same sequence of 
states. 
(4) Each sub-step terminates.
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From this it follows that every step is deterministic and terminates, and, hence, each of 
the five algorithms of CRL is deterministic and terminates. Note that we have assumed 
the four facts without proof. 
Having informally shown that all five versions of CRL are deterministic and terminate, 
we now address the question of the complexity of the five algorithms. All of them follow 
exhaustive strategies, i.e. in each of their steps, they run through the entire problem 
space. For instance, in step 1 each of them generates the whole set of all possible value 
assignments E Φ . Although their exhaustiveness guarantees that they always compute the 
correct solution for any input, it is also the reason for their computational intractability. 
In fact, all five algorithms are intractable in the sense that the amount of time and space 
required to produce an output increases at a faster-than-polynomial rate as the input size 
grows. 
The size of the input can be measured in terms of the number of propositional constants 
occurring in the input set Φ, i.e.|pro(Φ)|. In the first step, each of the algorithms 
requires us to compute the set E Φ , which has the size 2 
|pro(Φ)| . Hence, the number of sub- 
steps it takes to carry out step 1 exceeds 2 |pro(Φ)| and cannot be expressed in terms of a 
polynomial function of |pro(Φ)|. The same is true for other steps. 
For every algorithm of CRL we can express the amount of time required for running it in 
terms of an exponential function 2 f(|pro(Φ)|) , where f(|pro(Φ)|) is a polynomial function of 
the number of variables occurring in Φ. Hence, applying any of the five algorithms to a 
given input constitutes a problem which is at least in the complexity class EXPTIME. 
The fact that CRL is intractable makes the algorithm unsuitable for practical purposes. 
The algorithm is only applicable to inputs of very small sizes as its running time would 
otherwise be too long. However, the purpose of the chapter was to show that it is
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possible in principle to compute potential solutions to a given conflict. This has been 
achieved by specifying the exhaustive algorithms CRL-1 to CRL-5. 
Answering the question of how to design algorithms that can actually perform the tasks 
in polynomial-time, or how to produce close enough approximations to the solutions, 
exceeds the scope of the thesis. 
Example: Second Congo War 
In this section, we examine the goal conflict between the RCD and the Kabila 
government with regard to the integration of combatants of the RCD into the national 
Congolese army and apply each of the five algorithms to it. As a result, we get five sets of 
potential solutions to the conflict. We will evaluate the solutions in the final chapter of 
the thesis. 
The goal conflict is given as follows. 
a1: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) 
a2: Kabila government 
p: The combatants of the RCD are integrated into the Congolese national army. 
q: High ranking officers of the RCD are replaced. 
C = {Ga1p, Ga1Øq, Ga2p, Ga2(p É q)} 
Cg = {p, p, Øq, p É q} 
The Kabila government wants the combatants of the RCD to be integrated into the 
national Congolese army (Ga 1 (p)), but only if they replace their high ranking officers 
(Ga 1 (p É q)). The RCD also wants its combatants to be integrated into the national 
Congolese army (Ga 2 (p)), but it does not want to replace its high ranking officers 
(Ga 1 (Øq)).
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For the algorithm CRL-1, we take the set C g as an input. The following table displays all 
the relevant information required for running the algorithm. 
p 1 1 0 0 
p É q 1 0 1 1 
p 1 1 0 0 
Øq 0 1 0 1 
DEN 1 1 3 2 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 20: Information for CRL-1 
CRL-1 selects the two value assignments, e 1 and e 2 , with minimal density and constructs, 
for each of them, a solution set Φ 1 * and Φ 2 *. The two solution sets can be simplified by 
replacing their elements with logically equivalent, but simpler, formulae, and are then 
given by Φ 1 * = {p, p É q, p, q É p} and Φ 2 * = {p, p É p, p, Øq}, respectively. 
Algorithm: CRL-1 
Input: Cg = {p, p, Øq, p É q} 
Output: Φ1* = {p, p É q, p, q É p} and Φ2* = {p, p É p, p, Øq} 
According to the solutions generated by CRL-1, either the RCD has to give up its claim 
of not replacing its high ranking officers as a consequence of solution Φ 1 *, or the Kabila 
government has to give up its insistence that combatants of the RCD can only be 
integrated into the national Congolese army if the RCD replaces its high ranking officers 
as a consequence of accepting the solution Φ 2 *. 
For the algorithm CRL-2 we need to specify a subset of Δ Í C b such that all elements of 
Δ are contained in the solution set without being changed. For our example we choose Δ 
= {Øq}, i.e. we only look at solutions in which the high ranking officers of the RCD are 
not replaced.
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The relevant information for the algorithm is displayed in the following table. 
p 1 1 0 0 
p É q 1 0 1 1 
p 1 1 0 0 
Δ Øq 0 1 0 1 
DEN 1 1 3 2 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 21: Information for CRL-2 
CRL-2 selects the value assignment e 2 as this is the only value assignment with minimal 
density among the value assignments e 2 and e 4 that make Δ true. Then, the algorithm 
constructs a solution set Φ 1 * based on e 2 . The solution set is logically equivalent to the 
set Φ 2 * = {p, p É p, p, Øq}. 
Algorithm: CRL-2 
Input: Cg = {p, p, Øq, p É q}, Δ = {Øq } 
Output: Φ1* = {p, p É q, p, q É p} and Φ2* = {p, p É p, p, Øq} 
According the solution generated by CRL-2, the Kabila government has to give up its 
claim that the combatants of the RCD can only be integrated into the national Congolese 
army if the RCD replaces its high ranking officers. 
For the remaining three algorithms, we additionally need a finite, exhaustive collection of 
subsets of C g which reflects the origin of the claims, i.e. a distinction between claims 
made by the RCD and claims made by the Kabila government. The collection is given as 
follows: C g 1 = {p, p É q} and C g 2 = {p, Øq}. 
We deal with the two algorithms CRL-3 and CRL-4 simultaneously. The following table 
displays all the information needed for running CRL-3 and CRL-4.
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p 1 1 0 0 
Cg 1 
p É q 1 0 1 1 
p 1 1 0 0 
Cg 2 
Øq 0 1 0 1 
denc g1 (e) 0 1 1 1 
denc g2 (e) 1 0 2 1 
MAX 1 1 2 1 
DIF 1 1 1 0 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 22: Information for CRL-3 and CRL-4 
The algorithm CRL-3 minimises MAX by selecting the value assignments e 1 , e 2 and e 4 
and constructing solution sets based on these value assignments that are logically 
equivalent with the sets Φ 1 * = {p, p É q, p, q É p}, Φ 2 * = {p, p É p, p, Øq}, and Φ 4 * = 
{q É p, p É q, q É p, Øq}. 
Algorithm: CRL-3 
Input: Cg = {p, p, Øq, p É q}, {Cg 1 = {p, p É q} Cg 2 = {p, Øq}} 
Output: Φ1* = {p, p É q, p, q É p}, Φ2* = {p, p É p, p, Øq} and Φ4* = {q É p, p É q, 
q É p, Øq} 
According to the first solution generated by CRL-3, the RCD has to give up its goal not 
to replace its high ranking officers. According to the second solution, the Kabila 
government has to give up its claim that the combatants of the RCD can only be 
integrated into the national Congolese army if the RCD replaces its high ranking officers. 
According to the third solution, both parties have to give up their goal of integrating the 
combatants of the RCD into the national Congolese army. 
CRL-4 minimises DIF by selecting the value assignment e 4 and constructing a solution 
set based on e 4 that is logically equivalent with the sets Φ 4 * = {q É p, p É q, q É p, Øq}.
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Algorithm: CRL-4 
Input: Cg = {p, p, Øq, p É q}, {Cg 1 = {p, p É q} Cg 2 = {p, Øq}} 
Output: Φ4* = {q É p, p É q, q É p, Øq} 
The solution suggests that both parties should give up their goal of integrating the 
combatants of the RCD into the national Congolese army. 
Finally, we provide a table containing the relevant information for running CRL-5. 
p 1 1 0 0 
Cg 1 
p É q 1 0 1 1 
p 1 1 0 0 
Cg 2 
Øq 0 1 0 1 
∑ ∩ 
∈ Φ 
1 
E e 
e g ) C C ( conf .75 .5 .25 .25 
∑ ∩ 
∈ Φ 
2 
E e 
e g ) C C ( conf .5 1 0 .5 
DIFCON .25 .5 .25 .25 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 23: Information for CRL-5 
The algorithm CRL-5 minimises DIFCON by selecting the value assignments e 1 , e 3 and 
e 4 and constructing corresponding solution sets. The solution sets are logically equivalent 
to the sets Φ 1 * = {p, p É q, p, q É p}, Φ 3 * = {p Ú q, p É q, q É p, Øq} and Φ 4 * = {q É 
p, p É q, q É p, Øq}. 
Algorithm: CRL-4-SOL 
Input: Cg = {p, p, Øq, p É q}, {Cg 1 = {p, p É q} Cg 2 = {p, Øq}} 
Output: Φ1* = {p, p É q, p, q É p}, Φ3* = {p Ú q, p É q, q É p, Øq} and Φ4* = {q É 
p, p É q, q É p, Øq}. 
According to the first solution generated by CRL-5, the RCD has to give up its goal not 
to replace its high ranking officers. The second solution suggests that both parties should
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give up their goal of integrating the combatants of the RCD into the national Congolese 
army and the RCD should give up its goal of not replacing its high ranking officers. If 
the third solution were accepted, both parties would have to give up the goal of 
integrating the combatants of the RCD into the national Congolese army. 
In conclusion, we list again the input and output for the five algorithms if applied to the 
goal conflict between the RCD and the Kabila government. 
Input Algorithm Output 
Cg = {p, p É q, p, Øq} CRL-1 
Φ1* = {p, p É q, p, q É p} 
Φ2* = {p, p É p, p, Øq} 
Cg = {p, p É q, p, Øq} 
Δ = {Øq} 
CRL-2 Φ2* = {p, p É p, p, Øq} 
Cg = {p, p É q, p, Øq} 
Cg 1 = {p, p É q} 
Cg 2 = {p, Øq} 
CRL-3 
Φ1* = {p, p É q, p, q É p} 
Φ2* = {p, p É p, p, Øq} 
Φ4* = {q É p, p É q, q É p, Øq}. 
Cg = {p, p É q, p, Øq} 
Cg 1 = {p, p É q} 
Cg 2 = {p, Øq} 
CRL-4 Φ4* = {q É p, p É q, q É p, Øq}. 
Cg = {p, p É q, p, Øq} 
Cg 1 = {p, p É q} 
Cg 2 = {p, Øq} 
CRL-5 
Φ1* = {p, p É q, p, q É p} 
Φ3* = {p Ú q, p É q, q É p, Øq} 
Φ4* = {q É p, p É q, q É p, Øq}. 
Table 24: Input and Output of the Five Algorithms 
7.6  Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to specify five algorithms of CRL which generate potential 
solution sets to conflicts previously modelled by CML. This has been achieved to the 
extent that we have provided definitions for the five algorithms CRL-1, CRL-2, CRL-3, 
CRL-4, and CRL-5, and have shown how each of them computes a set of consistent sets 
to a given input set of propositional formulae. The consistent sets computed by the 
algorithms can be suggested to the conflicting parties as possible ways to resolve their
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conflict. Each of the five algorithms has been designed according to a particular principle 
which is realised in the type of solutions generated by the algorithm. 
It has been informally shown that the algorithms are all computable, i.e. that they halt 
after a finite number of steps for any given input. Furthermore, we have shown that the 
algorithms are intractable and are at least in the complexity class EXPTIME. 
Having defined resolution algorithms, we can now generate possible solutions to 
conflicts expressed in terms of consistent sets of propositional formulae. This gives us a 
constructive tool to address the question of how to solve conflicts. Computing solutions 
to a conflict constitutes the sixth step in the process of modelling and resolving a 
conflict. 
In the following chapter, we will interpret the types of solutions generated by the five 
algorithms and show how they provide minimally invasive solutions, compromises, or 
legal solutions to a conflict.
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CHAPTER 8 
Evaluating Solutions 
The Resolution Principles of Conflict Resolution Logic 
8.1  Introduction 
The aim of chapter 8 is to interpret the solutions generated by the five algorithms of 
CRL. As each of the five algorithms realises a different principle when generating a 
solution set to a given conflict, the solution sets satisfy different conditions of conflict 
resolution. Some of the solutions have the property of requiring only a minimal amount 
of change from the conflicting parties. Other solutions are guaranteed to be compatible 
with certain legal or moral norms, or provide compromise solutions. 
As a result of the chapter we will be able to give answers to the following questions. 
· How can minimally invasive solutions to a conflict be generated and how do they 
minimise collective and individual change, respectively? 
· How can solutions satisfying certain, specified, legal norms be generated? 
· How can compromise solutions be generated and how do they balance individual 
change and individual non-change?
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· How can potential solutions to sub-conflicts of the Second Congo War be 
evaluated? 
An outline of the chapter is as follows: In section 8.2 we show why solutions generated 
by the two algorithms CRL-1 and CRL-3 are minimally invasive solutions. In particular, 
we explain how solutions generated by the first algorithm minimise collective change 
(8.2.1), and solutions generated by the second algorithm minimise individual change 
(8.2.2). In section 8.3, we look at the type of solutions generated by CRL-2 and show 
how they are guaranteed to be compatible with norms contained in the set Δ. In section 
8.4, we analyse the solutions generated by the two algorithms CRL-4 and CRL-5, both of 
which produce compromise solutions. First, we look at the type of compromises 
generated by CRL-4 (8.4.1), and then at those generated by CRL-5 (8.4.2). Finally, we 
evaluate the solutions generated for the sub-conflicts of the Second Congo War. 
8.2  Minimally Invasive Solutions 
Solutions produced by the algorithms CRL-1 and CRL-3 can be characterised as 
minimally invasive solutions. We first look at the type of solutions generated by CRL-1 
and then at those generated by CRL-3. 
8.2.1  Solutions Minimising Collective Change 
CRL-1 takes as an input a finite set Φ of propositional formulae and outputs a set {Φ 1 *, 
Φ 2 *, … Φ n *} of consistent sets Φ i *. In the case of CRL-1, each Φ i * has the property of 
being as close as possible at the original set Φ, i.e. any other consistent set obtained from 
Φ by replacing its elements by formulae with a lower degree of potential conflict power
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has less elements in common with Φ than Φ i *. As formulae express the content of 
propositional attitudes held by the agents, the overall number of propositional attitudes 
that need to be changed if a set generated by CRL-1 is taken as a solution to a conflict is 
minimal. In other words: proposing a solution generated by CRL-1 to the parties 
involved in a conflict requires them to change their propositional attitudes only as much 
as absolutely necessary. Thus, we call solutions generated by CRL-1 minimally invasive 
solutions. 
The algorithm produces this kind of solution because it selects value assignments with 
minimal density and then alters just those formulae of Φ which are not satisfied by the 
selected value assignments. If a value assignment has minimal density with respect to a 
set Φ, it satisfies a maximal number of elements of Φ because the density of e is defined 
as the number of formulae not satisfied by e. 
To illustrate the property of minimal invasiveness of the solutions generated by the 
algorithm CRL-1, we look at the set Φ = {p Ú q, p, q, p Ù Øq}. The following truth table 
for Φ also shows the absolute densities of the four possible value assignments e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , 
and e 4 with respect to Φ. 
p Ú q 1 1 1 0 
p 1 1 0 0 
q 1 0 1 0 
p Ù Øq 0 1 0 0 
DEN 1 1 2 4 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 25: Solutions of CRL-1 
CRL-1 picks the two value assignments with minimal density, e 1 and e 2 , and generates the 
two corresponding solutions Φ 1 * = {p Ú q Ú (p Ù q), p Ú (p Ù q), q Ú (p Ù q), (p Ù Øq) Ú
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(p Ù q)} and Φ 2 * = {p Ú q Ú (p Ù Øq) , p Ú (p Ù Øq), q Ú (p Ù Øq), (p Ù Øq) Ú (p Ù 
Øq)}. Simplifying the formulae by replacing them with simpler formulae that are logically 
equivalent gives us the sets Φ 1 * = {p Ú q, p, q, p} and Φ 2 * = {p Ú q, p Ú q, q, p Ù Øq}. 
Both Φ 1 * and Φ 2 * are consistent. In Φ 1 *, only the formula p Ù Øq has been replaced by 
the weaker formula p, whereas in Φ 2 *, the formula q has been replaced by the weaker 
formula p Ú q. Note, that the density den Φ (e 1 ) = den Φ (e 2 ) = 1 is equal to the degree of 
inconsistency of Φ, inc-1(Φ). 
Any solution based on other value assignments than e 1 and e 2 results in a higher number 
of formulae required to be changed. For instance, the solution based on e 3 , {p Ú q, p Ú q, 
q, p ≡ Øq}, contains two formulae different from the formulae contained in Φ. Solutions 
based on e 4 require three formulae to be changed. 
The example shows that solutions generated by the algorithm CRL-1 require as little 
overall change as possible. However, these kinds of solutions do not take into account 
which of the parties is required to change its propositional attitudes. Although it is 
guaranteed that only a minimal number of the original claims must be changed, the 
required changes might be distributed unequally among the parties. For instance, one 
party might be required to change all its propositional attitudes, whereas another party 
might not be required to change any of its attitudes. This deficiency is accommodated for 
in solutions generated by CRL-3. 
With respect to the AGM model, solutions generated by the algorithm CRL-1 are closely 
related, though not equivalent, to the result of applying an update consolidation operator 
! based on a maxichoice contraction operator ¸ to a belief base A.
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8.2.2  Solutions Minimising Individual Change 
CRL-3 takes as input not only the set Φ, but also a finite, exhaustive collection {Φ i } iÎI of 
subsets Φ i Í Φ. {Φ i } iÎI contains information about the origins of the propositional 
attitudes whose contents are collected in Φ. Each cell Φ i represents the content of the 
propositional attitudes held by exactly one agent a i . For instance, the collection {Φ 1 = 
{p}, Φ 2 = {q}, Φ 3 = {p Ù Øq}} represents a situation in which an agent a 1 has a 
propositional attitude towards p, an agent a 2 has a propositional attitude towards q, and 
an agent a 3 has an attitude towards p Ù Øq. 
Solutions generated by CRL-3 can be characterised as minimally invasive for individuals. 
They have the property that the number of propositional attitudes required to be 
changed by any individual agent involved in the conflict is kept to a minimum. In any set 
which is not a solution generated by CRL-3, there is an agent who has to change more 
propositional attitudes than the agent who has to change the most attitudes according to 
any solution generated by CRL-3. 
This can be illustrated by looking at the set Φ = {Øp Ú Øq, Øp, Øp ≡ q, Øp Ú q, q, p Ù 
q, p Ú Øq, p, p Ù Øq} and the collection {Φ 1 = {Øp Ú Øq, Øp, Øp ≡ q}, Φ 2 = {Øp Ú q, 
q, p Ù q }, Φ 3 = {p Ú Øq, p, p Ù Øq}}. The truth table of this set is expressed by the 
table below. The table also shows the individual densities for each of the three agents, 
d Φ 1 (e), d Φ 2 (e) and d Φ 3 (e), the densities with respect to the whole set Φ, d Φ (e), and the set 
MAX of maxima of the set {d Φ 1 (e), d Φ 2 (e), d Φ 3 (e)}.
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Øp Ú Øq 0 1 1 1 
Øp 0 0 1 1 Φ1 
Øp ≡ q 0 1 1 0 
Øp Ú q 1 0 1 1 
q 1 0 1 0 Φ2 
p Ù q 1 0 0 0 
p Ú Øq 1 1 0 1 
p 1 1 0 0 Φ3 
p Ù Øq 0 1 0 0 
dΦ 1 (e) 3 1 0 1 
dΦ 2 (e) 0 3 1 2 
dΦ 3 (e) 1 0 3 2 
dΦ(e) 4 4 4 5 
MAX 3 3 3 2 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 26: Solutions of CRL-3 
The algorithm first calculates the densities d Φ 1 (e), d Φ 2 (e), and d Φ 3 (e), and then identifies 
the respective maxima of the three densities. The maxima are displayed in the row MAX. 
The algorithm then chooses the minimum of MAX, e 4 , and generates a solution set based 
on e 4 that is logically equivalent to the simplified set Φ* = {Øp Ú Øq, Øp, Øp Ú Øq, Øp 
Ú q, Øp Ú q, p ≡ q, p Ú Øq, p Ú Øq, Øq}. 
The solution generated by CRL-3 requires the agent a 1 to replace his attitude towards Øp 
≡ q by weakening its content to Øp Ú Øq, and it requires the agents a 2 and a 3 to change 
two of their attitudes each. The required changes for a 2 consist of replacing the formula q 
by Øp Ú q and the formula p Ù q by p ≡ q. a 3 has to replace p with p Ú Øq and p Ù Øq 
by Øq. Altogether, the maximum number of attitudes that any of the three agents need 
to change, according to the solution Φ*, is two.
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Solutions constructed on the basis of e 1 , e 2 , or e 3 require at least one of the agents to 
change all three of his propositional attitudes. For instance, in the solution based on e 1 , 
the agent a 1 has to change all of his three attitudes, whereas the agent a 2 is not required to 
change any of his attitudes. 
If the simpler algorithm CRL-1 were applied to Φ, it would pick the three value 
assignments e 1 , e 2 and e 3 and generate solutions based on these value assignments as the 
overall density of Φ is minimal in each of them. 
8.3  Legal Solutions 
Solutions generated by the algorithm CRL-2 can be interpreted as solutions that are 
compatible with certain, pre-defined, moral or legal norms. The norms, which are 
represented by a set Δ of propositional formulae, can be moral principles, such as 
principles of justice, non-violence, no-harm etc., or legal principles, such as certain legal 
conventions, human rights declarations, civil rights, elements of the international 
humanitarian law, etc. The solutions generated by CRL-2 are guaranteed to be 
compatible with all the previously designated norms contained in Δ. 
In principle, we can include in Δ any proposition p for which we want to be guaranteed 
that it is represented in the solution set of a conflict. Apart from norms, we might also 
want to include certain facts or trivially true beliefs in Δ in order to avoid solutions which 
contradict obvious facts or trivially true beliefs shared by all parties. However, in the 
following, we focus on legal or moral norms. 
If a formula φ is contained in Δ, it is assumed that it ought to be the case that φ, i.e. that 
we are obliged to restrict our solutions to only those solutions in which the truth of φ is
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not contested. As a minimal condition, Δ itself must be consistent. Otherwise, we would 
be forced to automatically violate at least some of the norms contained in Δ. 
Furthermore, Δ is assumed to be a subset of Φ, so it is finite as Φ is finite. 
The algorithm CRL-2 takes a finite consistent set Φ of propositional formulae together 
with a consistent subset Δ Í Φ of norms as an input. It then computes a set {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, 
… Φ n *} of consistent sets Φ i * such that Δ is  contained in all of the solution sets Φ i *, i.e. 
Δ Í Φ i * for all Φ i * Î {Φ 1 *, Φ 2 *, … Φ n *}. 
CRL-2 systematically looks at only those value assignments which satisfy Δ, and then 
proceeds according to the density minimising principle of the algorithm CRL-1. The 
following example illustrates how the algorithm works and shows that the solutions 
generated by it all satisfy the norms contained in Δ. We provide the truth table for the set 
Φ = {p ≡ q, q, Øp Ù q, Øq, p Ú Øq}, including the rows representing the formulae 
contained in the set of norms Δ = {Øq, p Ú Øq}. 
p ≡ q 1 0 0 1 
q 1 0 1 0 
Øp Ù q 0 0 1 0 
Øq 0 1 0 1 
Δ 
p Ú Øq 1 1 0 1 
DEN 2 3 3 2 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 27: Solutions of CRL-2 
As the table shows, only the value assignments e 2 and e 4 satisfy the formulae contained in 
Δ. These are picked by the algorithm first. Their respective densities are then compared 
and the one with the lower density, e 4 , is chosen. The corresponding solution set,
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generated by CRL-2 is the set Φ* = {p ≡ q, q Ú Øp, Øp, Øq, p Ú Øq } which contains as 
a subset the norms expressed in Δ. 
Note that the algorithm CRL-1 would have produced two solution sets based on the 
value assignments e 1 and e 4 , but one of the solutions would not have been compatible 
with the norms contained in Δ. 
With respect to the AGM model, the algorithm CRL-2 is closely related to the operation 
of screened revision. The set Δ of pre-defined norms directly corresponds to the set X of 
potential core beliefs, which is also guaranteed to be part of the revised set K#p of 
screened revision. Moreover, the consistency condition applies to both Δ and X. 
8.4  Compromises 
The two algorithms CRL-4 and CRL-5 both generate solutions to a conflict which can be 
interpreted as compromise solutions. CRL-4 produces compromises in the sense that the 
difference between the number of satisfied claims for the agent with the highest number 
of satisfied claims and the number of satisfied claims for the agent with the lowest 
number of satisfied claims is kept minimal. In other words: the number of satisfied 
claims for each agent is as equal as possible. CRL-5 produces more sophisticated 
compromises than CRL-4. Here, not only is the number of satisfied claims for each agent 
taken into account, but the sum of the potential conflict powers of these claims is also 
factored in. CRL-5 can, therefore, be regarded as a weighted version of CRL-4. 
Both algorithms take a set Φ of propositional formulae and a finite, exhaustive collection 
{Φ i } iÎI of subsets Φ i Í Φ. {Φ i } iÎI as input. As in the case of CRL-3, the collection
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reflects the different propositional attitudes held by the various agents involved in the 
conflict. A cell Φ i contains the content of the propositional attitudes held by the agent a i . 
We first describe and illustrate the type of solutions generated by CRL-4, and then we 
characterise the second compromise algorithm CRL-5. 
8.4.1  Solutions Equalling Individual Change 
Solutions generated by CRL-4 have the property that every agent involved in the conflict 
has approximately the same number of propositional attitudes represented in the 
solution. The number of satisfied propositional attitudes for the agent with the maximal 
amount of satisfied attitudes is as close as possible to the number of satisfied 
propositional attitudes for the agent with the minimal number of satisfied attitudes. This 
makes sure that the solution is fair to the extent that no agent is forced to give up 
significantly more propositional attitudes than the other agents. 
The algorithm, and the type of solutions it generates, can be illustrated by looking at the 
set Φ = {Øp Ú q, Øp ≡ q, Øp Ú Øq,  p ≡ q, p Ú Øq, Øp, Øq} and the collection {Φ 1 = 
{Øp Ú q, Øp ≡ q, Øp Ú Øq}, Φ 2 = {p ≡ q, p Ú Øq, Øp, Øq }}. The truth table is shown 
below. The table also shows the densities d Φ 1 (e) and d Φ 2 (e) as well as the differences 
between the maximal density and the minimal density for every e Î E Φ .
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Øp Ú q 1 0 1 1 
Øp ≡ q 0 1 1 0 Φ1 
Øp Ú Øq 0 1 1 1 
p ≡ q 1 0 0 1 
p Ú Øq 1 1 0 1 
Øp 0 0 1 1 
Φ2 
Øq 0 1 0 1 
dΦ 1 (e) 2 1 0 1 
dΦ 2 (e) 2 2 3 0 
DIF 0 1 3 1 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 28: Solutions of CRL-4 
CRL-4 first computes the densities with respect to the two sets Φ 1 and Φ 2 . Then, it 
identifies the maximum and minimum of these densities. As there are only the two cells, 
Φ 1 and Φ 2 , in the example, the row DIF just displays the differences between d Φ 1 (e) and 
d Φ 2 (e) for every e Î E Φ . The algorithm then picks the value assignment with the smallest 
difference, which is e 1 in the example, and generates a solution set based on e 1 . The 
solution set is logically equivalent to the simpler set Φ* = {p Ú q, p Ú Øp, Øp Ú q, p Ú 
Øq}, which is satisfied by e 1 . According to the solution set, each of the two agents has to 
change two of his original propositional attitudes. The agent a 1 has to replace his 
attitudes towards Øp ≡ q and Øp Ú Øq by attitudes towards p Ú q and p Ú Øp. In the 
second case he has to completely abandon his original attitude as he is required to replace 
it by a tautological attitude. The agent a 2 is required to replace his attitudes towards Øp 
and Øq by attitudes towards Øp Ú q and p Ú Øq. 
The example shows that e 1 is the only value assignment which forces the two agents to 
change an equal amount of attitudes. In a solution based on e 2 , for example, a 1 has to 
change only one attitude, whereas a 2 has to change two attitudes. Hence, the solution
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generated by CRL-4 constitutes a situation in which every party has to compromise to 
the same extent, and, therefore, represents a compromise solution. Note that the solution 
generated by CRL-4 is actually maximally invasive as the overall amount of changes is 
lower in each of the other solutions. However, it is the solution which distributes the 
amount of change most equally among the agents. 
8.4.2  Solutions Equalling Individual Non­Change 
Now we turn to the algorithm CRL-5. Before we illustrate it with an example, we 
describe a deficiency of the algorithm CRL-4 which will be dealt with by CRL-5. 
In the solution proposed by CRL-4, a 1 does not have to change his attitude towards Øp 
Ú q and a 2 is not required to change his attitudes towards the propositions p ≡ q and p Ú 
Øq. This can be regarded as unfair. Especially, when it is taken into account that the 
claim expressed by the formula Øp Ú q is much weaker than the claim expressed by the 
two formulae p ≡ q and p Ú Øq, and, hence, a 2 is able to satisfy much stronger claims 
than a 1 according to the solution generated by CRL-4. The strength of a claim can be 
measured by its potential conflict power. It is immediately obvious that a 1 can satisfy 
weaker claims than a 2 when we look at the potential conflict power of the formulae 
involved: conf(Øp Ú q) = .25 < conf(p ≡ q) + conf(p Ú Øq) = .5 + .25 = .75. 
Solutions generated by CRL-5 represent compromises in which the strength of the claims 
satisfied by each individual party is as equal as possible. This can be realised by keeping 
the difference between the strength of the satisfied claims for the party with the strongest 
satisfied claims and the strength of the satisfied claims for the party with the weakest 
satisfied claims minimal.
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As the strength of a party’s claims can be measured by the sum of the potential conflict 
powers of the claims, the algorithm first calculates the conflict powers of the formulae 
that are satisfied by a certain value assignment e. It calculates this sum for each party and 
each e Î E Φ individually. Then, it proceeds in a similar fashion to the algorithm CRL-4, 
i.e. it builds the differences between the maximum and the minimum of the sums and 
identifies the value assignment with the minimal difference. 
Applying CRL-5 to the input set Φ = {Øp Ú q, Øp ≡ q, Øp Ú Øq,  p ≡ q, p Ú Øq, Øp, 
Øq} and the collection {Φ 1 = {Øp Ú q, Øp ≡ q, Øp Ú Øq}, Φ 2 = {p ≡ q, p Ú Øq, Øp, 
Øq }} gives us the following truth table. The table also displays the sums ∑ 
1 e Φ ∩ Φ ∈ φ 
) φ ( conf 
and ∑ 
∩ ∈ 2 e Φ Φ φ 
) φ ( conf , where Φ e is the set of formulae contained in Φ which are satisfied by e. 
Øp Ú q 1 0 1 1 
Øp ≡ q 0 1 1 0 Φ1 
Øp Ú Øq 0 1 1 1 
p ≡ q 1 0 0 1 
p Ú Øq 1 1 0 1 
Øp 0 0 1 1 
Φ2 
Øq 0 1 0 1 
∑ 
∩ ∈ 1 e Φ Φ φ 
) φ ( conf .5 .75 1 .5 
∑ 
∩ ∈ 2 e Φ Φ φ 
) φ ( conf .75 .75 .5 1.75 
Max - Min .25 0 .5 1.25 
EΦ 
e1 
p=1 q=1 
e2 
p=1 q=0 
e3 
p=0 q=1 
e4 
p=0 q=0 
Table 29: Solutions of CRL-5 
The solution generated by CRL-5 on the basis of the value assignment function e 2 is a set 
which is logically equivalent to the simpler set Φ* = {Øp Ú p, Øp ≡ q, Øp Ú Øq, p Ú Øq, 
p Ú Øq, Øp Ú Øq, Øq}.
Chapter 8   Evaluating Solutions 
312 
If the solution generated by CRL-5 were accepted by the two agents a 1 and a 2 , a 1 would 
have to replace his attitude towards Øp Ú q by an attitude towards Øp Ú p whereas a 2 
would have to replace his attitudes towards p ≡ q and Øp by attitudes towards p Ú Øq 
and Øp Ú Øq. At the same time, a 1 would be able to maintain without change claims with 
a combined potential conflict power of .75, i.e. the two propositional attitudes towards 
Øp ≡ q and Øp Ú Øq, whereas a 2 would be able to maintain the two attitudes towards p 
Ú Øq and Øq with a combined potential conflict value also of .75. Hence, the strength of 
the claims that can be satisfied without change is equal for the two parties. 
In conclusion, we can observe that both CRL-4 and CRL-5 generate compromise 
solutions. CRL-4 focuses on equality regarding the number of changes necessary to be 
made by the agents involved in the conflict, whereas CRL-5 makes sure that equality is 
guaranteed with respect to the strength of the claims that do not require change by the 
agents. 
Example: Second Congo War 
In this section we evaluate the solutions generated by the five algorithms for the goal 
conflict between the RCD and the Kabila government. For each of the solutions, we give 
a justification of why it is a good solution. In conclusion, we make some comments 
about the solutions in general and how they can be seen as a step towards finding a 
sustainable solution to a conflict like the Second Congo War as a whole. 
The justification for choosing a solution generated by CRL-1 is its closeness to the 
original conflict. As a consequence, the agents have to change their attitudes only to a 
minimal extent. The solution Φ 1 * = {p, p É q, p, q É p}, for instance, only requires the
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RCD to abandon its goal not to replace its high ranking officers. This is the only change 
required according to the solution. In any other solution, except the two generated by 
CRL-1, more changes are required, i.e. both the RCD and the Kabila government have to 
change their goals. 
The motivation for choosing the solution Φ 2 * = {p, p É p, p, Øq}, generated by CRL-2, 
is that it is the closest solution to the original conflict which also guarantees that the high 
ranking officers of the RCD are not required to be replaced. In any other solution in 
which the high ranking officers of the RCD are not required to be replaced, more than 
one change is required, whereas Φ 2 * only requires the Kabila government to abandon its 
claim regarding the condition for the combatants of the RCD to be integrated into the 
national Congolese army. In the example, we chose Δ = {Øq} arbitrarily. A possible 
justification for that choice could be that dismissing high ranking officers of the RCD is 
considered morally wrong as they have achievements equal to those of the officers in the 
national Congolese army and should, therefore, be treated equally. There might also be 
legal reasons why the officers of the RCD cannot be dismissed. Obviously, other moral 
claims, even the opposite claim that they should be dismissed, might be justifiable. This 
would alter the set Δ and, hence, the solutions generated by CRL-2. 
Solutions generated by CRL-3 have the property that the individual change required from 
each agent is kept minimal. For instance, according to the solution Φ 1 * = {p, p É q, p, q 
É p}, the maximal amount of claim changes required from either of the two agents is 
one. The solution only requires the agent RCD to give up its goal of not having to 
replace its high ranking officers. In contrast, according to the solution Φ 3 * = {p Ú q, p É 
q, q É p, Øq} the agent RCD has to abandon both of its claims.
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The justification for the solution Φ 4 * = {q É p, p É q, q É p, Øq}, generated by CRL-4, 
can be described as follows: If Φ 4 * were accepted by the RCD and the Kabila 
government as a solution to their conflict, each of the two agents would have to give up 
one of their two goals and could realise the other one. Both the RCD and the Kabila 
government would have to abandon the goal of integrating the combatants of the RCD 
into the national Congolese army. However, the Kabila government could realise its goal 
of having combatants of the RCD integrated into the national Congolese army only if the 
RCD replaces its high ranking officers, and the RCD would not have to replace its high 
ranking officers. Thus, the solution Φ 4 * represents a fair solution as each party would 
have to give up, and could realise, the same amount of goals. 
Solutions generated by CRL-5 are good because they realise another principle of justice. 
Here, the RCD and the Kabila government can realise goals of similar strength. For 
instance, in the solution Φ 3 * = {p Ú q, p É q, q É p, Øq}, the Kabila government can 
realise only the weak goal according to which combatants of the RCD are only integrated 
into the national Congolese army if the RCD replaces its high ranking officers. This goal 
has a potential conflict power of .25. The RCD cannot realise any of its goals. In other 
words, both parties are strongly encouraged to abandon their goals. Similar justifications 
can be given for the other solutions generated by CRL-5. 
Altogether, the solutions generated by the five algorithms seem trivial. Either they 
suggest obvious solutions, like the RCD having to give up its goal of not having to 
replace its high ranking officers (Φ 1 *) or the Kabila government having to give up its 
condition for integrating the combatants of the RCD into the national Congolese army 
(Φ 2 *), or they seem counterintuitive as in the case of Φ 3 *, where the parties are required 
to abandon the goal of integrating the RCD combatants into the national Congolese 
army, even though this is a goal shared by both parties.
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The reason for the triviality of the solutions generated by the algorithms is the small size 
of the input set. In small conflicts that do not include many elements (goals, beliefs, 
norms, etc.) there are not many potential solutions available, and those that are available 
seem trivial. However, if the number of conflict elements increases, the number of 
possible solutions increases too. This opens the door for a large number of bargaining 
situations in which the different goals, beliefs, norms, etc. can be traded with each other. 
For these kinds of conflicts, the algorithms of CRL can produce various package 
solutions which satisfy the underlying principle of the respective algorithm. 
If we compare the solutions generated for the small goal conflict, we observe that some 
solutions are picked by more algorithms than others. For instance, the solution Φ 3 * is 
picked only once. This can be interpreted as a hint that Φ 3 * is not an appropriate 
solution to the conflict. Indeed, Φ 3 * seems also to be the intuitively least convincing 
solution. We also observe that the solutions Φ 1 * and Φ 2 * are picked more frequently by 
the algorithms CRL-1, CRL-2, and CRL-3, whereas the solutions Φ 3 * and Φ 4 * are picked 
more frequently by CRL-4 and CRL-5. This can be explained by the fact that the former 
three algorithms focus on minimising change, whereas the latter two focus on principles 
of justice. 
8.5  Summary 
The aim of chapter 8 was to provide an interpretation of the solutions generated by the 
five algorithms of CRL. This has been achieved to the extent that we have explained why 
solutions generated by the algorithms CRL-1 and CRL-3 can be regarded as minimally 
invasive solutions, solutions generated by CRL-2 as legal solutions, and solutions 
generated by CRL-4 and CRL-5 as compromise solutions. We have illustrated each type
Chapter 8   Evaluating Solutions 
316 
of solution by looking at the solution sets generated by each of the five algorithms when 
applied to an inconsistent set of propositional formulae. 
Having provided an interpretation for the types of solutions, we are now in the position 
of being able to assess the solutions that we have generated to a conflict and choose the 
solution which best fits the situation. Furthermore, we can look at solutions that have 
worked for previous conflicts and identify their type. Interpreting the solutions for a 
conflict can be seen as the last step in the process of modelling and resolving a conflict.
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, we critically assess the work presented in this thesis by providing answers 
to the following questions. 
· What has been achieved in the thesis? 
· What are the main results of the thesis? 
· How can the theoretical framework, developed in this thesis, be used in practice? 
· What questions have been raised in the thesis that would be interesting for 
further investigations? 
The aim of the thesis was to show how formal logic can be applied to the issues of 
conflict modelling and conflict resolution. After reviewing current theories of conflict 
(chapter 1), we developed the syntax (chapter 2), semantics (chapter 3), and axiomatics 
(chapter 4) of the logical system CML which is intended to model conflicts by combining 
ideas from classical propositional and first-order logic, alethic modal logic, branching- 
time temporal logic, and a number of propositional attitude operators. We have 
demonstrated how the different components and concepts of CML can be applied to real
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conflicts by reconstructing aspects of the Second Congo War within the framework of 
CML. 
We have established a classification scheme based on CML in order to identify the 
specific types of sub-conflicts constituting a conflict (chapter 5) and we have introduced 
two numeric measures for assessing the role conflict elements play within a conflict, as 
well as the depth of conflicts in terms of how easy it is to resolve them (chapter 6). In the 
last two chapters we have developed CRL, a set of five algorithms that generates 
potential solutions to conflicts previously modelled by CML. We have stated the specific 
steps through which the algorithms run (chapter 7) and explored the type of solutions 
generated by each of the algorithms (chapter 8). 
As the main theoretical result of the thesis, we have proven a completeness theorem for 
the logical system CML. Other theoretical results of the thesis include the definition of 
the potential conflict power of propositional formulae and the associated equivalence 
theorem for the semantic and syntactic versions of it, the definition of the degree of 
inconsistency of sets of propositional formulae, and the definition of the algorithms 
transforming inconsistent sets of propositional formulae into consistent sets by reducing 
the potential conflict power of their elements. 
A peculiarity of the semantics of the temporal fragment of CML is the property that 
states and time points are represented by two different semantic entities. In contrast to 
most branching-time temporal logics, in which states and time points are the same entity, 
in t-CML we can differentiate between the different modal states a conflict can possibly 
be in at a single time point. 
We now turn to the question of how the theoretical framework of CML and CRL can be 
used in practice. In general, conflict scholars who are inclined to systematic research can
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use CML to represent particular conflict cases in a unified and systematic way that 
straightforwardly displays the logical structure of the case. CRL can be used to generate 
solutions to a conflict which can then serve as a source of inspiration for resolving the 
conflict. Solutions generated by CRL can, obviously, not completely solve a conflict. 
However, they can be used as a starting point for finding a sustainable solution accepted 
by all parties. The advantage of solutions generated by CRL is that the parties are forced 
to make their beliefs, goals, norms, and emotions explicit. The solutions generated by 
CRL only reflect what has been fed as an input to the algorithms. The explicit character 
of the approach, combined with the feature that the type of solution, i.e. minimal 
invasive solutions, legal solutions, or compromise solutions, can be chosen by choosing 
the respective algorithm, provides a high degree of controllability. Conflict scholars 
working with the framework can control the whole process of modelling a conflict case, 
generating solutions to it, and evaluating the solutions. As a consequence, they can ‘play 
around’ with the model, i.e. they can generate different types of solutions, they can 
observe how different representations of a conflict produce different solutions as an 
output, and they can weigh the different aspects of a conflict by altering the input. 
The model can either be used descriptively or prescriptively. In its descriptive use, 
conflict scholars can describe conflicts with CML and classify them according to the 
classification scheme. Furthermore, they can generate solutions and compare these 
generated solutions with the actual solutions that were realised in the conflict. In its 
prescriptive use, conflict scholars can use the generated solutions as an inspiration for 
solving the conflict. They can suggest the solutions to the parties and explain why they 
are good solutions, i.e. they can explain what each party gains from the solution and what 
each party has to give up. Choosing a certain type of solution makes sure that the 
underlying principle of the respective algorithm is realised.
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Practitioners can use the model as a fact-finding tool. They can collect data about a 
conflict, either in co-operation with the parties or through independent observation, 
using the framework of CML. CML provides a guideline to the question of which data 
are of interest and how the data can be represented in an efficient way. 
Although our logic-based model as a whole, in addition to particular components of it, 
provides a number of different possible uses for conflict scholars and practitioners, we 
will summarise the way it can be used to model and resolve conflicts by going through a 
list of steps that establish a systematic method of modelling and resolving a conflict on 
the basis of CML and CRL. In the steps we assume that a particular conflict is to be 
modelled and resolved. 
Step 1: Collect data about the conflict. In particular data concerning the issues the 
conflict is about, the agents involved in the conflict, as well as their beliefs, goals, 
norms, and emotions. 
Step 2: Track the temporal occurrence of the collected data, in particular the 
dates at which the agents’ beliefs, goals, norms, and emotions appear. 
Step 3: Describe the conflict in the language of CML by translating the collected 
data into CML-formulae using the syntax of CML. 
Step 4: Identify subsets of the set of all formulae that represents the conflict and 
check their consistency/satisfiability using the axiomatics/semantics of CML. 
Step 5: Identify inconsistent/unsatisfiable subsets of the set of formulae that 
represents the conflict and classify the sub-conflicts that they represent using the 
classification scheme of CML.
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Step 6: Transform the identified sub-conflicts into propositional form. 
Step 7: Assess the claims made in the sub-conflicts with respect to their potential 
conflict power and the depth of the sub-conflicts with respect to their degree of 
inconsistency. 227 
Step 8: Generate potential solutions to the identified sub-conflicts by using their 
propositional form as an input to the five algorithms of CRL. 
Step 9: Assess the type of the solutions to the sub-conflicts generated by the five 
algorithms of CRL. 
Step 10: Identify, for each solution and each party, the set of claims the party is 
required to change, and the set of claims the party can directly realise, according 
to the solution. 
Step 11: Suggest the solution to the parties and point out what each party gains 
and loses in terms of claims that require change and claims that do not. 
Finally, we look at some areas that were examined in the thesis but have the potential for 
further investigation. We identify six such areas of further investigation. Four of the areas 
are of theoretical nature, i.e. they are of interest from a logical perspective rather than the 
perspective of a user of the model. 
First, the branching-time framework of the temporal fragment of CML provides an 
interesting basis for further research as it combines, in a unique way, the Rt-approach of 
Rescher’s temporal systems with the semantics of typical branching-time temporal logics, 
227 Step 7 is optional in the sense that it is not necessarily required for the generation of solutions to a 
conflict.
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such as CTL. As a consequence, the system has a syntactical representation for specific 
time points and its axiomatisation contains a complete description of the forwards- 
branching, backwards-linear, tree structures that constitute its semantics. Further 
questions include the relationship of the system to other temporal logics and also to 
logics such as hybrid logic and first-order modal logic, or the potential of the system to 
incorporate STIT theory and thereby constitute a system for a temporal modal logic of 
agency. 
A further theoretical question to elaborate concerns the relationship between the notion 
of degrees of inconsistency and paraconsistency. As a consequence of having a measure 
for the inconsistency of sets of formulae, the class of inconsistent sets can be ordered 
into classes of equally inconsistent sets. This ordering of inconsistency parallels the view 
in paraconsistent logic according to which not every inconsistent set of formulae is 
trivial, i.e. there are degrees of inconsistency such that some inconsistent sets are trivial, 
whereas others are not. 
The third theoretical question that might be interesting for further exploration concerns 
the relationship between the algorithm for making an inconsistent set consistent, as 
presented in the thesis, and other algorithms that perform this task, in particular the 
algorithms used in the AGM model for the consolidation operator. The method applied 
in our algorithm differs from established algorithms as it just replaces formulae from the 
inconsistent set by weaker formulae, instead of completely removing them. It can be 
argued that the result of our algorithm is, therefore, closer to the original set than the 
results produced by the updating operator of the AGM model. 
The fourth theoretical concern about our model deals with the relationship between the 
informational input, the description of a conflict in terms of CML-formulae, and the
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informational output, the solutions generated by the algorithms of CRL. Obviously, the 
output depends on the input, i.e. the types of solutions we can generate for a particular 
conflict with our model depend on how we describe the conflict in the first place. 
Although this dependency is not surprising, it might lead to controversial results. In 
particular, it might be interesting to address the question of monotonicity with regard to 
the informational input and output of our model. As a whole, our model is non- 
monotone in that input given in addition to an already provided conflict description 
influences the solutions generated by the model. Thus, it might be worthwhile to 
standardise the way conflicts are to be described by CML. 
From a practical point of view, we could use our logic-based model to design a database 
for conflicts that contains not only structural information of conflicts, such as the time 
they break out/end, the number of casualties, or the agents involved in them, but also 
information about their content, i.e. information about the beliefs, goals, norms, and 
emotions that constitute them and the logical relationships between those elements. In a 
further project we could link this CML-based database to already existing conflict 
databases 228 , such as COW 229 , COSIMO 230 , UCDP 231 , etc. Once a database has been 
created, we can collect data about conflicts, store it in the database, and use it to simulate 
conflict resolutions by applying the algorithms of CRL to selected data of the database. 
228 For a guide to conflict data and conflict datasets, see (Eck 2005). 
229 The Correlates of War project (COW), which originated in the University of Michigan is the largest 
databank on wars available covering wars between 1816 and 1997. See (Bremer and Cusack 1995). 
230 COSIMO is the databank used by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research in which 
the institute records information on political conflicts from 1945 onward. See (Pfetsch and Rohloff 2000). 
231 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program run by the University of Uppsala has collected data on minor 
armed conflicts, intermediate armed conflicts, and wars covering the years from 1946 onwards. See 
(Harbom and Wallensteen 2007).
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This brings us to the last area of further investigation of implementing the algorithms. As 
presented here, the five algorithms of CRL are intractable. We could make them 
workable by finding tractable algorithms for their sub-tasks and then programming them.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AJZEN, I. & FISHBEIN, M. (1980) Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall. 
ALCHOURRÓN, C., GÄRDENFORS, P. & MAKINSON, D. (1985) On the Logic of 
Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions. The Journal of 
Symbolic Logic, 50, 510-530. 
ALKER, H. R., GURR, T. R. & RUPESINGHE, K. (2001) Journeys Through Conflict: 
Narratives and Lessons, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
ALLAIS, M. (1953) Le Comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et 
axiomes de l'école américaine, Chicago, The University of Chicago. 
ALLPORT, G. W. (1935) Attitudes. IN ALLPORT, G. W. (Ed.) Handbook of social 
psychology. Worcester, Mass, Clark University Press. 
ÅQVIST, L. (2005) Combinations of Tense and Deontic Modality: On the Rt approach 
to temporal logic with historical necessity and conditional obligation. Journal of 
Applied Logic, 3, 421-460. 
ARNOLD, M. B. & GASSON, J. A. (1954) The Human Person: An Approach to an Integral 
Theory of Personality, New York, Ronald Press Co. 
ASCH, S. E. (1951) Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of 
Judgements. IN GUETZKOW, H. (Ed.) Groups, Leaderships, and Men. Research in 
Human Relations. Pittsburgh, Carnegie Press. 
ATKINSON, K., GIRLE, R., MCBURNEY, P. & PARSONS, S. (2008) Command 
Dialogues. IN RAHWAN, I. & MORAITIS, P. (Eds.) Fifth International Workshop 
on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems (ArgMAS 2008). Estoril, Portugal. 
AXELROD, R. M. (1984) The evolution of cooperation, New York, Basic Books. 
BAEURLE, R. & CRESSWELL, M. (1989) Propositional Attitudes. IN GABBAY, D. 
M. (Ed.) Handbook of philosophical logic. Dordrecht, Kluwer. 
BANDURA, A. (1978) Social learning theory of aggression. The Journal of communication, 
28, 12-29. 
BANDURA, A., ROSS, D. & ROSS, S. (1961) Transmission of Aggression through 
Imitation of Aggression Models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575- 
582. 
BAROS, W. & JAEGER, S. (2004) Eskalationsdynamik und Konfliktbearbeitung. IN 
SOMMER, G. & FUCHS, A. (Eds.) Krieg und Frieden: Handbuch der Konflikt-und 
Friedenspsychologie. Weinheim, Beltz.
Bibliography 
326 
BARTH, E. M. & KRABBE, E. C. W. (1982) From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of 
logics and argumentation, Berlin, New York, de Gruyter. 
BELNAP, N. (1991) Backwards and forwards in the modal logic of agency. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 51, 777-807. 
BELNAP, N. D., PERLOFF, M. & XU, M. (2001) Facing the future: agents and choices in our 
indeterminist world, Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press. 
BERCOVITCH, J. (1984) Social conflicts and third parties: strategies of conflict resolution, 
Boulder, Colo, Westview Press. 
BERKOWITZ, L. (1962) Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis, New York, McGraw- 
Hill Education. 
BOCHMAN, A. (2001) A logical theory of nonmonotonic inference and belief change, Berlin; New 
York, Springer. 
BONACKER, T. & IMBUSCH, P. (1999) Zentrale Begriffe der Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung: Konflikt, Gewalt, Krieg, Frieden. IN IMBUSCH, P. & 
ZOLL, R. (Eds.) Friedens- und Konfliktforschung: Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden 
Opladen, Leske & Budrich. 
BRAHM, E. (2003) Conflict Stages. Boulder, Beyond intractability. 
BREMER, S. A. & CUSACK, T. R. (1995) The process of war: advancing the scientific study of 
war, New York, Gordon and Breach. 
BREWER, M. B. & CAMPBELL, D. T. (1976) Ethnocentrism and intergroup attitudes: East 
African evidence, Beverly Hills; New York, Sage Publications; Distributed by 
Halsted Press. 
BROWN, M. E., LYNN-JONES, S. M. & MILLER, S. E. (1996) Debating the democratic 
peace, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
BURGESS, J. (1984) Basic Tense Logic. IN D. GABBAY, F. G. (Ed.) In Handbook of 
Philosophical Logic Dordrecht, Kluwer. 
BURGESS, J. P. (1980) Decidability for branching time. Studia Logica, 39, 203-218. 
BURTON, J. W. (1993) Conflict resolution as a political system, Fairfax, VA, George Mason 
University, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. 
BURTON, J. W. (1996) Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes, Lanham, MD, 
Scarecrow Press. 
CAPORAEL, L. R., DAWES, R. M., ORBELL, J. M. & VAN DE KRAGT, A. J. (1989) 
Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 12, 683-739.
Bibliography 
327 
CHELLAS, B. F. (1969) The Logical Form of Imperatives, Stanford, Dept. of Philosophy, 
Stanford University. 
CLARK, J. F. (2002) The African stakes of the Congo War, New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
CLARKE, E. M. & EMERSON, E. A. (1981) Synthesis of synchronization skeletons for 
branching time temporal logic. Lecture Notes In Computer Science, 131, 52-71. 
COCCHIARELLA, N. B. (1966) Tense and Modal Logic: a Study in the Topology of 
Temporal Reference. Unpublished Dissertation, UCLA. 
COGHLAN, B., BRENNAN, R., NGOY, P. & DOFARA, D. (2006) Mortality in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: a nationwide survey. The Lancet, 367, 44-51. 
COSER, L. A. (1957) Social conflict and the theory of social change. British Journal of 
Sociology, 8, 197-207. 
DAWES, R. M. (1980) Social Dilemmas. Annual Reviews in Psychology, 31, 169-193. 
DEUTSCH, M. (1973) The Resolution of Conflict: constructive and destructive processes, New 
Haven, Conn, Yale University Press. 
DEUTSCH, M. (1991) Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social 
and Cultural Influences. IN VAYRYNEN, R. (Ed.) New Direction in Conflict Theory: 
Conflict Resolution and Transformation. Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications. 
DEUTSCH, M., COLEMAN, P. T. & MARCUS, E. C. (2006) The handbook of conflict 
resolution theory and practice, San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass. 
DICTIONARY, A. H. (2000) The American Heritage dictionary of the English language, 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin. 
DIEHL, M. (1990) The Minimal Group Paradigm: Theoretical Explanations and 
Empirical Findings. European Review of Social Psychology, 1, 263-292. 
DOLLARD, J. (1964) Frustration and aggression, New Haven, Yale University Press. 
DOYLE, M. (1983) Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Parts I and II. Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 12, 205-235. 
EAGLY, A. H. & CHAIKEN, S. (1993) The psychology of attitudes, Fort Worth, TX, 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers. 
EBBINGHAUS, H.-D., FLUM, J. R. & THOMAS, W. (1994) Mathematical logic, New 
York, Springer-Verlag. 
ECK, K. (2005) A beginner's guide to conflict data. Finding the right dataset. IN UCDP 
(Ed.) UCDP Papers No 1., Uppsala Conflic Data Program. 
EMERSON, E. A. & HALPERN, J. Y. (1982) Decision procedures and expressiveness 
in the temporal logic of branching time. ACM New York, NY.
Bibliography 
328 
EMERSON, E. A. & SISTLA, A. P. (1985) Deciding Full Branching Time Logic. Austin, 
University of Texas 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, I. (2002) Britannica concise encyclopedia, Chicago, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
FDLR (2008) Homepage of the Force Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda. Force 
Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda. 
FELSCHER, W. (1985) Dialogues, strategies, and intuitionistic provability. Annals of pure 
and applied logic 28, 217-254. 
FESTINGER, L. (1957) A theory of cognitive dissonance, Evanston, Ill., Row Peterson. 
FISHBEIN, M. & AJZEN, I. (1975) Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: an introduction to 
theory and research, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
FOLGER, J. P., POOLE, M. S. & STUTMAN, R. K. (1993) Working through conflict: 
strategies for relationships, groups, and organizations, New York, HarperCollins College 
Publishers. 
FREGE, G. (1892(1980)) On Sense and Reference, Oxford, England, Blackwell. 
FUCHS, A. & SOMMER, G. (2004) Krieg und Frieden, Weinheim-Basel-Berlin, Beltz. 
FUHRMANN, A. (1997) An essay on contraction, Stanford, Calif, CSLI Publications; 
FoLLI, European Association for Logic, Language, and Information. 
FUKUYAMA, F. (1992) The end of history and the last man, New York; Toronto; New York, 
Free Press ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International. 
GALTUNG, J. (1990) Violence and Peace, Oxford, Pergamon Press. 
GÄRDENFORS, P. (1988) Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, 
Boston, Mass, MIT Press. 
GÄRDENFORS, P. & MAKINSON, D. (1988) Revisions of Knowledge Systems Using 
Epistemic Entrenchment. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc. San Francisco, CA, 
USA. 
GIRLE, R. (1996) Commands in dialogue logic. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Practical 
Reasoning, 1085, 246-260. 
GOLDBLATT, R. (1992) Logics of time and computation, Stanford, CA, Center for the Study 
of Language and Information. 
GOLDSTONE, J. (2001) Toward a fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory. IN 
POLSBY, N. W. (Ed.) Annual review of political science. Volume 4, 2001. Palo Alto, 
CA, Annual Reviews.
Bibliography 
329 
GORANKO, V. & ZANARDO, A. (2004) Combining linear orders with modalities for 
possible histories. Proceedings of CombLog’04 
GUREVICH, Y. & SAHARON, S. (1985) The Decision Problem for Branching Time 
Logic. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50, 668-681. 
HANSSON, S. O. (1991) Belief base dynamics, Uppsala, Sweden, Uppsala University. 
HANSSON, S. O. (1999a) A Survey of non-Prioritized Belief Revision. Erkenntnis, 50, 
413-427. 
HANSSON, S. O. (1999b) A textbook of belief dynamics: theory change and database updating, 
Dordrecht; Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
HANSSON, S. O. (2005) Decision Theory. 
HANSSON, S. O. (2006) Logic of Belief Revision. IN ZALTA, E. (Ed.), Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
HARBOM, L. & WALLENSTEEN, P. (2007) Armed Conflict, 1989-2006. Journal of 
Peace Research, 44, 623-634. 
HARDIN, G. J. (1969) The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-48. 
HEIDER, F. (1958) The psychology of interpersonal relations, New York, Wiley. 
HERZ, J. H. (1950) Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 2, 
157-180. 
HIIK (1998) Konfliktbarometer 1998: Krisen, Kriege, Putsche, Verhandlungen, 
Vermittlung, Friedensschluesse. Heidelberg, Heidelberg Institute on International 
Conflict Research. 
HIIK (1999) Konfliktbarometer 1999: Krisen, Kriege, Putsche, Verhandlungen, 
Vermittlung, Friedensschluesse. Heidelberg, Heidelberg Institute on International 
Conflict Research. 
HIIK (2000) Konfliktbarometer 2000: Krisen, Kriege, Putsche, Verhandlungen, 
Vermittlung, Friedensschluesse. Heidelberg, Heidelberg Institute on International 
Conflict Research. 
HIIK (2001) Konfliktbarometer 2001: Krisen, Kriege, Putsche, Verhandlungen, 
Vermittlung, Friedensschluesse. Heidelberg, Heidelberg Institute on International 
Conflict Research. 
HIIK (2002) Conflict Barometer 2002: Crises, Wars, Coup d'Etat, Negotiations, 
Mediations, Peace Settlements. Heidelberg, Heidelberg Intitute on International 
Conflict Research.
Bibliography 
330 
HIIK (2003) Conflict Barometer 2003: Crises, Wars, Coup d'Etat, Negotiations, 
Mediations, Peace Settlements. Heidelberg, Heidelberg Institute on International 
Conflict Research. 
HINTIKKA, J. (1973) Logic, language-games and information: Kantian themes in the philosophy of 
logic, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
HINTIKKA, J. & SANDU, G. (1997) Game-theoretical semantics. IN BENTHEM, J. 
V. & MEULEN, A. T. (Eds.) Handbook of logic and language. Amsterdam; New 
York; Cambridge, Mass., Elsevier; MIT Press. 
HOBBES, T. (1651(2003)) Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, Bristol, Thoemmes. 
HODKINSON, I. & REYNOLDS, M. (2007) Temporal Logic. IN BLACKBURN, P., 
VAN BENTHEM, J. & WOLTER, F. (Eds.) Handbook of Modal Logic. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
HOGG, M. A. & VAUGHAN, G. M. (2002) Social psychology, Harlow, England; New 
York, Prentice Hall. 
HUGHES, G. E. & CRESSWELL, M. J. (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic, 
London, Routledge. 
ICG (2003a) CrisisWatch: DR Congo. Bruxelles, International Crisis Group. 
ICG (2003b) The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict. Africa Report 
N°56 Bruxelles, International Crisis Group. 
ICG (2005) The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for All. Africa Briefing 
N°25. Bruxelles, International Crisis Group. 
ICG (2008a) Conflict history: DR Congo. Bruxelles, International Crisis Group. 
ICG (2008b) Conflict in Congo. Bruxelles, International Crisis Group. 
KAMP, H. (1971) To the memory of Arthur Prior Formal properties of'now'. Theoria, 37, 
227-273. 
KAMP, J. A. W. (1968) Tense Logic and the Theory of Order. Los Angeles, UCLA. 
KANT, I. (1795(2005)) Perpetual peace, New York, Cosimo. 
KAUFMAN, S. J. (2001) Modern hatreds: the symbolic politics of ethnic war, Ithaca, N.Y., 
Cornell University Press. 
KEOHANE, R. O. (1984) After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton Univ. Press. 
KINDT, W. (1972) Eine abstrakte Theorie von Dialogspielen. Mathematisches Institut 
Universitaet Freiburg. Freiburg, Universitaet Freiburg.
Bibliography 
331 
KNIGHT, J. & SENED, I. (1998) Explaining social institutions, Michigan, University of 
Michigan Press. 
KOWALSKI, R. (2003) A logic-based approach to conflict resolution. 
KRABBE, E. C. W. (1982) Studies in dialogical logic. Groningen, Rijksuniversiteit 
Groningen. 
KRIESBERG, L. (1982) Social conflicts, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall. 
KRIPKE, S. (1963) Semantical considerations on modal logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 
16, 83-94. 
KROEGER, F. & MERZ, S. (2008) Temporal logic and state systems, Berlin, Springer. 
LAZARUS, R. S. & LAZARUS, B. N. (1994) Passion and reason: making sense of our emotions, 
New York, Oxofrd University Press. 
LEVI, I. (1991) The fixation of belief and its undoing, Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge 
University Pr. 
LORENZ, K. (1961) Arithmetik und Logik als Spiele. Kiel. 
LORENZ, K. (1968) Dialogspiele als Semantische Grundlage von Logikkalkülen. Archive 
for Mathematical Logic, 11, 73-100. 
LORENZ, K. (1971) On aggression, New York, Bantam Books. 
LORENZEN, P. (1969) Normative logic and ethics, Mannheim; Zürich, Bibliographisches 
Institut. 
LORENZEN, P. & LORENZ, K. (1978) Dialogische Logik, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft. 
LUCE, R. D. & RAIFFA, H. (1957) Games and decisions ; introduction and critical survey, New 
York, Wiley. 
MADDEN, T. J., ELLEN, P. S. & AJZEN, I. (1992) A comparison of the theory of 
planned behavior and the theory of reasoned action. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 18, 3-9. 
MAGSAM, D. (2005) Rwanda and the Kivu Conflict. From Dealing With The Past To 
Future Cooperation. Berlin. 
MAKINSON, D. (1997) Screened Revision. Theoria, 63, 14-23. 
MARES, E. D. (2002) A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision. Erkenntnis (1975-), 56, 
229-246. 
MARKER, D. (2002) Model Theory: An Introduction, New York, Springer.
Bibliography 
332 
MCARTHUR, R. P. (1976) Tense logic, Dordrecht, Holland; Boston, D. Reidel Pub. Co. 
MCTAGGART, J. E. (1908) The Unreality of Time. Mind, 17, 457-474. 
MEARSHEIMER, J. J. (2001) The tragedy of Great Power politics, New York, Norton. 
MENDELSON, E. (2004) Introducing game theory and its applications, Boca Raton, Chapman 
& Hall/CRC. 
MILINSKI, M. (1987) TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation. 
Nature, 325, 433-435. 
MILL, J. S. (1859(1975)) On liberty, New York, Norton. 
MINGST, K. A. & KARNS, M. P. (1995) The United Nations in the post-cold war era, 
Boulder, CO, Westview Press. 
MONUC (2008) Democratic Republic of the Congo - MONUC - Facts and Figures. 
Mission d'ONU en RD Congo. 
MORGENTHAU, H. J. (1967) Politics among nations; the struggle for power and peace, New 
York, Knopf. 
MOSS, L. S. & TIEDE, H. J. (2006) Applications of Modal Logic in Linguistics. IN 
BLACKBURN, P., VAN BENTHEM, J. & WOLTER, F. (Eds.) Handbook of 
Modal Logic. Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
MUELLER, J. E. (1989) Retreat from doomsday: the obsolescence of major war, New York, Basic 
Books. 
MYERSON, R. B. (1991) Game theory: analysis of conflict, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press. 
NASH, J. F. (1950) Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36, 48-9. 
NAUR, P. & BACKUS, J. W. (1964) Revised report on the algorithmic language ALGOL 60, 
Copenhagen, Regnecentralen. 
NICHOLSON, M. (1992) Rationality and the analysis of international conflict, Cambridge; New 
York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press. 
NUCHELMANS, G. (1973) Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the 
Bearers of Truth and Falsity, Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
OATLEY, K. & JENKINS, J. M. (1996) Understanding Emotions, Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishers. 
OHRSTROM, P. & HASLE, P. F. V. (1995) Temporal logic: from ancient ideas to artificial 
intelligence, Dordrecht, Kluwer.
Bibliography 
333 
ORDESHOOK, P. C. (1986) Game theory and political theory: an introduction, Cambridge; 
New York, Cambridge University Press. 
OWEN, J. M. (1994) How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. International Security, 
19, 87-125. 
PFETSCH, F. R. & ROHLOFF, C. (2000) KOSIMO: A Databank on Political Conflict. 
Journal of Peace Research, 37, 379-389. 
PRIOR, A. N. (1967) Past, Present and Future, Oxford, Clarendon Publ. 
PRUITT, D. G. & RUBIN, J. Z. (1986) Social Conflict: Escalation, Impasse, and Resolution, 
Reding, MA, Addision-Wesley. 
RAHMAN, S. & CARNIELLI, W. A. (2000) The Dialogical Approach to 
Paraconsistency. Synthese, 125, 201-232. 
RAPOPORT, A. (1960) Fights, games, and debates, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press. 
RESCHER, N. (1966) On the Logic of Chronological Propositions. Mind, 75, 75-96. 
RESCHER, N. & URQUHART, A. (1971) Temporal Logic, New York, Berlin, Springer- 
Verlag. 
REYNOLDS, M. (2001) An Axiomatization of Full Computation Tree Logic. The Journal 
of Symbolic Logic, 66, 1011-1057. 
RICHARDSON, L. F. (1960) Statistics of deadly quarrels, Pittsburgh, Boxwood Press. 
RICHARDSON, L. F., RASHEVSKY, N. & TRUCCO, E. (1960) Arms and Insecurity: A 
Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War, Pacific Grove, CA, Boxwood 
Press. 
ROGET, P. M. (1996) Roget's II: the new thesaurus, New York, Berkley Books. 
ROSE, G. (1998) Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics, 51, 
144-172. 
ROSENSTEIN, J. G. (1982) Recursive linear orderings. Orders: description and roles, 99, 
465–475. 
ROSS, D. (2006) Game Theory. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
ROTT, H. (2001) Change, choice and inference: a study of belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning, 
Oxford; New York, Clarendon ; Oxford University Press. 
RUECKERT, H. & RAHMAN, S. (1999) Dialogische Modallogik (fuer T, B, S4 und S5) 
Logique et Analyse, 42, 243-282.
Bibliography 
334 
SALMON, N. U. & SOAMES, S. (1988) Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
SATO, K. (1988) Trust and group size in a social dilemma. Japanese Psychological Research, 
30, 88–93. 
SCHELLENBERG, J. A. (1996) Conflict resolution: theory, research, and practice, Albany, NY, 
State University of New York Press. 
SELIGMAN, M. E. P. (1975) Helplessness: on depression, development, and death, San 
Francisco; New York, W.H. Freeman ; Trade distributor, Scribner. 
SHALIT, B. (1988) The psychology of conflict and combat, New York, Praeger. 
SHERIF, M., HARVEY, O., WHITE, B., HOOD, R. & SHERIF, C. (1961) Intergroup 
Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment, Norman, University Book 
Exchange. 
SHERIF, M. & SHERIF, C. (1953) Groups in harmony and tension, New York, Harper & 
Row 
SIMMEL, G. (1955) Conflict, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press. 
SIMONOV, P. V. (1986) The Emotional Brain: Physiology, Neuroanatomy, Psychology, and 
Emotion, New York, Plenum Pub Corp. 
SIMPSON, J. A. & WEINER, E. S. C. (2004) The Oxford English dictionary, Oxford; 
Oxford, Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press. 
STELZNER, W. (1984) Epistemische Logik: zur logischen Analyse von Akzeptationsformen, 
Berlin, Akad.-Verl. 
STRAFFIN, P. D. (1993) Game theory and strategy, Washington, Mathematical Association 
of America. 
TAJFEL, H., BILLIG, M. G., BUNDY, R. P. & FLAMENT, C. (1971) Social 
categorization and intergroup behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149- 
178. 
TAJFEL, H. & TURNER, J. C. (1979) An Integrative Theory of Social Conflict, Monterrey, 
Brooks/Cole. 
TAJFEL, H. & TURNER, J. C. (1986) The social identity theory of intergroup relations, 
Monterrey, Brooks/Cole. 
TANAKA, K. (2005) The AGM Theory and Inconsistent Belief Change. Logique et 
analyse., 48, 113. 
TAYLOR, A. D. (1995) Mathematics and politics: strategy, voting, power and proof, New York, 
Springer-Verlag.
Bibliography 
335 
TENNANT, N. (2005) Contracting Intuitionistic Theories. Studia Logica, 80, 369-391. 
THOMASON, R. H. (1984) Combinations of Tense and Modality. Handbook of 
Philosophical Logic, 2, 135–165. 
THUCYDIDES (BC431(1972)) History of the Peloponnesian War, Harmondsworth, 
Baltimore, Penguin Books. 
THURSTONE, L. L. & CHAVE, E. J. (1929) The measurement of attitude; a psychophysical 
method and some experiments with a scale for measuring attitude toward the church, Chicago, 
Ill., The University of Chicago Press. 
TILLETT, G. (1999) Resolving conflict: a practical approach, South Melbourne, Oxford 
University Press. 
UNSC (1999) Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. UN Security Council. 
VAN CREVELD, M. (1991) The transformation of war, New York; Toronto; New York, 
Free Press ; Collier Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International. 
VAN KNIPPENBERG, A. & ELLEMERS, N. (1993) Strategies in intergroup relations, 
Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books. 
VENEMA, Y. & MUIDERGRACHT, P. (2001) Temporal Logic. IN GOBLE, L. (Ed.) 
The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. 
VON NEUMANN, J. & MORGENSTERN, O. (1953) Theory of games and economic 
behavior, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
WALDMANN, P. (2003) Civil Wars. IN HEITMEYER, W. & HAGAN, J. (Eds.) 
International handbook of violence research. Dordrecht; Boston, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
WALT, S. M. (2005) Taming American power: the global response to U.S. primacy, New York, 
Norton. 
WALTZ, K. N. (1979) Theory of international politics, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley. 
WILLIAMS, M.-A. (1994) On the logic of theory base change. Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science: Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Berlin, Springer. 
WILLIAMS, M.-A. & ROTT, H. (2001) Frontiers in belief revision, Dordrecht; Boston, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
WILSON, W. (1918) Fourteen-Points Speech. IN WIKIMEDIA (Ed.) Wikisource. 
ZANARDO, A. (1990) Axiomatization of ‘Peircean’ branching-time logic. Studia Logica, 
49, 183-195. 
ZANARDO, A. (1996) Branching-Time Logic with Quantification over Branches: The 
Point of View of Modal Logic. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 61, 1-39.
